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The purpose of this study is to investigate how cyberterrorists create networks in 
order to engage in malicious activities against the Internet and computers. The purpose of 
the study is also to understand how computer security labs (i.e., in universities) and 
various agencies (that is, law enforcement agencies such as police departments and the 
FBI) create joint networks in their fight against cyberterrorists. This idea of analyzing the 
social networks of two opposing sides rests on the premise that it takes networks to fight 
networks. The ultimate goal is to show that, because of the postmodern nature of the 
Internet, the fight between networks of cyberterrorists and networks of computer security 
experts (and law enforcement officials) is a postmodern fight. Two theories are used in 
this study: social network theory and game theory. 
This study employed qualitative methodology and data were collected via in-
depth conversational (face-to-face) interviewing. Twenty-seven computer security 
experts and law enforcement officials were interviewed. Overall, this study found that 
cyberterrorists tend not to work alone. Rather, they team up with others through social 
networks. It was also found that it takes networks to fight networks. As such, it is 
necessary for experts and officials to combine efforts, through networking, in order to 
combat, let alone understand, cyberterrorist networks. Of equal relevance is the fact that 
law enforcement agents and computer security experts do not always engage in battle 
with cyberterrorists. They sometimes try to interact with them in order to obtain more 
information about their networks (and vice versa). Finally, four themes were identified 
from the participants’ accounts: (1) postmodern state of chaos, (2) social engineering, (3) 
know thy enemy, and (4) the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 
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CYBERTERRORISM: A POSTMODERN VIEW OF NETWORKS  
OF TERROR AND HOW COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS  
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS FIGHT THEM 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The year 2006 has seen the release of a blockbuster, Firewall, starring Harrison 
Ford. This is the story of a computer security specialist whose job is to protect a Seattle 
bank’s financial holdings from the relentless threat of cyberterrorists and sophisticated 
Internet hackers. In this movie, Harrison Ford uses a complex network of tracers, access 
codes, and firewalls (Diones, 2006). What this also means is that pop culture no longer 
celebrates cyberterrorism as generally innocuous. Television and print journalists have 
been portraying cyberterrorism as a realistic threat to computers and the Internet (Krapp, 
2005). Indeed, as our lives rely heavily on the Internet, the attempt for cyberterrorists to 
spread terror is easy as the Internet is one of their means to wreak havoc. Government 
agencies, banks, universities, and many goods and service providers today use the 
Internet as their integral way to conduct daily operations (Lye & Wing, 2005). Not only 
is it very easy to connect to the Internet; the Internet has also brought revolutionary 
changes to humanity. One of these greatest changes has been the ever-expanding 
connectivity worldwide. In many respects, this has been a bonus for human 
communication (Dunnigan, 2003). Now, the expansion of communication and the 
transfer of knowledge throughout the world occur at a rate never achieved before 
(Matusitz, 2005a). However, there also has been a sinister side to this achievement. 
Individuals or groups can take advantage of the ease, flexibility, and anonymity afforded 
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by cyberspace to threaten citizens, specific groups, organizations, communities and entire 
countries (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). This threat is represented through the rapid 
spread of computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other malicious software 
programs to cripple entire network systems. As humans become more dependent on the 
plethora of opportunities available on the Internet, the potential exists for much more 
devastating consequences of this “sinister side” of the Internet; the biggest of these 
consequences may come from cyberterrorism (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003).  
Broadly defined, cyberterrorism is the use of new communication technologies to 
attack computer systems (Dunnigan, 2003). Cyberterrorism is a real threat and it is 
growing. It could be a destructive weapon of mass destruction and could harm the 
American economy in the process (McConnell, 2004). The reason is that the number of 
cyber attackers with the tools and resources to use computers against the United States is 
rising. The United States is the biggest target for cyberterrorists. As a result, large-scale 
computer attacks on the U.S. critical infrastructure and economy would be devastating 
(Kouri, 2005). A report by the General Accounting Office, an internal government 
watchdog, found soft spots in the computer network that could allow cyberterrorists to 
severely disrupt national defense or critical public operations or steal sensitive data 
(Williams, 2001). In fact, by eliminating certain data networks, cyberterrorists could 
cripple everything from telecommunications and power grids to hospitals and banking 
(Cha, 2001). The same cyberterrorists frequently attempt to break into corporate 
computers or contaminate a satellite with viruses that could dismantle it or change its 
orbit (Stone, 2001). According to Clem, Galwankar, and Buck (2003),  
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in the near future, it may be possible to harness the connectivity of the Internet to 
disable certain key computer systems and cause similar amounts of damage at 
much less risk to the attacker. For example, if a group wanted to disable an 
emergency medical services (EMS) dispatch center, it would be easier and less 
risky for the attacker to destroy it with explosives or to disable its computer 
systems with a computer virus (p. 272). 
In line with these contentions, cyber attacks against vital services, such as water 
and electrical supply systems, are another major area of concern. Hospitals and their 
surroundings heavily rely on water and can subsist for very limited periods without water 
(Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). Although most American hospitals have back-up 
generators that run when electrical supply systems fail, communities still remain highly 
vulnerable. By the same token, the longer a community remains without power, the more 
likely the people will suffer food and medication spoilage because of a loss of 
refrigeration and because of deaths due to medical equipment failure (Clem, Galwankar, 
& Buck, 2003). 
A very perilous attack that cyberterrorists could launch would be one against the 
Internet. The Internet is a mushrooming network that consists of billions of nodes and is 
burgeoning at a rapid rate. It includes private-home users, businesses of all sizes, 
universities, as well as federal, state, and local government agencies. Cyberterrorists can 
take advantage of a technique already perfected by hackers called a distributed denial of 
service (DOS) attack. DOS would contribute to the country’s increasing vulnerability as 
the American critical infrastructures become ever more reliant on the Internet (Kouri, 
2005). Paul Virilio (2000) already evoked the alarming likelihood of the collapse of the 
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Internet caused by a major technological “event” through DOS attacks, but also cyber 
attacks, worms, and computer viruses. 
Of equal concern is the fact that cyberterrorists also network among each other; 
they form networked enterprises for malicious activities against the computer world 
(Kouri, 2005). They use the Internet to communicate with each other and, among the 
many Internet sites where they can convene, the chat room is the one they use the most 
(Zepp, 1999). For cyberterrorists, a chat room is like a hub in the network; it is a central 
location on the Internet that has a large number of highly connected nodes. 
Cyberterrorists work in an “all-channel” type of network (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), 
that is, a network where all dispersed nodes can be interlinked for simultaneous 
dissemination of information and instant coordination (Barabasi, 2002). As a network of 
terror, a cyberterrorist network is of the postmodern type1, where no leadership is needed, 
where no leader exists, where no center exists, and where communication is even more 
flexible than one can ever imagine (Matusitz & O’Hair, in press). 
Fortunately, cybersecurity, an area of information technology and law 
enforcement, has flourished tremendously for the past couple of years (Moore, 2005). In 
response to cyberterrorism, and faced with the fear that networks of terror may become 
endless because of the ubiquity and flexibility of the Internet, federal government 
agencies, industries, and other organizations have applied a variety of security measures 
(Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). One of these security measures is the development of 
social networks of cyber defense. It is common knowledge that federal agencies have top-
secret networks (Webb, 2001); on a daily basis, they strive to ward off acts of 
 
1 The idea that cyberterrorist networks are postmodern was suggested by Dr. Eric Kramer, my advisor, 
during the multitude of conversations that I had with him. 
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cyberterrorism through these top-secret networks (Webb, 2001). For instance, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has created a Cyber Division to manage and direct a program that 
identifies cyber threats (Kouri, 2005). The FBI frequently networks with computer 
security experts (and vice versa) who have highly specialized computer-based skills 
(Kouri, 2005). Some of these computer security experts are instructors, and even 
undergraduate students, working in university cyber forensics labs. 
Cyberterrorism is a serious issue that pertains to us all. It must be carefully 
studied in order to understand how its networks can be effectively countered by networks 
of computer security experts and law enforcement officials. The ability to identify cyber 
attackers is now enabled from highly sophisticated specialists (Dunnigan, 2003). 
Computer security has become one of the main pillars for survival to organizations such 
as businesses, banks, and governments (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). For this 
reason, it proves very important to not only study what cyberterrorists can do to a 
computer or Internet system, but, above all, to investigate how networks of 
cyberterrorists operate and how cyber forensics teams and various law enforcement 
agencies create networks with each other in order to combat networks of terror.  
Purpose of Study 
This is a study about a growing communication phenomenon: social networks. In 
doing so, I explored the subfields of organizational communication and new 
communication technology. The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
cyberterrorists create networks in order to engage in malicious activities against the 
Internet and computers. The purpose of my study is also to understand how computer 
security labs (i.e., in universities) and various agencies (that is, law enforcement agencies 
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such as police departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation) create joint networks 
in their fight against cyberterrorists. This idea of analyzing the social networks of two 
opposing sides rests on the premise that it takes networks to fight networks (Arquilla & 
Rondfelt, 2001). The ultimate goal is to show that, because of the postmodern nature of 
the Internet, the fight between networks of cyberterrorists and networks of computer 
security experts (and law enforcement officials) is a postmodern fight. 
Although I touched on technical aspects such as firewalls and anti-virus software 
programs, the heart of this study pertains to the social aspect of the networks of the two 
opposing sides mentioned above. The goal is to see how they network, what types of 
communication patterns they use, why they need to network, and so on. I focused my 
research on computer technology labs at five universities – the University of Oklahoma, 
Purdue University, the University of North Texas, the University of Central Florida, and 
the University of Tulsa – because these labs have computer experts who have created 
cyber forensics teams that network with law enforcement agencies in their fight against 
cyberterrorists. I also focused my research on law enforcement agencies. It is important 
to know that many police departments today have computer security experts who are 
trained to identify cyberterrorists. For the past couple of years, federal agencies such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation have created cybersecurity teams working 
collaboratively with university cyber forensics labs and other organizations (McGinn, 
Raymond, & Joseph, 2002). 
Research Questions 
The participants were computer security experts and law enforcement officials. 
Among law enforcement officials were local police officers, members of the FBI, the 
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CIA, the National White Collar Crime Center, and other important organizations. 
Computer (or cyber) forensics experts work, for the most part, in universities. Twenty-
seven participants (n=27) in total were selected. Twenty-seven participants might seem to 
be an insufficient number for such a long study, but the participants were all primary 
sources. Participants in this field of study are uncommon and difficult to convince to 
participate in a major study. Many of them said that they had never been interviewed 
before. As such, the data in this study are primary. The reason all those participants were 
selected lies in the fact that they have adequate knowledge and expertise to enlighten me, 
through their direct experiences with both computer security and cyberterrorist incidents, 
on all the various topics that pertain to my research questions. These computer experts 
have created cyber forensics teams that network with law enforcement agencies in their 
fight against cyberterrorists. They have a very good idea of how networks of 
cyberterrorists work. For all these reasons, they are ideal participants in my study. There 
is a very detailed section of the methods section in Chapter 3. Below are the following 
questions to guide my research. 
RQ1: What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’  
accounts reveal about networks of cyberterrorists? 
RQ2: What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’  
accounts reveal about their own networks? 
RQ3: How can the conflict and interaction between cyberterrorists and computer 
 security experts (and law enforcement officials) be explained through the  
 use of both social network theory and game theory? 
RQ4: What are the themes that emerged across the participants’ accounts? 
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In order to answer RQ1 and RQ2, I analyzed the accounts – based on social 
network theory – provided by the participants through their answers to all the interview 
questions (as well as the possible probing questions). In order to answer RQ3, I analyzed 
the data from both the social network theory and game theory perspectives. The 
arrangement for this interpretation of data was structured in three different parts. Each 
was independent from one another. The first part was exclusively a social network theory 
approach; the second part was exclusively a game theory approach; and the third part was 
an intersection of the two approaches. As the point is made at the end of the literature 
review in this dissertation, the intersection of the two theories is appropriate to the novel 
characteristics of the Internet. Finally, in order to answer RQ4, I looked for common 
themes that emerged across the participants’ accounts. The list of interview questions is 
to be found in the interview protocol (see Appendix B on the last two pages of this 
dissertation). 
Methodological Approach 
The research employed qualitative methodology and data were collected via in-
depth conversational (face-to-face) interviewing. One of the reasons the methodology 
was qualitative lies in the fact that a certain number of the participants were highly secure 
people who refused to fill out surveys. According to them, one of the conditions to 
answer my questions was to see the researcher face to face. In fact, before I interviewed 
an FBI agent in the Southwest, I had to go through a scanner and a metal detector. I was 
not allowed to bring a tape-recorder either. I had to take notes for hours. This process had 
to be repeated for a couple of other participants as well. The method of in-depth 
conversational (face-to-face) interviewing followed the procedures described by Kvale 
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(1996). Kvale (1996) calls for seven stages in the interview process: thematizing,
designing, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying, and reporting. Analysis of the 
accounts is an omnipresent process throughout the research. While the qualitative 
researcher needs to know how to assess qualitative interview findings, it is also important 
that he or she understands that methods of improving research validity must be taken into 
account. An explanation of why the qualitative interviewing method is suitable for this 
study is given at the end of the methods chapter (Chapter III). 
Social Network Theory and Game Theory 
 We already know that this study uses two theoretical approaches in the analysis of 
networks of cyberterrorists as well as networks of computer security experts and law 
enforcement officials: social network theory and game theory. This will be described in 
detail later. For right now, let us focus on a brief description of the two theories. In the 
context of cyberterrorism, social network theory implies that cyberterrorists operate in an 
“all-channel” type of network (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), that is, a network where all 
dispersed nodes (cyberterrorists) can be interlinked for simultaneous dissemination of 
information and instant coordination (Barabasi, 2002). This is precisely how the Internet 
chat room works: simultaneous dissemination of information and immediate 
coordination. Likewise, computer security experts and law enforcement officials also 
need to network in an “all-channel” type of network, via computers and new 
communication technologies. Recall that it takes networks to fight networks. 
Game theory is the second theory used in this research. Game theory studies how 
individuals behave when they are placed in situations that require them to interact with 
other individuals. Game theory is about power and control. It rests on the premise that 
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each player “must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which 
decision is best for himself or herself” (Jehle & Reny, 2001, p. 267). As applied to 
cyberterrorism, cyber attackers like to commit malicious acts where they believe it will 
help change the course of actions that are used to prevent these attackers from reaching 
their goals. Any action that causes damage to a computer network will give a sense of 
victory to these cyberterrorists (i.e., self-glorification as the “enemy” suffers, and so on). 
On the other hand, the response from the computer administrators against a cyberterrorist 
action is twofold: retaliation (offensive) or conciliation (collaborative). Ironically, 
collaboration between the attackers and the defenders can contribute to the shrinking of 
the cyberterrorist network by reducing the number of members who were part of their 
[the cyberterrorists’] network. What happens is that the computer network can make it 
appear that the conciliation was not the result of the actions taken by the cyberterrorists. 
Consequently, some of the members may feel that the cyberterrorist attacks in question 
have not carried the impact they had hoped.  
Rationale for Conducting this Study 
 This section explains the rationale for conducting this study. Cyberterrorism is an 
act of terror that is waged on the Internet; many of us are potential targets of cyber 
attacks, which happen on a daily basis. Cyberterrorism is the sort of fear that can land in 
any home connected to the Internet. Therefore, millions of Internet users have something 
to worry about (Dunnigan, 2003). The fight against cyberterrorism requires law 
enforcement agencies and other groups to develop strategies, guidelines, and protocols – 
through solid networks – for sharing information about computer vulnerabilities and 
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cyber attacks (Peterson, 2002). Our daily lives depend on the outcomes of such joint 
efforts. Therefore, this study pertains to all of us.  
This Study Breaks New Ground 
This study breaks new ground. Most studies on cyberterrorism and its effects on 
Internet and computer networks have been conducted in the disciplines of business, 
management information systems, and information technology (i.e., Brynjolfsson & 
Mendelson, 1993; Klein & Myers, 1999). Yet, questions such as, “What are networks of 
cyberterrorists?” “How to defend against networks of cyberterrorists?” and “What are 
networks between cyber forensics labs and law enforcement agencies?” have been barely 
or inadequately answered from a communication perspective. Besides, no qualitative 
research has ever been conducted on the analysis of networks between computer security 
labs (i.e., in universities) and various agencies (that is, law enforcement agencies such as 
police departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation) in their fight against 
cyberterrorists.  
Likewise, no investigation of cyberterrorist networks from a qualitative standpoint 
has been published. This analysis of the “social aspect” of computer security helps 
readers, laypersons, and society in general better understand what a cyberthreat is, how 
networks of terror form and function, and how computer security labs and various 
agencies work together. One theory about terrorism is that the next big terrorist threat, 
among others, will happen within our computer systems.  
New Theoretical Approaches 
Although social network theory has been vastly applied to the study of terrorism 
(see Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001), it has been rarely applied to the analysis of 
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cyberterrorism (see Matusitz & O’Hair). In this study, the readers will notice that 
cyberterrorists are sometimes labeled as “nodes” in the network, with hubs being their 
central locations (i.e., Internet chat rooms). The theory will hopefully contribute to the 
study of networks in cyberspace and be further applicable in the context of organizational 
communication and new communication technology. 
In line with these contentions, to date, no cyber forensics experts or law 
enforcement professionals have advocated using principles based on game theory to try to 
model or predict the probability of a cyberterrorist attack. Therefore, they will find value 
in reading this study because they have never taken their experience and knowledge of 
cyberterrorism, the Internet, and computer security into the theoretical framework that are 
used in this study. The fact is that cyberterrorism is an area of investigation where 
practical application of game theory is essential. Game theory explains that, if a computer 
security expert wants to stay equal to, or one step ahead of, a cyberterrorist, state-of-the-
art expertise in defensive and offensive computer-related strategies is required. Protection 
of computer and Internet assets is critical in today’s corporate, military, academic, local, 
and national environments. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how networks of 
cyberterrorists form in order to keep our systems operative and secure. Game theory 
offers an array of powerful strategies for aiding understanding in the domain of 
cyberterrorism. 
A third and final point is that game theory is applied to social networks as I am 
attempting to show that the two theories intersect. This intersection of the two theories is 
primarily explained at the end of the literature review and allows me to perform a more 
complete analysis. The next three divisions of this section justify why this study is 
13
important for the subfield of organizational communication, for the subfield of new 
communication technology, and for the field of communication at large. 
Importance for the Subfield of Organizational Communication 
This study is important for the subfield of organizational communication for two 
main reasons. First, it improves the understanding of organizational communication 
overall. In fact, today is a very good time to explore perceived problems for research in 
organizational communication, especially in consideration of the substantial number of 
reported problems of information security systems in organizations (Lee, 2001). As the 
nature of cyberterrorism as well as Internet and network security is still being debated, 
and despite the fact that organizations, businesses, or even private-home PC owners 
might suffer from cyberterrorist attacks, particular attention to the identification of 
relevant actors in the organizational network of both cyberterrorists and computer 
security experts and law enforcement agents is important.  
Second, this study does not only increase the understanding of Internet and 
computer-related networks; it also increases awareness of the importance of 
interorganizational communication. The big challenge is to understand how cyberterrorist 
networks form, how they operate to carry out attacks, and how they can be dismantled. 
Equally challenging is to determine how networks of computer security experts and law 
enforcement agents function in all respects. If their networks are strong, they are able to 
identify, resist, and maybe thwart networks of cyberterrorists. The ultimate goal is to 
purge cyber attackers from our systems. After all, the goal is to improve society as a 
whole, is it not? Given that many present-day organizations are increasingly using 
computer technology, greater security will smooth the progress of the work of IT security 
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analysts, managers, and other vital members of organizations in their attempts to 
strengthen the exchange of information and knowledge quality. For all these reasons, this 
study likely advances the subfield of organizational communication. 
Importance for the Subfield of New Communication Technology 
In line with these arguments, this study corroborates the idea that terrorist 
networks doubtlessly co-evolve with technological innovation. Information technology 
has the capability to radically alter the very notion of communication (Brynjolfsson & 
Mendelson, 1993). Since very poor or inadequate research on the importance of the role 
of the Internet and the World Wide Web in the creation and organization of both 
cyberterrorist networks and networks of computer security experts and law enforcement 
agents has been conducted so far, this study contributes tremendously to the subfield of 
new communication technology. Today, the introduction of computer and information 
technology brings unique changes in the way humans, whether good or bad, 
communicate with one another (Dewett & Jones, 2001; Park & Yun, 2004).  
In addition, a unique application of game theory to a phenomenon related to new 
communication technology allows readers to understand the extent to which the 
interactions between the cyberterrorist and the computer security agent are to be viewed 
as a postmodern two-player game. As opposed to conventional combat techniques, 
conflict in cyberspace allows for the use of grand strategies aiming at fast and easy 
disintegration of the respective enemy. Not only can the cyberterrorist make multiple, 
simultaneous moves (as if he or she were composed of multiple selves), but, also, both 
the cyberterrorist and his or her opponent can make multiple, simultaneous moves 
coincidentally. In this world of new communication technologies, time and space are so 
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flexible that they allow for change and fluidity, so much so that the cyberterrorist’s 
resources may change drastically and very fast; he or she can acquire new tools, new 
weapons, new techniques, and new strategies within seconds. Any computer network that 
is unable to handle that is at a serious disadvantage. In cyberterrorism, where new 
opportunities for attack are rapidly, effortlessly, and repeatedly introduced, online 
learning of these opportunities for increasing the chances of achieving the expected 
desires and outcomes is a good strategy. This is where game theory perfectly fits in the 
subfields of new media and communication and technology. 
Importance for the Discipline of Communication at Large 
Finally, my research questions offer a unique contribution to the discipline of 
communication at large because they are a glance at the future. Computer security 
represents a fairly new topic in qualitative research. Therefore, the research questions will 
establish a long research agenda on the topic because it is situated in a time of significant 
change: many twenty-first century organizations operate and survive in networks run by 
cutting-edge computer technology. Consequently, their viability is based upon 
information and communication technologies (ICT), which are a constituent element of 
organizational form. As such, my research questions can broaden the horizons of the 
communication discipline by allowing scholars to move effortlessly across several 
subfields of the communication discipline. Most of the study pertains to organizational 
communication. Yet, as we have seen, the subfields of new media and communication 
technology also fit very well in this study because the issue at hand deals with human 
interaction in cyberspace and the protection of computer and information systems.  
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Recall what was just said: the context of qualitative research with regard to 
computer security is relatively new. As Klein and Myers (1999) put it, examining a 
phenomenon related to information systems from a qualitative perspective improves “the 
quality of future interpretive field research in information systems (especially that of a 
hermeneutic nature)” (p. 70). As explained at the end of the methods chapter (Chapter 
III), the use of qualitative interviewing for investigating my research questions is an 
appropriate method for analyzing untapped areas in computer security. I asked the 
participants to recount from their personal experiences so that they could supplement the 
qualitative analysis and give me a sense of the impact that information technology has on 
various Internet-related activities and social network practices. More importantly, no 
problem to date has been adequately or amply investigated as to what cyberterrorist 
networks are and how cyber forensics experts and law enforcement agents network 
among each other in order to fight these networks. Therefore, my research questions will 
be of interest to communication scholars from various subfields because these questions 
will enable them to take unique angles for investigating the nature of Internet and 
computer security networks by gathering data in the context of organizational 




Literature Review  
 This very extensive literature review is essential for understanding the goal of this 
study. The first fifteen pages or so deal exclusively with cyberterrorism: the origins of the 
word, what it means today, its legal definition, who the cyberterrorists are and where they 
mostly come from, the tools that they use, the tools that law enforcement agents use 
against them, what good cases of cyberterrorism can prove that it does happen, and what 
social networks of cyberterrorists look like. The second part of this literature review deals 
with social network theory: its definition, its main components (i.e., nodes, hubs), its 
origins (in the social sciences), its roots in systems theory, and its applications to the 
Internet, to the threat to Internet and computer security, and to cyberterrorist networks. 
The third part of this literature review is a comparative analysis between terrorist 
networks in Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks today. The goal of this comparative 
analysis is to demonstrate that although they resemble one another in some ways, they 
also differ in many other ways. One major difference is that cyberterrorist networks are 
postmodern types of network, where no leadership is needed, no center exists, and where 
communication is very flexible.  
This leads to the fourth part of the literature review: postmodernism and networks 
of cyberterrorists. This section describes postmodernism and discusses the application of 
postmodernism to cyberspace with respect to (1) Baudrillard’s hyperreal/real continuum, 
(2) the fragmentation, fluidity, and decentralization of the self as a result thereof, (3) 
cyberterrorism per se, (4) the organizational challenges of cyberterrorist networks faced 
by cybersecurity and law enforcement agents, and (5) the absence of leadership in 
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cyberterrorist networks. The fifth part of the literature review deals with a postmodern 
theory of terrorism in cyberspace: game theory. This section begins with an explanation 
of the rationale for using game theory in this study, its origins, and a full description of 
the theory. Then, the literature proceeds to describe the role of communication in game 
theory and its applications to terrorism. What comes next is a description of the 
application of the theory to cyberterrorism and how game theory and social network 
theory can be intermingled to investigate cyberterrorism. The sixth part of this literature 
review is an important premise in this study: it takes networks to fight networks. As such, 
this section explains the importance of cyber forensics in networks fighting networks, the 
social networks between law enforcement agencies and cyber forensics labs, and the 
crucial role of university cyber forensics labs as well as the role of informal networks. 
The last part of this literature review deals with the ethical dilemmas (for cybersecurity 
experts) in this whole course of action. An issue that could be dealt with after this study is 
completed is the following: is computerized surveillance acceptable from an ethical 
standpoint, even if the objective is to benefit society as a whole? 
Cyberterrorism 
 Cyberterrorism, what a strange word. Believe it or not, few people know what it 
means. And when they think they know what it means, they usually get it wrong. It might 
be interesting for the readers to describe cyberterrorism from various angles. Let us start 
with a brief description of the origin of the word.  
Cyberterrorism: Origin of the Word 
Cyberterrorism is the use of electronic networks, and computer technology, as a 
weapon (Dunnigan, 2003). Attacks through the Internet need to have a terrorist 
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component in order to be labeled “cyberterrorism.” From an historical standpoint, the 
word “cyberterrorism” was born in the late 1980s when Collin, a senior research fellow at 
the Institute for Security and Intelligence (ISI) in California (Collin, 1996), coined this 
hot techno-phrase by blending two linguistic elements: cyberspace and terrorism. 
Difficulty of Defining Cyberterrorism 
Today, almost two decades later, cyberterrorism remains difficult to define 
because this term does not have a clear, widely accepted definition. Part of the reason is 
that there is some controversy in the definition of cyberterrorism itself: the word consists 
of “cyber” – a definition for which most people would agree on – and “terrorism” – 
which, since 1793, has had over two hundred definitions (Schmid, 1984). “Cyber” is 
anything related to computers, computerized items (both real and imagined), and/or 
automated systems (both in terms of hardware and software). On the other hand, one 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. No wonder why even top scholars in the 
field of communication and information technology cannot agree on one single definition 
of cyberterrorism. An e-mail bomb can be an act of pure hacking for some, while it can 
be an act of cyberterrorism for others.  
To solve this problem, for the purpose of this study, I have chosen a definition 
that I stick to throughout the entire dissertation. Yet, I believe it is important to see how 
other scholars have defined cyberterrorism and its related terms. Let us begin to see what 
the definition of a “cyberthreat” is. Cyberthreats fall into two distinct classes: (1) 
traditional criminal activities facilitated by computers and the Internet, such as theft of 
intellectual property, online sexual exploitation of children, and Internet fraud; and (2) 
threats affecting national security (after Internet technology emerged), such as 
20
cyberterrorism and computer-aided terrorism (Kouri, 2005). Based on this definition, 
several terms have to be differentiated, some of which are “cybercrime” [which refers to 
the first definition of cyberthreat] and “cyberterrorism” [which refers to the second one].  
Cybercrime Different from Cyberterrorism 
Scholars have also compared cyberterrorism with cybercrime. Cybercrime and 
cyberterrorism are both acts of wrongdoing in the cyberworld (Britz, 2004). However, 
there is a difference between the two. The difference pertains to the motives behind the 
cyber attacks. Cybercrime is an unlawful or criminal act where computer technology is 
either a tool or a target (or both) (Britz, 2004). It is a fairly new field of criminological 
inquiry that comes from the area of criminal justice and it encompasses computer crime 
or computer-related crime (Carter & Katz 1996) and Internet crime (Wall, 2001). A 
cybercriminal, in essence, is a criminal who uses computers and/or the Internet to 
communicate, raise money, recruit new members willing to break the law, and commit 
other crimes. According to Archick (2003), a cybercriminal offense includes money 
laundering, as well “fraud and forgery, child pornography, copyright infringements, and 
security breaches such as hacking, illegal data interception, and system interferences that 
compromise network integrity and availability” (p. 2). Cyberterrorism deserves a more 
detailed definition and will be explained in detail later. Briefly described, cyberterrorism 
is the premeditated use of disruptive activities or the threat of using disruptive activities 
in the cyberworld. A cyberterrorist act always has motives that can be social, ideological, 
religious, political, or of similar intentions. Another objective of the cyberterrorist can be 
intimidating any person or group in furtherance of those motives (Dunnigan, 2003). 
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With respect to this brief definition of cyberterrorism, it is crucial not to forget the 
meaning of the word “premeditation.” A cyberterrorist act is always premeditated. 
However, a cybercriminal act does not have to be premeditated to be called 
“cybercrime.” A computer-whiz college student may break into a computer system for 
various reasons, and these reasons are not necessary intentional or premeditated. If 
caught, the computer-whiz college student will still be considered a cybercriminal and 
will probably go to jail, especially if the act was committed in a country that has 
cybercriminal laws, such as the United States and many European nations (see Archick, 
2003). Yet, the cybercriminal will not be found guilty of cyberterrorism if his or her act is 
not recognized as an act belonging to one of the categories described as cyberterrorism 
(as it is explained later in the sub-section entitled Legal Definition of Cyberterrorism). In 
addition, cyberterrorism is typically more massive and destructive than cybercrime 
(Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003). 
Hacktivism Different from Cyberterrorism 
Scholars have highlighted the importance of hacktivism as well. Hacktivism is 
electronic civil disobedience or Internet activism. Hacktivism consists of writing codes in 
order to promote political ideology (Milone, 2003). Hacktivists are cyber protesters; they 
have political motives and believe that proper use of code will have powerful effects 
(Dunnigan, 2003). However, they are not cyberterrorists because they do not cause harm 
to information systems, Web sites, and other computer-related materials. In other words, 
hacktivists do not engage in defacing Web sites, launching computer viruses, sending 
worms, or using malicious computer tools. If they do – and since they have political 
motives – then they become cyberterrorists. 
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Computer-Assisted Terrorism Different from Cyberterrorism 
Cyberterrorism is not the same as computer-assisted terrorism (Lenzner & Vardi, 
2004). Computer technology and/or the Internet can be used by terrorists (i.e., al-Qaeda 
members) to assist conventional forms of terrorism such as suicide bombings. They can 
use Web sites to simply communicate, receive orders from their commanders, obtain 
important information, carry out missions, propagate their messages, or recruit 
supporters. In a similar vein, the use of email as a medium to communicate information 
regarding massive-scale terrorist attacks does not constitute cyberterrorism. For instance, 
some experts on terrorism believe that each of the four groups of hijackers on September 
11th, 2001 did not know each of the other groups, but they had communicated with a 
central “commander” through the Internet. The “commander” might have been a sort of 
“go-between” or gatekeeper” between those four groups and might have used e-mail (or a 
Web site) to exchange information, procure and channel funding, and organize and order 
the launching of the attacks against the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon. 
Computer-assisted terrorism does not constitute cyberterrorism (Lenzner & Vardi, 
2004). Computer-assisted, just like “techno-terrorism,” refers to the abundant use of 
computer technology by terrorists as it adds to their conventional operations. 
Cyberterrorism, on the other hand, pertains to attacks on information systems, on a 
nation’s computer systems, computer-generated infrastructures, and so on. The following 
sub-section defines cyberterrorism in detail. 
What Is Cyberterrorism?  
The word “cyberterrorism” has been described in different ways and from 
different angles (Matusitz & O’Hair, in press). One of the definitions of cyberterrorism 
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tells us that it is the intentional use of threatening and disruptive actions against 
computers, networks, and the Internet in order to cause harm or further ideological, 
political, or similar objectives, or to intimidate any person in furtherance of such 
objectives (Arquilla, Rondfeltd, & Zanini, 1999; Conway, 2002). A similar definition of 
cyberterrorism is that it is “aimed at coercing a population or its government to accede to 
certain political or social objectives” (Clem, Galwankar, & Buck, 2003, p. 272). For the 
purpose of this study, I chose the definition below to show the boundary lines. So, below 
are the main characteristics of cyberterrorist acts (see Dunnigan, 2003; Verton, 1999): 
a) hacking into a top-secret federal computer system and stealing data for 
ideological, religious, political, or social reasons, or the threat thereof; 
b) damaging files for the reasons mentioned in a, or the threat thereof; 
c) changing information in order to destroy infrastructure targets, or the threat 
thereof; 
d) causing a disruption in the federal computer network as an act of retaliation, or 
the threat thereof; 
e) destroying the actual machinery of the information infrastructure, or the threat 
thereof; 
f) hacking into the controls of a nuclear power plant or a facility that handles  
hazardous materials, or the threat thereof; 
g) breaching dams through electronic computer systems (as a bomber would), or 
the threat thereof; 
h) disrupting monetary systems for the reasons mentioned in a, or the threat 
thereof; 
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i) damaging the mass media for the reasons mentioned in a, or the threat thereof; 
j) shutting down power grids for the reasons mentioned in a, or the threat thereof; 
k) disseminating false information for agency purposes, or the threat thereof; 
l) sabotaging operations, via computer technology, or the threat thereof; 
m) threatening to divulge confidential information or system weaknesses; 
n) causing a fatal incident by changing the prescription dosage through the 
hacking of a computer system, or the threat thereof; 
o) defacing Web sites for the purpose of spreading terrorist propaganda and for 
the reasons mentioned in a, or the threat thereof; 
p) coercing a government or a political faction, via computer technology, to 
modify, add, or subtract existing laws or rules; 
q) attacking a national, racial, religious, linguistic, or any social group or 
community, via computer technology, or the threat thereof. 
From all these characteristics of cyberterrorism, it follows that a cyberterrorist act 
is a cyber attack that endangers life, has the potential to inflict bodily harm, places the 
public or any section of the public in fear, affects unfavorably the harmony between 
different national, religious, racial, linguistic, or any social groups or communities, 
coerces or intimidates the government established by law, and so on. This brings up the 
question of whether or not a hacker is a cyberterrorist.  
Are Hackers Cyberterrorists? 
A computer-whiz kid seeking glory and who cripples the entire computer system 
of a university is not a cyberterrorist if (1) the act of hacking is not premeditated and (2) 
the act of hacking does not pertain to any of the seventeen characteristics of 
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cyberterrorism mentioned in the previous sub-section. As a result, the term “hacker” does 
not necessarily imply that he or she is a cyberterrorist. Hackers delve into systems or 
networks but do not destroy them. Note that, under the U.S. Congress approved law 
called “Act 2001” (Archick, 2003), if the damage caused by the computer-whiz kid is 
significant, then he or she might be still get some punishment. No matter what, a 
cyberterrorist is an intentional, malicious hacker. Hackers with malicious intent are 
cyberterrorists who use computer systems to achieve their goals (Vegh, 2002). If the 
hacker just tries to delve into computers with no intention to harm computers, then he or 
she is plainly a “hacker.” In fact, hacking can be a good tool for understanding the threats 
and vulnerabilities of a user’s computer. The key is to understand that the tools of the 
cyberterrorist are the tools of the hacker just applied with different motivations. 
Cyberterrorism: A Communicative and Semiotic Perspective 
In addition to this, there is a very important distinction to be made between 
hacking and cyberterrorism. Hackers delve into systems or networks but do not destroy 
them; they do not even communicate their intention to do so. Cyberterrorism, on the other 
hand, just like terrorism, is inherently a communicative process (O’Hair & Heath, 2005). 
Cyberterrorism can be promoted via the Internet, a public communication channel. As 
such, it is publicized and perpetuated through new media communication. Therefore, it is 
essentially through semiotics and the exploitation of new media that cyberterrorists find 
success in accomplishing their primary goals. Semiotics is the study of signs (Berger, 
1989; Luskin, 1996; Nöth, 1995; Sebeok, 1994). A sign communicates something that 
stands for something else, or that can be made to represent or symbolize something else 
(Berger, 1989). A sign system is embedded in the construction of meaning in a process of 
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symbolizing the world that takes place outside of human awareness. According to 
semioticians, we do not face a “simple” objective reality. Instead, what we see are signs 
and symbols within a communication context, where the communication of messages is 
considered essential to the construction of meaning (Fiske, 1982). From this vantage 
point, meaning is not absolute; it is not a static concept. On the contrary, it is an active 
process that is subject to continuous transformation. Besides, verbal communication is 
not the only medium that conveys meaning. Semiotics also deals with nonverbal 
communication (Benford, 1998). 
So, cyberterrorism is a semiotic act that is a message, a symbol, and a new media 
image. Our modern western world is immersed within images, signs, and symbols (Miller 
et al., in press). It is no surprise, then, that there is a powerful semiotic dimension to 
cyberterrorism. Indeed, it can involve sending images of fear. For instance, as will be 
explained later, in 1998 cyberterrorists sent a massive flood of e-mails to the Sri Lankan 
embassy’s main Web server with messages that read “We are the Internet Black Tigers 
and we are doing this to disrupt your communications.” The intent was not only to crash 
the computer systems of the embassy – and they succeeded (Denning, 2000) – the motive 
was also to send a semiotic message that evoked fear. Likewise, cyberterrorism is a 
semiotic gesture because it aims at creating not only fear, but also signs of fear. It is 
important to consider that, on the whole, cyberterrorist attacks are not successful. 
Although, theoretically, cyberterrorists could take down the whole U.S. West Coast if 
they managed to cripple a few massive power grids, in reality they create fewer casualties 
than is expected by the magnitude of the news they elicit. What it implies is that such acts 
leave compelling signs and images permanently anchored in our minds (Miller et al., in 
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press). For example, the movie Firewall, starring Harrison Ford, is a product of this. In 
the movie, the messages conveyed by cyberterrorist attacks of all sorts have an impact on 
Harrison Ford because those messages create interference and anxiety in the form of 
potent psychological noises in his (and his family’s) daily life. 
Just like terrorism is primarily a process of communication between terrorists and 
target audiences (Tuman, 2003), an important goal of cyberterrorists is to send a powerful 
signal, whose meaning is intended to frighten and coerce. Based on the seventeen 
characteristics of cyberterrorism mentioned earlier, cyberterrorism serves another 
semiotic function when it communicates a violent political meaning that symbolizes more 
of an ideological statement than a massive material threat. As we will see later, in 2002, a 
group of cyberterrorists, known as the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD), hacked into 
the official Web site of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and defaced it. As a title, they 
wrote, “The Face of the World’s Biggest Murderer.” At the bottom of the Web site, they 
left a message with the signature of the group. The WFD’s hacking into Sharon’s official 
Web site stands out as one example of a cyberterrorist group that was in a position to do 
far more damage and perhaps cause a national crisis in Israel (Verton, 2003a). By gaining 
such visibility – and sometimes they can infiltrate hundreds of thousands of computers – 
cyberterrorists are able to spread terror and evoke fear.  
Finally, what is also very semiotic is the relationship between cyberterrorism and 
new media such as the Internet and information technologies. Without these, 
cyberterrorism is an ill-fated task. Cyberterrorism news is made to order for the specific 
requirements of new media. Farnen (1990) already noted this when describing terrorism. 
As he remarked, “terrorism is different, dramatic, and potentially violent. It frequently 
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develops over a period of time, occurs in exotic locations, offers a clear confrontation, 
involves bizarre characters, and is politically noteworthy. Finally, it is of concern to the 
public” (p. 111). The exploitation of communication technologies by cyberterrorists is a 
fundamental element of the semiotic cyber struggle. In order to trigger economic chaos, 
lose of faith (on the part of certain businesses) to do transactions online, and massive 
overreaction from the public, cyberterrorists count on those communication technologies 
to stir up the target population by using images which, once produced, can be evoked 
again later and reused to new effect. Now that we have seen the communicative and 
semiotic perspective of cyberterrorism, let us digress for a moment and focus on its legal 
perspective. 
Cyberterrorism: A Legal Perspective 
 A little after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. Congress 
approved a new antiterrorist law called “Act 2001” (Archick, 2003). “Act 2001” included 
cyberterrorism as part of the legislative jargon and classified different types of 
cyberterorrism and wreaking losses to protected computer systems of citizens, juridical 
persons, and federal and state departments (including offices that coordinate national 
defense and ensure national security). Archick (2003) briefly describes those different 
forms of cyberterrorism. According to Archick, a cyberterrorist act is a cyber attack on 
critical infrastructure facilities, financial institutions, or government systems that are 
premeditated and motivated by the goal to (1) intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof and to (2) further political, social, or 
ideological objectives. 
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The Filipino author of the “I Love You” virus, a hacking achievement that caused 
over $10 billion in damage around the world (New York Times, June 13, 2000), was never 
prosecuted because in 2000, when this 23-year old male student sent his devastating 
hybrid virus, no applicable laws on cyberterrorism existed in the Philippines. So far, the 
Filipino hacker has not revealed any malicious intentions to send that virus. Even if 
according to BBC news, in an article entitled “Love Bug Revenge Theory” (published in 
May 10, 2000), the police believe that the Filipino hacker had the personal objective of 
retaliating against computer systems after his Master’s thesis was rejected, and even if for 
the American Computer Economic Group, the “I Love You” virus has been the most 
damaging act of cyberterrorism ever witnessed to date, the “I Love You” virus cannot be 
considered a cyberterrorist act because we do not know the intent of the Filipino hacker. 
Although the hacker’s virus infected and compromised computer systems including that 
of the Pentagon, governmental establishments, parliaments, and corporations worldwide 
(Wehrfritz & Vitisca, 2000), we do not know if the hacker’s objective was political, 
social, or ideological. It might have been an accident. The fact that no cyberlaws existed 
in the Phillipines in 2000 is a reflection of the clash between the old and the new in many 
legislative systems. As Ziff (2005) points out,  
police officers and other government agents commonly seize and search 
computers during criminal investigations. When reviewing the search of a 
properly seized computer for compliance with the Fourth Amendment, courts face 
the complicated task of applying constitutional protections from the eighteenth 
century to today’s computerized world (p. 841). 
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If the Filipino hacker were to send that virus today and if he were caught in the 
process by either European or American authorities, he would face legal imprisonment 
for two reasons. First, this virus today would constitute a cyberterrorist act, based on the 
definition given in the first paragraph. Second, he would be considered a cyberterrorist by 
both the U.S. Congress and the Council of Europe’s Convention (which is composed of 
33 countries, including the United States). The 2001 treaty of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention is the first international treaty designed to harmonize laws on cyberterrorism, 
“improving investigative abilities and boosting international cooperation” (Archick, 
2003, p. 1). What this boils down to saying is that, from a legal standpoint, times have 
changed since the “I Love You” virus harmed so many computer-based infrastructures in 
2000. Today, not only is there a legal definition of cyberterrorism ratified by many 
developed countries, but, also, international laws have been approved to identify, combat, 
and punish cyberterrorism. 
Cyberterrorists Come from All over the World 
 The literature has shown that many cyberterrorists come from five different 
geographical areas: (1) North America, (2) Western Europe, (3) the Eastern block and the 
ex-Soviet Union, (4) Far-East Asia (mainly China, Korea, and Taiwan), and (5) the 
Middle-East. 
 The first major group of cyberterrorists is to be found in North America. In 1994, 
a cyberterrorist broke into the computers of an Arizona water facility, the Salt River 
Project in the Phoenix area. The person behind the attack was only 27 (Washington Post, 
2002). Likewise, in March 2000, a computer virus was believed to have targeted the 
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Houston 911 system for massive disruption. The damage could have been unprecedented 
(Verton, 2003a).  
The second major group of cyberterrorists is composed of computer users from 
Western Europe. During the late 1980s, a hacker group in Germany sold information to 
the ex-Soviet KGB. The German group accessed the information by hacking into 
computer systems in Departments of Energy and Defense, defense contractors, and 
NASA (Stohl, 1989). Had they succeeded, the damage would have been colossal. In 
another example, during the Persian Gulf War, a group of Dutch cyberterrorists who had 
penetrated the Department of Defense systems attempted to sell their services to the 
Iraqis (General Accounting Office, 1991).  
The third major group of cyberterrorists is composed of Eastern Europeans and 
citizens of the ex-Soviet Union. The threat of networked cyberterrorism appears to have 
originated in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe (Kouri, 2005). In a 
similar vein, it has been reported that many ex-members of the former Soviet KGB are 
computer-savvy and have a solid background in the black arts of espionage (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1998), which poses an enormous concern to energy 
systems, electric sectors, and power operations. Experts are particularly worried about 
highly qualified computer specialists from the former Soviet Union (Matusitz & O’Hair, 
in press). Paying for the services of ex-Soviet hacker groups could disrupt the 
management and control systems since they have been well trained in cyberterrorism. 
Furthermore, it might the case that hacker groups that despise the United States decide to 
independently perpetrate attacks on American targets. 
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The fourth major group of cyberterrorists is composed of computer users from 
Far-East Asia (Dunnigan, 2003). We already know the story of the hacker from the 
Philippines. Briefly describing a major cyberterrorist incident, in 1998 the Sri Lankan 
government got a bitter flavor of cyberterrorism when a flood of e-mails was sent to the 
embassy’s main Web server with messages reading “We are the Internet Black Tigers 
and we are doing this to disrupt your communications.” The e-mail bombing crashed the 
computer systems of the embassy (Denning, 2000). The Internet Black Tigers are Sri 
Lankan members of a specialized faction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). Their intent is to harm the Sri Lankan government, whether through 
conventional terrorist acts or through cyberterrorist acts (Vidanage, 2006).  
The last major group of cyberterrorists is composed of computer users from the 
Middle East. According to Dunnigan (2003), there have been many malicious hackers 
from the Middle East who have attempted to destroy Web sites of American power 
plants. When they cannot strike power plants, they put zombies (see next sub-section) in 
thousands of homes PCs and launch Denial-of-Service attacks (see next sub-section) on 
military, commercial, and government Web sites, of which the consequences would be 
deleterious.  
What Tools Do Cyberterrorists Like to Use? 
More astoundingly, examples of cyberterror on computers and the Internet are as 
simple as malicious software such as computer viruses, trojan horses, vampires, logic 
bombs, computer network worms, and DOS attacks. 
Virus: a computer virus is a software program that can copy itself (Schwartau, 
2000). By self-replicating, it is oftentimes capable to cause massive harm to files or other 
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programs on the same computer. A virus “attaches itself to a legitimate program or 
document (for example, a Microsoft macro virus is embedded in word processing or 
spreadsheet files)” (Schwartau, 2000, p. 8). Yet, a virus cannot propagate to another 
computer without human intervention. A computer virus acts in a way that resembles a 
biological virus: it proliferates by putting itself into living cells. Not all viruses that target 
our computer systems are harmful; some are in fact innocuous. Sadly, though, we rarely 
see those (Dunnigan, 2003). And to show how devastating a computer virus can be, it 
might be interesting to remind ourselves of the cyberterrorist attempt against the Houston 
911 system for widespread disruption. Fortunately, the attempt to send a computer virus 
failed. Had the virus been successfully activated, it would have had a ripple effect (the 
possibility was that each infected computer propagated over 2,500 computers 
simultaneously). It would also have erased the infected computer’s hard drive on the 
nineteenth of the month, creating in effect a massive DOS attack against the 911 
emergency system (Verton, 2003a).  
Trojan horse: a Trojan horse is not a virus; yet, a virus might include a Trojan 
horse (Schwartau, 2000). A Trojan horse is a software application where users are misled 
into installing a program that is replete with infected documents. This program is to be 
downloaded, for instance, through clever e-mails. To make the trick even more realistic, 
such e-mails sometimes appear to come from friends or colleagues. In other words, a 
Trojan horse is masqueraded as another legitimate program (Dunnigan, 2003). The goal 
of the cyberterrorist is to damage the victim’s computer or files (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). According to an article entitled “Britain Warns of Trojan Horse Computer 
Attacks” (2005), central government computers have been the most usual targets of 
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Trojan horses. Corporations and individuals are also at risk, based on a warning given by 
the British National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC). The aim of 
cyberterrorists appears to be covert gathering and sending of commercially or 
economically valuable information. In many cases, as Mitnick and Simon (2002) put it, 
“the reason this technique [sending a Trojan horse] is so effective is that it follows the 
theory of killing two birds with one stone: The ability to propagate to other unsuspecting 
victims, and the appearance that it originated from a trusted person” (p. 96). 
Worm: a worm is a type of virus that slowly moves around from computer to 
computer and, then, slows things down. A worm tends to eat through and at resources 
(Schwartau, 2000), and does not attach itself to other programs (Dunnigan, 2003).  
Logic bomb: it is a hidden software program in a computer system that is executed 
when certain conditions are met. At that point, what follows is that the program does 
something usually bad (Dunnigan, 2003). A logic bomb is an unauthorized computer 
code, sometimes sent by email. When activated, it looks for specific conditions or 
specific states of the system which triggers the perpetration of a destructive act of 
sabotage, deletes or corrupts data, and has other harmful effects. 
DOS attack: DOS stands for denial-of-service attack; it is an attack against a 
computer system or network, causing a loss of service to users, usually the loss of 
connectivity and services by overwhelming the bandwidth of the target’s network or 
congesting the computer-related resources of the target’s system (Schwartau, 2000). DOS 
attacks “flood servers with so many incoming messages that the server can do nothing 
else but try and deal with the flood” (Dunnigan, 2003, p. 209). 
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Zombie: sometimes called “bot” or “robot,” a zombie is a system that has been 
taken over using Remote Control Software. In many cases, a zombie is used to send spam 
or to attack remote servers with an overwhelming amount of traffic. It also enables the 
cyberterrorist to have easy access to the intruded computer, to launch attacks from that 
computer, to delve into password-protected chat rooms, and get into the storage for the 
invader’s files (Dunnigan, 2003). A zombie, however, is more likely to be discovered and 
cleaned out if stored in professionally run Web sites (Dunnigan, 2003). 
Vampire: a worm or a virus of which the sole purpose is to run so profusely that 
the infected computer cannot do anything else. To be more precise, after the vampire 
starts running, it begins to replicate itself, to such an extent that the victim’s server is so 
active running hundreds of copies of the vampire that it can do nothing else (Dunnigan, 
2003). As one can imagine, vampires pose a threat to Internet software and, when 
activated, they constitute a chance for the cyberterrorists to strike.  
 The importance of listing and defining those cyberweapons lies in the very fact 
that they can be used by nasty individuals “to shut down computers, destroy data, and 
damage the nation’s power plants, factories, fuel supplies, communications systems, and 
even parts of the armed forces” (Dunnigan, 2003, p. 5). Now, it might be interesting to 
know what tools can be used for protection against cyberterrorism.  
What Are the Tools against Cyberterrorism? 
Computer security experts say that, although the first targets of cyber attacks tend 
to be government agencies, organizations and businesses that have not established 
security measures to protect their systems are also fair game. Some of the tools used 
against cyberterrorism are firewalls and anti-virus software programs.  
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Firewall: a computer system with special security precautions. Located between 
the Internet and a local network, it performs the role of a gateway to prohibit 
unauthorized or seemingly dangerous material from entering the network and to keep 
external nodes from accessing, say, an organization’s confidential data. Major Web sites 
and corporate computer systems have protected themselves with firewalls because they 
have the funds and motivations to do so. For instance, American power plants have well-
protected Internet operations and are well equipped to detect malicious intruders. Yet, 
they still have soft spots. According to an article entitled “Britain Warns of Trojan Horse 
Computer Attacks” (2005), firewalls do not give complete protection, and there is no 
complete mitigation for computers connected to the Internet.  
Anti-virus software: a software program that examines the computer memory and 
disk drives for malicious code. The program modifies the user if a virus is present, and 
will clean and delete infected files or directories. 
Other Cases of Cyberterrorism 
In an earlier section, we saw that the fourth group of cyberterrorists is to be found 
in Far-East Asia. Thornburgh et al. (2005) tell us about a Chinese group of cyberterrorists 
called Titan Rain that stole U.S. secrets. Those cyberterrorists are voracious, never 
hesitating to destroy any parasitic file they could find coming in their way, attempting to 
penetrate secure computer networks at the American most sensitive military bases, 
defense contractors, and aerospace companies. According to the same Thornburgh et al. 
(2005), those Chinese cyberterrorists work for the government in mainland China and 
have a political goal. Their cyber attacks come from just three routers that seem to be the 
first connection point from a local network to the Internet. A TIME investigation into the 
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case reveals how the Titan Rain attacks were uncovered, why they are considered a 
significant threat now under investigation by the Pentagon, the FBI and the Department 
of Homeland Security, and why the U.S. government has yet to stop them (Thornburgh et 
al., 2005). 
In the U.S. military, Titan Rain is creating fears. In fact, Titan Rain has the ability 
to cause widespread havoc as hundreds of computer systems in the Department of 
Defense have been penetrated by insidious programs such as Trojan horses. Not only 
could Titan Rain control the DOD hosts, but they could also use the DOD hosts in 
malicious activity (Thornburgh et al., 2005). The possibility also exists for the 
perpetrators to shut down each host. Allied nations such as Britain, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand have also been targeted by the Chinese cyberterrorists (Thornburgh et 
al., 2005). 
Social Networks of Cyberterrorists 
Although cyberterrorists tend to work alone, they sometimes feel the need to team 
up with others. In many cases, the now networked cyber attackers claim they are fighting 
a worthy cause. A few cyberterrorist groups are noticeable as being the “elite,” as they 
have done some of the major attacks around (Zepp, 1999). When cyberterrorists network,  
they network with other factions through various channels of communication. This 
method reinforces the needs of the community of cyberterrorists without the necessity of 
creating a large-scale single organization, like a massive conventional terrorist 
organization. So, cyberterrorists have become involved in Internet social networks 
(McKenzie, 2004). Some cyberterrorist groups like to act as cybersurrogate groups in 
order to help other cyberterrorists – who are really in need of help (i.e., regarding the 
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design of certain malicious software programs, etc.) – increase their chances of striking 
the right node or hub in the Internet or computer network. This has been proved easy and 
advantageous (Schwartau, 1996).  
Social Network Theory 
This section is an extensive analysis of social network theory, the study of the 
connections between individuals or organizations, forming what we call “social 
networks.” A “social network can be defined as a set of nodes or actors (persons or 
organizations) linked by social relationships or ties of a specified type. A tie or relation 
between two actors has both strength and content” (Castilla et al., 2000, p. 219). The 
study of social networks is important because it helps us better understand how and why 
cyberterrorists interact with each other through networks, and how the design of the 
network itself, especially in this day and age where technology plays a central role, can 
alter their interactions. This section starts with a definition, description, historical 
explanation, and identification of the basic tenets of social network theory. Then, it 
provides a synopsis of its role and scope in the social sciences and how the theory has 
become what it is today. As such, particularly examined are its origins rooted in Hegel’s 
systems theory (Beiser, 1993; Kojeve, 1969). Systems theory stresses the idea that every 
single element in a system or organism is inseparably interconnected with its 
environment in dynamic webs of relationships. In other words, a system is more than the 
sum of its parts. 
The end of this section focuses on the applications of social network theory to the 
Internet. In brief, the Internet is composed of an extremely large network of nodes that 
link computer systems worldwide, allowing them to send and receive information 
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(Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003). The section also describes how the theory applies to the 
threats to Internet and computer security. The main idea here is that the Internet is a 
scale-free network, which means that its nodes, the number of links on Web pages, the 
connection among users, and even emails are scale-free. A scale-free network is 
characterized by an uneven distribution of connectedness. While many nodes in the 
network are random (that is, they have a random pattern of connections), a few nodes act 
as hubs that have many connections (Matlis, 2002). The danger to this is that, because the 
Internet is a scale-free network, it is able to survive attacks or failures of its high number 
of insignificant nodes (called “random” nodes), but it is very vulnerable to targeted cyber 
attacks (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000; Ball, 2000) against its most important nodes. 
The reason lies in the fact that these nodes are so powerful that they act as very connected 
hubs as they connect a great number of Web servers. Barabasi’s explanation of the 
Internet network shows us that stopping a malicious software program from propagating 
requires that we focus on protecting those hubs (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). 
Finally, this section discusses social network theory as applied to the Internet, to the 
threats to Internet and computer security, and to cyberterrorist networks. 
Social Network Theory: Definition 
Social network theory is the mapping and understanding of social networks. The 
theory has grown considerably in this day and age since advanced computing technology 
has opened the door for new research. It is also a branch of social science that applies to a 
wide range of human organizations, from small groups of people to entire nations. As 
such, social network theory is the study of the connections between individuals (Degenne 
& Forse, 1999; Freeman, 1981; Lipnack & Stamps, 1986; Scott, 1991; Scott, 2000; 
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Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988) or organizations (Nohria & 
Eccles, 1992), forming what we call “social networks.” Social network theory involves 
relationships that explain the emergence, success, and dissolution of communication 
networks among individuals or organizations. These networks should be paid attention to 
because they reflect how humans amass the different types of support that they need, 
such as financial, political, and moral support among cyberterrorists. 
In the same train of thought, social network theory has shown that many 
intriguing properties of complex systems lie in their patterns of interaction (Sassen, 
1992). In fact, all patterns of interaction can be portrayed as networks (Barabasi, 2002; 
Buchanan, 2002; Strogatz, 2003; Watts, 1999a, Watts, 1999b). Then, it is no surprise that 
social network theory is applied to society, college classes, financial markets, ecospheres, 
friendships, romantic liaisons, marriages, and… hacker groups. Indeed, as we will see, 
networks also shape processes of terror and violence. 
What Are Social Networks? 
A social network refers to a group of objects, entities, or people – sometimes 
called nodes – and the relationships between these objects, entities, or people. In most 
social networks, the objects refer to persons or groups (Lipnack & Stamps, 1986; Scott, 
1991; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988). For Castilla 
et al. (2000), a “social network can be defined as a set of nodes or actors (persons or 
organizations) linked by social relationships or ties of a specified type. A tie or relation 
between two actors has both strength and content” (p. 219). Social networks can have 
sub-networks (like hybrids). As such, they can be a combination of networks within 
networks (as simply said, networks of networks), with numerous nodes linked in various 
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ways, like in a spider’s web. It is also fair to say that a social network is a collection of 
connected “points” generally designed to be resilient through redundancy. It can be one 
terminal, connected to the Internet, or one expert communicating with another expert in a 
common network devoted to a shared problem (Monge & Contractor, 2001, 2003). The 
design of a particular network also determines its resilience, its flexibility, its capacity to 
expand, and its vulnerability (Buchanan, 2002). The study of social networks, then, is 
important because it helps us better understand how and why we interact with each other, 
and how the design of the network itself, especially in this day and age where technology 
plays a central role, can alter this interaction.  
As Castells (1996) puts it, “networks constitute the new social morphology of our 
societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and 
outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture” (p. 469). An 
analogy can be made here with Prigogine’s (1969) concept of dissipative systems. A 
dissipative system is an open system characterized by the natural and unstructured 
appearance of a complex, sometimes chaotic, structure. The first phenomenological issue 
of a dissipative system is the realization that a “closed” physical system does not exist 
(Cahill & Kinger, 2000). From this vantage point, the interaction of a system with the 
outside world may become the beginning for the formation of a new dynamic state of 
matter for the system. So is a network; it is a dissipative structure that requires a 
continuous flow of matter and energy to maintain its state (Stengers & Prigogine, 1997). 
A network is an emergent structure that arises in a self-organizing system. Such a 
structure is dissipative in nature because it serves to dissipate energy in the system 
(Stengers & Prigogine, 1997). 
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The concept of “social network” is mostly associated with industrial society. Yet, 
it is interesting to know that as an organizational form it is an ancient practice. For 
instance, maritime trading networks were common in islands of ancient Greece and the 
islands that now constitute Indonesia (Landa, 1994). Later, in the Middle Ages, Christian 
religious scholars, who lived in isolated monasteries of Western Europe, organized an 
effective form of interaction through distributed social networks. Similarly, in the 11th 
century Maghrebi traders used networks of information exchange (Greif, 1994). 
Historians also record that families, ethnic diaspora groups, and communities around the 
world can all be seen as variants of social networks (Yarbrough & Yarbrough, 1999). 
Today, social networks are omnipresent (Buchanan, 2002). Whether they bind computers, 
economies, or hackers together, social networks are everywhere in the real world. In fact, 
the network appears to be an innovative form of organization – long after tribes, 
hierarchies, and markets – that comes into its own to put a new frame to society, and in so 
doing, the nature of conflict and cooperation (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). 
In line with these contentions, while some social networks are hierarchical, like 
the church structure during medieval times and in some parts of the world today, other 
social networks are “unbounded or bounded clusters of organizations that ... are 
nonhierarchical collectives of legally separate units” (Alter & Hage, 1993, p. 46). From 
this, it follows that a network can be organized on a non-hierarchical basis (World Health 
Organization, 1998). In fact, a network is more nimble and flexible than a hierarchy; it is 
more adaptable to changing circumstances. A network can differ in its formality, size, 
goals, and durability any time. Some networks are not fixed; they can be very malleable 
(Barabasi, 2002; Buchanan, 2002). It is often an unplanned, emergent system whose ties 
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end up being unevenly distributed, with some areas of the network sparsely connected. 
As such, a (social) network can take on many different forms (Provan & Milward, 1995). 
For instance, one form is the chain or line network (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), where 
information moves in a sequential manner through a series of nodes. Another form is the 
wheel or star network is a set of links with the lowest degree of shared centrality (Leavitt, 
1951). A third example is the hub network where there are a number of direct 
connections to a router or manager node and where exchange among actor nodes must 
pass through a central node (Lott & Taylor, 2005); this is typical of networks of terrorist 
groups that do not base their acts on cyber-technology. A fourth example is the all-
channel network (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), where any actor in the network is 
connected to any other actor. The all-channel is collaborative, quick, and effective, but 
can be difficult to maintain due to the significant need of exchange of information 
required. Nevertheless, it is the network of the information age and, when organized by 
cyberterrorists, it can be very effective (can launch multiple, repeated attacks from 
different points), very difficult to identify, and very difficult to destroy in its entirety 
(nodes are redundant). 
Nodes: Essential to Social Networks 
As mentioned in this previous section, a network is simply a collection of 
connected objects or actors called nodes. If these nodes are highly connected, they act as 
hubs; they do not have many connections, they are random nodes (Johnson, 2000). In 
social networks, a node is an individual communicating with other individuals for a 
common purpose (Monge & Contractor, 2001, 2003). In fact, according to social network 
theory, all humans are simply nodes in a network of rapidly expanding networks 
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(Barabasi, 2002). For a social network theorist, a complex human system should be seen 
as an interconnected system of nodes (people and groups) and ties (relations, 
connectivity, and flows). A tie concerns the ability to facilitate communication between 
nodes and is a measure of efficiency (Monge & Contractor, 2001, 2003). 
More importantly, nodes (as trivial and innocent as they look) in a social network 
can also be very powerful, for three reasons. First, the high number of nodes in a social 
network makes it a non-homogeneous entity. As such, there is a role for individual 
agency and (far) less dependence on leadership. Secondly, it is worth mentioning 
Metcalfe’s Law, coined by Robert Metcalfe (1993). According to this law, the power of a 
network is equal to the square of the number of nodes that it contains: an enterprise with 
ten nodes or intersections is not ten times stronger but a hundred times more effective 
than an enterprise with just one. In other words, the value of a network grows by the 
square of the size of the network (Metcalfe, 1993). A third reason why nodes can be 
powerful is that they can take one of three different forms. Some nodes are actors 
(Johnson, 2000), that is, people who do things and who have all kinds of skills or 
expertise (Barabasi, 2002). Other nodes are the directors – people with the highest power, 
or at least who do have power, and who are highly charismatic, influential, and 
motivating. Those directors also act as gateways and impact the flow of information and 
activity.  
Now that we have a definition of social network theory as well as a description of 
social networks and an explanation what their nodes represent, it is worth concentrating 
on the origins of the theory in order to understand the current scope of the theory and 
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why it applies particularly well to the context of cyberterrorism. The origins of social 
network theory are rooted in the social sciences and in systems theory. 
Origins of Social Network Theory 
 This section gives a description of the origins of social network theory in the 
social sciences and the roots of the theory in systems theory. Systems theory is Hegel’s 
theory of interconnections among all the parts of a system. 
Social Network Theory in the Social Sciences 
Social network theory is an important academic specialty pursued by a number of 
anthropologists, sociologists, and organizational communication theorists (Ronfeldt, 
2000). Their view is that all social relationships can and should be analyzed as social 
networks. In other words, they should be considered sets of actors (nodes) and ties (links) 
whose relationships form a pattern (Nohria & Eccles, 1992; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; 
Wellman & Berkowitz, 1997). In fact, for a social network theorist, almost any set of 
nodes (actors) that have ties adds up to a network. It is not surprising, then, that the 
abstract notion of a network is bound to play a role in the social sciences in the same way 
that the concept of Euclidean space and its generalizations played a role in physics 
(Lorrain, 1975). 
Historically, social network theory became significant in the social sciences with 
the release of anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown’s (1940) seminal article entitled “On 
Social Structures,” and with the works of sociologists like Moreno (1934), who have 
been studying social networks systematically for more than five decades in an attempt to 
develop sociograms and directed graphs to chart the ties among different individuals in 
groups or in particular contexts (what gradually became known as a “networks”). One of 
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the reasons social network theory has become popular in the social sciences lies in the 
fact that scholars have attempted to map the connections among individuals (Groom, 
1977). Thereby, one can evaluate the social capital of that individual. Social capital refers 
to the network position of a node (or person) and consists of the potential to depend on 
the resources contained by members of the network. Scholars in the social sciences also 
believe that the more mappings among people in a social network, the more growth. 
Growth is contingent upon the knowledge, influence, and power the original person will 
control. Social networks can help sociologists identify all sorts of groups: ethnic groups, 
tribes, groups of friends, cliques, and so on. As such, people will stay in a group where 
they know they can share equal power with their peers (Bonachich, 2001). This is one of 
the premises of social identity theory. 
Social network theory has also extended its scope in organizational 
communication. In fact, although many writers in the social sciences have discussed 
social networks, one of the most well-known social network researchers is Peter Monge, 
an expert on organization communication (Littlejohn, 1992). Monge (1987) has 
demonstrated that networks are groups connected to one another by communication ties. 
Organization is characterized by a number of structures, each being contingent upon 
those communication ties within the organization (Littlejohn, 1992; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; 
Stohl, 1995). Other scholars in organizational communication also study what are called 
organization-sets (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). They have observed that networks often come in 
several basic shapes (or topologies): notably the all-channel or fully connected or full-
matrix networks, where everyone is connected to and can communicate directly with 
everyone else (Evan, 1972). In the same train of thought, social network theory has been 
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seriously taken into consideration by organizational communication scholars who 
emphasize the importance of knowledge networks in global organizations and their 
relationships with IT-based organizations. Organizational researchers have designed 
computer models that test hypotheses about networks and information diffusion, changes 
in people’s knowledge and interaction networks, and the dynamics of networks of 
cultural influence.  
Finally, in international relations, the concept of network has been embraced by 
functionalists and integration theorists, and in the “cobweb” theory of world order of 
Burton (1972). 
Social Network Theory Rooted in Systems Theory 
Social network theory is among the dynamic large-scale theories of social systems 
(Berlinski, 1976; Hejl, 1984; Luhmann, 1982, 1995; Zeeuw, 1992) that emerged from 
Hegel’s systems theory (Beiser, 1993; Kojève, 1969). Georg Hegel (1770-1831) was a 
German idealist philosopher (Lukács, 1975) who suggested a holistic approach to 
understanding the dynamic interrelationship of parts to a whole. Hegel’s goal was to 
explain historical development as a dynamic process (Kojève, 1969). The main core of 
his theory was the system rather than the individual in isolation. As such, Hegel looked at 
society as a set of organizational and behavioral pattern structures that a system learned 
to select from the complex choices presented to it without full information as to the 
outcome (Beiser, 1993). In this train of thought, society came to make sense out of its 
options, as it came to learn from the outcomes. From this, it follows that the system 
develops means of self-analysis (Weinberg, 1975) to generate parts (or subsystems) that 
interact with all this complexity, and means to interact with these interactions. The main 
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premises of systems theory, then, are that a system is the sum of all its parts plus the 
effects of interrelation and interdependency among those parts – thus, a system is more 
than the mere sum of its parts – that the whole determines the nature of the parts 
(Lilienfeld, 1978; Weinberg, 1975), and that the parts cannot be isolated from the whole. 
Later, Marx and Darwin used Hegel’s theory in their work. Systems theory was 
strengthened and corroborated by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy as the basis for the 
field of study known as “general systems theory” (Bertalanffy, 1962, 1968). Instead of 
reducing a biological system, such as a plant or animal, to parts (organs or cells), systems 
theory posits that each component is related to other parts. The entire system functions as 
a whole, but each part (or subsystem) is identified by the unique activity that occurs 
within it. Consequently, Bertalanffy’s “general systems theory” influenced and impacted 
postliminary attempts to model system needs of organizations on those of all living 
systems (e.g., Miller, 1978). 
Today, systems theory has become an interdisciplinary study of the organization 
of phenomena: living things, objects, nodes, organizations, and, of course, people. It 
investigates both the principles common to all complex entities, and the (usually 
mathematical) models that can be used to describe them. Research using systems theory 
constitutes a wide range of possibilities of breaking down an organizational structure or 
process (Cortes, Przeworski, & Sprague, 1974). Subsequent, similar theories have 
demonstrated various ways of powerful counterintuitive dynamic effects of system 
structure, and in the past decades, the technical capacities of computer modeling have 
given rise to a powerful explosion of simulations of complex system dynamics (Collins, 
Hanneman, & Mordt, 1995; Bar-Yam, 1988). It is acknowledged among many scientists 
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and researchers that a system is composed of four things. First, a system consists of 
objects – the parts, elements, or variables within the system – that can be physical or 
abstract. Or both, depending on the nature of the system. Second, a system consists of 
attributes – the qualities or properties of the system and its objects. Third, a system has 
interrelationships among its objects. Fourth, a system exists in a particular setting, an 
environment. In fact, a system is a set of things that affect one another within a particular 
environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts. By 
extension, two types of system have been described in systems theory: the closed system 
and the open system. The closed system does not interact with its environment. It does 
not receive information and is likely to disappear. An open system, however, receives 
information, is organized, interacts dynamically with its environment, and adjusts to its 
surrounding systems (Midgley, 2003).  
In the same train of thought, another German thinker, Luhmann (1982) saw social 
systems as “autopoietic” (Bailey, 1997; Bednarz, 1988; Benseler, Hejl, & Kock, 1980; 
Zeeuw, 1992; Zeleny, 1981), that is, based on self-organization, something implying that 
all regulation in such systems is itself regulated and all controls are themselves controlled 
(Mingers, 1994). A system exercises control and achieves self-regulation in order to 
maintain stable states and adjust to its environment. In other words, it reaches the point of 
homeostasis (Luhmann, 1982, 1995). It becomes well ordered while it survives, and, 
because it attains its goals in many ways, it demonstrates the need for 
balance/homeostasis, change and adaptability (morphogenesis) and equifinality 
(Luhmann, 1982, 1995). 
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Finally, for the past few decades, as a result of the introduction of systems theory 
into social sciences, new terms have entered their vocabulary. Supporters of systems 
theory speak of systems, feedbacks and circular loops, cybernetic loops (Wiener, 1961), 
information retrieval, and, of course, networks. Since, for a system to function, there 
must be interaction among its parts, then networks do not exist without interconnection 
among individuals; by the same token, these individuals cannot be understood in isolation 
from the whole (Banathy, 1996). In this day and age, networks of terror are like that; they 
form a complex system of communications that has differentiated itself horizontally into 
a network of interconnected social subsystems. Within the framework of systems theory, 
it is of interest to investigate a cyberterrorist network by analyzing its key components. 
Social Network Theory and the Internet 
 The rationale for describing systems theory in the previous section lies in the fact 
that the complex structures and growth patterns of the Internet appear to resemble those 
of complex living systems, among which are the metabolic networks that operate inside 
cells and the social networks that constitute societies (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). 
This section describes social network theory as applied to (1) the Internet, (2) the threats 
to Internet and computer security, and (3) cyberterrorist networks. 
Social Network Theory Applied to the Internet 
 How does social network theory apply to the Internet? In a few words, the 
Internet is composed of an extremely large network of nodes that link computer systems 
worldwide, allowing them to send and receive information (Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 
2003). The networks of emails and many Web sites, for instance, have the unique 
structure of what we call “scale-free” networks (also known as “small world” networks). 
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Scale-free networks are characterized by their centrally located, highly connected hubs, 
which considerably influences the way the Internet operates (Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 
2003).  
The great advantage for the Internet to have a scale-free distribution is that 
navigation and communication online are extremely fast. In contrast, it takes much 
longer, with many more hops, to travel or communicate across networks that are not 
scale-free (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). Furthermore, because the Internet is a scale-
free network, the number of nodes with a specified number of connections automatically 
decreases as that number of nodes increases (Keller, 2005). Many nodes are linked to the 
network by way of just one connection: fewer have two, even fewer have three, and so 
down the line. As opposed to an exponential network, in the Internet network, there 
remain small but significant numbers of nodes that have many connections (Albert, 
Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). Consequently, the Internet is characterized by an uneven 
distribution of connectedness. Instead of the nodes of the Internet network having a 
random pattern of connections, some nodes act as very connected hubs, which 
significantly influence how the Internet network operates, while many other nodes do not 
(Keller, 2005). 
Social Network Theory Applied to the Threats to Internet and Computer Security 
We have seen that the Internet enables the formation of scale-free networks 
(Keller, 2005) and that it is a gigantic network of nodes that link computer systems 
worldwide, allowing them to exchange information (Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003). 
What this sub-section accentuates is how social network theory can be applied to the 
dangers posed by cyberterrorists to Internet and computer security. The Internet has many 
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nodes, and the majority of these nodes are so insignificant that the system will still 
survive if these nodes can crash. Basically, these nodes are like drops in the ocean. They 
are called “random” nodes. If truth be told, a very small percentage of Internet nodes are 
down at any given time (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). What this means is that the 
Internet can cope with up to 80% of all random node failures. Indeed, a scale-free 
network can absorb random node failures up to 80% of its small nodes before it 
dismantles. The reason for this is the non-homogeneity of the nodes on the Internet 
network; in many cases, failures are likely to occur on relatively small nodes (Faloutsos, 
Faloutsos, & Faloutsos, 1999; Matlis, 2002). With their very connected nodes, which are 
statistically unlikely to fail under random conditions, connectivity in the network is 
maintained. It takes quite a lot of random failure before the hubs are wiped out, and only 
then does the network stop working (Matlis, 2002).  
However, a major problem is that some of these Internet nodes, although few in 
numbers, are not random; rather, they are so powerful that they connect a great number of 
Web servers. These nodes act as very connected hubs, that is, as places of convergence in 
the network or as central connections to all devices in the network. When cyberterrorists 
know how to disrupt these nodes, the Internet will essentially be broken down into 
isolated parts (Ball, 2000). Failure of random nodes might have extremely little impact on 
a scale-free network’s connectivity or survival, but cyber attacks on network hubs will 
not only completely destroy the Internet; they will also make the Internet unusable until 
repaired. Cyber attacks can be terminal as cyberterrorists would mainly target the routers 
and servers that provide the most connections to the rest of the network. Connectivity is 
maintained by a few highly connected nodes, that is, hubs. The destruction of only 5-15% 
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of these hubs will effectively disable the Internet (Faloutsos, Faloutsos, & Faloutsos, 
1999; Matlis, 2002). Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000) claim that the destruction of just 
4% of these hubs will destroy the Internet. No matter what the exact figure is, the 
percentage is still small and should these hubs be targeted, they will make the Internet 
break into many isolated fragments.  
As one can see, a cyber attack, in which node failures are not random but are the 
result of deliberate harm, if directed at hubs, will make the Internet fail catastrophically 
(Matlis, 2002). Eliminate the very connected nodes and the scale-free network will stop 
functioning. What this all boils down to saying is that with respect to cyber attacks the 
critical infrastructures, whether the nodes on the network are randomly distributed or are 
scale-free makes a huge difference (Matlis, 2002). Yet, if the cyberterrorist is more than 
an amateur, and if he or she is armed with a map of a scale-free network, he or she could 
strategically focus their cyber attack(s) on the few very connected nodes. Destroying just 
a few of these could knock out virtually all flow of or access to information for other 
Web users, which, in turn, would disintegrate the webs rapidly into isolated fragments 
(Ball, 2000). This is the Achilles’ heel of the Internet (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). 
For this reason, protection against cyberterrorism needs to be concentrated on making 
key nodes or hubs invulnerable (Ball, 2000). 
Truly, a full understanding that the scale-free network that makes up the Internet 
is fragile is vital to Internet security. The Internet is simply too vulnerable to attacks that 
use malicious software programs. The same Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000) present 
us with a clever analogy when they claim that the network of nodes of the Internet can be 
compared to the network of airports in the United States. Most American airports are 
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small and would not disrupt the system too much if they were shut down. Yet, airports in 
cities like New York, Los Angeles, or Atlanta are so indispensable to the country that 
closing them would disastrously affect traffic (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000).  
Now, social network theory can be applied in exactly the same way to computer 
security. In the United States, most nuclear, water, electric, gas, telephone, data, 
transportation, and distribution systems are scale-free networks just like the Internet and 
they rely heavily on computer systems. This also means that, in order to function, they 
must be very dependent on highly connected nodes or hubs. Cyber attackers already 
know it. For this reason, these highly connected nodes or hubs need to be protected. 
Social Network Theory Applied to Cyberterrorist Networks 
Now that we know how the Internet is mapped from a social network perspective, 
and what the dangers are if the hubs are destroyed, let us focus on how networks of 
cyberterrorists function. Applying social network theory to the study of cyberterrorist 
networks is the first step to understanding the structure of their networks. While most 
conventional terrorist networks today tend to be scale-free networks (Robb, 2004), it is 
difficult to determine whether or not networks of cyberterrorists are scale-free. No 
empirical research on social networks of cyberterrorists has been published in a scholarly 
journal so far. I, the researcher, have found, based on the data that I collected, how social 
networks of cyberterrorists operate and whether or not their networks are scale-free.  
A scale-free network obeys a power law distribution in the number of connections 
among nodes on the network (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001). While some few 
nodes display extremely high connectivity (essentially scale-free), the vast majority of 
nodes are fairly poorly connected (Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003). Yet, from the literature 
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on cyberterrorism (i.e., Dunnigan, 2003, Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Schwartau, 1996; 
Zepp, 1999), it appears that all cyberterrorists can be highly connected when they feel 
they need to. Cyberterrorists do not meet in the physical realm as conventional terrorists 
do. Yet, cyberterrorists still need a “location” where they can meet, share ideas, swap 
insights, exchange tools and software programs, all of which provide the means, 
knowledge, and motivations they need to wreak havoc against Internet and computer 
networks.  
One of these important locations is the chat room. Indeed, cyberterrorists use the 
Internet to communicate with each other and, among the many Internet locations where 
they can meet, the chat room is the one they need the most (Zepp, 1999). A chat room 
can be used as a hub by cyberterrorists; it is a central location in the Internet network that 
has a large number of highly connected nodes. Put in layperson’s terms, it is a service 
given by Internet providers that allows Web users worldwide to communicate. 
Communication in the chat room is done via Internet Relay Chats (IRCs). There are 
countless chat rooms where cyberterrorists can communicate and network among each 
other. Some are, of course, more important than others. In these chat rooms, a 
cyberterrorist can simply ask another how to conduct an attack and get almost instant 
feedback. This really enables the cyberterrorist not to waste time searching what they 
need on the World Wide Web or through newsgroups (Zepp, 1999).  
So, the chat room is like a hub, a central location with a vast number of highly 
connected nodes. Therefore, the “scale-free network” theory can be applied in this very 
context. The larger the chat room – that is, the hub – has been in place, the greater the 
number of links to it. By the same token, the greater the capacity of the hub, the faster its  
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growth. Yet, cyberterrorist network hubs cannot be identified based on the number of 
links alone. Hubs vary in value depending on multiple vectors such as depth of 
connections, frequency of contact (which may indicate that the individual is a conduit for 
information flow rather than a resource), and duration of links (which is tied to the 
importance of that individuals skill set to ongoing operations of cells that they connect 
to). 
Of equal relevance is the fact that cyberterrorists operate in an “all-channel” type 
of network, as it was previously explained (see Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951). The “all-
channel” network is a network where all dispersed nodes can be interlinked for 
simultaneous dissemination of information and instant coordination (Barabasi, 2002). 
This is precisely how the chat room works: simultaneous dissemination of information 
and immediate coordination. The chat room is the perfect example of an Internet hub 
because it has decentralized command and control, as well as extremely fast 
communication flow between numerous nodes in the network. The main corollary thereof 
is that geography and location in the network are not the primary factors that determine 
connections among cyberterrorists. Rather, in a scale-free system like the chat room, Web 
users connect to well-connected others. For this reason, chat rooms, some of which 
become even bigger and more attractive to cyberterrorists, can best be explained by social 
network theory.  
Now that we know social network theory, its definition, its main components, its 
origins, its application to the Internet and to computer security, and what cyberterrorist 
networks are, let us proceed to use social network theory in comparative analysis between 
terrorist networks of Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks today. 
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A Comparative Analysis of Terrorist Networks 
in Antiquity and Cyberterrorist Networks Today 
This section is a comparative analysis of terrorist networks in Antiquity and 
cyberterrorist networks today. Particularly studied is the comparison between the social 
network of the Jewish Revolt in 66-73 CE and the cyberterrorist attacks during the 
Kosovo war in 1999. The Revolt in 66-73 CE, also known as “the First Revolt,” was 
propelled by a social network of terrorists, of which the main group was the Zealots. 
Other groups joined them later. The Kosovo conflict saw the rise of the first major 
Internet war where malicious independent hackers targeted NATO and US government 
Web sites. The analysis is based on social network theory because it embodies a 
particular theoretical orientation towards the structure of terrorist networks. It also 
enables the author to make the point that social network theory is the best theory that can 
be used to demonstrate that cyberterrorist networks resemble networks in Antiquity in 
some ways, and differ from them in many other ways. The ultimate goal is to bridge the 
gap between theory and practice. An important conclusion from the analysis is that the 
centrality of the Zealots during the Jewish Revolt exemplifies the measure of the 
prominence of the “star” or “wheel” network. In other words, the ties that the Zealots 
have with other factions make them prominent because they are “particularly visible to 
the other actors in the network” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 172). What is also 
relevant is that the relations among the groups were nondirectional (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). After the analysis of the Jewish revolt, I provide an analogy with the 
cyberterrorism incident over the Kosovo conflict. What was shown was that 
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cyberterrorist networks follow a pattern of the all-channel network, where all the nodes 
can connect with any other node, without the fear of being caught.  
This section starts with an extensive literature review. Drawing on a description 
of terrorism in Antiquity and what their networks looked like, the point is made that the 
current shape of cyberterrorism casts a new light on the examination of terrorism in 
Antiquity. In fact, based on six factors, many analogies can be made between 
cyberterrorist networks in this day and age and terrorist networks among the Ancients. 
Those factors include (1) similar terrorist motivations, (2) similar illegal money-making, 
(3) similar end result: fear, (4) similar patterns of communication, (5) similar connections 
and kinship webs, and (6) similar obstacles. The conclusion of the section is to not only 
compare the similarities between the two types of networks, but also the many 
differences that exist. A cyberterrorist network is a postmodern type of network, where 
no leadership is needed, no center exists, and where communication is ultra flexible and 
quasi limitless. As opposed to those Ancient hierarchical structures that were vertically 
designed, cyberterrorist organizations are actually not organizations. They do not exhibit 
an intrinsically “group” or “design” nature.  
Terrorist Networks in Antiquity 
Terrorist networks, for the purpose of intimidating or destabilizing entire peoples, 
regimes, or systems, have existed from the days of Antiquity (Anderson & Sloan, 2002b). 
In fact, networking is a strategy that has long been used to reach political, religious, 
economical, or social goals. Nevertheless, the historical reality of terrorism in a certain 
period and in a certain place is not easy to determine. One of the reasons is that the legal 
description of particular forms of behavior of people informs much about the attitudes 
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and expectations of the state, but not about the activities and motivation of criminals 
(Mitchell, 1998), or extremist groups. The imposition of blame takes the form of labeling 
(Jones, 1964). Some acts and their agents are labeled “criminal,” others are not. This is 
why it is deemed necessary and beneficial to characterize what a terrorist was in 
Antiquity. 
What Was a Terrorist in Antiquity? 
Terrorism is as old as the human discovery that people can network into social 
groups. Since the rise of barbarous tribes that conquered agricultural communities and 
expelled them from the land (i.e., to live in walled cities), terror has been a powerful 
weapon in humans’ efforts to achieve domination (Baring & Cashford, 1991; Saksena, 
1985). In Antiquity, terrorists – although a term that did not exist until 1793, the tragic 
period that followed the French revolution – were those who were hunted down by the 
Roman and Greek states (Horsley, 1986), as well as territories in the Middle East 
(Farmer, 1956), for political or religious reasons.  
Pre-state societies generally did not have an idea of “crime” (Roberts, 1979). 
They considered torts committed against a member of that society as an issue for dispute-
solving, rather than the penalization of one side by an external body (Burkert, 1983; 
Girard, 1977; Mair, 1962; Roberts, 1979). Yet, in Antiquity, the conception of violent 
“crime,” or what would be “terrorism” today, came to the forefront. When it was not 
violence produced by the state, but delivered by other agencies (i.e., rebels in early 
central Italy of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE) (Rawlings, 1998), the criteria defining 
terrorists were imposed by Greek and Roman power-holders who decided to place them 
beyond the pale of civilized society. Terrorist actions extended across a spectrum from 
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killing political figures “to regional insurrections and the bids for power of would-be 
emperors” (Mitchell, 1998, p. 157). The illegitimacy of terrorism and all forms of 
banditry was the perfect correlate of the legitimacy of the Mediterranean empires. The 
codified law of the Roman Empire, for instance, was able to place rebels in a category of 
literal outlaws, enemies of the state, and with absolutely no form of legal recognition 
(Mitchell, 1998). More importantly, they were identified not merely as “enemies of the 
state,” but also as those who belonged to society in conflict, divided from one another by 
class, by deviant political systems or by primitive geographical conditions (Mitchell, 
1998). 
In line with these contentions, the term “reapers of terror” (and all its related 
forms) was not in normal usage a self-descriptor adopted by terrorists themselves, but a 
sticker attached to them by the state, as well as by their victims’ families, potential 
victims, and supporters from other states, who viewed them as spreading dismay, fear, 
and panic. Terrorists were those sufficiently alienated from the “order” to take violent 
action against the local elites and their property (Hopwood, 1998). Usually, they were 
organized criminal gangs, a.k.a. ergasterion (in the singular), that is, “workshop of 
violence” (Davidson, 1997), or “workshop of offenders” (Fisher, 1998). They were 
engaged in assassination, kidnapping, fraud, either in the countryside or in the urban 
areas (Fisher, 1998). Some of them were called latrones (bandits), others were called 
kakourgoi (wrongdoers) and poneroi (villains), all of whom had a perverse nature to be in 
constant rebellion (Hopwood, 1998). Those hardcore rebels and violent objectors to the 
state were typically headquartered in mountains. From these territories, they launched 
their attacks on the plain and its cities (Hopwood, 1998).  
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Equally, important, terrorists in Antiquity were also “semi-professionals” who 
expected some reward. They were typically independent mercenaries who considered 
themselves free. They were armed retainers drawn from the same source as those labeled 
as illegitimate, freelance users of force (Hopwood, 1998). Terrorism on a small scale 
became terrorism on a national scale when some of them took their family interests into 
the foreign-policy arena.  
What Did Terrorist Networks in Antiquity Look Like? 
As Hopwood (1998) nicely puts it, these “part-time deviants” needed 
organization. Organized terrorism tended to gain the legitimacy of official policy, 
particularly when aimed at external targets, such as neighboring polities or their 
prominent citizens (Rawlings, 1998). Terrorism in Antiquity also involved careful 
network planning; it was made of informal, loosely structured open networks, usually 
divided into small fragmented, and ephemeral enterprises (Potter, 1994). The habits and 
the movements of the targets were watched by one group, weapons were procured by 
another group, and transport as well as safe housing was provided by either network cells 
or private owners interested in terrorist activities.  
Because each terrorist group had its own private intelligence network, no one 
group would have created a single central intelligence organization that might fall into 
the hands of a rival faction. Part of the reason was that small groups sometimes plotted 
against each other (Fisher, 1992). The power and status of these terrorists was measured 
by their ability to attempt to out-do members of rival states or communities. Those 
groups were “competing interest groups of individuals who may well have used their 
personal supporters and a range of methods for their own advancement” (Rawlings, 1998, 
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p. 99). As such, while conflict and violence were ever-present in the network among two 
or more factions, the balance between autonomy and domination was most often 
mediated by personalized links between leaders or leading representatives of those 
groups (Mitchell, 1998). 
The aristocratic families of early Greece shared similar characteristics with 
terrorist networks in that they resembled Mafia-like criminal gangs. They were small, 
closely knit groups that were composed of the same kith (Laqueur, 1999b). They 
committed killings for political and economical motives. Killing was actually the first 
resort, as they were impatient for quick results. They gathered wealth by violent, 
deceitful, and otherwise illegitimate means (Wees, 1998b). They were also difficult to 
infiltrate in that they were well organized, dedicated to aggressive material goals, and 
relentlessly inclined to flourishing their economic enterprises. Spying, plotting, and 
informing seemed to be, at least at times, organizationally complex affairs (Berdan, 
1998). Networked groups needed a safe location where they could plan their actions with 
minimal risks involved. As Fisher (1998) explains it, they would congregate in 
an establishment where friends and associates might choose to regularly meet, if 
necessary in relative secrecy (perhaps under the front of a retail business), and in 
a “workshop” for a specific group of criminals, and hence an organized criminal 
network with an identifiable base (p. 55). 
A rarely mentioned example of such networked terrorism is the chaotic and 
violent practice of terror by revolutionaries in the area of Taurus, southern Anatolia. In 
that area, terrorists were responsible for threats to society which fell short of warfare, that 
is, organized interstate violence, but which were more than merely individual and random 
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acts of criminal behavior (Mitchell, 1998). They were groups that reached the peak of 
their power and whose disastrous energies had to be checked by an authority powerful 
enough to enforce law and order on its members (Whitby, 1998). They networked with 
others in order to commit horrible killings as well as upper-class crimes against property 
(Fisher, 1992). Likewise, in other ancient societies, such as the ancient Aztec society, 
multiple actors were involved in similar abominable networks. For instance, any bribe-
taker would network with a bribe-giver (that is, stolen goods had to be obtained and 
passed from person to person) (Berdan, 1998), and some acts of killing required the 
organization of more than one perpetrator.  
Another important consideration of terrorism in Antiquity was their networks of 
“patronage.” Indeed, not only were clans of terror highly stratified, but they also harbored 
extra-legal and violent forms of patronage (Zehr, 1978). In fact, patronage should be 
considered a form of treason or improper collaboration. It implied that the more personal 
the relationship, the less expensive, overtaxing, and demanding the “contract.” The verbal 
agreements on which these contracts were based were followed for the sake of 
“friendship” and involved the exchange of services and favors (Blok, 1974). Patronage 
was practiced by hierarchical, Mafia-like organizations based on gentes, or clans, often 
exploiting relationships between “perpetrators” of terror and “sellers” of terror, like 
patron-client relationships (Rawlings, 1998). Through patronage, clans provided a 
network of resources and contacts (Rawlings, 1998). In many societies, patronage was 
vital to maintaining a degree of social harmony (Silverman, 1977; Wees, 1998a). Yet, the 
problem was that patronage was also synonym with harboring terrorists. There was much 
legislation concerning the harboring of terrorists on estates which were taken together 
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with laws directed against those promoting acts such as “fencing” properties. These were 
usually interpreted as efforts to close off potential support for bandits, and thereby render 
them more isolated (Shaw, 1984). 
The Boukoloi 
The rebellion of the Boukoloi is a very good example of terrorist networks in 
Antiquity. The Boukoloi (pronounced vookolee in Modern Greek) lived across the central 
and northern Egyptian Delta. The Delta is “a huge flood-plain formed by the division of 
the Nile into its various branches just to the north of modern Cairo” (Alston, 1998, p. 
137). The Delta consisted of a number of urban areas, surrounded by a number of villages 
or small settlements (Brink, 1987, 1988). The Boukoloi had to network in order to 
survive. A bloodthirsty group living in a meandering of lakes and marshes, they were 
considered what we would call today “terrorists” by various peoples such as the Romans 
(Alston, 1995). One of the areas, Mareotis, where they possibly lived, was an area of 
terrorist activity, led by different tribes. The networking between the Boukoloi and such 
groups was complex, but, apparently, they could only survive by exchanging foods and 
goods from the agriculture. The Boukoloi killed a lot of Romans in the Egyptian Delta in 
the 170s BCE; they infringed upon local security measures and intimidated the Syrian 
forces, possibly helped by forces from Arabia (Alston, 1998). More importantly, the 
Boukoloi were also considered “an enemy within,” “a source of potential disruption and 
criminality throughout the Delta” (Alston, 1998, p. 142) and “outlaws” (p. 144). They 
were enemies who were stigmatized. Becoming Boukoloi was becoming “other.” 
With the Boukoloi, we observe the account of a rebellious group that is 
characteristic of terrorist network activity. Terrorism here appears to be a social 
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phenomenon. Their rebellion was caused by a combination of ruthless and 
uncompassionate government, drastic social conditions, economic difficulties, and escape 
from oppressive Roman taxation (Alston, 1998). In these circumstances, the state had 
trouble gathering forces to put down their rebellion. As one can see, the Boukoloi really 
resemble terrorist groups in modern banditry and guerrilla warfare. What we have here is 
“rural banditry stemming from within the settled community and exacerbated by 
economic problems” (Alston, 1998, p. 144). 
The Comparative Analysis 
The current shape of cyberterrorism casts a new light on the examination of 
terrorism in Antiquity. In fact, based on six factors, many analogies can be drawn 
between cyberterrorist networks in this day and age and terrorist networks among the 
Ancients. Those factors include (1) similar terrorist motivations, (2) similar illegal 
money-making, (3) similar end result: fear, (4) similar patterns of communication, (5) 
similar connections and kinship webs, and (6) similar obstacles.  
Similar Terrorist Motivations 
Terrorist matters are quite volatile and unexpected, yet motivation has always 
been the key (Sloan, 1995). Four categories of motivations have been identified: (1) 
political ambitions, (2) economic deprivations, (3) crime for crime’s sake, and (4) the 
need for publicity. The first category of motivation is political (Fisher, 1998). The word 
“political” here is used as a broad term that comprises “religious” and “social.” Political 
murder appears in the earliest annals of humankind (Laqueur, 1999b). Political 
oppression and social idealism are generally mentioned as the root causes of terrorism. 
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As Schweitzer (2002) puts it, terrorism in Antiquity was primarily based on political 
motivation. It was mainly,  
premeditated violence directed against both armies and general populations 
characterized the actions of rebellious forces, seeking new political orders, that 
destroyed the early civilizations of the Dark Ages, triggered the decline of the 
Egyptian Old Kingdom, brought down the states of Greece and Crete, and toppled 
the Roman Empire (p. 25). 
In line with these contentions, the Zealots felt the need for radical political change 
as well. The Zealots were a Jewish extremist group of the 1st century CE involved in 
fierce terrorist acts during the Roman Empire (Smith, 1971); they refused that Jews pay 
taxes to Rome and did not acknowledge the authority of the Roman emperor. Their 
closest “co-workers” were called the Sicarii. Sicarii is a word derived from the word sica,
a short sword used to attack their targets (Laqueur, 1999a). They held out against Rome 
for six years before choosing mass suicide over surrender in Masada in 73 CE (Ben-
Yehuda, 1998), when the second Temple was burned down and the Jewish state ceased to 
exist (Gray, 1993). They were convinced that political change could come only through 
“propaganda of the deed” (Laqueur, 1999b). Their hate and fanaticism were so deeply 
ingrained that they were willing to use any weapon to strike Roman soldiers (who had by 
military force occupied the Holy Land and the City of David), Jewish “collaborators” 
who favored these Romans (i.e., the Pharisees), and Jewish moderates in Palestine who 
had succumbed to Hellenistic influences. This is why they adopted terrorism as their 
main form of struggle. Their most basic motive was that all means were justified to attain 
political and religious liberation. 
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Political ambition and commitment are also part of the agenda of cyberterrorists 
(Denning, 2001). Sabotage of electronic networks, power grids, and other elements of a 
nation’s infrastructure may not be solely aimed at crippling specific individuals or groups 
(Schweitzer, 2002). In some cases, these cyberterrorist acts are also aimed at achieving 
political goals. Nevertheless, they may prove to be alarmingly effective in the 
disintegration of institutions, thereby disrupting thousands, indeed millions of lives 
(Schweitzer, 2002). Governments also use cyberterrorists as propagandists, or even 
soldiers. Their intent is to overthrow specific political systems. During the conflict over 
Kosovo, government actors and nonactors were dangerous hackers because they launched 
email bombs against other governments’ computers, taking over their web sites, deluging 
viruses, and even coordinating actions with fellow conspirators (Denning, 2001). 
Such government-sponsored terrorism is an old practice. Terrorism in Antiquity 
“found its sponsors in the hallowed halls of officialdom, in the entity known as 
government” (Collins, 2002, p. 3). The motivation was also to create social engineering 
stratagems to transform terrorists into conscienceless machines (Collins, 2002). History 
has recorded that, up to this day, most terrorists have been young, the great majority 
being male, especially for right-wing movements. If, however, the state was to “own” 
violence, it had not only to apportion redress, but also to impose blame. To this extent, it 
is fair to say that some of the terrorist acts in Antiquity were a result of state-formation. 
Today, rogue governments supply the technological know-how to cyberterrorists “either 
by political design or for commercial gain” (Laqueur, 1999b). When cyberterrorists fight 
anonymously against political opponents, they try to hide their tracks. For instance, the 
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damaging Code Red virus of 2001 came from China (Dunnigan, 2003). Foreign experts 
even believed the Chinese government backed it up, but China denied any responsibility.  
A second category of motivation is economical. Terrorism has oftentimes been a 
movement against the rich. Aristotle already found connections between poverty and 
crime (Fisher, 1998). In this sense, terrorist acts help us make sense of the forms of 
oppression among certain groups. We saw in the previous section that the Boukoloi 
rebelled against the Romans mainly for economical reasons: they were suffering from 
drastic social conditions, financial difficulties, and arduous Roman taxation (Alston, 
1998). To cite another example, Herod the Great accumulated immense wealth by 
acquiring Judea and building Caesarea, an artificial harbor on the eastern Mediterranean 
coast. His income was about 40 million denarii per year, which amounted to 
approximately one tenth of the estimated total budget of the Roman Empire (Starr, 1982). 
This, among other reasons, created an economic upturn in Judea and led different 
extremist groups to revolt and commit crimes against the power-holders. Today, terrorist 
crimes can also be perpetrated for financial reasons. It is not unusual to learn that viruses 
and other damaging Internet-based weapons have been sent by cyberterrorists who live in 
countries that are poor, sometimes extremely poor. Pakistan, considered a third-world 
country by the United Nations, has a large population of skilled programmers and 
Internet explorers (Dunnigan, 2003) who are ready to support the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
in return for all kinds of favors (some of them are financial rewards). One of their tasks is 
to cause economic damage to their enemies. 
A third terrorist motivation is criminal in character. In this case, terrorists commit 
crimes for crime’s sake, not based on shared values. The rise of small sectarian groups in 
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Antiquity showed that they lacked clear political and economical agendas. Their goal was 
to destroy infrastructures or, in some cases, humankind (Laqueur, 1999b). Terrorism was 
an undeclared, but open war; their motivation was to hurt. Emerging from a temple’s 
doorway, after studying a target’s routine every night, they knew the exact moment to 
strike. This is how some Roman emperors were assassinated. Some of the cyberterrorists 
have the same goal and tactic. As Mansfield (2000) puts it, “it’s usually contempt. Most 
virus writers and hackers feel left out of the mainstream society… money isn’t their 
primary motivation in most cases” (p. 20). Indignation and a wish for revenge (for 
transgressions against them, whether real or imagined) can be their prime motivations. 
Cyberterrorists are even branded as “the intellectual version of those spray-painting 
teenagers” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 40). After all, what types of crime do most cyberterrorist 
acts entail? Breaking into somebody else’s computer network, corrupting data, damaging 
files, or even changing a product’s dosage (in a hospital) that relies solely upon an 
electronic device. Hackers whose sole purpose is to “destroy” have their own nickname. 
They are called “black hats.” “Black hats,” or “crackers,” are out to do damage 
(Mansfield, 2000). A good analogy could be made with criminals in Antiquity: kakourgoi 
(wrongdoers) and poneroi (villains) wore a sort of dark hat when they were out to 
commit a murder. No matter what, the goal of cyberterrorists is criminal. It is even more 
than that; it is insidious. What makes the United States so powerful is not only its 
economy, values, and people, it is also the hardware, software, and electronic 
infrastructure upon which the country’s development and growth rest (Verton, 2003a). 
Cyberterrorists know that. Their attacks inflict heavy symbolic injuries on this nation. 
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A last category of motivation is the need for publicity. Classic terrorism is 
“propaganda by deed.” Terrorism is news (Laqueur, 1999b). Terrorists need publicity. In 
66-73 century CE, the Zealots sent their members to places where they would slit the 
throats of Romans (and those who favored them) in public. In fact, they employed very 
visible and visual acts of murder against Roman legionnaires or Jewish citizens they saw 
as guilty of apostasy or treason. Their killings frequently took place in broad daylight and 
in front of witnesses, in crowded market places or on feast days. The reason the Zealots 
committed those acts so blatantly was to show themselves who they were (Roth, 1959). 
Their ultimate goal was to send a message to the Roman authorities and those they called 
“Jewish traitors.” 
Later, this tactic was repeated by subsequent generations of terrorists. Not 
surprisingly, cyberterrorists also try to gain publicity. As such, not only do they attempt 
to find flaws that exist in private and federal computers (and other Internet-based and 
electronic systems), they also show their targets that they are what they want to be, that 
is, computer geniuses who, after having sold their souls to a cause for diverse reasons, 
like to catch computer users by surprise. What it boils down to saying is that 
cyberterrorism, just like terrorism, is inherently a communicative process (O’Hair & 
Heath, 2005). Cyberterrorism can be promoted via the Internet, a public communication 
channel. As such, it is publicized and perpetuated through new media communication. 
Therefore, it is essentially through semiotics and the exploitation of new media that 
cyberterrorists find success in accomplishing their primary goals. In 2002, a group of 
cyberterrorists, known as the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD), hacked into the 
official Web site of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and defaced it. As a title, they 
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wrote, “The Face of the World’s Biggest Murderer.” At the bottom of the Web site, they 
left a message with the signature of the group. The WFD’s hacking into Sharon’s official 
Web site stands out as one example of a cyberterrorist group that was in a position to do 
far more damage and perhaps cause a national crisis in Israel (Verton, 2003a). This 
example shows that cyberterrorism is a semiotic act that is a message, a symbol, and a 
new media image. Clearly, by gaining such visibility – and sometimes they can infiltrate 
hundreds of thousands of computers – terrorists are able to spread terror in cyberspace 
and evoke fear. Of course, they would never divulge their real identity. Besides, it is 
impossible to categorize a whole group of people with a single character portrait 
(Mansfield, 2000). Some merely seek publicity to show their excitement and power, 
although they can cause a lot of ravage in the process. The Zealots would also kill people 
in broad daylight for “publicity” purposes, but they would still cover their heads and not 
reveal who they were as individuals. 
As one can see, for two millennia terrorists of all sorts have committed their acts 
based on four motivations, that is, political, economical, merely criminal, or for publicity 
purposes. Those last five pages are important because they lead to the premise that 
motivations are what unite people with the same convictions, the same goals, people who 
have a common denominator. Given this, they are ready to move on and join forces by 
creating local groups that will spread out like mushrooms. This is how terrorist networks 
emerge. The motivation to kill leads to propagation of killing. And what is the best way 
to propagate? The best way to propagate is to network. As we will see later, 
cyberterrorists divide themselves in smaller cyberterrorist factions, like it was in 
Antiquity. Sometimes, they act alone. 
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Similar Illegal Money-Making 
Among the similarities that can be identified between terrorist networks in 
Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks today, it should be noted that they both engage in 
illegal money-making undertakings. This yearning for obtaining funds is significant as an 
aim of terrorist acts, sometimes as a transitional step to finance ambitious plots, to back 
expanded operations, or even to satisfy personal greed (Sloan, 1995). We saw earlier that 
networks of patronage were plentiful in Antiquity. Through patronage, clans provided a 
network of resources and contacts (Rawlings, 1998). This form of illegal money-making 
was practiced by organizations based on gentes, or clans, often exploiting relationships 
between “perpetrators” of terror and “sellers” of terror, like patron-client relationships 
(Rawlings, 1998). As such, it meant that terrorists would be harbored by “patrons” in 
order to yield “revenue.”  
Similarly, in Ancient Greece, organized terrorist activity was also determined by 
the need to obtain money unjustly. Crimes, Fisher (1998) notes, were committed through 
philochrematia, that is, greed and desire for money. Some of the groups to blame were 
collections of rich elite men accepting large bribes from unknown parties. Of equally 
corrupted minds were some members of the Roman elite who used “terror” groups for 
money laundering. They negotiated with dangerous, extremist, and rebellious parties such 
as the Cilicians of Mount Taurus, or Roman Rough Cilicia, living in southern Asia Minor 
(Hopwood, 1998). Not all states in Antiquity considered illegal money-making a serious 
crime, due to an awareness of a lack of effective monitoring of currency movements. 
Consequently, even “respectable” citizens did not feel obligated to refrain from 
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networking with criminals, to report suspicious transactions, or to use any monetary 
instruments payable to bearers.  
Two thousand years later, it seems that few of the networking practices have 
changed. What is very different, however, are the means used by current terrorist groups 
to obtain illegal funds. It is already known that governmental actors and terrorist 
organizations (as well as drug cartels like those in Columbia) network as “enterprises” of 
criminals driven by a thirst for accumulation of wealth (Schweitzer, 2002). In this regard, 
cyberspace also seems to open doors for the development of such “enterprises” as it 
[cyberspace] is a relatively simple and secure base to obtain substantial amounts of 
money (Laqueur, 1999b). When back in the early 1980s Internet users represented small 
communities where everyone knew everyone (Dunnigan, 2003), no one dared to engage 
in networked money laundering on the Net. Today, cyberactions are so unrestrained that 
terrorists can easily operate as stockbrokers, looking for the best deals. As brokers, they 
simply offer dirty money to the highest bidder (Andelman, 1994).  
Another meaningful consideration is that cyberterrorists use e-cash, the most 
widespread form of currency that flows through the financial laundromats (Schweitzer, 
2002). Some of their e-cash comes from wire-transfer companies. Although wire-transfer 
companies provide a valuable service to low communities which can now have easy 
access to banks, they have also served as laundering operations for terrorists (McFadden, 
1997). From this, it may be inferred that wire-transfer companies make transactions and 
terms with cyberterrorists who, in turn, consider those companies as important 
constituents in their network of illegal money-making. A significant analogy can be made 
here with the networks of patronage in Antiquity, where clans and “patrons” provided a 
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network of resources and contacts (Rawlings, 1998) to terrorists by harboring them and 
using them as “members of the workforce.”  
In the same train of thought, the immense growth of international trade and 
business transactions also leads to ever-increasing automation; this means less personal 
interaction with customers (Schweitzer, 2002). For instance, the European Union Bank 
(EUB), “sited” in Antigua, was the first full-service Internet bank. As it operated within a 
banking and Internet free-trade zone, anonymity was guaranteed and no one could trace 
any transaction. This was already the case in some governmental practices in Antiquity 
where, as mentioned earlier, no one felt obligated to report suspicious transactions or to 
use any monetary instruments payable to bearers (as such, nothing was traceable). The 
European Union Bank’s Web site disappeared in 1997, but until then the bank was 
exempt from regulation and not subject to inspection (Farah, 1997). The bank is thought 
to have laundered important sums of money from Russian cyberterrorists. 
A last meaningful similarity is the desire to commit a terrorist act or kill for the 
purpose of obtaining funds. In Ancient Greece, some crimes were committed through 
philochrematia, that is, greed and desire for money (Fisher, 1998). Earning their financial 
keep is also a motive that cyberterrorists share with their Ancient counterparts. They 
would not hesitate to employ threats and violence. It was reported, for example, that 
cyberterrorists and criminal hackers from the Jihad threatened to engage in disruptive 
attacks to blackmail and extort funds from private sectors and commercial enterprises that 
have business affairs with the Israelis (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). To all appearances, 
cyberterrorist prime targets are financial institutions, whose networks could be hacked 
and delved into, and whose money and assets could be plundered. In the same process, 
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financial markets could be affected by the destruction of data or the transfer of phony 
information. Truly, cyberterrorists target those institutions that stand in their greedy 
trajectories to financial payoffs (Schmid, 1996). This is why businesses around the world 
are spending billions of dollars in an attempt to make their bookkeeping and inventory 
control systems untouchable, their transaction billings and payments, proprietary 
information, and personnel records safe (Medd, 1997). 
Similar End Result: Fear 
Acts of extreme violence have always been abominable. As the Zealots 
considered themselves the elite of a new world order, cyberterrorists see themselves as 
“the elite of a new electronic order” (Laqueur, 1999b, p. 77). The ultimate consequence 
of terrorism is fear. Terrorists are part of a movement of a certain period. 
Understandably, the public is fearful of the secret and mysterious character of those who 
would commit such acts, sensing that any actions could occur at any time (Schweitzer, 
2002), even when it is the least expected. In some cases, it even causes as much havoc 
and detriment as the terrorist act itself: panic, the chaotic response from the population 
that is likely to occur when a terrorist act is committed or the threat exists that there may 
be such an act. True panic is contagious, a crowd phenomenon, not an individual one 
(Laqueur, 1999b). As Laqueur (1999b) continues, 
the consequences of a mass panic in both material and human terms can be huge; 
they can lead to a paralysis of normal life, epidemics, post-traumatic stress, and 
tremendous anxiety, especially if the nature and extent of the danger remains 
unknown (p. 272). 
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Let us take the example of the Zealots. Their terrorist actions caused trauma and 
turned Roman citizens (and Jewish sympathizers to the Romans) breathless, speechless, 
or motionless. They became paralyzed. More importantly, the Zealots’ revolt influenced 
subsequent revolts in Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern history, such as the murderous 
crusade led by the Assassins (11th-13th centuries) against those who would not conform to 
their religious beliefs (Anderson & Sloan, 2002b). The sum of their crimes resulted in 
far-reaching dismay and desolation, especially after the Romans destroyed the Temple in 
Jerusalem. Around that time, assassination of politicians was an appraised tactic adopted 
by terrorists to send chills down the spine of the population.  
These goals were achieved to a degree that cyberterrorists, who would instantly 
relate to them, can certainly aspire to. In 2001, for instance, just three viruses caused over 
60 % of the cyberterrorist attacks reported that year (Dunnigan, 2003). That was only 
three viruses. Now let us say that a network of several cyberterrorist groups decides to 
join forces on one single devilish project. All the hopes, all the intergroup cooperation, all 
the energy, all the technology, all the time, and all the money they have will be 
concentrated on that particular project in an attempt to destroy an important infrastructure 
of our nation. Imagine the following situation: they send hundreds of computer viruses, 
plus damaging software, trapdoors, Trojan horses, worms, and spy chips. What would the 
end result be? Fear. Not that defense against cyberterrorists is difficult and in many cases 
impossible (Laqueur, 1999b), but even if the project fails, its magnitude and the impact it 
has on the potential targets are sufficient for cyberterrorists to get their message out. As 
seen earlier, one of their motives is to receive publicity; it is a vital component of terrorist 
strategy that seeks to undermine the will of an enemy. When terrorists publicize, they 
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justify their crimes to a global audience. The media also contributes to heightened panic 
on the part of the population. Most developed societies have numerous media outlets, and 
the more developed a society, the more vulnerable it is to the consequences of hysteria. 
The word “network” itself can be frightening to those who are aware of the 
potential harmful effects of “scattered terrorism.” Already in Antiquity terrorist groups 
relied on networks to deceive their targets. As such, they created the illusion of invincible 
numbers by hiding in wide areas such as mountains. The Cilicians are a good example of 
a terrorist group that inflicted such fright upon the population. From the 1st to the 4th 
centuries CE, the Cilicians were peasants who became extremist insurgents against the 
Roman order. Organized into cells that were dispersed all over the ridges of Mount 
Taurus, they came down the mountains in widely separated groups and used violent force 
against townsfolk (Hopwood, 1998). As such, they struck fear among farmers, 
shipowners, and merchants. Other terrorist groups in Antiquity organized their activities 
around speed. They used rapid group maneuvers, making them look more numerous than 
they really were. All these actions caused a serious weakness in their enemy’s psyche, 
and the terrorists were feared wherever they went. Today, cyberterrorists might not even 
have to network with one another in order to engage in their activities. It may just be one 
or two masters in cyberspace with evil intentions. Society’s reactions to an Internet-
mediated attack, nevertheless, might be that the people who are to blame are members of 
a vast cyberterrorist network, while in reality it was only one or two individuals. 
Cyberspace has contributed to the fear of the unknown because nobody can be sure about 
what is “out there.” While ancient activities led to crises which, in turn, led to coups 
d’état (Wees, 1998b), cyberterrorist activities lead to panic, which, in turn, should lead 
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power-holders to take more measures. Yet, if security measures are insufficiently taken, 
the end result will eventually be a weakness of our psyche.  
 Another factor that leads to fear is the meticulous selection of targets by terrorists. 
In Antiquity, some of the exposed victims of terrorists were actually important figures 
that criminals wanted: politicians with “superior power,” vastly-expanding influence, 
notable personalities, and even rich business owners. In the 5th century BCE, for example, 
networks of “semi-professional” rebels assassinated Ephialtes (c. 460 BCE) and 
mutilated Hermai (Fisher, 1998). In drawing a parallel here, it is interesting to mention 
that some of the most vulnerable victims of cyberterrorists are those owning PCs that also 
have “superior power” (richly supplied), as well as fast and always-on connections (cable 
modem and DSL). These computers are abundant, not always protected, and just the type 
of machines cyberterrorists like to take over (Dunnigan, 2003). 
The point made here is that terrorism leads to “smarter crime” (Laqueur, 1999b). 
Whether it is through speed, through an illusion of invincible numbers, through the 
assassination of important figures, or through independence and invisibility in 
cyberspace, terrorist networks in Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks today share the 
common fact that, in order to strike fear and catch targets by surprise, new and radically 
different offensive techniques have been developed. 
The main element of their offensive technique is the development of new 
“weaponry.” Not only were the Zealots distinguished by strict discipline and obedience, 
but they also had the absolutely best equipment. One of their allies’ weapons was the 
sica, a small dagger, so small that it could be hidden and pulled over in a second to cut a 
throat. With the spread of metals technology, terrorists in Antiquity were able to arm 
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themselves to such a degree that they could easily wreak havoc on both the ruling elites 
and the commoners (Johnson, 1990). As one can imagine, cyberterrorists also have 
powerful equipment. Yet, no one is sure whether they can match US homeland security 
(Dunnigan, 2003). From what we know, however, high-tech damaging software, cracking 
tools, and encryption programs are among many of the cyberterrorists’ tools (Schweitzer, 
2002). Of more concern is the damage terrorists might inflict upon the electronic 
underpinnings of many American institutions, as they save colossal funds for 
cybersabotage. In 1995, there were already over 250,000 hacking attempts, modifications 
of data, and destruction of software and information bases. Attacks against emergency 
response systems, our hospital infrastructures, and educational and commercial 
institutions that are contingent upon computer-based networks may soon become real. 
Calculated short circuits and more serious knots in these electronic webs could bring the 
dynamism of our daily lives as we now know it to a screeching halt, to the delight of 
cyberterrorists waiting to maul technically paralyzed victims (Schweitzer, 2002). 
Similar Patterns of Communication  
Throughout human history, communication has always been a crucial weapon for 
attacking targets (Dunnigan, 2003). Across the centuries, the ability to orally convey 
huge amounts of complex information, and later put it in writing, allowed humans to 
develop particular patterns of communication. In Antiquity, terrorists were already aware 
that managing networks of criminals required new forms of communication, such as 
long-range communication. The result, however, was that authorities could rarely 
intercept or monitor terrorist communication. For instance, the Zealots used a number of 
signals to identify one another and communicate with each other (i.e., private gestures 
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and secret handshakes). They also communicated agendas with the help of word of 
mouth. Since there were no microphones at that time and since most of the Zealots were 
very familiar with the areas where they would commit their crimes, they knew they were 
able to communicate without Big Brother eavesdropping. Only an extreme hazard such as 
treason or a serious mistake on the part of the terrorists themselves would have them 
caught by the Roman authorities.  
Additionally, what was difficult for Roman commanders, in their attempt to bust 
or identify the Zealots, was that communication emerged and changed according to the 
task at hand (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). As such, their patterns of communication were 
often loose, informal, and, depending on the needs of the group, marked by varying 
degrees of intensity. Terrorists have always been interested in studying their enemy’s 
patterns of communication before they attacked. As such, they collected information, a 
lot like what intelligence service agents would do today, with the intent to relay it to the 
power-holders of terrorist groups who needed it as quickly as possible. Besides, for 
several millennia, the objective has always been to disrupt enemy communications 
(Dunnigan, 2003). In the past, this meant sending deceptive signals during an attack.  
Deception is also part of cyberterrorism; the Internet is a powerful, cunning 
semiotic tool for its practice. Deception is the act of both hiding the real and showing the 
false. Its ultimate goal is to promote a desired outcome or to reach an end, a personal 
objective. In “Towards a Semiological Guerrilla Warfare,” Umberto Eco (1986) already 
claimed that “the battle for the survival of man as a responsible being in the 
Communications Era is not to be won where the communication originates, but where it 
arrives” (p. 142). The definition of deception stresses the second party that is involved, 
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where the cyberterrorist is consciously trying to create deception in order to reach an end, 
such as defeating security measures. To defeat security measures, a cyberterrorist or any 
attacker must find a pattern to deceive trusted users into revealing information, or engage 
in disinformation (i.e., trick an unsuspecting mark) into providing them with access 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002). There are, of course, other deceptive practices such as 
swapping gender, using other people’s computers, or relying on encryption programs 
(Schneier, 1996; Stallings, 1998; Wayner, 1996).   
Undoubtedly, new technologies have acutely facilitated communication among 
cyberterrorists and reduced the time for the delivery of information (Monge & Fulk, 
1999). Particularly, not only does the Internet diminish the costs of this delivery of 
information, but it also accelerates the speed of communication and the bandwidth 
(Heydebrand, 1989). As explained earlier, increased terrorist speed was a tactic already 
employed in Antiquity to frighten the enemy or make their defense less capable. Speed 
can also be used to improve communication, multiplying the efficacy of cooperative or 
joint attacks. This became a significant impact of speed. It is the essential quality of an 
attack on the Internet: the more speed cyberterrorists have, the less time the defense has 
to respond (Dunnigan, 2003). When the environment for terrorists is rapidly changing, 
however, so too are the problems. For that reason, intense communication among them 
becomes an ongoing necessity. Communication is indispensable among individuals 
whose tasks are mutually dependent, in the sense that one sends or receives information 
or resources relevant to the other (Watts, 2003). It is not surprising, then, that the Zealots 
were energetically protecting their own patterns of communication by making them more 
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intense and effective. Similarly, protecting one’s own ability to communicate is still a 
vital strategy for any cyberterrorist. 
What comes next is the evidence that terrorists really did and still do operate 
through networks. Although terrorist networks in Antiquity were different from the ones 
that we know today, they still have significant elements in common with cyberterrorist 
networks. Emphasized here are the similarities, not the differences (those will be dealt 
with later). As such, the author makes a series of analogies of Ancient terrorist 
connections and kinship webs with those of cyberterrorists.  
Similar Connections and Kinship Webs 
We should think of terrorist networks not merely as “networks of information 
processors” (Watts, 2003, p. 273), where the role of the network is to operate large 
volumes of information without overloading any individual processors, but also as 
connections and kinship webs. “Connection” means “link,” “tie,” “contact,” and 
“association.” “Kinship” means “relationship,” “friendship,” “alliance,” and, oftentimes, 
“dependence.” All these synonyms not only imply the importance of working in webs, 
but they also involve a notion of trust. Terrorist networks all have similar trust patterns, 
as predictable as the paths by which they come together to form a stronghold. Trust can 
be sometimes so strong that terrorist groups – as it was the case for the Zealots – protect 
their vital communication flows by having their members pledge allegiance that they will 
commit suicide if they are caught. Among other rules imposed by terrorists is that 
members had to eat cyanide or cut their tongues when captured. What is also interesting 
is that part of the failure of Roman and Greek power-holders to dismantle terrorist groups 
was their inability to learn how to harness the power of their networks. Unfortunately, we 
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also live in a time where it is difficult to disrupt cyberterrorist networks because global 
key technologies themselves have become networked.  
The principal task of a terrorist connection or kinship web is not production, but 
coordination. Coordination serves “as an information pump between the individuals 
whose task is production” (Watts, 2003, p. 275). All successful terrorists in Antiquity 
engineered social webs that distributed information. They went after as much information 
as possible. They not only wanted to know fundamental facts and tips (i.e., where the 
enemy was and who was leading them), they also looked for additional details by 
networking, for instance, with people working for the Senate themselves. So they were 
able to make good use of all this information. Anyone waging an attack on the Internet 
must do the same (Dunnigan, 2003). The more the cyberterrorist knows about what he or 
she is dealing with, the more successful he or she will be. Yet, if the cyberterrorist knows 
too much and if the cyberterrorist has been part of a massive cyberterrorist network, he or 
she could compromise the group if he or she were captured. 
Now, another question pops up: how did the terrorists in Antiquity obtain vital 
information on their enemies? There are many answers to this question and it would take 
too many paragraphs to make a historical account. What is necessary to know, however, 
is that some terrorist groups developed connections with corrupt politicians. Yes, 
terrorism-driven corruption is very old. As explained by Blok (1979), it was not unusual 
to see the political elite developing connections with the “evil ones.” Crime involved 
webs of influence that linked heinous insurgents with those in positions of power in the 
political world. Besides, connections in the form of harboring and “fencing” were 
activities on the boundary between straight and Machiavellian. Such interstitial activities 
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became benchmarks for the negotiations between the bandits and the Roman elites in 
their role as law enforcers (Hopwood, 1998). Shaw (1990) reveals a consistent pattern of 
connections between the state-based authority of the Mediterranean lowlands and the 
loosely-structured, but no less capable power structure of the highlands, which focused 
on those in charge of eliminating targets, that is, the big men and their kinship networks.  
As one can see, it is not unfair to say that, in order to be effective, part of the 
terrorist success depended on healthy support, or at least support by a certain segment of 
society. They formed hybrid organizations that were pursuing a combination of political 
and economic agendas. While terrorists in Antiquity were somewhat helped through their 
connections with people working for the Senate, the elites, or even business owners 
(remember “patronage”), cyberterrorists today are able to “get together” via email and 
Internet chat rooms. Such connections are of particularly great appeal to those also 
interested in pursuing a combination of political and economic agendas through Internet-
mediated destruction. As such, creating malicious software has become a networked 
effort and, as a result, more powerful “vandalware” has come to the forefront of 
electronic media (Dunnigan, 2003). As Dunnigan (2003) continues, 
the Internet has enabled people of like mind and intentions to, well, network. In 
the past there would be small communities of programmers all over the country 
(and world), largely brainstorming new products and working in isolation. This 
changed as more software developers got an ARPANET. This ability to connect 
with like-minded people in far-off places was intoxicating (p. 7). 
It is plain to see that the Internet, which used to be a safe haven for small 
communities of programmers, has become “intoxicating.” It is affecting not only the 
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types of targets and weapons terrorists choose, but also the ways in which such groups 
network and structure their organizations. What is even more frightening is that many of 
the nasty terrorist activities are based solely on the use of the Internet, computers, and 
telecommunication devices. The goal is to create connections and coordinate dispersed 
activities (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). So, the effects of networking in cyberspace can be 
detrimental. Now, by being part of a virtual horde, cyberterrorists can be productive with 
others from remote places. No one – at least only a few – anticipated that this opportunity 
to create social networks on the Internet would lead terrorists to form their own 
worldwide connections as well (Dunnigan, 2003). What they have done is understand 
how the system worked and develop ways to take over. Consequences can be devastating 
because, 
they allow those with destruction in mind to get together… For years it was 
thought that the first Trojan horses and viruses, spread around on the Net to 
destroy people’s data, were the work of demented loners. Eventually the 
realization came that even loners like to get together (Dunnigan, 2003, p. 8). 
The rise of networked cyberterrorism is part of a more significant shift to netwar 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Netwar involves measures taken by terrorists to create 
“dispersed, small groups that communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in 
an internetted manner” (Zanini & Edwards, 2001, p. 30). 
In line with these contentions, it is essential, in order to have a good grasp of what 
terrorist networks in Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks share in common, to focus 
more on internal ties among terrorist groups or even within a terrorist group itself. As 
such, it might prove useful to extrapolate the point that was made a couple of paragraphs 
86
earlier that state-based authorities were involved with the “loosely-structured” kinship 
networks of the Mediterranean highlands. What it means is that they were loose networks 
of individuals and subgroups with strategic guidance, but that nonetheless enjoyed more 
tactical independence (Zanini & Edwards, 2001) than soldiers of the Roman and Greek 
armies, shaped like strong hierarchical pyramids. Terrorist networks were also 
hierarchical, yet members still benefited from taking more independent measures. They 
“tended to work in pairs or groups, whether through the casual co-operation of friends, 
temporary groupings of political allies, or as part or more organized, mutually supportive, 
social clubs or political hetaireiai” (Fisher, 1998, p. 57). This was also reflected through 
interactions among members that were sometimes volatile (Ranstorp, 1994), but 
oftentimes flexible. 
There is another advantage of having flexibility and ties among terrorists. 
Individuals with mutual agendas and goals could form subgroups, convene at a target 
location, carry on terrorist operations, and then subsequently terminate their relationships 
and redisperse (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). The Zealots, for instance, collaborated with 
outside groups (from regions outside of the Roman Empire) that would be considered “ad 
hoc” groups today. Part of this strategy to work with “outsiders” is that it is easier to 
punish large groups that feed off of terrorism than to deal with splinter groups that are 
more difficult to figure out, much less to locate (Schweitzer, 2002). Of equal relevance is 
the fact that in networks, as opposed to organizations that have no connections or kinship 
webs, terrorists are not always limited to how much work they can do. Internally, the 
volume of the work is conducted by self-managing teams, while external linkages 
compose “a constellation involving a complex network” (Monge & Fulk, 1999, p. 71) of 
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contributing cells. The Zealots already exemplified the notion that interactions among 
members were flexible and so were their tasks and workloads. Since then, it has been 
recorded that both internal and external ties are made possible not by bureaucratic 
sanction and order (like in vertically-led business corporations of far-Eastern Asia), but 
rather by collective norms and values, as well as reciprocal trust (Zanini & Edwards, 
2001). 
Whether composed of internal or external linkages, the Internet is, let us face it, a 
network of networks. It consists of countless interconnected networks spread around the 
globe. Our computers form the Internet range from huge mainframes. Yet, what is 
different from terrorist networks in Antiquity is that the sprawling Internet networks, of 
which cyberterrorists are some of the key members, have replaced hierarchical 
organizations (Laqueur, 1999b). Even though members of terrorist networks were 
somewhat loose and enjoyed more tactical independence than soldiers of the Roman and 
Greek armies, they were still, as mentioned above, forced to obey and to follow a 
strategic guidance. They had a central commander, sometimes established outside the 
regions where the terrorist cells were located. By extension, in the case of patronage in 
the Roman period, we can see some resemblance with the Italian Mafia: it is a network of 
connections with other violent folks, which makes the leader a friend of the friends. 
More importantly, while terrorist networks can be linked by groups that consist of 
hundreds, if not thousands of members, some terrorist parties can be very small, 
sometimes consisting of just one individual (Laqueur, 1999b), such as an independent 
terrorist, sharing the same goals as other terrorist groups, but acting as a mercenary. 
History is replete with examples of independence terrorism; even Antiquity has recorded 
88
a couple. While private smallholders liked to rely on bands of marauders and hired killers 
(Schweitzer, 2002) to do the bidding of bribed politicians, members of the Roman senate, 
or terrorist kingpins, it was not unusual that private groups had fellow politicians 
themselves assassinated by independent terrorists. The Zealots encouraged citizens to 
take a dagger and become involved in the act of committing murders, on their own, 
against the Romans. Some terrorist acts were also executed by lonely individuals such as 
Herostrat, the citizen of Ephesus, who burned the local temple (Laqueur, 1999b). 
Likewise, in 70 BCE, when Rome had a republican form of government, the wealthy 
politician Marcus Licineus Crassus, who later became Rome’s Praetor, was using fire-
fighting mercenaries to burn the buildings of owners who refused to sell him their land 
(Collins, 2002). 
As it has always been, the smaller the group, the more difficult to detect (Laqueur, 
1999b). Traces are even more difficult to find if it is just one terrorist “out there.” Now 
imagine the current situation, where one of the most successful skills a cyberterrorist has 
learned in an attempt to master the Internet is “stealth.” Surprise and getting away 
undetected are precious weapons for cyberterrorists (Dunnigan, 2003). Given this, they 
can smoothly act as malicious independent hackers propelled by technical challenge, as 
criminals interested in personal financial gain, or as foreign espionage agents looking to 
exploit information for economic, political, or military objectives (Department of 
Defense, 1996). They can also act as part-time terrorists: individuals who are not directly 
affiliated with a given terrorist organization, but who still support its agenda and use 
damaging software tools and instructions available at the terrorist Web site (Zanini & 
Edwards, 2001). As such, these part-time terrorists can be business rivals, spies, thieves, 
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disgruntled employees (Laqueur, 1999b), “hackers for hire,” part-time “volunteers,” and 
“script-kiddies” (comparable amateurs who rely on off-the-shelf and easy to use tools) 
(Zanini & Edwards, 2001).  
These individuals who are technically skilled have to constantly test their tools 
and weapons. Although they are willing to strike targets by both disrupting and 
employing destructive means to further a political agenda, they still need the acumen of 
spies and not be detected (so they can return for more secrets later). This espionage also 
serves the purpose of scouting for damaging cyberwar attacks (Dunnigan, 2003). By 
playing the role of independent computer soldiers, it is oftentimes difficult to identify the 
source of the cyberterrorist act, the computer network’s “weaponry,” knowledge, funds, 
or summon to actions that are employed. They do not even need to put their lives on the 
line to protect the interests of others. 
Similar Obstacles 
In spite of all the advantages that networks offer to terrorists in general, it should 
be said that there have been attempts to thwart – if not destroy – the development of such 
networks. Looking for similar obstacles that both terrorists in Antiquity and 
cyberterrorists had to face, it has been found that targets will best hinder the progression 
of networked terrorism by protecting themselves. The best attack is defense (which seems 
like the opposite of what protection should be). One such defense is protection of 
property. Already in Ancient Greece protection of land was enforced against the threat 
posed by dangerous men (Fisher, 1998) to shield property even against any type of 
destruction. These measures were also designed to make life easier for the poorest 
farmers being squeezed by the Mafia-style depredations of criminals. 
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Today, protection of property against terrorists is synonym with firewalls built by 
companies and anti-virus programs anyone can download for free on a personal 
computer. Firewalls, for instance, are obstacles to cyberterrorists. As McNamara (2003) 
states, 
firewalls offer protection from intruders by serving as a barrier between a 
computer system and the outside world (usually the Internet). Firewalls work by 
preventing certain data packets from reaching the computer while allowing other 
types of data in. Think of a firewall as a guard for all TCP/IP traffic on your 
network, constantly challenging packets to identify themselves as friend or foe, 
based on a set of rules you’ve provided the firewall with (p. 247). 
This is the purpose of the firewall: to be a shield (protection from attackers) and 
obstacle (challenging packets to identify) at the same time. There are other types of 
firewalls such as packet-filtering routers (to forbid an outsider to connect to applications 
within the network) and the proxy server (to check the content of each data packet as it 
arrives) (Mansfield, 2000). Major Web sites and corporate networks have protected 
themselves because they have the funds and impetuses to do so. Power plants have well-
protected Internet operations, and are equipped to detect intruders, often divulging where 
they come from (Dunnigan, 2003). 
Counterterrorist agencies have also considered the option of collaborating with a 
large number of cyberterrorists and learning from their knowledge for defensive and even 
retaliatory purposes (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). They have increased their reliance on 
experts such as Richard Clarke. Richard Clarke was the US first counter-terrorism chief 
during the Clinton administration. He is now the de facto anti-cyberterrorism czar 
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(Verton, 2003a). He has pushed the American government to improve cybersecurity and 
create obstacles against cyberterrorism. The reliance on experts or academics to 
strengthen barriers against terrorism is not new.  
In Antiquity, Josephus (37 CE-circa 100), a Jewish historian (Thackeray, 1968), 
was also Rome’s “private consultant” on terrorism. In his writings, he warned Romans 
against the Zealots (Bilde, 1988; Feldman & Hata, 1987; Josephus, 1982; Maier, 1993) 
and warned others against the folly of opposing the Romans. What Josephus also 
represented for the Zealots is a political obstacle during the remainder of the war. Part of 
the reason is that he assisted the Roman commander Titus in negotiating with the so-
called revolutionaries (Rajak, 1984). Not surprisingly, Josephus was branded as a traitor 
and, unfortunately, was unable to convince the defenders of Jerusalem to surrender to the 
Roman siege, which led to the destruction of the city and the Holy Temple.   
The biggest obstacle that terrorist networks have always faced is “crippling 
intrusion” such as misleading information and distrust. History is abundant with cases of 
treason, even among terrorists themselves or those “old-boys’” networks. This makes the 
perspective of networks sometimes limited in scope. As explained by Zanini and 
Edwards (2001), 
to the degree that erroneous or otherwise misleading information is planted into a 
network’s information flows by what are seemingly credible sources, over time 
the integrity and relevance of the network itself is compromised. This in turn 
could breed distrust and further cripple a group’s ability to operate in a dispersed 
and decentralized fashion (p. 53).  
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As one can see, terrorist networks in Antiquity and cyberterrorist networks today 
seem to mirror each other on many patterns of evil stratagems. No matter what century, 
no matter what geographical area, no matter what the motivations are, no matter how the 
network is formed, no matter who is involved, and no matter who the target is, terrorists 
seem to have always attempted to create a new order with their new kinds of technology, 
be it a shiny dagger or software to penetrate computer files. Even some members of the 
Roman elite collaborated with terrorists. So networking with criminals is as old as gold.  
As explained in this section, the Zealots, for instance, had an extensive network that 
operated in Antiquity and that is still relevant today. Indeed, its network is a forerunner of 
cyberterrorist networks not only in aspects of motivation, but also in aspects of kinship, 
design, targeting, and goals. Although the Jewish Revolt was ultimately a failure (mass 
suicide in Masada), the fact that the Zealots are remembered two millennia later 
demonstrates the deep psychological influence they have brought.  
In line with these contentions, it is fair to say that successful cyberterrorism, like 
terrorism in Antiquity, depends on two major elements: means and vulnerability. The 
means are the human resources, tools, and weapons available to the attacker. The 
vulnerability is the extent to which the target’s defense and networks are effective 
(Dunnigan, 2003). However, it also proves factual that terrorist networks may be 
somewhat limited for reasons mentioned earlier. In turn, potential victims since early 
history have always invented ways to protect themselves, not only by attacking, but also 
by defending themselves against attacks, or even relying on experts. For instance, 
“human intelligence” in Ancient Rome was taught by Josephus. It was slightly akin to 
what Homeland Security does today, 
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A Comparative Analysis of the Jewish Revolt and the Cyberterrorism 
Incident over Kosovo, Based on Social Network Theory 
This section uses social network theory to make a comparison between the social 
network of the Jewish Revolt in 66-73 CE and cyberterrorist attacks during the Kosovo 
war in 1999. The Revolt in 66-73 CE, also known as “the First Revolt,” was propelled by 
a social network of terrorists, of which the main group was the Zealots. It took time for 
other groups to join them. The Kosovo conflict saw the rise of the first major Internet war 
where independent hackers targeted NATO and US government Web sites. The use of 
social network theory is important here because it [the theory] embodies a particular 
theoretical orientation towards the structure of terrorist networks. After all, networks are 
one of the most common forms of social organizations (Williams, 2001). This is why it 
applies perfectly to the Jewish Revolt and the war in Kosovo. It also enables me to make 
the point that social network theory is the best theory that can be used to demonstrate that 
cyberterrorist networks resemble networks in Antiquity in some ways, and differ in other 
ways. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to bridge the gap between theory and practice.  
To begin with, a historical explanation of the reasons that led angry Jews to rebel 
against their Roman oppressors is provided. Then, an explanation of the relevance of 
social network theory in this analysis is given. This is a springboard from which the 
author draws hubs and nodes, through graphs, of the networks that link the Zealots and 
their collaborators. The main argument is that the centrality of the Zealots (in Masada) 
exemplifies the measure of the prominence of the “star” or “wheel” network (Bavelas, 
1950) during the Jewish Revolt. In other words, the ties that the Zealots in Masada have 
with others make them prominent because they are “particularly visible to the other 
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actors in the network” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 172). What is also relevant is that 
this prominence is neither due to the reception nor the transmission of many ties, since 
the relations were nondirectional (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). After the analysis of the 
Jewish revolt, the author provides an analogy with the cyberterrorism incident over the 
Kosovo conflict. The main argument is that cyberterrorist networks follow a pattern of 
the all-channel network, where all the nodes can connect with any other node, without the 
fear of being caught. Plus, there is no centrality in the all-channel since it has a horizontal 
and flat structure, and not a hierarchical or vertical one. 
The Jewish Revolt of 66-73 CE 
We already know that a great deal is factual about the Zealots thanks to Josephus 
Josephus’s writings (Josephus, 1982). “We will kill all collaborators” and “No king but 
God” were some of the many slogans that emerged from these politico-religious 
insurgents. The Romans labeled them “a sworn fraternity of fanatics” and “rebels.” 
Josephus called them brigands of a new type, in the same way that we call cyberterrorists 
“terrorists of a new future.” At first, the Zealots were very active in the Galilean hills, 
waging occasional guerrilla warfare and being a widespread nuisance. By early 1st 
century CE, the locals and the religious groups were unwilling to support them, so their 
numbers were small (Josephus, 1982). The main reason is that the Zealots, unlike the 
Pharisees, wanted to expedite the process of religious liberation by direct action (Farmer, 
1956). However, in about 30 CE, Jesus Christ began his journey of prophecies. As his 
prophetic vision increased, so did the pressure from Roman despotism. Such cruelty led 
more and more Romans to profane religious institutions and, consequently, more and 
more disgruntled folks would join the Zealots’ rebellious group (Smith, 1971). As the 
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years went by, they created an extensive web of terrorists and developed a major 
information network. This helped terrorists slit the throats of Romans, who had occupied 
Israel since 63 BCE, and their “collaborators.” What followed was a Jewish rebellion in 
66 CE, after Florus, the last Roman procurator, stole vast quantities of silver from the 
Temple in Jerusalem. Thousands of Jews (of different walks of life), maybe a million, 
inspired by religious conviction, created a mass uprising not only against the Romans 
who governed both Greeks and Jews (Telushkin, 1991), but also against the Greeks in 
Judea. As such, they ambushed sentries, sabotaged military stores, stole horses, and 
destroyed roads and water works, poison wells, granaries, and the water supply of the 
Holy City (Bloom, 2002; Roth, 1959). 
The above historical account is better known as the Jewish Revolt of 66-73 CE in 
Jerusalem (Goodman, 2002; Roth, 1959). Through their actions, the rebels aspired to act 
as propellers of a long-prophesized messianic intervention. The reasoning behind this was 
that, for the rebels, the Roman oppressors would either not resist at all or do it so poorly 
because of fear and a sense of being outnumbered. The ultimate goal of the rebels was to 
create a panic more alarming than the affliction itself. Although few people supported the 
Zealots at first, the Zealots’ ranks grew exponentially as more profanities were 
committed against Jewish heritage and many Jews rapidly became persuaded that they 
could defeat Rome (Horsley, 1986). The Zealots and other “liberators of Jerusalem” had 
thousands of fighters (the accurate number is unknown) divided into groups. The Zealots, 
under Eleazar ben Simon, occupied Masada (the most important besieged area of the 
Revolt), the Antonia, and the Temple. The Sicarii (led by Simon ben Giora) ran the upper 
city of Jerusalem. The Idumeans held Southern Judea (Bloom, 2002). There were other 
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allies such as the partisans under John of Giscala and other groups of lower-class citizens 
who, nonetheless, were willing to sacrifice their lives for a new world order. 
Applying Social Network Theory to the Jewish Revolt 
 All these groups joined forces in 66 CE; they were linked through a social 
network. At first, the network had no apparent plan or organized leadership. Yet, it took 
time for the Roman legions to realize that the leadership was eventually “headquartered” 
at the fortress of Masada (Cohen, 1982), where strong ties started to develop with the 
other rebels who seized control of Jerusalem section by section. At some point during the 
Revolt, their social network was so strong that they massacred the sole cohort of Roman 
infantry left behind by Florus as a garrison. They also besieged Herod the Great’s two 
strong fortresses, Herodium and Machaerus (Bloom, 2002). The Zealots in Masada did 
not always have strategic significance in the overall structure of the Jewish network of 
rebels. Part of the reason is that a lot of ties were cut, while other new ties developed. 
After all, the Jewish revolt lasted seven years. So it is no surprise that the network was at 
times significant and at other times weak. Figure 1 (on the next page) shows the most 
important nodes (or actors) in the social network of the Jewish revolt, when their network 
was strong. The most important nodes were the Zealots in Masada, the Zealots at the 
Temple, the Zealots at the Antonia, the Sicarii in the Upper City, the Idumeans in 
Southern Judea, and other partisans in the Lower City. Figure 1 is a highly centralized 
graph. The purpose of using a graph in social network theory is to identify the most 
important nodes (or agents) in a social network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The idea of 
centrality of individuals or groups in a social network was one of the first to be pursued 
by social network analysts (Scott, 2004). 
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Figure 1      Example of a “star” or “wheel” network, as in this network of the Jewish rebels 
 
The network shown in the graph is also called the “star” or “wheel” network 
(Bavelas, 1950) because there is a central point that is at the hub or core of different 
Jewish connections. In other words, the most prominent individual or group (in this case, 
the Zealot leadership at the fortress of Masada) stands at the center of the network and 
has influence on its environment (i.e., in terms of decision-making, etc.). Whether this 
prominence is due to the reception or the transmission of many ties is not a particular 
concern here, since the relations were nondirectional (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). What 
is important is that, according to social network theory, the Zealots in Masada represent a 
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point that is said to be locally central because “it has a large number of connections in its 
immediate environment” (Scott, 2004, p. 82). However, it is not globally central because, 
as we have seen, the Zealots in Masada did not always have strategic significance in the 
overall structure of the Jewish network of rebels.  
In line with these contentions, it might be difficult to know the exact validity of 
the measures of centrality. Do they really capture what we substantially mean to be 
“prominence” or “significance”? Can we simply focus on nodes that are “selected” the 
most to find the most important nodes? (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The answer to these 
questions can prove accurate if we consider the historical fact that all ties that link the 
Zealots in Masada to the other groups are not interchangeable. For that reason, the 
Zealots in Masada are not equally central. For instance, the tie between the Masada folks 
and the Sicarii outranks the others because, historically speaking, their relationship and 
cooperative efforts during the Jewish Revolt were stronger than the others. By the same 
token, it is not surprising that the link between the Zealots in Masada and the Idumeans in 
Southern Judea is weaker than the others, since Southern Judea is further away than the 
areas where the other rebels were located. In other words, the Idumeans were not as 
extensively involved in relationships or “well connected” with the Zealots as the others 
were. A validity of prominence and centrality in a social network “corresponds to the 
intuitive notion of how well connected a point is within its local environment” (Scott, 
2004, p. 83). 
What comes next is an explanation of “network self-destruction,” based on social 
network theory, due to an historical fact of internal hatred within the social network of 
the Jewish rebels. What happened was that the links between the important actors in their 
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social network became heavily damaged after Emperor Nero heard about the success of 
the Revolt and dispatched Vespasian to command three legions and auxiliaries (nearly 
60,000 men) to march to the port of Caesarea, and then to Jerusalem. This campaign 
successfully secured Roman progress (by besieging many places in the Holy City). This 
progress provoked internal conflict within the social network of the Jewish rebels 
themselves, leading the Zealots and one group of allies, the Idumeans of Southern Judea, 
to overthrow the Jewish aristocrats and seize control of Jerusalem. Simon and other 
terrorists entered Jerusalem and opposed the Zealots’ control of the rebellion. Part of the 
rationale behind this opposition was that the Jewish leadership in Masada did almost 
nothing to help their besieged allies. They had concluded that the Revolt could not be 
won. The Jewish forces were eventually deeply divided, which, in turn, crippled the 
coordination of operations or even mutual support. This led to self-destruction of their 
social network because from the year 70 until 73 CE, most large nodes were removed (in 
other words, most Jewish ally groups were massacred by the Romans), which isolated the 
central node in Masada. This meant the end of the social network of terrorists during the 
Jewish Revolt. It takes a lot to destroy a network (Barabasi, 2003). The failure of the 
Jewish Revolt was due to deep hatred among the Jewish rebels themselves.  
Figure 2 (on the next page) shows a cripple social network of terrorists, where all 
the links are destroyed, isolating the central node in Masada. Because social network 
theory suggests that compartmentalization into node structures is crucial to the “survival” 
of the network of terrorists, and because the compartmentalization of terrorism into nodes 
allows for more openness, flexibility, and diversity which, in turn, enables different nodes 
to communicate with less difficulty, the social network of Jewish rebels could not survive 
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because all the links and resources shared between the Zealots in Masada and the other 
terrorist allies were progressively destroyed. 
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Figure 2        The crippled social network of the Jewish rebels from 68 to 73 CE, the year the 
remaining Jewish rebels committed mass suicide at Masada 
 
The nodes could not even survive through “autopoiesis” (Bailey, 1997; Bednarz, 
1988; Benseler, Hejl, & Kock, 1980; Mingers, 1994; Zeeuw, 1992; Zeleny, 1981), that is 
“self-organization” (Heylighen, 2003), because the existing interactive elements of the 
nodes were nullified, which gradually incapacitated the social network to regulate itself. 
This meant self-destruction. The only escape for the remaining Jewish rebels (from 
Roman capture) was to commit mass suicide in Masada in 73 CE. 
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The Kosovo War as an Incident of Cyberterrorism 
The social network of the Jewish revolt of 66-73 CE shows recognizable 
characteristics of cyberterrorist networks. A good example of a cyberterrorist network 
incident is the one that occurred during the Kosovo war in 1999. The conflict over 
Kosovo has been characterized as the first war on the Internet. Government and non-
government actors alike disrupted service on government computers and took over their 
Web sites, particularly US government Web sites (Denning, 1999). What happened is 
that in 1999 NATO airplanes bombed Serbian targets in an effort to stop the Serbs from 
attacking Albanians (Dunnigan, 2003). In the process, they accidentally bombed the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. For this reason, thousands of young Chinese 
hackers targeted US government Web sites, including the Energy and Interior 
Departments’ Web sites, the U.S. Embassy site in Beijing, and the U.S. Naval 
Communications Command. By the same token, cyberterrorists attacked NATO’s main 
Web site, causing a line saturation of the server by using a “bombardment strategy” 
(Seffers, 1999). NATO computers were also flooded with email bombs – sending an 
email bomb consists of deluging hundreds of thousands of emails into a computer 
network – and hit with denial-of-service (DOS) attacks by hacktivists protesting the 
bombings against the Serbs. Likewise, American businesses, public institutions, and 
academic institutes received tons of virus-laden e-mails from a certain number of Eastern 
European countries. One group, the Kosovo Hackers Group, a coalition of European and 
Albanian hackers, attacked five Web sites (Regan, 1999). Nothing serious happened, but 
had their attempts been successful, the consequences thereof would have been 
devastating. 
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The dispute over Kosovo was really “turning cyberspace into an ethereal war zone 
where the battle for the hearts and minds is being waged through the use of electronic 
images, online discussion group postings, and hacking attacks” (Dunn, 1999, p. 42). But 
that was not all. Another group, the Black Hand hackers (from Serbia), deleted all data on 
a U.S. Navy computer. Members of an affiliated cell, Serbian Angel, planned daily 
actions that blocked and disrupted military computer operated by NATO countries. They 
also delved into a Kosovo Albanian web server and threatened to destroy the Alliance’s 
information system (Adams, 1998). In the same geopolitical area (that is, Serbia), both 
Milosevic (the Yugoslav president at that time) and people opposed to NATO engaged in 
cyberterrorism. So did civilians caught in the conflict, who considered cyberspace a 
powerful tool to express sentiments about the risks under the fatal exposures to NATO 
carpet bombings. The Russians took part in cyberterrorism too. They attacked 
governmental Web sites of NATO countries, using virus-infected e-mail and 
“infiltration” attempts. Over one hundred institutions in the United States received these 
e-mails. Various British organizations lost files and databases in the process.  
More importantly, Americans were also involved in the cyberterrorist incident of 
the Kosovo war. What happened was that this incident ignited the passions of American 
cyberterrorists to bring down several Web sites in Yugoslavia (Regan, 1999). Team Split, 
an American group of cyberterrorists, broke into government Web sites, posted 
statements such as “Tell your governments to stop the war,” and even assaulted them. 
Others tried to corrupt e-mail systems, which were also saturated by one individual who 
sent two thousand messages a day (Seffers, 1999). Nevertheless, individuals from allied 
countries retaliated. For instance, one group, Dutchthreat, based in the Netherlands, 
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blasted a Yugoslavian Web server after they grew infuriated about a message posted on a 
Yugoslavian ISP that called NATO members “Nazis.” Besides, an order passed by 
President Clinton in 1999 allowed American government computer hackers to infiltrate 
Slobodan Milosevic’s foreign bank accounts and siphon off his hidden funds that could 
have been used for military purposes (Hoffmann, 1999). The computer attacks on his 
foreign bank accounts were also committed to alter his banking records (Becker, 1999). 
The main rationale behind this covert action was to help the CIA overthrow the Yugoslav 
president (Sherwell, Nikolic, & Strauss, 1999). 
Applying Social Network Theory to this Cyberterrorism Incident 
 The incident of cyberterrorism during the Kosovo war demonstrates that various 
groups can be located far away from one another and still have the same targets, that is, 
NATO and US government Web sites. What is also interesting is that these groups 
probably did not know one another. As such, there were hacker groups from China, from 
Russia, from Serbia (several), from Albania, and even from the United States. The 
Internet was their conduit. Drawing a parallel, it might also be the case that, considering 
the high number of rebels during the Jewish Revolt of 66-73 CE (maybe one million), 
some of the partisan groups did not know each other either. Applying social network 
theory to the Kosovo cyberterrorism phenomenon, we can see that cyberterrorists can 
easily connect all over the map, from sites to sites, and aim at the same targets. Figure 3 
(on the next page), based on Dorothy Denning’s (2001) description of the situation, is an 
interpretation of what the cyberterrorist network over the war in Kosovo in 1999 could 
have looked like. Figure 3 shows the all-channel network (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), 
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Figure 3       Example of an all-channel network, typical of a cyberterrorist network  
 
In this model, the Kosovo Hackers Group could have communicated with the 
Team Split about bettering their endeavors to target Web sites. The all-channel network is 
collaborative, quick, effective, and multi-directional. It implies that there is no central 
node as in the star or wheel network. Therefore, there is no central commander. In other 
words, it is a full-matrix networks, where every cell is connected to and can communicate 
directly with every other cell (Evan, 1972). What can also be said is that the Kosovo 
Hackers Group may have acted alone without communicating with anybody. As soon as a 
cyberterrorist group is created on the Internet, the Internet automatically puts that group 
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in an all-channel network because cyberspace is in fact an ultra-flexible network of 
billions of nodes that can communicate with one another, even unbeknownst to each 
other. Based on social network theory, the Internet enabled various groups of 
cyberterrorists – or even independent hacker groups that did not know each other – to 
cross national boundaries and operate safely by targeting American and NATO Web sites 
without being caught. This is where postmodernism is applicable because the FBI could 
have been there too. Not only can coordination be tricky, but, also, anonymous nodes 
such as FBI cells can infiltrate cyberterrorist networks too. 
No matter what, in the all-channel network, the measure of visibility is 
tantamount to the number of links (Barabasi, 2003). More importantly, cyberterrorist 
networks do not break apart under failure. The voluntary destruction of nodes will not be 
fatal. Even if NATO and US experts had brought down nodes one after the other, any of 
the remaining nodes would have survived because nodes on the Internet are autonomous 
and resilient. However, if the cyberterrorist network has large hubs, and if these hubs are 
destroyed, then the network can break. In the grand scheme of things, independent 
cyberterrorist cells such as the Black Hand Hackers and Team Split are small nodes. 
Indeed, the nodes from the graphs are small, in comparison with a node such as the US 
government’s central computer system, which constitutes, of course, a very large node on 
the Internet. This means that the elimination of several large nodes, or hubs, on the 
Internet could create a catastrophic disorder, like a cascading failure. As explained by 
Albert Barabasi (2003), 
if crackers launched a successful attack against the largest Internet hubs, the 
potential damage could be tremendous. This is not a consequence of bad design or 
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flaws in Internet protocols. Such vulnerability to attack is an inherent property of 
all scale-free networks (p. 117). 
 NATO and the US government could not really do anything to destroy the nodes 
of the hacker groups because they were not fixed and they were very difficult to find. 
They operated from small private computers that were presumably located in other 
countries. For a cyberterrorist network to be vulnerable to a counteroffensive attack led 
by an army of cyberwarriors, several of the largest hubs must be simultaneously removed 
to crush them (Barabasi, 2003). What is even more complex in cyberterrorist networks is 
that they are horizontal and flat, rather than vertical and bureaucratically governed 
(Arquilla, Rondfeldt, & Zanini, 1999). There is no central leadership as there was during 
the Jewish Revolt. After the remainder of the rebels committed suicide in the fortress of 
Masada in 73 CE, the Revolt was over. The Romans had won. Cyberterrorists’ horizontal 
and flat type of organizational structure is different from the traditional terrorist 
network’s hierarchical design. It is different in that this type of organizational structure is 
based upon flexible communication relationships. This information is not covered in this 
section, but it will be later. 
Discussion 
What this section has demonstrated is that terrorist networks in Antiquity and 
cyberterrorist networks today seem to mirror each other in their patterns of evil 
stratagems. Yet, they also differ in many ways. Looking at their similarities, we have 
seen, for instance, that they both seem to have comparable trust patterns. While Ancient 
terrorists would connect with other individuals who have mutual agendas and goals to 
form subgroups, convene at a target location, carry on terrorist operations, and then 
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subsequently terminate their relationships and redisperse (Zanini & Edwards, 2001), 
cyberterrorists today navigate on the Web and try to connect there. More importantly, 
cyberterrorists and their Ancient counterparts also have the same motivations (that is, 
political ambitions, economic deprivations, crime for crime’s sake, and the need for 
publicity). While the Zealots were convinced that political change could only be attained 
through “propaganda of the deed” (Laqueur, 1999b), and while their most basic drive was 
that all means were justified, political ambition and commitment are also part of the 
agenda of cyberterrorists (Denning, 2001). Sabotage of electronic networks, power grids, 
and other elements of a nation’s infrastructure may not be solely intended to cripple 
specific individuals or groups (Schweitzer, 2002). In some cases, these cyberterrorist acts 
are also aimed at achieving political goals. After foreign experts learned that the 
damaging Code Red virus of 2001 came from China (Dunnigan, 2003), they believed the 
Chinese government backed it up, but China denied any responsibility. Terrorism is also 
news (Laqueur, 1999b), publicity. In 66-73 CE, the Zealots slit the throats of Romans 
(and those who favored them) in public, in the same way that cyberterrorists like to send 
email bombs on thousands of Web sites, enough to disrupt an entire state’s computer 
network. 
What this section has also argued is that alongside the old terrorism, new kinds of 
terrorism have arisen, but until more fitting terms gain general acceptance, old labels will 
have to suffice (Laqueur, 1999b). Premeditated acts of terrorism have always dotted our 
world’s history. This is why it was deemed necessary, in order to make a good 
comparison with cyberterrorists, to characterize what a terrorist was in Antiquity. The 
point was made that the criteria defining terrorists were determined by Greek and Roman 
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power-holders who decided to place them beyond the pale of civilized society. No matter 
what, planning a damaging terrorist attack requires talent and technology. Two millennia 
later, the adage “terrorism leads to ‘smarter crime’” (Laqueur, 1999b) still prevails. The 
impacts of technology that devastated entire armies and peoples provide an interesting 
analogy with our contemporary anxieties over the possibility of harmful cyberterrorist 
incidents. As they act in networks or with hired mercenaries, they aim for ingenuity, both 
for using their technology and for outsmarting their enemy (Schweitzer, 2002). They also 
need money to carry out their plots. This is why another motivation is economical (i.e., 
money laundering). Cyberactions are so limitless that terrorists can easily operate as 
stockbrokers, looking for the best deals. Economic deprivation also leads us to believe 
that terrorism is a social phenomenon. As described in the example of the Boukoloi, 
networks emerged as a result of a combination of ruthless and uncompassionate 
government, drastic social conditions, and escape from oppressive Roman taxation 
(Alston, 1998). 
What has been emphasized is that all those motivations are what blend individuals 
into the same melting pot of convictions and goals. When people have a common 
denominator, they will join forces by creating local groups that will propagate into 
sprawling networks. This is how terrorist networks are created. This comparative analysis 
of networks exemplifies the notion that terrorism has made colossal progress, but human 
nature has not changed. There is as much evil and insanity as there ever was (Laqueur, 
1999b). We all know that the ultimate result is fear. Indeed, fear. Fear of networks. In 
Antiquity, networks were already made of informal, loosely, and open structures, usually 
divided into small, fragmented, and temporary ventures. This took the appearance of an 
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illusion of invulnerability, making the enemy feel that they were outnumbered. They also 
organized their activities around speed, which is the prime quality of an attack on the 
Internet: the more speed cyberterrorists have, the less capable the defense is (Dunnigan, 
2003). Some of these networks are actually hybrid organizations that pursue political and 
economic agendas. The main goal has always been the same: to create connections and 
coordinate dispersed activities (Zanini & Edwards, 2001). One way the Ancients 
organized terrorism was through patronage (Zehr, 1978). Patronage was synonym with 
harboring terrorists; it was practiced by hierarchical, Mafia-like organizations that 
exploited the relationships between “perpetrators” of terror and “sellers” of terror, like 
patron-client relationships (Rawlings, 1998). While terrorist networks can be linked by 
groups that consist of hundreds, if not thousands of members (as it was during the Jewish 
Revolt), some terrorist parties can be very small, sometimes consisting of just one 
individual (Laqueur, 1999b), such as an independent cyberterrorist, sharing the same 
goals as other cyberterrorists, but acting as a hacking mercenary. They would sell their 
souls to a cause for diverse reasons, like to catch computer users by surprise. The 
ultimate corollary will be a weakness of our psyche, because panic resulting from 
terrorism causes as much detriment as the terrorist act itself.  
Finally, a comparison between the social network of the Jewish Revolt in 66-73 
CE and cyberterrorist attacks during the Kosovo war in 1999 was made. The use of social 
network theory was important here because it embodies a particular theoretical 
orientation towards the structure of terrorist networks. The theory also applies perfectly 
to the Jewish Revolt and the cyberterrorism incident over Kosovo. It is actually the best 
theory that can be used to demonstrate that cyberterrorist networks resemble networks in 
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Antiquity in some ways, and differ in other ways. The ultimate author’s goal in the 
analysis was to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Of particular relevance in this 
comparison was that the social network of the Jewish rebels was the “star” or “wheel” 
network (Bavelas, 1950) because there the graph (Figure 1) shows a central point that is 
at the hub or core of different Jewish factions. The Zealots in Masada were the most 
prominent faction and had influence on their environment. The relations they kept with 
their allies were nondirectional (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Besides, based on the 
premise of social network theory, the Zealots in Masada represent a point that is said to 
be locally central because “it has a large number of connections in its immediate 
environment” (Scott, 2004, p. 82). It is not globally central because the Zealots in Masada 
did not always have strategic significance in the overall structure of the Jewish network.  
In line with these contentions, the point was made that the social network of 
Jewish rebels was caught in “self-destruction” because, as suggested by social network 
theory, compartmentalization into node structures is crucial to the “survival” of a 
network. Yet, the social network of Jewish rebels could not survive because all the links 
and resources shared between the Zealots in Masada and the other terrorist allies were 
progressively destroyed (see Figure 2). This resulted, historically speaking, in internal 
hatred within the social network of the Jewish rebels. As such, large nodes were 
removed. These nodes could not even survive through “autopoiesis,” that is, “self-
organization,” because the existing interactive elements of the nodes were rendered 
naught, which gradually incapacitated the social network to regulate itself. This meant 
self-destruction and a mass suicide in Masada in 73 CE. 
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As we have seen, this led to an analysis of the cyberterrorism incident over the 
Kosovo war in 1999. The graph (Figure 3) shows an all-channel network (Bavelas, 1950; 
Leavitt, 1951), where any node in the cyberterrorist network can connect with any other 
node. The all-channel network is collaborative and, above all, multi-directional. It implies 
that there is no central node and no central commander. It is a full-matrix networks, 
where every cell is connected to and can communicate directly with every other cell 
(Evan, 1972). Part of the reason is that the Internet automatically puts any user in an all-
channel network; cyberspace is literally an ultra-flexible network of billions of nodes that 
can communicate with one another, even unbeknownst to each other. Based on social 
network theory, the Internet enabled various groups of cyberterrorists to cross national 
boundaries and commit their cyberactions safely. We have also seen that it is very 
difficult to remove independent cyberterrorist cells such as the Black Hand Hackers and 
Team Split because they are small nodes. The US government’s central computer system, 
however, is a very large node, which means that the elimination of several large nodes in 
cyberspace could lead to a catastrophic disorder, like a cascading failure. 
What should be emphasized to a large extent in the future is the very fact that a 
cyberterrorist network is a postmodern type of network, where no leadership is needed, 
no center exists, and where communication is freer than birds in the air. Based on social 
network theory, I will make the point that, as opposed to those Ancient hierarchical 
structures that were vertically designed, cyberterrorist organizations are actually not 
organizations. They are movements. They do not exhibit an intrinsically “group” or 
“design” nature. Nevertheless, one should not downplay the importance of hierarchies; 
they are excellent structures for exerting control (Watts, 2003), as it was the case for the 
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Jewish rebels. Regarding cyberterrorists, there is certainly a lot to be said about their 
networks. As Schweitzer (2002) puts it, “while traditional concepts of terrorism may have 
withstood the test of centuries, the new millennium breaks the mold and calls for a rapid 
retrofit” (p. 290). The author is no counter-terrorism guru like Richard Clarke and no 
historian à la Josephus, but he encourages academics, experts, and private consultants to 
continue their never-ending struggle to understand cyberterrorism and Internet-based 
networks. 
Postmodernism and Networks of Cyberterrorists 
 This comparison between networks of terrorists in Antiquity and networks of 
cyberterrorists exemplified the very notion that cyberterrorist networks are postmodern 
types of networks, where no leadership is needed, no center exists, and where 
communication is ultra flexible and quasi limitless. As opposed to conventional terrorist 
organizations, with their hierarchical structures that are vertically designed, cyberterrorist 
organizations are actually not organizations. They do not exhibit an intrinsically “group” 
or “design” nature. Rather, they are volatile and unexpected, a very postmodern attribute. 
For these reasons, this section purports itself to define postmodernism and to discuss its 
application to cyberspace with respect to (1) Baudrillard’s hyperreal/real continuum, (2) 
the fragmentation, fluidity, and decentralization of the self, (3) cyberterrorism per se, (4) 
the organizational challenges faced by cybersecurity and law enforcement agents, and (5) 
the absence of leadership in cyberterrorist networks. 
Definition of Postmodernism 
Postmodernism is a cultural movement of the late twentieth century (Docherty, 
1993; Jameson, 1991) that endorses the view that we are living in an era of individual 
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freedom from imposed rules and social constraint (McQuail, 2000). The postmodern 
movement has been prominent in media and communication studies (Williams, 2003). 
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the theory of postmodernism is that it 
implies a blurring of the boundaries between previously distinct or opposite phenomena 
(Lister et al., 2003), and represents a shift away from spatialization and a triumph over 
linearity (Bubitt, 2002). For postmodernists, “nothing is the same, the world is 
decoherent, discontinuous, uncertain, inconsistent” (Kramer, 1997, p. 10). Meaning is not 
important because it is always indeterminate. Meaning is deconstructed (Derrida, 1973). 
In order to have a good idea of what postmodernism is, it would be interesting to 
compare it with modernism. While modernism is synonymous with the early twentieth-
century machine age, postmodernism represents the age of simulation, of online selves, 
and of computer and electronic media (McDermott, 1992; Turkle, 1992). Crotty (1998) 
follows the same lead in his comparison of the two worldviews below: 
Postmodernism refuses all semblance of the totalizing and essentialist 
orientations of modernist systems of thought. Where modernism purports to 
base itself on generalized, indubitable truths about the way things really are, 
postmodernism abandons the entire epistemological basis for any such claims 
to truth (p. 185).  
Other scholars such as Lyotard and Baudrillard have been major influential 
theorists on the matter. For Lyotard (1984), a French scholar, postmodernism is a 
perspective; a means for understanding the conditions in which people live and learn 
now. According to him, postmodernism implies that individuals reject the grand 
narratives and paradigms that have defined culture and behavior in the past. For Jean 
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Baudrillard (2003), a French sociologist and one of the leading postmodern social 
theorists (Kellner, 1989), the postmodern world is reflected in the “hyperreal” world in 
which we live.  
Postmodernism and Cyberspace: Hyperreal vs. Real 
Cyberspace is a manifestation of the postmodern condition (Gur-Ze’ev, 2000). 
Ross (1988) goes even further by saying that the Internet “is the postmodern medium par
excellence” (p. 7). The era of the public sphere as face-to-face interaction has gone 
(Poster, 1997). Today, the public sphere is postmodern because it is based on the notion 
that it is a mediated and mediating space. What this means is that cyberspace is the new 
public sphere and it is postmodern; it treasures the concept of the “public” while 
disengaging it from any particular time or place (Zarefsky, 1994). As a result, the 
postmodern map of cyberspace becomes the totality itself, superseding the world. 
Baudrillard (2003) refers to this moment as the “precession of simulacra” (p. 1). 
Simulacra and simulation, for Baudrillard (2003), constitute the world of cyberspace, 
what he calls the “hyperreal.” Simulacra are mere signs which come to constitute new 
realms of experience. Simulations make these new realms of experience practical, 
allowing humans to do things that are not normally doable, to observe phenomena that 
are not normally visible, to control processes that are not normally controllable, or to 
participate in scenes or situations that would normally be dangerous, fatal, impossible, or 
too expensive.  
This all boils down to saying that the adoption of cyberspace as a way to 
communicate and “do things” enabled by the elimination of the old, impeding structures  
is a postmodern condition that signals a rupture with modernism. Postmodernism implies 
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a positive reading of cultural and social change where new media technologies such as 
the Internet free themselves from the repressive hierarchies of the era of modernism 
(Lister et al., 2003). Postmodernism implies the hyperreal. The hyperreal is “the blurring 
of distinctions between the real in the unreal in which the prefix ‘hyper’ signifies more 
real than real whereby the real is produced according to a model” (Best & Kellner, 1991, 
p. 119). From Baudrillard’s vantage point, humans are at the end of history and history 
may be reversing itself; humans live in a hyperreality, a sort of “post-orgy state of things” 
(Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 137). Our simulation of the real is our production of the real as 
pre-coded signs that function as the real, which leads to a hyperreality. As such, 
Baudrillard (2003) suggests that any effort to materialize the real as the real involves its 
artificial materialization as its own perfect exemplar, and thus as a hyperreality. He also 
sees the resulting real as veiling our own experience in its hyperreal semiotic perfection 
(Baudrillard, 1990). 
This postmodern view of the real can be illustrated through the notion of “virtual 
terrorism.” Today, terrorists know how to engage not only in horrors of real terrorism, 
but also “virtual terrorism” by using cyberspace to amplify the threat, mislead the public, 
and be widespread by media. Sloan and Kearney (1978) also call this phenomenon “non-
territorial terrorism.” The postmodern view of cyberspace is that it makes the fine line 
between image and reality collapse into itself. What we are left with is hyperreality. 
Baudrillard (2003) writes, 
no more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more 
imaginary coextensivity: the genetic miniaturization is the dimension of 
simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory 
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banks and models of control, and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of 
times from these. It no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures 
itself against either an ideal or negative instance. It is no longer anything but 
operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary envelops 
it anymore. It is a hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory 
models in a hyperspace without atmosphere (p. 2). 
Der Derian and Douglas (2005) corroborate the same idea when they argue that 
cyberspace produces effects and results that blur our accustomed ways of perceiving the 
world. What we see are new worlds that emerge; although real, they are less than 
physical. What we see are new spaces that emerge; although extensive, they are 
immediate and not at all distant. To come to the point, as the virtual becomes ever more 
actualized in our everyday lives, many of the usual ways in which we have perceived the 
world are being reversed (if not turned upside down). Wakabayashi (2002), a Japanese 
scholar, substantiates Der Derian’s and Douglas’s thoughts when he contends that our 
new ways of living and perceiving things are seen in the emergence of cyberspace and 
the “virtual city” in computer networks (especially on the Internet). Cyberspace, for 
Wakabayashi, is a change in the physical urban environment, whereas the “virtual city” 
in computer networks is a phenomenon of the non-physical environment (inside 
computers). These phenomena are the direct consequence of the postmodern social 
transformation, that is, the new relationship between space and society. The hyperreal is a 
semantic emptiness; the sense of “placeness” as we know it in physical, contemporary 
society does not make sense in cyberspace. For this reason, cyberspace is regarded as a 
postmodern phenomenon (Wakabayashi, 2002).  
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Truly, real space and hyperreal space are separated for two reasons: on the one 
hand, in the sense of not being consistent in their spatial construction and, on the other 
hand, in the sense that real space and hyperreal space are also physically separated by the 
screen that divides one spatial modality from the other. Therefore, the difference between 
“being” outside the space and “being” within the space is contingent upon the context, 
framework, and circumstances within the space. Let us follow the lead of Sobchack 
(1992) when she says that hyperreal space,  
becomes abstract, ungrounded, flat – a site for play and display rather than an 
invested situation in which action “counts” rather than computes. Such a 
superficial space can no longer hold the spectator/user’s interest, but has to 
stimulate it constantly in the same way a video game does. Its flatness – a 
function of its lack of temporal thickness and bodily investment – has to attract 
spectator interest at the surface… In an important sense, electronic space 
disembodies (p. 57). 
This notion of hyperreal also implies that cyberspace enables the “self” to become 
fluidity, a flow of identity that converges under the sign of the virtual environment. 
According to Poster (1997), “Internet technology imposes a dematerialization of 
communication and, in many of its aspects, a transformation of the subject position of the 
individual who engages with it” (p. 215). As a result, identity, then, becomes a flux or, as 
Rheingold (1998) suggests, a “fluid” that causes humans to be disembodied. Human 
disembodiment in cyberspace is one of the central tenets of postmodernism. In 
postmodernism, “identity is not unitary or essential, it is fluid or shifting, fed by multiple 
sources and taking multiple forms” (Kumar, 1997, p. 98). The next section highlights the 
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postmodern transformation of the “self” through fragmentation, fluidity, and 
decentralization of the “self.” 
Postmodernism and Cyberspace: Fragmentation, Fluidity, and Decentralization of Self 
In regard to cyberspace, postmodernism emphasize fluidity, and the immediate 
and constant re-referencing of identities. The flow of identity converges under the sign of 
the virtual environment. We enter the nature of the real that enables the virtual. Instead of 
printed matter, what we have are recombinant energy processes or flows (Matusitz, 
2005c). Identity, then, becomes a flux or, as Rheingold (1998) suggests, a “fluid” (p. 84) 
that causes humans to be disembodied. In this sense, we take a fluid role in the 
construction of identity through different levels and qualities of interaction. Fluidity of 
the self means that the self can be manipulated on the whims of its creator; it also implies 
fragmentation of the self, a term of postmodern identity construction (Matusitz, 2005c). 
While modernist notions of the self are based on the ideal of a stable, non-shifting 
identity, postmodernism conceives identity as continuously being reconstructed (Deibert, 
1997). For postmodernists, identities in contemporary life are fleeting philosophical 
entities, moments of hyperreality likened to the swirling signification of cyberspace 
(Baudrillard, 1991).  
In addition, it is important to mention the notion of decentralization of the self in 
cyberspace. The self becomes decentralized because cyberspace has no center; it has 
acquired the form of a self-regulating system with billions of chunks of information 
accessible to anyone. From a postmodern standpoint, as humans communicate in virtual 
space, they experience a continuous, time-based junction of symbolic meaning forces 
(Matusitz, 2005c). What this means is that interaction in cyberspace presents one field of 
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symbolic meaning force that can only be understood contextually vis-à-vis other adjacent 
forces. As a result, our spatio-temporal ways of world-making (Goodman, 1978) and of 
conceiving the world are not a flexible and uniformed system. The postmodern 
inflexibility of the self in cyberspace “constitutes a form of absolute presence (one 
abstracted from the continuity that gives meaning to the system past/present/future) and 
changes the nature of the space it occupies” (Sobchack, 1992, p. 57). In other words, with 
respect to the decentralization of the self and the reconstruction of identity, in the 
disembodied world of cyberspace, many of the basic cues to personality and the social 
roles we are accustomed to in the physical world are absent (Gill, 1996). Therefore, 
Baudrillard’s simulacrum, mentioned previously, creates a passive subject living his or 
her own existence in his or her own reality, or simply someone who takes the simulation 
as the only significant, compelling reality. In fact, for the Web user, identity in 
cyberspace may not be a representation of a self any more. Rather, it may become the self 
against which life in the body is weak psychic competition. Postmodernism imagines the 
self, in this case the Web user, not as a producer of meaning, but as a consumer defined 
in her or his interaction with others in cyberspace. 
As one can see, as opposed to modernism, postmodernism posits that the concept 
of “me” as an entity is just an illusion, a simulacrum. This idea of the postmodern self in 
the virtual world had already been illustrated by Habermas (1980) when he wrote that, 
the postmodern stance heralds many of the arguments that have arisen from new 
technologies. Like postmodernism, electronic communications constitute the 
subject in different ways than do modern institutions… At the same time, 
technology also can configure multiple representations of the self. In a virtual 
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space, appearance replaces the real… Internet recalls the postmodern idea of 
“simulacrum” – there exists no concrete essence apart from that which is seen or 
reproduced” (p. 296). 
In this sense, while the “me” in the real world is something that appears through 
our own unique point of view, the “me” in the hyperreal world of cyberspace is reduced 
to the ontology of the image thanks to the digital media – following the lead of 
Habermas, one can have multiple representations of the self. In postmodernism, not only 
are the phenomena results of our point of view, but the ”me” is now exclusively for “me.” 
From this postmodern perspective, the Web user can, on the one hand, embody a single 
subject who is volatized and fragmented (Simpson, 1995; Turkle, 1995) and, on the other 
hand, personify many different characters in cyberspace. Of equal significance is the fact 
that individuals are in contact with people from different cultures and with people they 
have met only as virtual constructs. Consequently, by interacting beyond the stigma of 
real life, it is difficult to determine how identity is to be projected; likewise, the online 
medium has the potential to become a deceptive social space where individuals become 
victims of malevolent acts.  
Part of what postmodernism introduces is a set of non-linearities in time, in space, 
in virtual environment, and in decentered self (what Sherry Turkle calls “life on the 
screen”). Molded on Gibson’s (1984) matrix of informational space, “postmodernism’s 
objects now exist outside science fiction” (Turkle, 1995, p. 45). Sherry Turkle (1995) 
continues by saying that, 
They [postmodernism’s objects] exist in the creatures of a SimLife computer 
game, and in the simulations of the quantum world... All of these are life on the 
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screen. And with these objects, the abstract ideas in Jameson’s account of 
postmodernism become newly accessible and even consumable (p. 45). 
A thought-provoking worldview through which to consider the process of the 
“self” has been presented to human beings (Matusitz, 2005c). The next sub-section 
emphasizes how cyberterrorism has been made possible thanks to the postmodern world 
that makes up cyberspace, including multiple representations of the self and new 
conceptions of space and time. 
Postmodernism and Cyberspace: Cyberterrorism 
Cyberterrorism is a postmodern method of reaping terror for five reasons. First, 
cyberterrorists can cover their true identities and locations a mouse click away; they can 
choose to remain anonymous, pretend to be another self, or simulate multiple selves 
within a few seconds. Postmodernism stands against reified corporeal bodies and 
regimented social structures. Identity as we know it in the physical world is something 
constructed (Lister et al., 2003); cyberspace, however, makes identity fluid, 
deconstructed, and faded away, which enables the cyberterrorist to come and go without 
notice. In cyberspace, the self can take on a different meaning and can be represented 
rather than real. This justifies the existence of Otherness (Matusitz, 2005c). Otherness 
dwells in the cyberterrorist’s identity and his or her network – both in their production of 
meaning and in their interpretation. Identity does not exist without meaning and 
interpretation. In order to find out who is who behind a cyber attack, part of the objective 
of the computer expert is not only to play the role of the Other, but also to construct 
meaning and interpretation when tracking a cyberterrorist online. Reputations on the 
Internet are developed and maintained or challenged and blasted (Matusitz, 2005c). By 
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looking closely at these cues, at how they work and when they fail, computer experts can 
learn a great deal about how cyberterrorists communicate among one another. 
Second, the opportunities for interaction among cyberterrorists on the Internet can 
create a sense of immersion and engagement far different from anything that sensory or 
motor realism can provide (Schiano, 1999). Computer technology and the Internet enable 
cyberterrorists to establish social interdependence (and, hence, communities) that is more 
difficult to achieve in the corporeal world because of the stumbling blocks posed by 
modernity’s social structures and physical divisions, all of which prevent conventional 
terrorists from communicating as quickly and easily as they do it on the Internet. Yet, 
cyberterrorist networks are more than online communities; they organize relationships 
into powerful synergies that have an ultimate goal: to create a new world order by 
destroying the existing world order. How do they do that? They do that by not only 
striking their targets through viruses and other malicious tools, but, also, by tactfully 
using cyberspace to alter human interactions and by making the sense of self – as we 
know it on earth – senseless. This is a manifestation of postmodernism. 
Third, cyberterrorism is also a postmodern strategy for spreading terror because it 
seemingly has no limits, no inside or outside. The postmodern theatre of war may be 
fundamentally changed by the Information Age revolution, at both the strategic and 
tactical levels (Peters, 2004). Cyberterrorism is global and exceptionally fast and mobile. 
In highlighting the danger of cyberterrorism, Pillar (2001) points out the ease of 
movements across international boundaries and the growing potential for cyberterrorists 
to maneuver despite long distances. The space-time compression established by a 
postmodern communications environment (Lister et al., 2003) enables cyber attacks 
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against the Internet and other computer networks to be carried out far away, making 
borders, X-ray machines, and other physical barriers irrelevant. Cyberterrorism uses new 
computer technologies not only for improving communication and information exchange, 
but also for harming computer-based targets. Cyberterrorism is a reality as airport 
controllers have discovered to their consternation. Cyberterrorism is also postmodern 
because it is telegenic; it is aware that terror today must use computer media in all its 
forms to shape the subjectivities of the viewing public (Peters, 2004). 
Fourth, and in line with these contentions, cyberterrorism is postmodern because 
it creates a “small world” consciousness. Thanks to the unprecedented flexibility and 
resourcefulness of the Internet, cyberterrorists are able to find connecting paths to other 
groups (of individuals with similar intentions) in remote locations with just a few jumps. 
The key to discovering short paths within networks is the existence of clusters of related 
nodes [cyberterrorist groups] in addition to “short cuts” within the network (Barabasi, 
2003). These short connecting paths between cyberterrorists are the postmodern effect of 
human interaction in cyberspace; hence, the notion of a “small world” consciousness 
comes into play (Barabasi, 2002) 
Fifth, cyberterrorism is postmodern because it is made possible through a self-
assembly process: the Internet. In an analysis of the vulnerabilities of the Internet to 
cyberterrorism and destruction through malicious software programs, Albert and Barabasi 
(2000) came up with the idea that the Internet is a self-assembly process, which can cope 
with multiple minor failures. Yet, it is also in great danger vis-à-vis cyber attacks along 
its key pathways. The view of the Internet as self-assemblage is reminiscent of 
constructions of the fragmentary postmodern subject. This fragmentation is incomplete; 
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instead, the postmodern subject and the Internet possess the same characteristics of 
having central lines of construction, with many potential and variable outcomes (Albert 
& Barabasi, 2000). 
As one can see, the cyberterrorist can be the one next door, a “mouse click away,” 
or 10,000 miles apart, still a mouse click away. Through multiple representations of the 
self, new conceptions of space and time, all of which are made possible in a “small 
world” consciousness, cyberterrorism is a postmodern way of spreading terror. The new 
world order of terrorism has already started. What comes next is a description of how 
difficult the task is for computer experts to cope with the postmodern organizational 
structures of cyberterrorists. 
Postmodernism and Cyberspace: An Organizational Challenge 
Networks are the basis of globalization and communication. As humans naturally 
form a network society (Castells, 2000), they find that networks are group support 
systems. They are supportive in the sense that they “are created through coordinated 
activities and relationships that permeate organizational boundaries” (Stohl, 1995, p. 23). 
Cyberterrorists also have the very characteristic of using networks to communicate. 
Thanks to this, they are able to create worldwide liaisons; they realize that 
communication in cyberspace is so easy and accessible to anyone that networks can 
ensure efficiency and security in many situations. Cyberterrorist networks are self-
organized, rapid, efficient, and flexible. They represent an organizational innovation 
(Berger, 1998), but also an organizational challenge to computer experts and law 
enforcement agents in their attempt to track down those responsible for cyber attacks. 
The fact is that it is very difficult to control the flow of information on the Internet 
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because the volume of information is colossal and access is decentralized (Matusitz & 
O’Hair, in press). This is a perfect trait of postmodernism. 
Cyberterrorist networks are postmodern because they cross continental borders 
within seconds; they have no fixed geographic centers and they rely on the software of 
ideas rather than the hardware of the Army, Navy, or Air Force (Matusitz & O’Hair, in 
press). The Internet facilitates easy exchange of information; cyberterrorists can remain 
distant from areas where they are considered persona non grata (Matusitz & O’Hair, in 
press). Terrorism has moved from hierarchical toward information-age network designs 
(Arquilla, Rondfeldt, & Zanini, 1999). This is an organizational challenge because, in the 
past, law enforcement agents would know who was who behind terrorist acts (usually a 
country or a leader from a hierarchical terrorist organization). In this day and age, the 
postmodern type of network of terror is horizontal and flat, and not vertical and 
bureaucratically governed (Matusitz & O’Hair, in press). As a result, more effort is 
required on the part of counter-cyberterrorism experts to build networks that fight 
networks. As it will be explained later in detail, these experts are usually cyber forensics 
experts who feel compelled to communicate with other agencies through networks. Yes, 
through networks, just like cyberterrorists do. 
Cyberterrorist networks are postmodern because they are organized in a fully 
networked, decentralized, and “all-channel” (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951) manner. 
Recall that the “all-channel” network implies that any node in the network is connected to 
any other node. No wonder why the main backbone of cyberterrorist networks is not a 
top-down hierarchy, but a massive set of interconnections through the Internet. These 
interconnections are established so quickly that it takes a lot of patience and tremendous 
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skills for computer experts to catch even a potential linkage that has been made between 
cyberterrorists. Cyberterrorist networks contain extremely developed IT structures that 
support flexible emergent systems of communication (Monge & Fulk, 1999). These 
organizational structures enable communication relationships that go beyond 
organizational levels and boundaries. Flexibility, in turn, “implies that these relationships 
wax and wane” (Monge & Fulk, 1999, p. 71). One can very well imagine how 
complicated this “wax-and-wane” element can be for those who do not have the 
necessary means or expertise to track down cyberterrorists. 
What adds to the success of cyberterrorism is not only the simple stance of 
carrying out attacks while staying “in the dark” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001) or by 
remaining anonymous, but also the fact that the Internet allows cyberterrorists to 
structure their networks with virtually no risks involved. This postmodern method of 
causing harm on the Internet and computers is truly a challenge for international 
computer security. For the past several decades, postmodern theorists such as the 
deconstructionist Jean Gebser (1985) have been discussing changes in our perception of 
time. Their main argument is that time is not fixed. While conventional terrorists still 
have notions of time as they know it in real life, where the fundamental concepts for 
understanding reality – that is, space, time, and distance – do not change (Matusitz & 
O’Hair, in press), cyberterrorists have altered these notions of time as cyberspace drives 
them to cross the spatial divide. This puts an end to geography. Cyberterrorists are only a 
mouse click away from Web servers in China or Russia. For Cairncross (1997), this even 
means the death of time.  
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Truly, cyberspace makes irrational and senseless the time needed for a 
communicative act to occur between cyberterrorist A and cyberterrorist B. By 
coordinating their activities via cyberspace, by living with these postmodern conceptions 
of time, by living in spatial emptiness [that is, in denial of any physics of spatiality and of 
any presence; even the presence of absence], cyberterrorist networks not only make the 
Internet a postmodern battlefield, but they also make their network structure extend 
geometry (Matusitz & O’Hair, in press). This is exactly how the Internet works. As 
Mitchell (1995) suggests, 
the Net negates geometry; it is fundamentally and profoundly antispatial. It is 
nothing like the Piazza Navona or Copley Square. You cannot say where it is or 
describe its memorable shape and proportions or tell a stranger how to get there. 
But you can find things in it without knowing where they are. The Net is ambient 
– nowhere in particular and everywhere at once (p. 8).  
Considering all this, it is not surprising how challenging it is for cybersecurity 
experts and law enforcement agents to identify cyberterrorists. Yet, the reason why most 
cyberterrorist attempts have failed does not lie in the fact that cyberterrorist networks are 
weak or that they have relatively low impact. The reason is that cybersecurity experts 
have the required knowledge, skills, and expertise to resist cyber attacks; they install 
firewalls and other preventive measures. The last sub-section of this discourse on 
postmodernism pertains to the absence of leadership in cyberterrorist networks.  
Postmodernism and Cyberspace: Where No Leadership Is Needed 
We saw earlier that, from an organizational vantage point, postmodernism in 
cyberspace is reflected in the transition from a centralized, hierarchical, and rigid 
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organizational structure to a decentralized and very flexible structure. Postmodern 
networks of terror also have flat, horizontal type of structures that do not require 
cyberterrorists to have a leader and that allow them to operate in an “all-channel” 
(Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951) manner. Since no leadership is needed, cyberterrorists do 
not have rigorous schedules to follow; they do not have long correspondence times of 
weeks, or even months. Instead, they are able to communicate on a daily basis, masking 
their identities and movements by operating in a series of Internet cafes (Ballard, Hornik, 
& McKenzie, 2002).  
For sure, cyberterrorists do not require permission for action from a leader, even 
if cyber attacks require the formation of a network. It goes without saying that 
cyberterrorists do not need a collaborating or weak government to harbor them as they 
train and plot. The majority of cyberterrorist acts are in fact not state-sponsored. In the 
cyberterrorist world, there is just no single, central leadership. Neither are there 
headquarters (Matusitz & O’Hair, in press). While the chief leadership of a conventional 
terrorist group does give orders and assignments, if the members of the group become 
cyberterrorists, they will tend not to follow the leader(s); rather, they will use him or her 
as a messenger, go-between, or gatekeeper. Nevertheless, the group will remain a 
sophisticated organization with vast capability. 
Beyond doubt, cyberspace alters the very concept of terrorist leadership. Even the 
most fundamental leadership techniques have been transformed by the influence of the 
Information Age and its highly sophisticated technological resources. Postmodernism 
questions the necessity of reason in the service of power, and the types of leadership that 
require unification and harmony within centrally governed chains of command (Williams 
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& Sewpaul, 2004). In the same perspective of postmodernism, the upcoming section is an 
examination of how the battle between computer experts and cyberterrorists can be 
explained through the central tenets of game theory. As the argument will be made, in 
this analysis of social networks of cyberterrorists, game theory is a solid supplement to 
social network theory. 
A Postmodern Theory of Terrorism  
in Cyberspace: Game Theory 
 Postmodern Internet-based terror reapers are cyberterrorists; they constantly seek 
to turn the technological superiority and complexity of their targets into liabilities rather 
than assets. Just look at how immeasurably vulnerable our postmodern society is in the 
face of malicious software programs or any destruction – or even any disconnection – of 
our information systems or power supplies. Despite the fact that abundant technical 
safeguards may be created by the finest experts worldwide, the dangerous game we have 
to face against cyberterrorists will be a strategies-versus-counterstrategies game in which 
the players who will prevail will be those who possess the structural advantage. In many 
cases, to disrupt is, so to say, structurally less difficult than to protect. Hence, the modern 
protectors may be playing a losing game against the postmodern disruptors. This section 
purports to analyze how the battle between computer experts and cyberterrorists can be 
explained through game theory, which, in this study, perfectly complements the role of 
social network theory. Many applications of game theory are related to economics, 
political science, voting decisions (Bilbao et al., 2002), as well as other numerous 
domains, including an important one in this study: law enforcement (Fent, Feichtinger, & 
Tragler, 2002). 
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Rationale for Using Game Theory  
Game theory is important in this study because the theory examines the 
relationships between individuals or groups, using models with clear statements of 
consequences (individual payoffs) that depend on the actions taken by more than one 
individual (Aumann & Hart, 1992; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). The rationale for using game theory in this study lies in the fact that 
game theory is about power and control. It deals with two-person (or more) decision-
making situations (with opposing or joined interests). As explained later, game theory can 
also be applied to the study of cyberterrorism. Since games frequently reproduce or share  
characteristics with real situations, they can offer strategies for dealing with such 
circumstances. The basic assumption is that the players (decision makers) follow specific 
objectives and take into account both their skills and expectations of the other player’s 
(decision maker’s) behavior.  
Another reason why game theory is suited for this study lies in the fact that, 
against opponents who carry out attacks in a postmodern fashion, conventional strategies 
lead nowhere. The cyber attacker and the computer security agent not only engage in 
real-time game play; they also use strategies that are not conceivable in conventional 
conflict. Game theory can explain how viruses evolve through carefully taken actions 
(Turner, 2005). For this reason, the theory can greatly contribute to a better understanding 
of cyber strategy and its implications. For instance, when a public Web server 
administrator notices something unusual in the network (i.e., caused by a DOS attack), he 
or she may suspect that an attack has occurred and that action must be taken now. This 
implies that the two players are in the same context. One player wants to attack a 
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computer system; the other wants to protect it. The context involves short-term strategies 
on the part of both sides. The interactions between the cyberterrorist and the computer 
security agent are to be viewed as a postmodern two-player game. The goal here is to 
explain what strategies are used by both players and how computer security agents can 
use the outcomes of the game to improve the security of their network.  
Origins of Game Theory 
Game theory was first outlined by John von Neumann, a Hungarian-American 
mathematician, in a paper entitled “Theory of Parlor Games” that he presented at the 
Mathematical Society of Göttingen in 1928 (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). In his 
paper, von Neumann laid out a mathematical model for identifying the best strategy for a 
player to achieve the greatest possible results with minimal losses in any type of contest 
(that involves more than one player). In order to do so, von Neumann examined the 
tactics in which either of two players could make moves so that he or she could achieve 
the optimal “pay-off” at any given moment in the game (Poundstone, 1992). von 
Neumann’s inspiration for game theory was poker. Poker, for von Neumann, was not 
based on the theory of probability alone. Rather, an important factor in the victory of any 
of the player is the idea of “bluffing,” a strategy used to deceive the other players or 
conceal information from them (Poundstone, 1992). 
A couple of years later, von Neumann collaborated with Oskar Morgenstern, an 
Austrian economist at Princeton, to develop game theory into a book. Their book, 
“Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), 
radically changed the field of economics. In fact, the winners of the 2005 Nobel Prize in 
Economics were two game theorists, Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann. The former 
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is best known for tackling practical questions, while the latter, a mathematician, is 
credited with more theoretical contributions (Holden, 2005). Game theory has also had a 
significant impact in the domains of psychology, sociology, politics, political science, 
terrorism, warfare, games (i.e., chess and simulation games) and, for the past twenty 
years, video games, the Internet, and many emergent fields.  
On a side note, game theory has been successful in the social sciences because it 
pertains to fundamental studies of diverse aspects of collective behavior: care for others 
vs. selfishness and cooperation vs. competition. Game theory has also been used by social 
scientists to predict which behaviors can spread through a particular group of people, 
particularly in contests involving classic strategies such as “trust” versus “cheater” 
(Turner, 2005). 
Description of Game Theory 
Game theory studies how individuals behave when they are placed in situations 
that require them to interact with other individuals. As a branch of applied mathematics, 
the theory analyzes rational behavior in interactive or interdependent situations and 
proposes a set of mathematical tools and models for analyzing these interactive or 
interdependent processes (Neel, 2005). It rests on the premise that each person “must first 
know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best for himself 
or herself” (Jehle & Reny, 2001, p. 267). As the theory suggests, a game consists of 
players. The number of players does not matter, but the theory is best applicable when the 
number of players does not exceed “a few.” So, each person is a player in the game and 
the player is also a decision maker, choosing how he or she acts. Because each player 
wants the greatest possible consequence according to his or her preference, every 
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decision made by each player will have an impact – whether positive or negative – on the 
outcomes of the game. In other words, each outcome is the result of particular moves 
made by the players at a given point in the game (Rapoport, 1974).  
The fundamental characteristic of game theory is the assumption that players are 
rational and, therefore, look for the maximization of the difference between their own 
costs and benefits when considering an action they want to take. In other words, by 
providing tools for analyzing strategic interactions among two or more players, game 
theory uses simple models to study complex interactive relations. The advantage of this is 
that game theory helps illustrate the potential for – as well as the risks associated with – 
collaborative behavior among distrustful players in the game. As one can see, this all 
looks like a chess game, where each player does not know what moves his or her 
opponent will take. Therefore, each of the players must find a strategy to examine the 
possible actions of each other in the situation. The ultimate goal is to determine the best 
course of action for himself or herself (Jehle & Reny, 2001).  
Below is a model of how game theory is used to simulate real-life situations. The 
model typically contains five elements and is based on Rapoport’s (1974) explanation of 
game theory: 
1) players (or decision makers);  
2) strategies available to each player; each player has several choices at any given 
time during the game; every possible strategy pursued by each player 
leads to a defined end-state (either a “win” end-state, a “lose” end-state, or 
a “zero-sum” end-state); 
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3) rules that govern each player’s behavior; each player has full knowledge of the 
rules; violating the rules can lead to an end-state that would have been 
different had one or all players followed them; 
4) outcomes; each outcome is the result of particular choices made by players at 
any given point in the game; and  
5) payoffs accumulated by each player as a consequence of each possible  
outcome; a player will always take the path that will result in a greater 
payoff to himself or herself (which means that each player knows the 
payoffs both to himself or herself and the opponent(s) at any given end-
state). 
According to Rapoport (1974), these elements assume that each player seeks to 
follow the strategies that will help him or her accomplish the most beneficial goal in 
every situation. Of equal relevance is that game theory implies strategic thinking about 
how player A will act in a situation where his or her moves will affect player B, whose 
moves, in turn, will have an impact on player A. What comes next is a description of four 
types of outcomes that result from the actions taken by the players in the game: (1) the 
Nash equilibrium, (2) the zero-sum game, (3) the positive-sum game, and (4) the 
negative-sum game. 
Nash Equilibrium 
The concept of Nash equilibrium was coined by John Nash (1950), a game 
theorist and famous 1994 Nobel Prize winner (Milner, 1995). It refers to the outcome of a 
game that occurs when one player takes the best possible action based on the action of 
another player. Likewise, the latter player takes the best possible action based on the 
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action of the first player. In the Nash equilibrium, both players perform their dominant 
strategies. What this means is that none of the two players would change his or her 
strategy if they were offered the chance to do so at the end of the game. So, each player 
makes the best decision for himself or herself that he or she can, taking the actions of his 
or her opponent as given (Mehlmann, 2000). 
In addition, the Nash equilibrium also implies that each player maximizes his or 
her own actual or expected payoff. Recall that the payoff is the outcome obtained by a 
combination of decisions. Again, each player takes the other player’s current strategies as 
given (Nash, 1950). So, a player has nothing to gain by changing only his or her own 
strategy. If a player has chosen a strategy and if he or she cannot benefit by changing his 
or her strategy, while the other player keeps his or hers unchanged as well, then the 
current set of strategies and the payoffs that result from the outcome of the game 
constitute a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). 
Zero-Sum Game 
A zero-sum game is a game in which the interests of each player are diametrically 
opposed (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). In other words, regardless of the outcome 
of the game, the winnings of one player are exactly balanced by the losses of the other 
player. What this means is that each of the payoffs must be the negative of the other(s) 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). The outcome of the game is named “zero-sum” because 
when a player adds up his or her total gains and subtracts the total losses of the other, 
they will sum to zero. All in all, player A can win only at the expenses of player B (or 
vice versa) and the benefits and losses to both player A and player B amount to the same 
value (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
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Positive-Sum Game 
A positive-sum game is a situation in which each player can benefit from the 
actions taken by all players, even if some players benefit more than others. Thus, it can 
result in one player losing and another gaining with an overall gain (Mehlmann, 2000). 
Negative-Sum Game 
A negative-sum game is a situation in which the actions of each player hurt both 
themselves and their opponents. It can also result in one player losing and another 
gaining with an overall loss (Mehlmann, 2000). 
Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Game 
As one can see, different outcomes are possible. Given this, it would be 
interesting to know if computer security experts should better engage in cooperative 
behavior instead of non-cooperative behavior (or vice versa) when facing cyberterrorists. 
Simply defined, a non-cooperative game, in game theory, is one where each player 
pursues his or her own interests independently. In a cooperative game, players form 
coalitions and combine their decision-making problems (Basar & Olsder, 1999). Let us 
focus on a past collaborative situation very briefly. According to Verton (2001b), it is 
sometimes the case that investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation develop 
close relationships with cyberterrorists through the use of chat rooms (Internet Relay 
Chat rooms). Rapidly, cyberterrorists are asking the investigators to take part in 
coordinated cyber attacks and eventually they offer, in exchange for their participation, to 
share stolen information (Verton, 2001b). Here, the two parties work together and do 
fairly well in their collaboration (“If you participate in our cyber attacks, we will give you 
what you need”). 
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The Role of Communication in Game Theory 
Communication plays a central role in game theory because the theory involves 
the analysis of conflict, cooperation, and the degree of communication needed to reach a 
desired outcome by each player (Osborne, 2003). Game theory also deals with strategic 
interaction. A strategic interaction requires that the players make decisions; the outcome 
of the game depends on the players’ choices. A strategic interaction inherently involves 
human communication. For instance, the cyberterrorist needs to find a way through 
communication and trust in order to reach a collaborative outcome with the computer 
security agent. In fact, in a collaborative game, the ability with which each player 
communicates, the intensity of communication, and even the organization with which 
these players communicate can deeply affect – whether positively or negatively – the 
outcome of the game (Osborne, 2003). If there is no communication between two players, 
then no cooperation can be formed. However, if they can communicate and engage in 
cooperative behavior, the outcome would be quite different. For this reason, repeated 
interaction might lead to different outcomes.  
Applications of Game Theory in the Study of Terrorism 
Several game-theoretic models of terrorism exist (see Sandler & Hartley, 1995). 
Since the 1980s, a group of scholars in economics and political science have applied 
game theory to the study of terrorism (Lapan & Sandler, 1988, 1993; Lee, 1988; Scott, 
1991; Selten, 1988), which refers to the premeditated use or threat of use of violence in 
order to achieve political objectives through intimidation or fear (Overgaard, 1994). 
Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983), for instance, offer a rational-actor model that 
explains the negotiation process between terrorists and federal counter-terrorism agents 
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for hostage crises or property seizure (and where demands are issued). In the model 
created by Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983), the terrorists’ assessment of the likely 
concession to be given by a government is contingent upon a probability distribution, 
conditioned on previous governmental concessions. The analysis made by Sandler and 
his colleagues (1983) shows that the choices and actions made by the terrorists are 
influenced by those of the government and vice versa. 
Game theory has also been applied in the analysis of terrorists’ choice of targets, 
for a three-player game that involved two targeted countries and a common terrorist 
threat (Sandler & Lapan, 1988). In this game, each country independently chooses its 
deterrence expenditures. The goal is to determine the terrorists’ probability of logistical 
failure on that nation’s soil. The terrorists choose the option for the highest expected 
payoff for their attack. Each country’s choice of deterrence bestows benefits and costs on 
the other target. By transferring the attack abroad, each country imposes an external cost 
on its counterpart. Yet, by limiting the number of attacks and their gravity at home, each 
country offers an external benefit to foreign residents.  
There are other applications of the game-theoretic model that could be described 
in great lengths, such as the one that analyzes a situation where the terrorists know their 
true strength, but the targeted country must estimate the terrorists’ resources based on the 
level of their attacks. If, for example, the country knows that the terrorists have sufficient 
resources to force the country to surrender eventually, then the most beneficial strategy 
for that country is to concede at the outset and suffer no damage (Sandler & Lapan, 
1988). The application of game theory to cyberterrorism contains the same fundamental 
elements needed for the players to reach their desired outcomes, as it is explained next. 
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Game Theory as Applied to Cyberterrorism: An Overview 
Just as we are able to understand the strategies used by conventional terrorists in a 
particular game, we may also be able to understand how cyberterrorists act in a given 
situation. Two basic principles that make up game theory are that the players are rational 
and intelligent in strategic reasoning. With respect to cyberterrorists, why do many of 
them try to destroy the computer system of the Pentagon or other federal agencies? Why 
do they not cripple more targets outside those organizations? The answer to these to 
questions is simple. Cyberterrorists like to commit malicious acts where they believe it 
will help influence those who make decisions directly in the way of the cyberterrorists’ 
goals. A network of cyberterrorists has as its main objective to cause damage to the 
computer system that it attacks. This damage can take many forms. First, any action 
undertaken by the computer network to strengthen its security system against attacks 
generates benefits for the cyberterrorists because it imposes costs on the computer 
network. Second, any move taken by the cyberterrorists that causes damage to the 
computer network increases benefits for the cyberterrorist (i.e., self-glorification as the 
“enemy” suffers, and so on).  
Conversely, the response from the computer network against a cyberterrorist 
action can be twofold: retaliation (offensive) or conciliation (collaborative). Oddly 
enough, collaboration between the attackers and the defenders can contribute to the 
shrinking of the cyberterrorist network by reducing the number of members who were 
part of their network. What happens is that the computer network can make it appear that 
the conciliation was not the result of the actions taken by the cyberterrorists. 
Consequently, some of the members may feel that the cyberterrorist attacks in question 
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have not carried the impact they had hoped. In reality, though, the end-result is a draw (or 
a win-win outcome). Retaliation can also increase winnings for both sides because it 
expends resources. 
 The outcome can also be a Nash equilibrium. According to Lye and Wing (2005), 
a Nash equilibrium gives a computer security expert – or even a public Web server 
administrator – an idea of the cyber attacker’s strategy “and a plan for what to do in each 
state in the event of an attack” (p. 9). Finding additional Nash equilibria allows that 
public Web server administrator to learn more about the cyber attacker’s best attack 
strategies. Just like in a chess game, player A (say, a computer security agent) does not 
know the next move of player B (the cyberterrorist) and vice versa. Player A only needs 
to act when an attack on the computer network is suspected. It is fair to assume that both 
players know what each other is capable of doing. Yet, they do not know what each 
other’s next move will be. Again, it is just like a chess game, where the game is 
evolutionary.  
Game Theory as Applied to Cyberterrorism: A Postmodern View 
As opposed to conventional war techniques, game theory in cyberspace allows for 
the use of grand strategies aiming at fast and easy disintegration of the respective 
opponent. Not only can a player make multiple moves simultaneously (as if he or she 
were composed of multiple selves), but, also, both players can make multiple, 
simultaneous moves in the same context as well. While in most conventional games, 
players alternate moves, in cyberspace this is not true anymore. An opponent can launch 
multiple, simultaneous attacks easily and quickly (Littman, 1994). What this also means 
is that time is not “constraining” in the context of cyberterrorism. In other words, 
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opponents in cyberspace are under no time control constraints (Carmel & Markovtich, 
1996). Timing for move and state updates is not fixed. Neither is it defined. In actual 
space, time is perspectival (Gebser, 1985), while in cyberspace, time is “aperspectival.” 
For this reason, time becomes a “fluxing intensity, rather than a fixed extensity, and as 
such it is not prone to being fragmented into identical and repetitive units of measurement 
such as past, present, or future” (Kramer, 1997, p. 122). This is postmodernism. 
On a side note, remember our description of the terrorist networks created by the 
Zealots and their comrades in Antiquity. Game theory would perfectly apply in that 
context. The Zealots and the Romans were clear opponents. The rules of the game were 
different than those in cyberspace: the Zealots and the Romans were taking actions 
against each other in a linear dialectical process. They were learning from each other’s 
tactics as they were networking and creating cells at the right locations. One of the game 
strategies that could not be used was spying or infiltration. For instance, it was difficult 
for the Zealots to infiltrate the Romans because the terrorist game they were playing 
occurred in actual space. A Zealot was clearly a Zealot, that is, a Jew possessing well-
defined Jewish facial features, speaking Hebrew, and so on. However, on the Internet, 
there is so much anonymity that it is not only difficult to tell what game the cyberterrorist 
is playing or what network he or she is involved in; it is also difficult to determine who 
the other player is or what his or her ulterior goal is. Is the other player a real threat or is 
it just an FBI agent acting as a cyber spy? Because of the postmodern nature of the 
Internet, and because of the absence of spatiality (as opposed to the spatiality during the 
period in Antiquity), the Web user can move effortlessly across the spatial divide.  
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The fragmentary aspect of the Internet and communication in cyberspace 
gives each of the players more autonomy to create their own environment and 
identity. While modern identity is a location, postmodern “identity” is nonlocalizable, 
and “therefore often seen as nonidentity” (Kramer, 1997, p. xviii). Because they are 
able to change their identities every second with just one mouse click, cyberterrorists 
are free from imposed rules and social constraint as they know it in the perspectival, 
physical world. Is the other player a real threat or is it just an FBI agent acting as a 
cyber spy? Because of the postmodern nature of the Internet, and because of the 
absence of spatiality, the Web user can move effortlessly across the spatial divide. 
When confronting each other in cyberspace, the cyberterrorist and the computer 
security agent find themselves in a space and time that are aperspectival. Kramer 
(1997) writes extensively on aperspectival time. For Kramer,  
aperspectival time is a dimensional constituent of the world. Time is not 
anywhere, nor is it going “anywhere.” Nor is time a “constant.” Instead, it 
enables “going.” It enables difference, constance (identity), and discontiguity. 
In the aperspectival universe of infinity and eternity, the center is everywhere 
and the circumference nowhere. Every “place” and “person” is the/an axis 
mundi, the center of everything as well as an edge. Because there is no single 
edge one is always the center and never the center (p. 122). 
Based on a game-theoretical model, the traditional way of looking at conflict is 
the following: is there another strategy to evaluate the opponent? How do his or her 
actions differ from mine? How likely am I to win the conflict? Or how likely is my 
opponent to lose the conflict? In the context of cyberterrorism, this symmetry tends to be 
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broken. Postmodernism always implies change and fluidity. This is Derrida’s (1967) 
deconstruction of meaning and of the Other’s sense-making and intentions. The player’s 
opponent may have an end goal that is compatible with his or hers. Likewise, the 
opponent may be trying for something that the player does not like, yet the opponent does 
not compromise the critical objectives of the player’s mission (Hsu et al., 1990; Tesauro, 
1994). Also interesting is that the Internet and computer technology allow players to 
change their goals more quickly and more frequently (Carmel & Markovitch, 1996). 
They can even change the rules. In most games, the rules are known by all participants 
beforehand. In the situation of cyberterrorism, anything goes.  
In line with these views about change and fluidity, the opponent’s resources may 
change during the game, based on new tools, new weapons, new techniques, new 
strategies, all of which can be acquired within seconds. Any network that is unable to 
handle that is at a critical disadvantage. In cyberterrorism, where new opportunities for 
attack are rapidly, effortlessly, and repeatedly introduced, online learning of these 
opportunities for increasing the chances of achieving the expected desires and outcomes 
is a starting point. It certainly is a good approach. Plus, the opponent may be able to 
design programs that will get a computer network in bad habits, which the opponent can 
later exploit for his or her own purposes. Programs susceptible to this are called 
“leadable” (Littman, 1994). One approach to resisting leadability is to learn only from 
mistakes, not from successes. The idea of losing the game is not always a bad idea, since 
computer security agents can learn from mistakes. This is where game theory perfectly 
fits. The approach just mentioned limits the opponent’s power to use rewards for bad 
moves to train the computer security agents’ network (Littman, 1994).  
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Intersection of Game Theory and Social Network Theory in the Study of Cyberterrorism 
The reason why game theory can intersect with social network theory in the study 
of cyberterrorism lies in the fact that the Internet is a large-scale communication network 
that cannot be managed by one central authority, but by various nodes or hubs 
communicating among each other and that use all sorts of strategies. Some of those nodes 
or hubs are cyberterrorists themselves and they are also part of the game. This lends to 
the analysis of the network system using the game theory model, in which 
communication paths or data streams can be altered by selfish nodes – cyberterrorists in 
this study – who try to cause damage or modify the state of the network. Besides, instead 
of being a homogeneous network where users interact safely and in an honest way, the 
Internet is more like a social network of heterogeneous, selfish users who try to maximize 
their personal desires (Floyd & Fall, 1999). This is where game theory and social network 
theory intersect. Game theory is a natural modeling framework for understanding how 
nodes in the network make decisions independently and how they seek to optimize their 
desires by using strategies. Computer security agents happen to be the standard defenders 
of the network (Floyd & Fall, 1999). They have to intermingle with cyberterrorists and 
use different strategies in order to reach their desired outcomes (for the benefit of the 
network, of course).  
The scenario on the next page (Figure 4) represents our game model during the 
interaction between a cyberterrorist and a computer security agent. The public Web 
server, the private file server, and the private workstation are very important nodes in the 
graph. Since these three nodes are highly connected to thousands of computers, they are 
actually hubs. The cyberterrorist represents an external node, very small, working from a 
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single computer. The cyberterrorist is not a hub; however, his or her actions could be 
damaging. The links that we see are direct communication paths. The computer security 
agent can work, for instance, from a private workstation and can have direct access to all 
the features of the public Web server. 
 
private 
 public                                 file server 





Figure 4      Example of a local network attacked by a cyberterrorist 
 
From a game theory perspective, all kinds of strategies are available to each 
player. For example, “a common target for use as a launching base in an attack is the 
public Web server” (Lye & Wing, 2005, p. 4). By using this hub as a springboard from 
which serious damage could be inflicted, the cyberterrorist could try to flood private-
home computers with sniffer programs or viruses. No matter what, until the cyberterrorist 
takes action, the computer security agent does not know whether there is an attacker or 
not. He or she does not even know about the existence of the node. Plus, we should keep 
in mind that not all actions taken by the cyberterrorist can be observed. Once the game 
has started, each player has several choices at any given time during the game. An action 
pair (composed of both the cyberterrorist and the computer security agent) can cause the 
local network to move from one state to another (Lye & Wing, 2005). 
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There are highly expected payoffs based on the actions taken by each player. The 
cyberterrorist’s rewards might be in terms of the amount of damage done to the network. 
For instance, a “defaced corporate website may cause the company to lose its reputation 
and its customer to lose confidence” (Lye & Wing, 2005, p. 3). This is a reward for the 
cyber attacker. By the same token, disrupting a hub (public Web server) can be the 
desired outcome of the cyberterrorist, even if it just takes 15 minutes for the public Web 
server administrator to determine the strategy that was used and restart the service. On 
the other hand, the reward of the computer security agent would be to see the strategies 
taken by the cyberterrorist fail, which happens in most cases (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
The game can be a “cooperative” type of game if a cyberterrorist uses inducements to get 
a public Web server administrator to take actions that will reach a positive outcome. The 
choices and actions made by the cyberterrorist can be influenced by the administrator 
(and vice versa). For example, the cyberterrorist can urge the administrator to install two 
levels of password protection to make the effort required to wreaking havoc more 
challenging to the attacker. Maybe he or she would love that. It might be the case that the 
cyberterrorist wants the network to be in a very good state in order to create the biggest 
damage. After all, it takes a big target to create big damage.  
Based on the motives of the attacker, the administrator might, in turn, increase 
security to prevent him or her from carrying out their plan. The cyberterrorist might 
perceive this next move as a trade-off. Conversely, computer security agents might be 
able to contemplate the idea that, while unknown cyberterrorist actions may occur at any 
time, some of their moves are more likely to occur than others. As such, if a 
cyberterrorist is presumed to have access to a particular hub within a network, the 
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chances of being able to perform a previously unknown move using that hub are much 
greater. The task of cyber officers, then, becomes easier. Now that we have seen how 
computer security experts cope with cyberterrorists through various strategies and 
techniques, based on game theory intermingled with social network theory, let us focus 
on the types of networks they create in order to thwart, or be cognizant of, networks that 
cyberterrorists web or span for themselves.  
It Takes Networks to Fight Networks  
It takes networks to fight networks. These six words were stated by Arquilla and 
Rondfeldt (2001). Hierarchies are clumsy techniques to use against cyberterrorist 
networks. Since our government purports to defend its universities, organizations, 
hospitals, businesses, and other agencies (and all its citizens) against cyberterrorism, it 
might be interesting to understand what networking designs and strategies are used in 
order to stop, or at least, to understand social networks of terror. This does not mean 
imitating the cyberterrorist networks per se; rather, for law enforcement agencies, IT 
networks, and cyber forensics labs, it means learning to draw from experience or 
previous encounters of their networks. Hopefully, readers will have a better 
understanding of the rise of network forms in the Information Age (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 
2001). Networks between the agencies and groups mentioned above rely heavily on 
technological innovation, as well as the development of new mechanisms for interagency 
and multi-jurisdictional collaboration (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001). 
The literature tells us that it is necessary for governments, in their tracking down 
of cyberterrorists or recovery of seized and frozen data, to consult with local officials and 
other cyber organizations in order to maximize their outcomes (Rist & Chee, 2004). As 
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explained in this section, the network of computer security experts and other important 
agents is enabled by cyber forensics experts involved in federal or local networks (i.e., 
experts from university cyber forensics labs, etc.), immediate incident responses, and 
high-rate security analysis tools (Rist & Chee, 2004). Note that it is not easy for 
cybersecurity experts and law enforcement agents to identify networks of cyberterrorists. 
Yet, the reason why most cyberterrorist attempts have failed does not lie in the fact that 
cyberterrorist networks are weak or that they have relatively low impact. The reason is 
that cybersecurity experts have the required knowledge, skills, and expertise to resist 
cyber attacks. They install firewalls and other preventive measures. 
Lack of Cyber Forensics Expertise in Law Enforcement 
The majority of law enforcement agencies do not clearly recognize occurrences of 
cyberterrorism (Aeilts, 2005). As Goodman (2001) puts it, “victims may have serious 
doubts about the capacity of the police to handle computer crime incidents in an efficient, 
timely, and confidential manner” (p. 13). Ten years before Goodman wrote this quote, 
Hafner and Markoff (1991) already remarked that law enforcement agencies were 
frequently ill-prepared and insufficiently trained to capture computer criminals and 
handle digital evidence. The technologically-related hurdles that might prevent nations 
from mitigating cyber threats primarily deal with the tools and knowledge used in 
cyberspace. Put in layperson’s terms, law enforcement often lacks the appropriate 
knowledge to keep up with cyberterrorists (Gabrys, 2002). Many people involved in 
computer forensics feel the main problem is the lack of education in law enforcement 
relating to cyberterrorism and the like. Law enforcement agents have devoted themselves 
to the high-degree crimes, lumping cyber crimes into a low priority status. Yet, the 
149
financial losses resulting from a computer attack could fund a small country (Zangrilli, 
2002). Fortunately, for the past few years, things have gotten better; computer technology 
has increasingly been valued in the realm of law enforcement that used to wage wars 
without computers. As a matter of fact, law enforcement agencies are backed up months 
in cyber forensic investigations (McGinn, Raymond, & Joseph, 2002).  
Cyber Forensics: An Area for Fighting Networks of Cyberterrorists 
Cyber forensics experts are computer experts with highly technical skills. Cyber 
forensics, also known as computer forensics, is a method to improve investigation into an 
ever-growing era of crimes that uses computers, computer-aided terrorism, 
cyberterrorism, espionage, bank and business fraud, and identity theft (Thilmany, 2004). 
Cyber forensics refers to retrieving and analyzing evidence from computer systems, 
including small bits of computer hardware and electronic data on the Internet (Delio, 
2005; Holsapple, 2005; Smith, 2000). A similar definition of cyber forensics is that it is 
the identification, examination, and reconstruction of evidence that is extracted from any 
element of computer systems, computer networks, computer media, and computer 
peripherals that allow forensics analysts to solve a computer-related crime (Hosmer et al., 
2000). Cyber forensics experts usually have solid knowledge in a wide range of 
computer/networking hardware, software, and operating systems.  
Part of cyber forensics is what is also called “network forensics.” Network 
forensics experts preserve, identify, extract, document, and interpret network data 
(Roberts, 2005). Network forensics lies at the interface between electronic information 
systems and the law, and also involves reviewing a compromised network and figuring 
out step-by-step what happened (Prosise & Mandia, 2001). Network forensics experts 
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have three functions that make up networking security more reliable: (1) to analyze 
vulnerability assessment and risk management, (2) to detect network intrusion and 
incident response, and (3) to ensure computing and networking forensics by making 
computer systems more secure. One recent way to do this has been closing 
computing/networking loopholes exploited by cyberterrorists to launch attacks, such as 
Denial of Service (DOS) (Oklahoma Digital Forensics Lab, 2005). 
Who Is Part of the Network Fighting Networks?  
 According to the cyber forensics lab at Purdue University, there are four network 
communities involved in cyber forensics: law enforcement, military, private sector, and 
academia (Cyber Forensics at Purdue University, 2005). To begin with, law enforcement 
officers have been encouraged to learn the arts of digital forensics (Boyle, 2005). When 
working with an ongoing investigation, it is important for them to be able to gather 
evidence as fast as possible (Holsapple, 2005). Plus, cyber forensics software can protect 
electronic evidence for use in investigations (Boyle, 2005). Because computers are 
machines that can stay in a lab waiting to be processed for a year or more, it gives 
malicious hackers time to hide their traces before evidence can be collected and 
processed. Therefore, gathering evidence in a quick fashion allows law enforcement 
agents to discover new leads early in an investigation (Holsapple, 2005). The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation is seriously involved in cyber forensics (Beucke & Grow, 2005; 
Moore, 2005). 
 Second, the military is also involved in vast network of computer security 
activities that aim at purging cyberterrorists from the digital realm (Swartz, 2004). Not 
only does the U.S. military have cyberwar tools and cyber-warfare capabilities, but they 
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also collaborate with local organizations and defense experts (Fisher, Nobel, & Taft, 
2003). Another collaboration is the one between military, security, and corporate bodies, 
all of which know that the United States is vulnerable to a full-scale electronic attack 
(Graham-Rowe, 2003). Let us not forget to mention the importance of cyber crime 
centers around the nation for the military investigation of digital evidence. For instance, 
investigators in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines frequently contact the cyber 
forensics lab in Baltimore to analyze digital evidence that is held as part of the military’s 
most complex cyberterrorism-related investigations (Messmer, 2005). 
Third, the private sector is also seriously involved in the network against 
cyberterrorists. The main reason stems from the fact that cyberterrorists have already 
manifested themselves by using worms or viruses they plant on our personal home 
computers to launch assaults on private-sector infrastructures (McCracken, 2004). Since 
companies today rely heavily on cyberspace and the Internet, they tend to network with 
organizations that ensure Internet safety. Such organizations encourage researchers and 
developers to join forces in the identification and patching of vulnerabilities (McCracken, 
2004). The private sector is also collaborating with the U.S. Federal Government, which, 
for a couple of years, has taken a leadership role in stopping cyber attacks and other 
intrusion attempts. One such leadership role is the creation of the National Cyber Security 
Summit Task Force, a group of more than three dozen corporations and organizations. 
The goal is to issue an information security policy framework in the resistance against 
hacking and cyberterrorism (Carlson & Fisher, 2004).  
In a similar vein, law enforcement agencies are occasionally called upon to 
investigate network and computer intrusions if a hacker or cyberterrorist gains 
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unauthorized access to a system protected by law. The agencies must also have complete 
and credible network forensic evidence of potential cyber attacks if they want to 
prosecute the hacker or cyberterrorist or if they want to seek legal warrants to control 
suspected activities (Phillips et al., 2005). Federal law enforcement officials claim that 
cooperation is needed from the private-sector companies since they are major targets of 
cyber attacks. In 2002, groups were already assisting private-sector companies with 
protecting themselves from cyberthreats (Thibodeau, 2002). Yet, although federal and 
private-sector officials have created vast collaborative networks of cyber forensics 
support such as the network of counter-cybersabotage on the possible information 
technology-based failures during the summer 2003 blackout in the U.S., the World Bank 
demands that the private sector make exceptional efforts to work with law enforcement 
agencies as well as with supervisory authorities within and across borders because of the 
worldwide nature of Internet technology (Verton, 2003b). 
Fourth, the world of academia is crucial in this investigation of networks of cyber 
forensics experts. A whole section is devoted to university cyber forensics labs and their 
important role in the collaboration with law enforcement agencies. 
Social Networks among Law Enforcement Agencies 
With respect to cyberdefense or cyberprotection, there is more maturity among 
law enforcement agencies today. They realize that a good strategy to obtain the 
information and resources necessary to counter cyberterrorist activities is to network or 
operate in a more collegial fashion. At the local level, one such collaboration occurred in 
March 2000, when the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center and the FBI 
Houston field office stated their investigation into a computer virus that was believed to 
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have targeted the 911 system for massive disruption (Verton, 2003a). The growth of the 
FBI’s Infra Guard Program, a voluntary organization of companies that both provide 
information and get information, has demonstrated that joining forces is better than acting 
alone (especially when it comes to cracking down on threats and risks).  
Social Networks between Law Enforcement Agencies and Cyber Forensics Labs 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation employs cybersecurity experts to flush 
hackers and cyberterrorists out of our digital systems. Cybersecurity technicians work for 
government agencies worldwide and must keep up with brand-new technology (Moore, 
2005). Lance Hawk, a Philadelphia-based cyber forensics expert, trains investigators for 
law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. Hawk says that the demand is high for 
specialties such as detecting and fighting computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and 
spyware. Cyber forensics, Hawk continues, has become one of the hot professions in the 
FBI. Applicants usually must be twenty-three years old. Yet, the call for experts in this 
field is so colossal that the FBI is making exceptions to that requirement (Moore, 2005). 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not the only agency that absolutely needs 
skilled cyber forensics experts. Practically every federal, state, and local government 
agency – including the U.S. armed forces, the Department of Defense Computer 
Forensics Lab, local district attorneys, and local police departments – needs skilled 
cyberinvestigators (Moore, 2005). In order to knock down networks of cyberterrorists, 
law enforcement agencies also network with university cyber forensics labs (Carlson, 
2004; Habeeb, 2004; Smith, 2000). For instance, law enforcement officials regularly 
demand assistance in pre-search warrant preparations and post-seizure handling of 
computer equipments (Oklahoma Digital Forensics Lab, 2005). 
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The National White Collar Crime Center (Mokhiber, 2000; Radcliff, 2002), or 
NWCCC, is the interface between criminal justice agencies on all jurisdictional levels 
and is a link between local and state criminal justice agencies. These agencies have 
economic crime-fighting capabilities and the minimum requirement for federal 
investigation and intervention. NWCCC provides support for the prevention, 
investigation, and prosecution of cyberterrorism thanks to its blend of research, training, 
and examinatory support services. NWCCC also organizes National Cybercrime Training 
partnerships, which provide training to state and local law enforcement agencies – along 
with district attorney’s offices – in how to respond successfully to cyber incidents. The 
center also provides training to the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), which is in a 
partnership with the FBI as well (DiNardo, 2004). What the IFCC does is offer a central 
analytical repository for complaints and provides victims with easy means to alert 
authorities of a suspected cyber violation (DiNardo, 2004). 
University Cyber Forensics Labs 
One such cyber forensics lab is the University of Oklahoma (OU) cyber forensics 
lab, called the ODFL. The ODFL, the Oklahoma Digital Forensics Lab, located at the OU 
Cyber Forensics Lab, has as its main goal to analyze the traces of cyberterrorists and 
hackers who launch attacks (through computer viruses) in order to disrupt security issues 
and disrupt normal functioning of the Internet. Analyzing such traces can provide 
precious information on the source and type of the attack. The ODFL has a research 
team, composed of faculty and students from the University of Oklahoma’s School of 
Computer Science (Oklahoma Digital Forensics Lab, 2005). All members of the team 
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have vast knowledge on computing/networking hardware and software, and are highly 
qualified to carry out research projects in their fight against networks of cyberterrorists. 
Another important cyber forensics lab is the one at Purdue University, part of 
whose mission is to act as a national center and provide support for investigations in the 
area of cyber forensics (Cyber Forensics at Purdue University, 2005). Purdue University 
networks with law enforcement agencies with a program that helps officers to quickly 
examine computers used to commit crimes (Holsapple, 2005). More specifically, the 
Purdue Department of Computer and Information Technology offers fast cyberforensics 
triage, which consist of training for police officers, crime scene investigators, federal 
agents, and other law enforcement personnel to conduct an analysis of computers 
suspected to have been used in a crime (Holsapple, 2005). Purdue University also 
participates in a federally sponsored program that establishes national standards for 
education and certification of computer forensics (Thilmany, 2004). One Purdue research 
project seeks to profile cyberterrorists’ behavior based on their habits of using computers. 
A third cyber forensics lab that is worth mentioning in this study is the Digital 
Forensics lab at the University of Central Florida (UCF). The UCF Digital Evidence 
division staff is composed of UCF professors from the Departments of Computer Science 
and Engineering Technology, law enforcement officers, and undergraduate and graduate 
students. The main goal of the Digital Forensics lab at UCF is to network with state and 
local law enforcement agents in order to assist them with cyber-related challenges 
(Digital Evidence, 2005). UCF Professors and law enforcement officials collaborate on a 
variety of digital forensics topics. Their work involves identifying, gathering, 
safeguarding, examining, and analyzing digital evidence (i.e., trails made by 
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cyberterrorists). The activities of the UCF digital forensics staff are very technical and 
computer-related, involving the collection and examination of evidence from computers 
(Digital Evidence, 2005). As one can imagine, the Digital Forensics lab at UCF is a 
tremendously useful source of help for agencies such as the FBI in the Southeastern area 
of the United States. 
A fourth cyber forensics lab is the one at the University of North Texas (UNT). 
UNT’s Computer Privacy and Security Lab has been acknowledged as one of the finest 
computer security teams worldwide (Coleman, 2002). Not only does the UNT Computer 
Privacy and Security Lab create computer security specialists, but it also networks with 
the Denton Police Department in Texas and other federal agencies. A fifth cyber 
forensics lab is the one at the University of Tulsa. This lab focuses on applying computer 
forensics and collaborating with law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies ask the lab 
at the university to examine computer evidence. Cyber forensics experts also train law 
enforcement officers. They train professional support technicians as well (Mercer, 2004). 
Informal Social Networks 
One of the formal rules in social networks is that agents are supposed to do a 
background check on their informants (Thornburgh et al., 2005). Yet, social networks 
between cyber agents and law enforcement officials can also be informal. Because the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation does not have a sufficient number of top-notch computer 
experts to recruit for cyber forensics, they will tend to rely on freelance cyber experts 
(Thornburgh et al., 2005).  One of these “vigilantes” is Carpenter. After Carpenter made 
his first discoveries about a Chinese group of cyberterrorists, Titan Rain, in March 2004, 
he began exchanging the information with unofficial contacts that he knew in Army 
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intelligence. The fact is that federal rules forbid military-intelligence officers to work 
with American civilians (Thornburgh et al., 2005).  
Nevertheless, by October 2004, the Army approved Carpenter’s input, as well as 
his informal operations with the FBI. Carpenter says he became a confidential informant 
for the FBI for the five months that followed October 2004. Later, the situation was 
reversed. At the end, reports from his cyber-surveillance reached the primary leadership 
of the FBI’s counterintelligence division. As a result, his work, considered illegal, was 
folded into an existing task force on the cyber attacks (Thornburgh et al., 2005). The 
morale of the story is that federal law enforcement cyber agents sometimes use informal 
sources like independent cyber experts (i.e., Carpenter). However, they are also paranoid 
about doing so, worried that these freelance cyber experts jeopardize investigations by 
tracking cyberterrorists too noisily or, even worse, that they are the cyberterrorists 
themselves (Thornburgh et al., 2005). 
Ethical Dilemmas for Cybersecurity Experts 
Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation are right when they say they 
should be concerned about involving themselves in informal networks with cyber experts 
like the one mentioned above. Yet, we should also be concerned about how our privacy 
has changed since the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Although the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution deal with some aspects of 
territorial privacy, the United States does not have a general law on privacy (Berkman & 
Shumway, 2003), let alone on information and communication privacy on the Internet 
and the World Wide Web. The Internet and the World Wide Web enable immediate 
communication among widely dispersed humans. Unfortunately, private communications 
158
on the Internet and the Web are being intercepted and observed by local security and law 
enforcement agencies (Berkman & Shumway, 2003). In fact, the FBI has permission 
from any Internet Service Provider to install a machine, called Carnivore, that observes 
and reads email, and that monitors other online communications (Mansfield, 2000). 
Nevertheless, law enforcement officials still need a prosecutor’s certification that what is 
to be investigated pertains to terrorism or cyberterrorism (Berkman & Shumway, 2003). 
Berkman and Shumway (2003) also note that government surveillance of our only 
activities is legal, according to Congress, because it is, 
largely due to a 1994 law, which mandates that digital telecommunications 
barriers, who control the pipelines to the Internet, design their systems to be 
tappable by law enforcement. In other words, the architecture of the system must 
be compatible with surveillance software and other monitoring programs (p. 103). 
Now, we should keep in mind that what was just said only applies for surveillance 
or investigation that is to be performed in the United States. Under U.S. law, however, it 
is illegal for Americans to control or monitor foreign computers (Thornburgh et al., 
2005). The FBI would require high-level diplomatic and special authorization from the 
Department of Justice to sneak into foreign computers. The military would have more 
flexibility, under a protocol called “preparation of the battlefield,” to hack into foreign 
computers. Yet, if any American agency – whether local, state, or federal – got caught, it 
could set off an international incident (Thornburgh et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, the United States is keen on engaging in “domestic surveillance” 
behavior and checking anything that is on our computers. Part of the reason stems from 
the fact that several bills related to cyberterrorism and cybersecurity have been passed by 
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the Congress (Archick, 2003). One of these bills was under the umbrella of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT, as outlined below: 
The USA PATRIOT ACT (P.L. 107-56, introduced as H.R. 3162 by Rep. James  
Sensenbrenner in October 2001) authorizes the interception of electronic  
communications for the collection of evidence related to terrorism, computer  
fraud, and abuse (Sections 201 and 202). It also clarifies the definition of  
protected computers and increases fines and prison terms for damage (Section  
814) (Archick, 2003, p. 5).  
 Where should the line be drawn? The FBI and other agencies might tell us they 
are controlling our online activities in a consistent and balanced way. But even if their 
machines are meant to intercept unlawful communications or actions, and even if new 
information through this machine leads to new insights or new investigations, the 
question raises as to whether or not it is ethical to our lives. Is computerized surveillance 
acceptable from an ethical standpoint, even if the objective is to benefit society as a 
whole? 
More importantly, cyber forensics experts are developing a software program for 
digital fingerprinting. Digital fingerprinting enables a cyber forensics expert to identify a 
computer user based on profiling, that is, on the process of analyzing or recording a 
person’s performance or behavior behind the computer screen (i.e., the number of 
keystrokes per minute, the writing style and type of language that he or she uses online, 
etc.). This software program is supposed to work at great efficiency. Now comes the big 
question: is it ethical that we are being profiled when we engage in communication 
behind the computer screen? In a similar fashion, the Internet enables cyber forensics 
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experts to participate in chat rooms and online forums in order to gather information 
about practically any subject they need. While the Internet provides easy access to 
diverse Internet communities, it presents a new ethical dilemma. Should university 
students or college professors working for cyber forensics labs be authorized to engage in 
“cyber spying” in the same way that law enforcement officials do? The answer to some 





 The third chapter of this dissertation covers, in detail, the methods used to 
conduct the study proper. As such, face-to-face qualitative interviewing was the method 
used in this study. The importance of qualitative methodology, the analysis of the 
accounts, and member checking are justified. This chapter also contains a description of 
the interview procedure (the interview process, the interview questions, and the necessity 
of using the technique of probing). Of equal relevance in this chapter is the section on the 
research questions and the section that explains how social network theory and game 
theory are used for the interpretation of the data, as well as how the two theories are 
intermingled when interpreting the data. What follows is a section about the participants, 
that is, who the participants were in this study, why they were selected, in which sites or 
locations they were interviewed, how they were recruited, and how they were protected. 
Finally, this chapter validates the reasons that explain why qualitative interviewing 
methods are best suited to answering my research questions. By the same token, I provide 
arguments as to how valid, reliable, and generalizable the results of qualitative 
interviewing can be.  
Qualitative Interviewing  
 Face-to-face qualitative interviewing is a methodological approach that employs 
in-depth analysis of a particular setting (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). The analysis of 
qualitative data consists of breaking down a phenomenon to research its components. In 
doing so, the researcher is able to create a pattern for the whole by relating categories or 
themes to one another (Schwandt, 2001). This process implies that meaning is inferred 
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from the data collected. This section focuses on describing qualitative methodology, 
Kvale’s six steps for analyzing the accounts, and the technique of member checking, 
which consists of reporting back preliminary findings to participants. 
Methodology 
The research employed qualitative methodology and data were collected via in-
depth conversational (face-to-face) interviewing. One of the reasons the methodology 
was qualitative lies in the fact that a certain number of the participants were highly secure 
people who refused to fill out statistical surveys. According to them, one of the 
conditions to answer my questions was to see the researcher face to face. In fact, before I 
interviewed an FBI agent in the Southwest, I had to go through a scanner and a metal 
detector. I was not allowed to bring a tape-recorder either. I had to take notes for hours. 
The same process had to be repeated for a couple of other participants as well. The 
research employed qualitative methodology and data were collected via in-depth 
conversational (face-to-face) interviewing, following the procedures given by Kvale 
(1996). Kvale (1996) calls for seven stages in the interview process: thematizing,
designing, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying, and reporting. As described 
later in detail, the interview protocol is based on questions about cyberterrorists, their 
networks, cybersecurity experts, their networks, as well as the games and strategies that 
are used in the context of cyberwar. The protocol is designed in such a way that the 
interviewees’ responses pertain to the research questions. I asked the participants to 
recount from their personal experiences so that they could supplement the qualitative 
analysis and give me a sense of how to interpret the data later on. 
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For the purpose of this study, the answers to the interview questions are to be 
understood as accounts. An account is a way of describing events to make a story worth 
telling, with believability. It asks for an extended account of some past time (Riessman, 
1993). In an account, participants recall events and memories at their own pace and in a 
manner that is comfortable to them. Accounts take place in a conversational manner 
(Wengraf, 2001). Participants also use accounts to justify or explain their own actions or 
actions of others (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). By the same token, an account given during an 
interview is the presentation not only of reasons but also of the participant him- or 
herself. The relevance of the participants’ responses (that is, their accounts of past 
experience) was meticulously tested. Data collection and analysis procedures were well 
documented (most of the time with an audio-tape recorder). Some very important steps in 
the analysis of the accounts are the transcription and analysis/interpretation stages. 
Transcription involves translating from an oral language, with its own set of rules, to a 
written language, with another set of rules (Kvale, 1996).  
Then, after everything was done, I analyzed and interpreted the data. This means 
that I evaluated the coherence, logic, and comprehensibility of the accounts of each 
interviewee in great depth. The goal was to make a plausible report to my readers. Note 
that the analysis of the accounts here is to be differentiated from Labov’s and Walestky’s 
(1967) model of narrative analysis. For these two scholars, analyzing a narrative is 
analyzing its clauses, its general structure (that is, its abstract, orientation, evaluation, 
resolution, and coda), and so on. Yet, almost forty years down the road, other scholars 
have come up with new ways of analyzing qualitative data. In this study, the analysis of 
the data followed Kvale’s (1996) model very closely, as it is described below. 
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Analysis of the Accounts 
Kvale (1996) suggests six steps of research, each with its own type of analytic 
reasoning: 
1) The participants describe their lived world during the interview. 
2) The participants themselves discover new relationships during the interview and see 
new meanings in what they experience. They start to see new meanings in their life 
worlds based on the descriptions of the interviewer. 
3) During the interview, the researcher condenses and interprets the meaning of what the 
participants describes. Then, the researcher sends the meaning back, which enables 
the interviewee to revise or alter his or her statements.  
4) The transcribed interview is interpreted by the researcher: to structure the material, 
the researcher clarifies the material to make it open to analysis, for instance by 
eliminating all the deviations and repetitions. Finally, in the analysis itself, the 
researcher elaborates the meanings of the interview by using one of five approaches 
to the analysis of meaning (i.e., meaning condensation, meaning categorization, 
structuring of the accounts, meaning interpretation, and generating meaning through 
ad hoc methods). 
5) Re-interviewing is a possible fifth step. The researcher may give the interpretations 
back to the participants in order to receive comments on researcher interpretations of 
the accounts. 
6) The researcher may extend the continuum of description and interpretation to involve 
action. A final analysis was made of the transcribed material. That final analysis 
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produced the significant themes found in the interview data. The result of the analytic 
processes is the interpretation of these data. 
Member Checking 
 Analysis of the accounts is an omnipresent process throughout the research. While 
the qualitative researcher needs to know how to assess qualitative interview findings, it is 
also important that he or she understands that methods of improving research validity 
must be taken into account. A whole section is devoted to validity and reliability at the 
end of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is essential to discuss “member checking” as a 
preliminary step to understanding the importance of the validity and reliability of 
qualitative methods in this study. Based on the recommendations of Kuzel and Like 
(1991), “member checking” is necessary in qualitative interviewing methods. Member 
checking happens when the researcher restates, summarizes, or paraphrases the 
information received from an interviewee to check if what was heard or written down 
during the interview is correct. Member checking always comes after data collection and 
consists of reporting back preliminary findings to participants, asking for crucial critiques 
on the findings and incorporating commentaries into the findings.  
 Hence, member checking is a key element of credibility. Guba and Lincoln (1989) 
describe it as “testing hypotheses, data, preliminary categories, and interpretation with 
members of the stakeholding groups from whom the original constructions were 
collected. This is the single most crucial technique for establishing credibility” (p. 239). 
Member checking is constant checking throughout the investigation process (“do 
interview transcripts reflect what participants wanted to convey?”). The researcher has to 
“test” the data and conclusions with the participants. The purpose is, as Lincoln and Guba 
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(1985) argue, to make sure that the researcher “be able to purport that his or her 
reconstructions are recognizable to audience members as adequate representations of 
their own (and multiple) realities, it is essential that they be given the opportunity to react 
to them” (p. 314). 
Research Questions 
This is a study about a growing communication phenomenon: social networks. In 
doing so, I explored the subfields of organizational communication and new 
communication technology. The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
cyberterrorists create networks in order to engage in malicious activities on the Internet. 
Another purpose of this study is to understand how computer security labs (i.e., in 
universities) and various agencies (that is, law enforcement agencies such as police 
departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation) create joint networks in their fight 
against cyberterrorists.  
The ultimate goal is to show that, because of the postmodern nature of the 
Internet, the fight between networks of cyberterrorists and networks of computer security 
experts (and law enforcement officials) is a postmodern fight. The participants were 
computer security experts and law enforcement officials. Among law enforcement 
officials were local police officers, members of the FBI, the CIA, the National White 
Collar Crime Center, and other agencies. Computer (or cyber) forensics experts work in 
universities for the most part. The reason these participants were selected lies in the fact 
that they have adequate knowledge and expertise to enlighten me on the issue of 
cyberterrorism. Below were the following research questions to guide my research:  
RQ1: What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’  
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accounts reveal about networks of cyberterrorists? 
RQ2: What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’  
accounts reveal about their own networks? 
RQ3: How can the conflict and interaction between cyberterrorists and computer 
 security experts (and law enforcement officials) be explained through the  
 use of both social network theory and game theory? 
RQ4: What are the themes that emerged across the participants’ accounts? 
 In order to answer RQ1 and RQ2, I analyzed the accounts – based on social 
network theory – provided by the participants through their answers to all the interview 
questions (as well as the probing questions). In order to answer RQ3, I interpreted the 
data from both the social network theory and game theory perspectives. This is 
thoroughly explained in the next section. Finally, in order to answer RQ4, I looked for 
common themes that emerged across the participants’ accounts. 
Theoretical Approaches to the Interpretation of the Data 
 In order to answer RQ3, both theories were used; the arrangement of this 
interpretation was structured in three different parts. Each was independent from one 
another. The first part was exclusively a social network theory approach; the second part 
was exclusively a game theory approach; and the third part was an intersection of the two 
approaches. 
The Social Network Theory Approach 
The goal of using social network theory in this study is to explain the behavior 
and actions of both cyberterrorists and computer security experts (as well as law 
enforcement officials) in the context of the networks that they create. On the one hand, in 
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order to understand how cyberterrorists create networks to engage in malicious activities 
on the Internet, an etic approach was used. An etic account is a description of a behavior 
or actions in terms familiar to the observer. In other words, it is the “outsider” view (Pike, 
1967). Recall that the participants interviewed were computer security experts and law 
enforcement officials. I asked them to tell me about their experiences and all that they 
knew about cyberterrorists and their networks. The participants here were observers (or 
outsiders) and not native informants.  
On the other hand, in order to understand how computer security experts and law 
enforcement officials create networks to combat networks of cyberterrorists, or at least 
stop or resist them, an emic approach was used. The information they provided was an 
account of their behavior and actions – the participants themselves – in terms that were 
meaningful (consciously or unconsciously) to them. Here, it was not the “outsider” view, 
but the “insider” view, since the analysis of the data reflected the viewpoint of the native 
informants. 
The Game Theory Approach 
I did not use game theory as a tool to design new strategies for cyber forensics 
labs and law enforcement agencies to combat social networks of cyberterrorists. Rather, I 
used game theory to analyze the data provided by the participants in order to understand 
the existing strategies used by both cyberterrorists and computer security experts (and 
law enforcement officials). The main reason game theory was used lies in the fact that 
existing strategies can be modeled as games. When a game is discovered, a description 
fulfilling the properties of game theory can be implemented. The conclusions drawn from 
game theory were presented without computational data and mathematical formulas. As 
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Lye and Wing (2005) point out, solutions for game models are hard to compute. Hence, 
based on the main tenets and rules of game theory, I interpreted the data conceptually.  
Based on the literature review, since computer security experts and law 
enforcement officials are involved in game strategies with cyberterrorists (no matter what 
the outcome or end-result is), they provided an “insider” view, so the approach was emic. 
By examining the data from my interviews, my goal was to determine what types of 
outcomes or end-states the games between the cyberterrorist and the computer security 
expert tend to result in. The questions (and probing questions) to be answered were 
similar to the following: What type of game is going on here? Does the outcome tend to 
be a zero-sum game? Is it usually a positive-sum game? Can it be a negative-sum game? 
Or even a Nash equilibrium? In a non-zero game, for instance, it never makes sense to 
communicate in an honest way; therefore, it would not be surprising that players use the 
Internet to increase such complexity.  
With respect to a positive-sum game, the trend might be that both the 
cyberterrorist and his or her opponent eventually reach positive outcomes. Given this, 
instead of creating a dichotomous divide between the attacker and the defender, why not 
consider the extent to which the two are intertwined. As such, it was of interest to see 
whether or not those who defend systems and those who attack them fall into the gray 
areas in between. Or, think of the following question: “Do ‘good’ and ‘evil’ blur into 
gray?” Finally, a Nash equilibrium gives the computer security agent a good idea about 
the cyberterrorist’s strategy and “a plan for what to do in each state in the event of an 
attack” (Lye & Wing, 2005, p. 9). Yet, not enough studies have been conducted to reach 
such a conclusion.  
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Intersection of Social Network Theory and Game Theory 
The intersection of social network theory and game theory is very useful in this 
study. How the two theories can be intermingled has already been fully explained in the 
literature review, so it does not need to be explained again. The advantage of such an 
approach to interpreting data is that it allows me to perform a more accurate analysis.  
Interview Procedure 
 This section describes the procedure for interviewing participants, based on 
Kvale’s (1996) seven stages of interview investigation, outlines the interview protocol, 
and mentions the importance of probing. 
Interview Process 
 Kvale’s (1996) seven stages of interview investigation were methodically and 
fastidiously followed. The research goal was to collect personal accounts from 
participants involved, on a daily basis, in the detection and combat of cyberterrorist 
networks and in the networking with agencies such as law enforcement agencies and 
cyber forensics labs. I guided a close and private conversation with each of the 
interviewees. According to Kvale (1996), the interview is a unique form of conversation 
based on everyday life and, nonetheless, it is a professional conversation which has a 
structure and a rationale. The rationale is that it transcends the spontaneous exchange of 
views as in mundane conversation, and becomes a meticulous questioning and listening 
approach with the purpose of obtaining thorough knowledge about a certain issue. 
Another rationale is to obtain descriptions of the lived world of the participants regarding 
the interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena.  
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The qualitative interview is a conversation, but not between “equal” partners; 
rather, it is asymmetrical because the researcher determines and controls the situation. 
For instance, the topic of research is introduced by the interviewer, who critically 
analyzes and follows the account of the participants and directs the discussion toward the 
experience to be understood. In order to conduct in-depth interviews, the researcher has 
to live within the interview experience, both participating in and directing the 
conversation at the same time. The outcome of the interviews depends on the researcher’s 
knowledge, sensitivity, and empathy (as research tool). Reflexivity definitely plays a part 
at every stage of the investigation. Because the researcher is the research tool, everything 
that happens in the research reflects the researcher’s thinking. Reflexivity implies that the 
researcher is mindful of all the other stages at the same time; that one pays continual, 
extraordinary attention. Being the researcher is a saturated role that goes from the most 
general perspective of the entire project to the smallest focus on the moment of the 
interview, all permeated by the researcher’s own experience of the topic that is under 
examination. 
 As a researcher, I was very attentive to the accounts told by the participants. A 
reciprocal level of interpersonal relationship was needed. The more attentive and 
comfortable I was, the more relaxed the participants became. Both the participants and I 
were allowed to volunteer information, bearing in mind that we both shared and shaped 
the space together. In addition to this, observation is important. Observation is a key skill 
while interviewing. For this reason, the researcher must be a good listener, encouraging, 
showing interest, and expressing concern. Nonverbal is the first line of contexting the 
verbal. Nonverbal messages are expected to appear in the conversation (i.e., emotional 
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cues such as a tense voice, giggling, and nervous laughter). Therefore, I needed to have a 
good understanding of the participant’s world going into the interview so that I could 
decipher the nonverbal aspects in anticipation of the transcription process. 
The transcription process involves translating from an oral language, with its own 
set of rules, to a written language, with another set of rules (Kvale, 1996). The average 
length of each interview was about one hour and eight minutes. After the interviews were 
transcribed, I evaluated the coherence, logic, and comprehensibility of the accounts of 
each participant in great depth. The interview sessions began in December 2005 and 
ended at the end of January 2006. Creating the transcription of each interview took, on 
average, between four and seven hours, and served as part of the process of saturated 
listening. 
Interview Questions 
While I took notes when conducting interviews with a few highly secure people 
who refused to be tape-recorded, most of the interviews were audio-taped with a small 
recorder that was placed between the participant and me. In doing so, I was better able to 
concentrate on the topic and the dynamics of the interview. During these face-to-face 
interviews, participants were asked to answer a series of open questions. The whole 
interview process lasted approximately one hour and eight minutes per participant and 
took place in a private room (i.e., a room in a library, a law enforcement office, etc.). 
Each participant individually sat with me and gave me their account. I met with each 
participant only once. Many interview questions pertain to social network theory – 
particularly the first series of questions – and game theory – the last couple of questions. 
The reason the first series of questions pertain to social network theory lies in the fact that 
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it is important to first understand what networks of cyberterrorists and networks of their 
opponents are before having a grasp of how the actors play games in those networks. The 
twenty questions asked during the interview followed the order that is presented below 
(see Appendix B for interview protocol). The first series of questions pertain to RQ1. The 
next series of questions are relevant to RQ2. The last series of questions concern RQ3. No 
questions were asked to elicit data for RQ4. The data from which the themes (for RQ4)
emerged come from many interviews conducted with the participants. No particular 
question was favored or asked in order to solicit these themes. All in all, it is the product 
of all the questions and answers to these questions. 
In order to answer RQ1 (What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement 
officials’ accounts reveal about networks of cyberterrorists?), I, the researcher, thought it 
was wise to center the first two questions on the very issue of this study: cyberterrorism. 
As such, the first two questions of the interview protocol are “What is cyberterrorism?” 
and “What are the motivations to engage in cyberterrorism?” Having an understanding of 
what cyberterrorism is and why cyberterrorists engage in cyber attacks and create those 
networks of terror is a necessary foundation in this qualitative study. The next questions 
derive directly from social network theory. Based on the scholarly literature, we know 
what postmodern terrorist networks look like, but I thought it would be interesting to 
know the participants’ perspectives on those cyberterrorist networks. As such, the next 
two questions are “What does a network of cyberterrorists look like?” and “What do 
cyberterrorists do in those networks of terror?” These questions are broad but useful in 
this study. The next two questions are more technical and reflect the mechanics of social 
networks of terror. As we have seen, a social network is an interconnected system of 
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nodes and the relationships between these nodes. The highly connected nodes are called 
“hubs.” These hubs have a high degree of centrality and removing these hubs can lead to 
the destruction of the network. Therefore, as it is important to know these aspects of 
cyberterrorist networks, the next two questions are the following: “Describe the role of 
nodes and hubs [minor and important actors] in the networks of cyberterrorists” and 
“Describe the degree of centrality in cyberterrorist networks.” The seventh question of 
this interview protocol pertains to the culture of cyberterrorist networks. Every group, 
every community, and, therefore, every network has a culture, whether it is offline or 
online. The researcher thought it was interesting to know about the way of life and 
cultural practices of cyberterrorists. As such, the question is, “Describe the culture or way 
of life of cyberterrorist networks.”  
The subsequent series of questions pertain to the social networks of law 
enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts (RQ2: What do computer security 
experts’ and law enforcement officials’ accounts reveal about their own networks?). 
Recall what was said in a previous section: it takes networks to fight networks. These 
words, stated by Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2001), imply that top-down hierarchies are not 
effective techniques to use against social networks of cyberterrorists. As such, it is 
interesting to know what networking designs and strategies are used to fight, let alone 
understand, cyberterrorism and social networks of terror. Therefore, two fundamental 
questions are, “What types of networks do you use to combat cyberterrorism?” “What do 
you do in those networks?” Networking against cyberterrorists is a new strategy. As the 
point was made in the literature review, law enforcement agents have been engaged in 
this type of practice for just a few years (McGinn, Raymond, & Joseph, 2002). Yet, it 
175
would be important to know whether or not cooperation among agencies is fruitful and 
whether or not there are downsides to networking with others in the context of cyberwar. 
As such, the next two questions are, “Is it necessary to create networks against networks? 
Explain” and “Describe the downsides to networking with other agencies.” It is also 
important to know whether or not those networks are formal or informal. Therefore, the 
question is, “Are those networks formal or informal? Explain.” By extension, a social 
network, whether it is a clique, a group of friends, a cyberterrorist network, or a network 
of law enforcement agents, always has nodes, hubs, and degrees of centrality in order to 
function. So, the next two questions are similar to the questions asked about 
cyberterrorist networks for RQ1: “Describe the role of nodes and hubs [minor and 
important actors] in your networks” and “Describe the degree of centrality in your 
networks.” 
In order to analyze RQ3 (How can the conflict and interaction between 
cyberterrorists and computer security experts [and law enforcement officials] be 
explained through the use of social network theory and game theory?), a couple of 
questions – that is, the last series of questions in the interview protocol – were asked to 
look at how networks of cyber security experts (and law enforcement officials) operate 
against and vis-à-vis networks of cyberterrorists, that is, how the two sides conflict and 
interact with each other, based slightly on social network theory and mostly on game 
theory. The reason game theory is very much emphasized here lies in the fact that game 
theory is well applied in direct interactional and conflicting situations (Fent, Feichtinger, 
& Tragler, 2002), as it is the case in this study. As such, a good question was, “Describe a 
direct interaction or conflict between cyberterrorist networks and cyber forensics experts’ 
176
(and law enforcement agents’) networks?” Because it is important to know how to cripple 
another network, based on social network theory and game theory, the following question 
was asked: “How can a network knock down another network?” 
We have seen that postmodern cyberwar is a type of warfare that is based on 
strategies, just like a chess game. The rules are always evolving. The conflict between 
cyberterrorists and their opponents is an evolutionary game because new methods are 
constantly invented. The goal of the cyberterrorists is to create tactics and weapons that 
continually change in an effort to defeat their opponents’ networks and systems. 
Likewise, it is essential for law enforcement agents to find strategies to counter 
cyberterrorist tactics. Therefore, the last five questions of this interview protocol reflect 
all this. They are the following: “What game or strategy do cyberterrorists use?” “What 
game or strategy do cyber security experts and law enforcement officials use?” “Could 
you give me an example of a collaborative game strategy between the two sides?” “Could 
you give me an example of a non-collaborative game strategy between the two sides?” 
and “Do cyberterrorists make the rules of the game or do they go along?” 
Probing 
The questions in this protocol are important. Yet, it is sometimes the case that 
participants elicit accounts or situations that call for other questions that are not in the 
protocol. The first segment of an in-depth interview is spent by both the researcher and 
participant getting to know each other. The general experiential topic is introduced in the 
first few minutes, beginning with the first of these broad questions above and then 
focusing upon the subject progressively. For this reason, the researcher added probes to 
the questions as the conversation is progressing. Probing questions are used to guide the 
177
direction of the logic or path of the interview. A probe investigates a particular content 
area that the researcher wants to know more about. Probes were based upon previous 
research, my own intuitions, and findings from prior interviews. For instance, for the 
second question, “What are the motivations to engage in cyberterrorism?”, as opponents 
may have different end goals from us, I added a probe and asked the participant what the 
rewards or desired outcomes are for a cyberterrorist’s action. The use of game theory 
here was important when it came to the interpretation of the data. 
The goal of including this section on probing is to show that the interview was not 
always structured as the interview protocol looks like. For Lofland and Lofland (1995), 
an unstructured interview seeks “to discover the informant’s experience of a particular 
topic or situation” (p. 18). An unstructured interview is open-ended and informal, which 
allows for research flexibility and responsiveness to emerging issues. More importantly, 
this design also enables both the researcher and the participant to control the pace and 
flow of conversation, including the introduction of new topics (Mishler, 1986). 
Participants 
 This section describes, in detail, who the participants were in this study, why they 
were selected, in which sites or locations they were interviewed, how they were recruited, 
and how they were protected. 
Who Were the Participants? 
I, the qualitative researcher, managed to find twenty-seven (n=27) participants 
who, from an examination of the research literature, are representative of the research 
questions. Twenty-seven participants might seem to be an insufficient number for such a 
long study, but the participants were all primary sources. Participants in this field of study 
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are uncommon and difficult to convince to participate in a major study. Many of them 
said that they had never been interviewed before. As such, the data in this study are 
primary. The participants were experts in computer and information security from ages 
18 to 64 (to avoid exclusion criteria). Selected participants were not only computer 
security agents, cyber forensics experts, IT analysts, and members of information 
technology (IT) labs; they were also people working for law enforcement agencies such 
as local police departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and district attorneys’ 
offices.  
Why Were these Participants Selected in this Study? 
 All the participants mentioned above possess the knowledge and expertise to 
enlighten me, through their direct experiences with computer security and cyberterrorist 
incidents, on all the various topics that pertain to my research questions. Computer 
experts have created cyber forensics teams that network with law enforcement agencies 
in their fight against cyberterrorists. It is important to know that, in this day and age, law 
enforcement agents (i.e., working for police departments, etc.) work alongside computer 
security experts who are trained to identify cyberterrorists and arrest them. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has cybersecurity teams as well; they work collaboratively with 
university cyber forensics labs and other agencies. More importantly, all these 
participants understand how networks of cyberterrorists work. For all these reasons, they 
are ideal participants in my study. 
Where Were the Participants Interviewed? 
The location where the participants were interviewed was mostly in the Midwest 
and in the Southwest. The major sites of participant recruitment were (1) the information 
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technology lab at the University of Oklahoma, (2) the information technology lab at the 
University of North Texas, (3) the information technology lab at Purdue University, (4) 
the information technology lab at the University of Central Florida, and (5) the 
information technology lab at the University of Tulsa. The reason I selected these 
universities for my research lies in the fact that their information technology labs have 
computer experts who have created cyber forensics teams that network with law 
enforcement agencies in their fight against cyberterrorists. Other major sites for 
participant interviewing were the Norman Police Department, the Denton Police 
Department (Texas), the Lafayette Police Department (Indiana), the Orlando Police 
Department (Florida), and branches of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So, I used a 
convenience sample. One of the underlying reasons for doing this lies in the fact that it 
just makes it easier – due to temporal and geographical constraints – for a student who 
attends a Southwestern university and who has negotiated access to these sites. 
How Were these Participants Recruited? 
 To recruit participants who work in university computer labs, I asked the head of 
a computer lab to give me permission to have a list of names of computer security experts 
who would be willing to participate in my study. If the head of the computer lab agreed to 
give me that list, I called (by phone) or I contacted, by email, those experts in the field of 
computer and network security, and I explained to them the purpose of my study. If they 
agreed to participate in my study, and before these participants answered my interview 
questions, I showed them the informed consent form (see Appendix A, at the end of this 
dissertation).  
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To recruit participants working for a police department, I asked the head or 
supervisor of police officers (who are computer security experts) to give me permission 
to have a list of names of people who would be willing to participate in my study. When I 
was allowed to have a list of police officers willing to participate in my study, I called 
them (by phone) or I contacted them, by email, and I explained to them the purpose of 
my study. If they agreed to participate, and before they answered my interview questions, 
I showed them the same informed consent form.  
To recruit participants working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other 
federal agencies, I used chaining. Chaining is a process whereby one person tries to get 
another person entrée into a group or community that is usually not open to the public. In 
the world of the FBI and other federal agencies, there is a two-degree separation. I could 
get interviews with federal agents only through chaining, that is, through an informant 
who was trusted by FBI agents. The informant was a computer security expert who knew 
potential participants working for the FBI. When I was given a list of highly secure 
participants such as FBI agents, I called them (by phone) or I contacted them by email, 
and I explained to them the purpose of my study. If they agreed to participate in my 
study, and before these participants answered my interview questions, I showed them the 
same informed consent form.  
How Were these Participants Protected? 
For the protection of the participants, and for the ethical issues inherent to every 
research project involving human participants, I assured them that their identities 
remained anonymous and that they would have access to the written texts of my research 
– also useful for member checking – before I would incorporate excerpts of these texts in 
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my dissertation. To increase the protection of the participants, I also assured them that the 
tapes would be destroyed when the study is complete. 
Why Are Qualitative Interviewing Methods Best 
Suited to Answering My Research Questions? 
Studying the context in which networks of cyberterrorists are examined and 
Internet and computer systems are meant to be better secured requires an appropriate 
research methodology. Before explaining why I contend that qualitative interviewing 
methods are better than quantitative methods to investigate my research questions, it is 
worth quoting Denzin and Lincoln (1998) to provide a sound and powerful definition for 
both methods: 
The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the processes and meanings that are 
not rigorously examined, or measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, 
amount, intensity, or frequency. Qualitative researchers stress the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and 
what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such 
researchers emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to 
questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning. In 
contrast, quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables, not processes. Inquiry is purported to be within a 
value-free framework (p. 8). 
There are many reasons why qualitative interviewing methods are better than 
quantitative methods for answering my research questions. First of all, qualitative 
research enables the interviewer to engage in “intensive self-reflection and introspection” 
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(Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 4). As a researcher, I can get closer to the respondent’s 
perspective thanks to detailed interviewing (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985). With 
quantitative methods, however, I would hardly ever be able to gain the respondent’s 
perspective because I would rely on more distant, inferential empirical materials (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1998). Let me elaborate on that first point. In the context of cyberterrorism, 
observing sites (i.e., cyber forensics labs, law enforcement agencies, etc.) and 
interviewing key people in each organization or agency would establish a trusting 
relationship between the researcher and the participants, which, in turn, can be important 
in providing insights into the everyday practices of the interviewees. This would also 
enable these interviewees to reflect in depth upon their lived experiences through 
accounts (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985).  
Second, as a qualitative researcher, I want to write in the first-person account and 
not engage myself in third-person prose, because with qualitative interviewing, I can 
incorporate factors of emotionality, reflective interpretation, and mentality into my work 
(Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Quantitative methods do not allow that. Qualitative interviewing, 
on the other hand, gives a great deal of attention to both the inner and outer states of 
human activity (Hamilton, 1998). Interviewing members of organizations or agencies 
with which I am not familiar make me more aware of other cultural selves. When the 
interviewer becomes aware of the “cultural self,” there is an extra set of resources upon 
which to draw in interpreting results (Olesen, 2000).  
Third, other “truths” about cyberterrorist networks or Internet and computer 
security may be valid outside of the world of quantitative tools that is analyzed and 
interpreted to reach different conclusions. Claims to truth are always discursively situated 
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in relation to power. Truth implicates regulatory rules that must be met for some 
statements to be more meaningful than others (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). For 
instance, it is sometimes the case that the participants have a specific issue they desire to 
share with the leaders of their organizations or agencies, but they do not take the step and 
bring it to them because of the concern of “power” just mentioned. Therefore, the 
participants might see the qualitative interviewer as their “confidant” in that they can 
communicate that issue in depth and share it with the interviewer face to face. The 
positive outcome is that the interviewer might extract more truthful statements from the 
participants. It is more difficult with statistics or surveys to detect this sort of information 
because the quantitative researcher might not be aware of the problems that the 
participants did not raise to the leaders of the organization. Therefore, it is an in-depth 
and experienced qualitative interviewer who can be more aware of the irregularly 
mentioned problems and, consequently, can be more aware of how cyberterrorists operate 
and how organizations or agencies can improve their security systems. In a similar 
fashion, because the interviewer is the primary instrument of research, his or her 
conceptual models, beliefs, and prejudices would be able to filter through the 
interpretations of the claims to truth mentioned above (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). 
Fourth, there is a gathering momentum for qualitative interviewing in information 
systems (Lee, 2001; Trauth, 2001). Qualitative interviewing in the study of information 
technology and cyberterrorism has the ability to transcend the rational domain. Whereas 
quantitative methods such as statistics, surveys, and questionnaires belong to the rational 
research domain, qualitative interviewing, as Lincoln and Guba (2000) put it, has at its 
fingertips many additional ways of collecting data – creativity, movement, direct 
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knowing, intuition, flow, and so on. Quantitative methods do not allow me to be a 
bricoleur, a “Jack of all trades or a kind of professional do-it-yourself person” (Lévi-
Strauss, 1966, p. 3) because qualitative interviewing is multimethod in focus (Brewer & 
Hunter, 1989). This boils down to saying that, if new techniques have to be invented or 
pieced together (to help me pursue my research), qualitative research enables me to be 
more than a “limited” researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). This is what is meant by 
bricoleur.
Fifth, as opposed to quantitative research, qualitative interviewing is more 
constructed. While quantitative researchers “leave the field with mountains of empirical 
materials and then easily write up his or her findings” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 29), 
the qualitative interviewer begins by creating notes. The interview itself, after being 
recorded, is then re-created as a file that contains the researcher’s early attempts to 
understand and interpret what he or she has learned (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985). 
Finally, the researcher produces the end-result (that is, the text) that comes to the reader. 
As such, the reader learns from the carefully reflexive point of view and 
experience/interpretation of the researcher (Silverman, 1993). 
Sixth, because the qualitative interviewer is the chief instrument for the research 
process, he or she brings to the research process an individual mindset and biases 
(Janesick, 2000). Yet, I consider it as strength because it adds to the richness of 
knowledge about complex situations. The study of cyberterrorism and information 
systems lends itself to analyzing complex situations. One complex task in qualitative 
interviewing is seeking meaning in context (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Mishler, 1986). Not 
only must the subject matter be set in its social and historical context so that the reader 
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can understand how the existing situation emerged (Klein & Myers, 1999) – for instance, 
I would have to take an in-depth look at past network problems (i.e., Brynjolfsson  & 
Mendelson, 1993) – but, also, qualitative interviewing must aim at “producing an 
understanding of the context of the information system and the process whereby the 
information system influences and is influenced by its context” (Walsham, 1993, p. 4). 
Seventh, tools such as surveys and statistics used in quantitative research are more 
artifacts of the researcher’s program and less the results of analysis. Quantitative 
researchers work from a schedule of already-made questions that allow a respondent to 
check a box on a page that is later transformed into quantified analysis of a large number 
of responses. However, a protocol for interviews is stronger because it guarantees that 
interviews collect comparable data across collection events. More importantly, the 
protocol can be used to probe knowledge and give a chance to inform each interviewee at 
definite times. A quantitative tool such as a questionnaire lacks the human touch that 
interviewees would need in that situation.  
Eighth, it might be the case that the interviewee is not very familiar with the way 
cyberterrorist networks operate. Nevertheless, this lack of complete knowledge can be 
overcome if the interview protocol allows for an initial general discussion in order to 
identify the overall interviewee’s knowledge of the subject. By the same token, some 
time could be even spent creating an informational foundation before the interview 
continues. As a matter of fact, qualitative interviewing may not specify questions per se.
The interviewer may ask of the respondent broad, experiential queries as conversational 
grounds for the respondent to volunteer his or her accounts of lived experience about the 
information security system in relation to the organization or experience being the focus 
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of research. With a quantitative tool like a questionnaire, it would be more difficult to 
follow the procedure mentioned above.   
Questions of Reliability and Validity 
One question that one might all ask is the following: “Tell me how your 
‘measures’ are reliable and valid, and tell me how you can generalize with this stuff.” We 
saw earlier that the benefit of member checking is that it adds accuracy and richness to a 
final report and that including member checking into the findings (i.e., gaining feedback 
on responses from the interviewees) is an important method of increasing credibility. In 
order to better answer the question that I brought up in this paragraph, I considered 
whatever discussions of reliability and validity I have been exposed to, including texts in 
quantitative and qualitative methods classes that I took, in theory courses that I attended, 
as well as philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias, and other sources that I read. For 
several decades, the concepts of validity, reliability, and generalizability in social 
research have gained the status of a scientific holy trinity (Kvale, 1995). I believe that 
qualitative interview findings are as valid and reliable as quantitative data for several 
reasons. The notion of generalizability will be discussed later.  
Validity and Reliability of Qualitative Interview Findings 
As Clifford Geertz (1973) once remarked, the validity of a statistical table differs 
from the validity of thick description in an interviewer’s report. Therefore, one should not 
get caught in an “either or” trap. Quantitative research and qualitative research are two 
different methods for two different purposes. While quantitative research seeks to 
“explain,” or erklaren (Maddox, 1985), qualitative research attempts to “understand,” or 
verstehen (Trigg, 1993). The goal of erklaren is to explain (maybe even predict or 
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control) how carefully specified groups of people will likely respond or react to specific 
stimuli under carefully controlled conditions. The goal of verstehen is to make people 
aware of how humans act on meaning. The goal of the researcher is to make readers 
understand how meaning is created and how it becomes “background expectancies” or 
“shared understanding” among human beings with shared experience.  
Before explaining the main factors that justify qualitative interviewing as a valid 
and reliable method, let us begin by defining the concepts of validity and reliability. 
Validity questions whether or not the study investigates what was intended. It is 
paramount to “the extent to which our observations indeed reflect the phenomena or 
variables of interest to us” (Pervin, 1984, p. 48). Validity is “a process for developing 
sounder interpretations of observations (Cronbach, 1971, p. 433). In fact, a valid 
argument is powerful, convincing, well grounded, and justifiable. A valid inference is 
precisely derived from its premises (Kvale, 1995). Validity is also the researcher’s mask 
of authority (Lather, 1993). Without it, there is no truth (Scheurich, 1992) because 
actions that lack validity “seem unable to occur in reality” (Todorov, 1977, p. 82). 
Reliability, on the other hand, is a concept that is more encountered when studying 
quantitative methods. It refers to the consistency of findings or results (Kirk & Miller, 
1986). Qualitative researchers often refer to reliability as consistency. They see reliability 
as “dependability” and stress the importance of using multiple sources of information. 
Furthermore, reliability is affected by the quality of the questions and the fit to the group 
being studied. 
The first factor confirming the validity and reliability of qualitative interviewing 
is that, although quantitative and qualitative research methods differ sharply in working, 
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both research designs look for valid and reliable results. With respect to qualitative 
interviewing, validity is socially constructed (Kvale, 1995), both by the field researcher 
and the participants, who collaborate in the same setting and situation. The field 
researcher “wants to provide an account that communicates with the reader the truth 
about the setting and situation” (Altheide & Johnson, 1994, p. 496). As a qualitative 
interviewer, I would not attempt to seek proof or some type of statistical correlation; I 
would strive for thick description: is the interpretation emerging from the participants’ 
accounts convincing to the reader – does it ring true? (Altheide & Johnson, 1994). 
Validity of qualitative data is what is hoped for because the researcher wants data to be 
representative of a real and complete picture of phenomena under investigation. The 
ultimate question that the qualitative researcher asks is the following: “Are the 
representations in the text consistent with the real?” (Lincoln & Denzin, 1998, p. 416).  
Another important factor is that, in my research, validity would be my loyalty and 
commitment to representing the people – i.e., computer security experts, university cyber 
forensics employees, IT analysts, law enforcement officials, and so on – being studied as 
fully as possible. Within such an all-embracing conception of validity, qualitative 
interviewing may, in principle, lead to valid scientific knowledge (Kvale, 1995) because 
qualitative interviewing means more than merely asking questions; the validity of in-
depth interview data depends considerably on the methodological skill, understanding, 
and wholeness of the researcher. With regard to reliability, in order to ensure reliability in 
my type of research, examination of truthfulness and trustworthiness is also crucial. Seale 
(1999), by establishing good quality work through reliability in qualitative studies, asserts 
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that the trustworthiness of a qualitative research report lies at the heart of issues 
traditionally discussed as reliability. 
The third factor is that the text – that is, the end-product written by the qualitative 
interviewer – is considered valid if it is sufficiently grounded, and “comprehensive in 
scope, credible in terms of member checks, logical, and truthful in terms of its reflection 
of the phenomenon in question” (Lincoln & Denzin, 1998, p. 414). In other words, 
validity becomes contingent upon the quality of “craftsmanship” in the qualitative 
investigation, which includes constantly checking, questioning, and theoretically 
interpreting the findings. In this “craftsmanship” approach to validation, the focus shifts 
from examination at the end of the production line to quality control during all the stages 
of knowledge production (Kvale, 1995). This means that validity in qualitative 
interviewing is dependent on meticulous “checking.” As opposed to validity in 
quantitative research, validity in in-depth interviewing is not synonym with “control” or 
“verification” of a final product. Rather, verification in my study is built into the research 
process with frequent checks of the credibility, plausibility, reasonableness, and 
trustworthiness of the findings (Kvale, 1995). This is why I want to outline, in detail, the 
tactics formulated by Miles and Huberman (1994) for testing and substantiating 
qualitative interview findings. The tactics involve looking for negative evidence (and not 
just looking around the site), checking for representativeness and for researcher effects, 
weighing the evidence, eliminating rival explanations, and checking the meaning of 
outliers (this would occur if the interviewees in the organization give unusual responses 
that are far outside most of the rest of the responses in the data set) (Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  
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A fourth factor is that systematic and rigorous observation involves far more than 
just the researcher’s presence and his or her looking around the site. The approach in my 
study is to analyze the many sources of potential biases that may emerge in the research 
sites. These potential biases may invalidate observations and interpretations. This is why 
engaging multiple methods such as observation, interviews, and recordings yields more 
valid and reliable construction of realities (Johnson, 1997). Also part of the multi-method 
strategy involves employing extreme cases, following up surprises, replicating a finding 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), and getting feedback from IT analysts, cyber forensics 
experts, and other specialists. 
Generalizability of Qualitative Interview Findings 
In the same line of reasoning, the goal of qualitative interviewing is to generalize 
from close study. Generalizability means that findings can be generalized; it refers to the 
extent to which an account can be further applied to situations or populations not directly 
studied. Lincoln and Guba (1985) stress that generalizability allows a semblance of 
prediction and control over similar phenomena, yet one should keep in mind that “any 
generalization is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion” (Cronbach, 1975, p. 125). The 
qualitative researcher “generalizes” his or her findings, but not with an approach that 
seeks to reach the scope of a universal law. Instead, the richness of the thick description, 
the particular elements that were detailed, recorded, and verified, and the patterns of 
themes that these elements exhibit, enable the researcher to make all those 
“generalizations.” “Generalizability” in qualitative interviewing means that the findings 
are trustworthy, dependable, and transferable (Oberle, 2002). The ultimate objective is 
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that the qualitative results from my research serve as the foundation for future studies that 
will benefit from my observations. 
However, I am also fully aware of the fact that generalizing in qualitative 
interviewing is more difficult. While in most quantitative research, generalizing is a 
relatively straightforward task – indeed, when the statistician collects the same variable 
from his or her subjects in the sample, all that needs to be done is generalize to the 
sample as a whole and compute values such as the mean or median – the data in 
qualitative interviewing are more raw and hardly ever pre-categorized. Accordingly, I, as 
the researcher, needed to take the time to sort out and “classify” that raw information. 
This shows that in-depth qualitative interviewing must be a rigorous methodology where 
the researcher detects participants who have closely experienced the phenomenon in 
question, observes them, and interviews them for hours. Then, the researcher edits the 
interviews profoundly so that he or she pictures the participants’ life experiences in a way 
that makes the account different from what any of these participants has told. In the 
meanwhile, the researcher still addresses the question of interest. As one can see, even 
generalizing across a set of different accounts can become a labor (a labor of love 
nonetheless). 
In contrast with quantitative research, where the researcher’s findings are 
generalized beyond the sample from which the data was drawn, a qualitative interviewer 
provides a thick description of the study to the readers. Part of the goal of producing a 
thick description is to persuade readers that the interpretation of the findings is plausible. 
As far as this investigation of cyberterrorist networks and information security is 
concerned, there are undoubtedly a certain number of law enforcement agencies and 
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cyber forensics labs that have vast expertise in the matter and that exist in many areas of 
the Midwest and the Southwest. They can be found anywhere. Although there are clear 
differences between each of these organizations or agencies, they also share many 
similarities such as the way some of their structures or operations work (i.e., they rely on 
computer and Internet networks and have computer security experts). Although these are 
not statistical generalizations, anyone familiar with these twenty-first century 
organizations and agencies can recognize these standard elements. So, the reader can 
easily identify with these organizations and agencies.  
What this means is that the generalizations of the findings might somewhat differ 
from what the reader expects, but, if we were to “look at the whole picture,” a thick 
description provides the readers with ample information to evaluate the suitability of 
applying the findings to other settings. This enables the readers to determine if the 
situation described in the rich text (that has been meticulously crafted) applies to the 
situation of the reader himself or herself. By the same token, the investigator can 
ascertain the typicality of the case, that is, describe how typical a participant is in relation 
to others in the same class so that readers can make comparisons with their own 
situations (Merriam, 1988) and estimate whether or not the work of the researcher is 
generalizable to them and consistent with their perceptual reality. In this way, 
generalizability is a process of interaction; it is a conversation between the researcher and 
the researched, and between the reader and the text (Atkinson, Heath, & Chenail, 1991). 
Finally, generalizability in qualitative interviewing is highly possible because this 
type of research is based on the principle that social actors co-create emergent social 
worlds, in a particular time and place. For this reason, the concept of generalizability for 
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qualitative interviewing involves social processes (i.e., insiders-outsiders) that might be 
relevant in more than a single setting or interaction. As a qualitative researcher, using the 
term “generalizability” does not refer to the statistical relation of a sample to the greater 
population, but to common patterns in social interaction and social life. What is useful, in 
order to generalize the findings of my study on information security systems, is to 
diversify the investigation as much as possible in order to determine whether or not the 
findings vary from one location to the next. For example, I could have attempted to 
interview members of large IT corporations in the upper Midwest and members of private 
industries in the lower Midwest (most of which have computer security experts working 
for them). In other words, I might have conducted a cross-case analysis, that is, an 
analysis across multiple potential targets of cyberterrorist networks that builds an 
integrated framework (Merriam, 1988). This could have shifted attention to other 
organizations in the research sites in order to further explore and modify the initial 





Analysis of Research Question 1 
In this chapter, the findings from accounts elicited from twenty-seven participants 
(mostly cyber forensics experts and law enforcement officials, but also other important 
individuals working with them) about their fight with cyberterrorists and their 
experiences of collaborating with other agencies are analyzed in detail. This analysis 
examines each of the four research questions separately. In order to answer RQ1 (What 
do computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’ accounts reveal about 
networks of cyberterrorists?), the following questions were asked in each interview: (1) 
What is cyberterrorism?; (2) What are the motivations to engage in cyberterrorism?; (3) 
What does a network of cyberterrorists look like?; (4) What do cyberterrorists do in those 
networks of terror?; (5) Describe the role of nodes and hubs [minor and important actors] 
in the networks of cyberterrorists; (6) Describe the degree of centrality in cyberterrorist 
networks; (7) Describe the culture or way of life of cyberterrorist networks. These 
questions were mostly driven by social network theory and do not include probing 
questions that were asked during each interview because, for each participant, the 
interviews progressed differently. Let us begin by analyzing the participants’ perspectives 
on what cyberterrorism is.  
What Is Cyberterrorism? The Participants’ Perspectives 
Although the interview questions for RQ1 were mostly driven by social network 
theory, it would be wise to center the first question on the main issue of this study: 
cyberterrorism. For this reason, I asked the participants what their perspectives were on 
cyberterrorism. In other words, “what is cyberterrorism?” The participants’ accounts are 
195
consistent with the assumptions made about cyberterrorism in the literature review. The 
first excerpt was selected from an interview conducted with a forensics examiner. His 
main tasks and responsibilities are to examine and investigate any kind of intrusion or 
suspected illegal activity on any kind of digital medium. The participant described one of 
the components of cyberterrorism. For him, cyberterrorism is, 
any kind of threat that can come through any digital medium, such as network 
package injection, injected across software programs loaded on. It’s also any kind 
of threat that can take down an infrastructure or network such as a power plant 
infrastructure, an IT infrastructure, or a law enforcement infrastructure. 
The statements made by this participant are clear-cut. Cyberterrorism is “any kind 
of threat” via a digital medium. The scholarly literature says that “digital” includes, but is 
not limited to, systems related to computers, computerized items, and/or automated 
systems (both in terms of hardware and software) (i.e., Casey, 2004). Part of this 
definition embraces some statements made in the description above (“network package 
injection, injected across software programs loaded on”). This view of cyberterrorism is 
general and does not include the motivations behind cyberterrorism. Nevertheless, 
cyberterrorist threats, says our participant, could cripple infrastructures or networks “such 
as a power plant infrastructure, an IT infrastructure, or a law enforcement infrastructure.” 
The excerpt below, selected from a computer crime specialist in the Southwest, is similar 
to the previous excerpt: 
It’s some type of violation either through the use of a computer or with a 
computer against a network. So, it involves a computer mechanism of some sort. 
It is intentional and has to be done through a computer network or a computer 
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system, which may be an individual workstation or a more complex grid of 
computer systems or an application on various levels of what that means. 
Here, however, the emphasis is not on digital media, but on computers themselves 
(“It has to be done through a computer network or a computer system”). The participant’s 
statements relate very much with accounts of cyberterrorism in the scholarly literature. 
For instance, for Dunnigan (2003), cyberterrorism is the use of electronic networks and 
computer technology as weapons. Likewise, for Stone (2001), cyberterrorists frequently 
attempt to break into computers to contaminate them – and others – with viruses (i.e., 
what our participant calls “violation”). In addition, in this excerpt, there is mention of 
intention (i.e., “it is intentional”) behind the cyber attacks. This corresponds with the 
description of cyberterrorism made by other scholars such as Arquilla, Rondfeltd, and 
Zanini (1999) and Conway (2002). For them, cyberterrorism is the intentional use of 
threatening and disruptive actions against computers, networks, and the Internet in order 
to cause harm or further ideological, political, or similar objectives, or to intimidate any 
person in furtherance of such objectives. The following excerpt, taken from an interview 
conducted with a computer crime specialist with the National White Collar Crime Center, 
adds something important to the previous descriptions of cyberterrorism. For this 
participant, cyberterrorism is, 
any means by which an information system can be used to cause some sort of 
harm. This could be harm to the information system itself or some sort of physical 
infrastructure. For example, a lot of dams are controlled by computers. That could 
be subverted to bad uses, like opening up the floodgates and drowning half the 
town. Theoretically, cyberterrorists could do it, but that hasn’t happened yet. 
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First, this description highlights the effect of cyberterrorism, that is, harm (i.e., “to 
cause some sort of harm”). The two previous excerpts did not focus on harm. 
Cyberterrorism, Dunnigan (2003) says, can cause harm, even devastating harm. Second, 
this participant emphasizes the fact that cyberterrorists have not been successful in 
conducting a massive-scale attack (“that hasn’t happened yet”). Nevertheless, our 
participant adds that, “theoretically, cyberterrorists could do it.” Although the participant 
did not use a term such as “massive-scale,” the idea that cyberterrorism could be 
“opening up the floodgates and drowning half the town,” is, in itself, a massive attack 
and, theoretically, it could be done. The next excerpt, taken from a forensics examiner in 
the Southwest, takes a different angle on cyberterrorism:  
You’ve heard of the Nigerian scams? Those are basically people that exploit 
money; they would claim to be some person that has a lot of money. American 
and British banks are some of the most targeted. Once they start following into 
the ploy with you, they threaten you and your family, they have people come and 
harass you. They are definitely cybercriminals, but not cyberterrorists. They only 
threaten people. They use email communication.  
Here, the description of cyberterrorism is that if it is only a threat via computers 
or the Internet (i.e., “email communication”), it is not an act of cyberterrorism. Rather, it 
would be cybercrime (i.e., “They are definitely cybercriminals”). Besides, as opposed to 
what was said in the very first excerpt, a threat, in and of itself, cannot “take down an 
infrastructure or network such as a power plant infrastructure, an IT infrastructure, or a 
law enforcement infrastructure” (see first excerpt of this sub-section). Open sources on 
cybercrime correspond with the statements made by the participant on the matter. A 
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cybercriminal, in essence, is a criminal who uses computers and/or the Internet to 
communicate, raise money, recruit new members willing to break the law, and commit 
other crimes such as threats (McQuade, 2005). Archick (2003) goes further when she 
says that a cybercriminal offense includes money laundering, as well “fraud and forgery, 
child pornography, copyright infringements, and security breaches such as hacking, 
illegal data interception, and system interferences that compromise network integrity and 
availability” (p. 2). The next excerpt concentrates on the difference between hacking and 
cyberterrorism. Asking a participant working in a cyber forensics lab if there was a 
difference between a hacker and a cyberterrorist, the participant responded with the 
following statement: 
Yes, there is. A lot of hackers do it for the fun of it or for notoriety, or for 
personal gain, whereas cyberterrorists usually do it to disrupt or to cause trouble 
to actually try to strike terror and fear into the general populace or into a certain 
company. Another difference is that hackers like to brag about being hackers, but 
cyberterrorists do not see themselves as cyberterrorists. They like to rationalize 
their actions.  
This difference between hacking and cyberterrorism helps us understand the 
intent of both types of disruption and, to some extent, the effects of cyberterrorism. Based 
on the participant’s description, the hacker does it just “for the fun of it or for notoriety, 
or for personal gain.” From this, it can be inferred that hackers like to delve into 
computers with no intention to harm computers. A cyberterrorist, on the other hand, is an 
intentionally malicious hacker. Indeed, cyberterrorists “usually do it to disrupt or to cause 
trouble to actually try to strike terror and fear into the general populace or into a certain 
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company.” This is a throwback to the definition of Vegh (2002) mentioned at the 
beginning of this study. For him, hackers with malicious intent are cyberterrorists. In line 
with these contentions, as explained in the literature review, just like terrorism is 
primarily a process of communication between terrorists and target audiences (Tuman, 
2003), an important goal of cyberterrorists is to send a powerful signal, whose meaning is 
intended to frighten and coerce. The participant expresses it clearly: “to actually try to 
strike terror and fear into the general populace or into a certain company.” 
Cyberterrorism is a semiotic act; it is a message, a symbol, and a new media image. Our 
modern western world is wrapped up with images, signs, and symbols (Miller et al., in 
press). Given this, there is a powerful semiotic dimension to cyberterrorism. Without a 
doubt, it can involve sending images of fear. 
The participant makes another difference: “hackers like to brag about being 
hackers, but cyberterrorists do not see themselves as cyberterrorists.” From this, it 
follows that cyberterrorists have different views than law enforcement agents as to what 
constitutes a cyberterrorist. This is an important matter because cyberterrorists, as they 
like to “rationalize their actions” (according to our participant), might not realize that the 
fact that they are damaging computer systems makes them cyberterrorists. In the 
cyberterrorists’ community, do they even know that they are cyberterrorists if they 
conduct cyber attacks or cripple entire networks? The fact that they like to rationalize 
their actions demonstrates that part of their identity is to say “no” to the Internet rules 
enforced by law enforcement and the powers that be. Asking the same participant 
whether or not cyberterrorism is accidental, the participant responded that it was not: 
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No, it’s not accidental. You can’t accidentally do it. I’ve seen people accidentally 
hack, but with cyberterrorism, you have to specifically have a target picked out 
and a method picked out that’s going to be very specific for your purpose. 
Cyberterrorism, says our participant, is “not accidental” because “you can’t 
accidentally do it.” From this, we can deduce that cyberterrorism is always intentional. A 
computer-whiz college student may break into a computer system for various reasons, 
but, as the point was made in the previous excerpt, these reasons are not necessary 
intentional. Hackers might just do it “for the fun of it or for notoriety, or for personal 
gain.” They have no intention to cause harm. By extension, the participant’s belief that 
hacking can be accidental (“I’ve seen people accidentally hack”) refers precisely to the “I 
Love You” virus incident mentioned in the literature review. The “I Love You” virus was 
a hacking episode that resulted in more than $10 billion in damage around the world 
(New York Times, June 13, 2000). The twist is that the Filipino author of the virus was 
never prosecuted because in 2000, there were no cyber laws in the Philippines. Although 
the “I Love You” virus infected and harmed computer networks including those of the 
Pentagon, governmental establishments, parliaments, and corporations worldwide 
(Wehrfritz & Vitisca, 2000), nobody knows if the hacker sent that virus intentionally. It 
might have been an accident. For all these reasons, from a law enforcement perspective, 
the “I Love You” virus was an act of hacking, not cyberterrorism (New York Times, June 
13, 2000) because, as the participant tells us, cyberterrorism has “to be very specific for 
your purpose.” The next excerpt was, again, selected from the interview conducted with 
that same participant: 
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They all come together with a common goal of wreaking havoc. Their main 
initiative is to find people that are like-minded because hacking, while it is 
traditionally seen as the one kid sitting down at 2 a.m. in front of his mom’s 
computer, is not always like that. It can be highly organized in groups and 
individuals who are working together on a common goal, like the botnets out of 
the Netherlands. That was a group of people that came together for a group cause. 
A botnet is a compilation of compromised machines that run malicious programs 
(i.e., worms, Trojan horses, or backdoors) under a common command and control 
infrastructure (Baker, 2005). The Dutch botnets were operated by a cyberterrorist group 
from the Netherlands of which the main goal was to cripple computer systems of various 
businesses (Knight, 2005). This demonstrates that this is a group of people who come 
together “for a group cause” and that it is composed of “individuals who are working 
together on a common goal.” And the common goal of cyberterrorists is to wreak havoc 
(“They all come together with a common goal of wreaking havoc”). For this reason, 
“their main initiative is to find people that are like-minded.” The participant also makes a 
reference to hacking as a traditional form of computer intrusion that has no intent to harm 
(“it is traditionally seen as the one kid sitting down at 2 a.m. in front of his mum’s 
computer”). Nevertheless, it “is not always like that.” Hacking can also be malicious 
hacking. Malicious hacking – if it is intentionally malicious – is cyberterrorism. The last 
excerpt of this sub-section, taken from a former CIA agent who specialized in computer 
crime, is interesting because it gives an overall perception of cyberterrorism as a threat to 
our society: 
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I think cyberterrorism is a threat to our society. Some people say that 
cyberterrorism has never happened and that it never will, but that strikes me as 
naïve. Think about the computer intrusions that have been done out of the former 
Soviet block against banks. People stole millions. If you can do those intrusions 
for an economic gain, why couldn’t cyberterrorists do that for a political gain? I 
agree that cyberterrorism on a massive-scale hasn’t happened, but that doesn’t 
mean we shouldn’t protect against it. 
 Cyberterrorism, says this former CIA agent, is a threat to our society. Based on 
his statements, there have been cases of computer invasions for financial purposes. The 
intruders were from the ex-Soviet Union. Computer intrusions, he continues, are a threat 
to our society because if we can have intrusions for an economic gain, “why couldn’t 
cyberterrorists do that for a political gain?” This excerpt is similar to the third excerpt in 
that both participants emphasize the very notion that cyberterrorists have the capabilities 
to cause serious problems. Yet, while in the third excerpt it was said that cyberterrorists 
could “theoretically” open up the floodgates and drown half the town, in this excerpt a 
different outlook of the potential of cyberterrorism is expressed in the following terms (“I 
agree that cyberterrorism on a massive-scale hasn’t happened, but that doesn’t mean we 
shouldn’t protect against it”). Here, the participant recommends that we should protect 
ourselves against cyberterrorism, implying that it is dangerous. 
All in all, these eight excerpts articulate the dangers of cyberterrorism and the 
similarities and differences it has with other forms of computer intrusion, particularly 
hacking. While both hacking and cyberterrorism are forms of intrusion, cyberterrorism 
has the distinctive characteristic of being intentional in wreaking havoc or causing harm. 
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A few examples were given to demonstrate the potential threat of cyberterrorism; it could 
flood a town, harm a power plant, cripple an entire infrastructure, or compromise 
computer systems. Although hacking could be a good means for threatening computers or 
make them more vulnerable, attacks through the Internet or against networks or systems 
need to have a terrorist component in order to be labeled “cyberterrorism.” This is why 
the next sub-section purports itself to concentrate on the various motivations that 
cyberterrorists have for engaging in cyber attacks. 
Cyberterrorism: Various Motivations 
I asked the participants what the motivations to engage in cyberterrorism were. 
Most of the data I collected on this are consistent with the statements made in the 
literature review. For the purpose of this sub-section, I selected four relevant quotes that 
are representatives of many of the participants’ accounts. For instance, asking a professor 
and executive director of an information security center at a Midwestern university what 
the motives of cyberterrorist acts are, he responded promptly with the following: 
Anything that would motivate someone to commit a terrorist act in the physical 
world could spawn an analog in the realm of digital information systems, 
computing, and the like. Cyberterrorism could be blowing up a chemical plant and 
disabling the phone systems. We don’t protect our infrastructures as well as we 
should. Security and liability have not been at the forefront of those concerns up 
until recently.  
The statements made by this participant are interesting because they give us an 
all-encompassing perspective of the motives of cyberterrorism. In essence, “anything that 
would motivate someone to commit a terrorist act in the physical world could spawn an 
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analog in the realm of digital information systems, computing, and the like.” Based on 
this view, it follows that the motives of cyberterrorists are the same as those of 
conventional terrorists. What are the motives of conventional terrorists? There is a 
plethora of articles and books on the subject. For example, Der Derian (2005) maintains 
that terrorism is an act based on personal, political, social, ethnic, religious, ideological or 
similar motives. This goes directly to the assumptions made on cyberterrorism at the 
beginning of this literature review. Seventeen forms of cyberterrorism were given. In 
general, the motives are the same as those of conventional terrorists such as Al Qaeda. As 
such, a cyberterrorist act is any act committed for ideological, religious, political, or 
social reasons, or the threat thereof, via computers or the Internet. It could be destroying 
infrastructures; destroying the actual machinery of the information infrastructure, or the 
threat thereof; hacking into the controls of a nuclear power plant or a facility that handles 
hazardous materials, or the threat thereof, and so on. Regarding this last form of 
cyberterrorism, the statement made by the participant is almost identical (that is, 
“cyberterrorism could be blowing up a chemical plant and disabling the phone systems”).  
The following examples are an extension of the previous ones. Cyberterrorism 
could be shutting down power grids for ideological, religious, political, or social reasons 
(in the same way that conventional terrorists would), sabotaging operations; causing a 
fatal incident, coercing a government or a political faction, via computer technology, to 
modify, add, or subtract existing laws or rules; attacking a national, racial, religious, 
linguistic, or any social group or community, via computer technology, or the threat 
thereof. The point made here is that, whatever form of cyberterrorism it is, it resembles 
conventional terrorism because the motives are the same. The participant’s account 
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corresponds with the assumptions made in this study. For this reason, terrorist 
motivations could spawn an analog in the digital realm. Asking another participant, who 
is the chair of a cyber forensics program in a department of computer and information 
technology at a Midwestern university (where he is also an associate professor), he 
responded with specific statements about the motives of cyberterrorists: 
They can have political, social, religious, ethnic, financial motives. They can have 
a mental illness too. Some of them can be state-sponsored, as it was the case for 
the defacement of Ariel Sharon’s Web site. You’ve got individual motives. It all 
depends on their motives. It could be to cause fear of uncertainty. There’s always 
the ability to impact financially. You make people uncertain or fearful of online 
transactions. 
 Again, it is very clear in those statements that they [cyberterrorists] can have 
political, social, religious, ethnic, or financial motives. The participant here even adds 
that defacing Web sites is a cyberterrorist act because it can be state-sponsored. Based on 
his belief about the defacement of Ariel Sharon’s Web site, we can add that the purpose 
of cyberterrorism is also to spread political propaganda. No matter what, the ultimate 
goal is “to cause fear of uncertainty.” Here, what is dealt with are not only the motives 
but also the effects of cyberterrorism on our society. The effects are based on the 
motives. The two concepts are highly correlated. This excerpt is also different from the 
previous one in that it also makes the point that the motives could be financial (i.e., “to 
impact financially” and to make people “uncertain or fearful of online transactions”).  
So, those who are likely to conduct cyber attacks are those who are socially, 
politically, financially, religiously, or ethnically motivated. Going back to the statement 
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made about Ariel Sharon’s Web site, as we have seen in the literature review, in 2002 a 
cyberterrorist group known as the World Fantabulous Defacers (WFD), whose cultural 
practice is to wreak havoc on Web sites, delved into the Web site of Ariel Sharon, the 
Israeli Prime Minister, to deface it. They wrote, on his Web site, “The Face of the Biggest 
World’s Murderer.” According to Verton (2003), the WFD had strong political clashes 
with Sharon’s administration. Those types of cyber attacks could pose serious threats. 
Another participant, a professor of social network theory, working closely with the FBI, 
made similar statements when he said that there have been Christian and Muslim Web 
sites defaced by each other: 
 They [cyberterrorists] have many different motives, like political motives. If they 
have the mindset that a country shouldn’t be acting the way they are, they can put 
pressure just like any traditional terrorist. We have been attacked multiple times, 
specifically United States Web sites, attacked and defaced, hosting companies 
taken down, uh, companies threatened of being taken down if they didn’t stop 
supporting certain initiatives within the government. There have been quite a few 
different documented and probably even many more undocumented cases. 
Ideological motives would easily be the religious aspects. There have been 
Christian and Muslim Web sites defaced by each other, churches’ and temples’ 
Web sites defaced. Financial motives are not a big thing for cyberterrorists, but 
they have to be funded like every other group. 
 While the scholarly literature says that the defacement of Ariel Sharon’s Web site 
was mainly politically motivated (Verton, 2003), here it seems that the “Christian and 
Muslim Web sites defaced by each other” are ideologically or religiously motivated (i.e., 
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“Ideological motives would easily be the religious aspects”). Besides the Christian and 
Muslim Web sites defaced by each other, the participant says that churches’ and temples’ 
Web sites have been defaced as well. It is worth looking at the first statement (“They 
[cyberterrorists] have many different motives, like political motives. If they have the 
mindset that a country shouldn’t be acting the way they are, they can put pressure just 
like any traditional terrorist”). A similarity can be drawn with the previous excerpt: their 
motives and acts can be applied in the digital realm (“just like any traditional terrorist”).  
Another important consideration is that cyberterrorists, as it is made clear by our 
participant, are not necessarily driven by financial motives (“Financial motives are not a 
big thing for cyberterrorists”). This goes back to the statement made about Nigerian 
scams in the previous sub-section; those scams are acts committed by cybercriminals 
because “those are basically people that exploit money.” Nevertheless, based on the 
excerpt above, it seems that in order to be active and successful, they need financial 
resources (“they have to be funded like every other group”). Money, in this context, is 
used as a tool and not the ultimate objective of personal gain. The last excerpt of this sub-
section focuses solely on one motive: political. It was selected from an interview 
conducted with a senior analyst engineer in forensics who also has an IT group. He and 
his group support the police of a Midwestern university (where that participant is 
employed), law enforcement investigations, and internal investigations for the Dean of 
Students and human resources: 
What will come in the next wave of cyberterrorism will be hugely destructive. 
The intent will be political; to bring down the politics of whatever you’re opposed 
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to. The misconception of the cyber world is that we believe that cyberterrorists 
can’t get us. 
“The intent,” says our participant, “will be political.” A correlation can be made 
with statements written by scholars such as Anderson and Sloan (2002a) when they say 
that terrorism is primarily a political act. From this vantage point, just as it is for 
conventional terrorism, the intent of cyberterrorism is “to bring down the politics of 
whatever you’re opposed to.” So, based on the selected accounts, we can conclude that 
cyberterrorists have various motives that are identical to the motives of conventional 
terrorists. These motives can be social, ideological, religious, political or ethnic. As it 
turns out, the motive that emerges the most in these accounts is the political motive. By 
the same token, financial motives do not seem to be as prominent as the other motives. 
Nonetheless, in all cases, the intent is to cause harm via computer technology or the 
Internet, in the same way that the intent of terrorists is to cause harm by dropping bombs 
or engaging in similar types of action. The next few sub-sections will focus on issues and 
topics driven mostly by social network theory, the first of which pertains to what 
networks of cyberterrorists are. 
Networks of Cyberterrorists: What Are They? 
The data that pertain to this sub-section are mostly based on two interview 
questions, “What does a network of cyberterrorists look like?” and “What do 
cyberterrorists do in those networks of terror?” Nine excerpts were selected to illustrate 
that analyzing social networks of cyberterrorists is important because it helps us better 
understand how and why cyberterrorists interact with each other through those networks, 
and how the design of the network itself, especially in this day and age where the Internet 
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and computer technology play a central role, can facilitate their interactions. This analysis 
follows the premises of social network theory. Social network theory is the mapping and 
understanding of social networks (Lipnack & Stamps, 1986; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988). The questions that pertain to the roles of hubs 
and depths of communication patterns are not dealt with in this sub-section, but will be in 
subsequent sub-sections. The first excerpt, taken from an interview conducted with a 
forensics examiner in the Southwest, gives a broad outlook of cyberterrorist networks:  
Usually, it’s not just an individual. It’s going to be a cyberterrorist joining a 
network. You get all these cyberterrorists that will go online and use IRC. They’ll 
form kind of these loosely-knit groups. Then, um, they can communicate, transfer 
files, sharing information through IRC. They can share strategies and all those 
different things. 
Based on these statements, the existence of networks among cyberterrorists is 
clear (“Usually, it’s not just an individual. It’s going to be a cyberterrorist joining a 
network”). Cyberterrorists, then, tend not to work alone; they feel the need to team up 
with others. Besides, when cyberterrorists network, they network with others via different 
channels of communication; what they do is “go online and use IRC.” Note the emphasis 
on groups that are loosely knit (“They’ll form kind of these loosely-knit groups”). As we 
will see later, the emergence of hubs is enabled by those groups that are loosely knit. The 
participant lists some of the activities that are done in those cyberterrorist networks 
(“they can communicate, transfer files, sharing information through IRC. They can share 
strategies and all those different things”). These practices reinforce the needs of the 
community of cyberterrorists without the necessity of creating a large-scale single 
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organization, like a massive conventional terrorist organization. The statements made by 
the participant are consistent with the descriptions of important issues in the scholarly 
literature. For instance, McKenzie (2004) argues that cyberterrorists have become 
involved in Internet social networks. Likewise, for Schwartau (1996), some cyberterrorist 
groups play the role of cybersurrogate groups in order to assist other cyberterrorists who 
are really in need of help (i.e., regarding the design of certain malicious software 
programs or, like the participant says, the sharing of information and strategies). The 
main goal is to increase their chances of successful cyberterrorist attacks against the 
Internet or computer networks. The creation of networks has been proven to be easy and 
advantageous (Schwartau, 1996). The following excerpt was taken from the account told 
by an IT Security Analyst II (an assistant forensics examiner) in the Southwest: 
You’ll have two or three or four guys or girls in the cyberterrorist network. You’ll 
never know if they’ve met before. They don’t use their real identities. They’re 
really smart; they understand how this works. They will write tools, scripts, um, 
programs that can harm your computer, and distribute them within that 
[cyberterrorist] network. 
Cyberterrorist networks, as it transpires in the first statement, are composed of 
both “guys” and “girls.” Interestingly enough, some of the literature mentions that those 
networks are composed of members of both gender (i.e., Levy, 2001). Another quote 
from a different participant says that “the average age of a cyberterrorist is twenty-eight 
years old.” These demographics increase our knowledge somewhat, but what matters 
more is the fact that anybody can use the Internet to engage in cyber attacks and anybody 
can join a cyberterrorist network, regardless of gender or age. Speaking of gender, a 
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direct comparison can be drawn with conventional terrorist networks, where females have 
been known to commit terrorist acts, i.e., the Patty Hearst case (Holman, 2004). This 
exemplifies, again, that cyberterrorism is, in a lot of respects, terrorism in the digital 
realm. By the same token, the belief that the average age is twenty-eight years old shows 
that, in order to be a successful cyberterrorist, one needs to be very skilled with 
computers and spend a tremendous time online, learning all the tools and strategies to 
harm computer networks and systems. Can a twelve-year old hacker be as knowledgeable 
as a twenty-eight year old cyberterrorist? Levy (2001) mentions many non-cyberterrorist 
hackers whose ages range from twelve to nineteen. However, most of the members of the 
Chinese cyberterrorist group Titan Rain have a college degree, sometimes at the graduate 
level, or have done some military training (Schneier, 2005). So, it is no surprise that the 
average age of the cyberterrorist is in the late twenties. For all these reasons, it can be 
deduced that the previous statement that hackers, as opposed to cyberterrorists, “tend to 
be teenagers or computer-whiz kids” has some validity.  
In a similar fashion, in the cyberterrorist network, the main actors might not know 
one another (as the participant says, “You’ll never know if they’ve met before”). The fact 
that they might be unbeknownst to each other has been confirmed in scholarly pieces. 
McClure and Scambray (1999) maintain that the Internet can be used in such a way that 
the structure of cyberterrorist networks allows some groups to communicate with each 
other while they do not even know one another. Likewise, according to our participant, 
“they don’t use their real identities.” The postmodern nature of cyberspace is such that 
Web users can alter their identities within a few seconds. Postmodernism emphasizes 
fluidity and the immediate and constant re-referencing of identities. Identity becomes a 
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flux or, as Rheingold (1998) suggests, a “fluid” (p. 84) that enables Web users to be 
disembodied. In this sense, they can take a fluid role in the construction of identity 
through different levels and qualities of interaction. Anonymity works for cyberterrorists. 
This means that the self can be manipulated on the whims of its creator. It also entails 
fragmentation of the self, a term of postmodern identity construction (Matusitz, 2005c). 
While modernist notions of the self are based on the ideal of a stable, non-shifting 
identity, postmodernism conceives identity as continuously being shifting and 
reconstructed (Deibert, 1997). The next excerpt, taken from a cyber forensics specialist in 
the Midwest, also emphasizes the anonymous aspect of cyberspace, which makes the task 
easier for cyberterrorists: 
On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog, which makes the task complicated 
for them [law enforcement]. It might even be the case that one federal agency is 
stalking the other agency. Who’s part of a network of cyberterrorists? You don’t 
know that until you catch one of them, and even if you catch one of them it’s still 
gonna be hard to get the others.  
Cyberterrorists protect themselves through the Internet. They can conceal specific 
parts of their identities: skin color, ethnicity, social status, sexual orientation, and so on. 
Sherry Turkle, in her book Life on the Screen (1995), shows how possible it is to alter our 
identities and how the intensive relationships Web users have with the Internet change 
the way they make their identities seem to be. Turkle describes the computer as a tool, a 
mirror, and as a gateway to the world through the looking glass of the screen. From this 
perspective, cyberterrorists use computers and the Internet as new media on which to 
project their new identities. The only way to bust them is to catch them in actual physical 
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space, a feature of modernism (“Who’s part of a network of cyberterrorists? You don’t 
know that until you catch one of them”). Cyberterrorists enter cyberspace as part of the 
routines of everyday life. Their concealed identities that turn into new or even multiple 
identities make their world ambiguous. A central tenet of postmodernism is the 
willingness to accept ambiguity (Kramer, 1997). It is so ambiguous that it confuses 
federal agencies (“It might even be the case that one federal agency is stalking the other 
agency”). From a social network theory standpoint, there cannot be mutual observable 
behavior between two nodes in a social network on the Internet, which is a direct contrast 
with dense networks in actual physical space, characterized by “network closure” 
(Coleman, 1990, p. 318). Network closure is the extent to which everyone knows 
everyone else in a network. The next excerpt, from the IT Security Analyst II mentioned 
earlier, underlines the formation of cyberterrorist networks through worldwide 
cooperation: 
There is cooperation among those groups around the globe that do try to help each 
other out. You’re not only seeing U.S. cyberterrorists perpetrating against U.S. 
targets. It’s global. It’s gonna be someone in a country that has poor cybercrime 
laws or poor law enforcement that are willing to go after these targets there. 
Again, based on the participant’s words, cyberterrorists tend not to work alone. 
Instead, they cooperate and this can be done globally (“There is cooperation among those 
groups around the globe”). As the participant continues, cyberterrorists are not always 
geographically located at the same place (“You’re not only seeing U.S. cyberterrorists 
perpetrating against U.S. targets. It’s global”). From a social network theory perspective, 
the rapid evolution of global electronic networks such as the Internet points to the 
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potential of those networks to develop communication means that enable nodes to 
communicate and interact with other nodes in real time all over the world (Kettinger & 
Grover, 1997). In doing so, these nodes can easily create networks where they can collect 
information and transfer knowledge.  
The last statements of this excerpt indicate specific areas where cyberterrorists 
might originate (“It’s gonna be someone in a country that has poor cybercrime laws or 
poor law enforcement that are willing to go after these targets there”). Such was the case 
of Western European countries and former Soviet Union states a number of years ago. 
Recall what was said in the literature review; in the late 1980s, a German hacker group 
sold data to members of the ex-Soviet KGB. The German group accessed the information 
by hacking into computer systems in Departments of Energy and Defense, defense 
contractors, and NASA (Stohl, 1989). If they had been successful, the damage would 
have been colossal. Additionally, during the Persian Gulf War, a group of Dutch 
cyberterrorists who had intruded the Department of Defense systems attempted to sell 
their services to the Iraqis (General Accounting Office, 1991). These examples really 
demonstrate that cyberterrorist groups do try to create global networks in order to reach 
their outcomes. The next excerpt, selected from an interview conducted with a local law 
enforcement agent in the Midwest, deals specifically with the role of the Internet in the 
formation of cyberterrorist networks and the creation of sub-networks within the bigger 
network: 
I think that things are really easy for them [cyberterrorists] because of the nature 
of the Internet. It’s all over the world and there are unimaginable ways to 
communicate with it within seconds. With that, you can create a network with 
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tons of relationships, and it works for cyberterrorists. Once they have a network, 
they can also have other networks within that network, you know, like one small 
network under the big umbrella to recruit new potential cyberterrorists and 
another one to fundraise money for building new software programs. 
Based on the participant’s comments, it appears that the nature of the Internet can 
be an augmentation to the power of cyberterrorists to wage successful attacks (“I think 
that things are really easy for them [cyberterrorists] because of the nature of the 
Internet”). Besides, the Internet alters and defies the geometry of interrelations within 
networks (“It’s all over the world and there are unimaginable ways to communicate with 
it”). This is a manifestation of the postmodern aspect of the Internet right there; the 
Internet, through “unimaginable ways to communicate,” enables cyberterrorists to do 
things that would not be possible in the actual physical world of conventional terrorists. 
In addition, the Internet enables relationships to “transcend geographic boundaries into 
areas of the world” (Hecht, et al., 2005, p. 271) that Web users would not otherwise 
travel because the possibilities to transcend temporal boundaries are spectacular (i.e., 
communication can be done “within seconds”). 
In line with these arguments, the Internet offers cyberterrorists the possibility for 
creating networks with a significant number of relationships within a computer-mediated 
world (“you can create a network with tons of relationships”). More importantly, their 
networks can have sub-networks, like hybrids (“Once they have a network, they can also 
have other networks within that network”). In other words, cyberterrorists can create a 
combination of networks within networks or, simply, networks of networks. As such, one 
sub-network could be used “to recruit new potential cyberterrorists” and another one “to 
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“fundraise money for building new software programs.” Sub-networks can break down 
what appears to be a single large network into smaller ones, which allows for numerous 
nodes to be linked in various ways, like in a spider’s web (Barabasi, 2003). From all this, 
it appears that the design of a cyberterrorist network is the same as the design of a social 
network in that it is characterized by flexibility and a capacity to expand (through 
techniques like sub-networks) (Buchanan, 2002). The following excerpt, selected from an 
account told by a professor of social networks in the Midwest, builds on the previous 
excerpt with respect to the idea that the Internet modifies and challenges the geometry of 
interrelations within networks. It also brings information on the “all-channel” aspect of 
cyberterrorist networks:  
The way cyberterrorists communicate online is extremely fast and effective. 
Connections are made among all of them [cyberterrorists]. The Internet really 
helps a lot. Their networks are very heterogeneous. They have to be any way, 
otherwise they wouldn’t be able to be loosely knit.  
The way the participant describes the connections that are made possible among 
cyberterrorists thanks to the Internet illustrates the feature of an all-channel network 
(Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), where any node in the network is linked to any other node 
(“Connections are made among all of them [cyberterrorists]”). The all-channel is 
collaborative, quick, and effective (“The way cyberterrorists communicate online is 
extremely fast and effective”), but can be difficult to maintain due to the significant need 
of exchange of information required. Nevertheless, it is the network of the information 
age and, when organized by cyberterrorists, it can be very effective (i.e., it can launch 
multiple, repeated attacks from different points) and very difficult to destroy in its 
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entirety (nodes are redundant). By extension, in such a postmodern social network, nodes 
– as trivial and innocent as they look – can be very powerful; the high number of nodes in 
a social network makes it a non-homogeneous entity (“Their networks are very 
heterogeneous”). A heterogeneous network consists of a mix of nodes that makes them 
loosely knit and, therefore, very difficult to identify. Plus, a non-homogeneous network 
has another advantage; failures are likely to occur on relatively small nodes (Faloutsos, 
Faloutsos, & Faloutsos, 1999; Matlis, 2002). On the other hand, a homogenous network 
is composed of closely-knit nodes, which makes the network more vulnerable and easier 
to identify (since all the nodes are very similar and follow the same pattern). The next 
excerpt, taken from an account told by an IT Analyst II, describes the absence of 
leadership in cyberterrorist networks: 
There is no leadership. If anything, it’s more of a “lead by agreement.” They 
might be the most experienced and skilled, but if you don’t like what they do, 
they just go out or you get rid of that person. There’s no hierarchy. You can 
usually tell in some that there is a natural order that works out between the 
younger hackers and the more experienced hackers, just like any pack of wolves 
or wild animals. The order is based on knowledge, skills, and experience. When 
their name is in the news, they put themselves above the other guys. 
The first four words of this excerpt sum it all up: “There is no leadership.” This 
assumption is very consistent with the findings of the study conducted by Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999), where the three scholars argue that Internet-based 
intergroup networks of cyberterrorist cells symbolize the postmodern type of structure, 
that is, a move away from the traditionally organized, hierarchical design to the 
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decentralized and flexible horizontal structure. As such, the communication pattern and 
the flow of information in cyberterrorist networks move horizontally, non-linearly, and 
through many sub-networks. In other words, instead of operating through a central 
command structure – as it is the case in traditional terrorist organizations – in which 
information filters down from the top in a vertical and linear manner, information in 
cyberterrorist networks moves laterally from node to node. This non-hierarchical 
structure makes the nature of operations work asymmetrically and in an all-channel 
manner (Bavelas, 1950, Leavitt, 1951). So, as the participant says, “there’s no hierarchy.” 
The cyberterrorists who stand out in their networks are the ones who have more 
experience (“natural order that works out between the younger hackers and the more 
experienced hackers”). This also implies that they have more notoriety. However, they 
are not the leaders per se. Instead, our participant continues, “the order is based on 
knowledge, skills, and experience.” 
In line with these contentions, since cyberterrorist networks are organized on a 
non-hierarchical basis, they tend to be more nimble and flexible than hierarchies. As a 
result, their networks are more adaptable to changing circumstances. By the same token, 
they are not fixed but very malleable (Barabasi, 2002; Buchanan, 2002). They are mostly 
unplanned, emergent systems whose ties end up being disproportionately and unequally 
distributed, with some areas of the network sparsely connected. The next excerpt, 
selected from an interview conducted with the manager of an information security team 
at a Midwestern university, also emphasizes the lack of leadership in cyberterrorist 
networks: 
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I think there is a bog underground network that exists because they have to 
communicate with one another. Cyberterrorism is not a one-man effort. I think 
that it’s a group of individuals who are working together. That’s where they 
conglomerate and get all this data in one area. They have different factions spread 
all over. I do not believe they have a leader because you will see internal fights 
within these groups, arguments between two members. It’s almost who can show 
up the other. 
“Cyberterrorism,” says our manager of the information security team, “is not a 
one-man effort.” Given this, they do have to collaborate or, at least, communicate with 
one another (“they have to communicate with one another”). Arquilla & Ronfeldt (2001) 
maintain that cyberterrorist groups, what the participant calls “factions,” are likely to be 
composed of small units that communicate and plan their activities in an internetted 
manner. This is a break from the past when groups and units depended on a state sponsor 
for physical location and financing. Cyberterrorists, in contrast, can take actions without 
the need for a purported or outward commander (“I do not believe they have a leader”). 
The last excerpt of this sub-section draws attention to the importance of collaboration and 
interaction for their networks to survive:  
Typically, there’s no hierarchy or structure. It’s more like anarchy. There is no 
supreme god. They’re independent, but they also have to collaborate, otherwise 
their network wouldn’t survive. So, I think there must be some kind of interaction 
to make their network viable. 
Again, their networks are not hierarchical (“there’s no hierarchy”). Our 
participant goes even further by contending that their structures are more like anarchies 
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because, he says, “there is no supreme god.” The other statements highlight the 
importance of collaboration (“they also have to collaborate”) and interaction (“there must 
be some kind of interaction”) for their networks to remain viable (that is, “otherwise their 
network wouldn’t survive” and “to make their network viable”). This is a direct 
throwback to Hegel’s systems theory (Beiser, 1993; Kojève, 1969), upon which some of 
the main tenets of social network theory rest. Systems theory is based on the premise that, 
for a system to function, there must be interaction among its parts. In other words, 
networks cannot survive, let alone exist, without interaction or interconnection among 
nodes. Besides, parts (or nodes or individuals) cannot be understood in isolation from the 
whole (Banathy, 1996). For this reason, in this day and age, cyberterrorist networks 
model that design. They create complex systems of interconnections that have 
differentiated themselves horizontally into networks of interconnected social sub-systems 
(i.e., sub-networks or hybrids). 
In summary, social network theory helps understand how cyberterrorist networks 
operate. Put simply, cyberterrorists are nodes in a network of rapidly expanding 
networks; they can be male or female with an average age of twenty-eight years old. 
Cyberterrorist networks are so flexible, nimble, and rapid that they can have sub-
networks or hybrids. They are also characterized by a decentralized structure that is 
composed of cells. Given this, cyberterrorists do not communicate or collaborate among 
each other in traditional hierarchies (as opposed to armies and traditional terrorist 
organizations) (Barabasi, 2002). Because of the absence of leadership and the 
postmodern nature of the Internet, collaboration and communication in their networks 
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tend to be horizontal, in an all-channel manner (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951), and 
anonymous. 
Hubs as Humans with High Degrees of Centrality 
In this sub-section, as well as the following two sub-sections, an analysis of the 
role of hubs is provided, based on social network theory. Hubs are those important nodes 
in the network of cyberterrorists that are so powerful that they connect a great number of 
other nodes [cyberterrorists]. The end-result of the analysis is that any type of network is 
much stronger when its hubs are active. Three types of hubs are identified in this study: 
(1) hubs as humans with high degrees of centrality, (2) hubs as go-betweens, and (3) hubs 
as central locations. The main questions that generated relevant data on this matter are the 
following: “Describe the role of nodes and hubs [minor and important actors] in the 
networks of cyberterrorists” and “Describe the degree of centrality in cyberterrorist 
networks.” This first sub-section particularly examines hubs as humans with high degrees 
of centrality. Two quotes from accounts told by an IT Analyst II in the Southwest and a 
professor at a Midwestern university, respectively, serve to illustrate that hubs as humans 
have high degrees of centrality; they are givers/receivers and central locations for the 
other nodes. They also have great power in the network through their transfer and 
exchange of knowledge: 
I don’t think they have a leader per se. I don’t think they go through an election 
process. Generally, in a network of cyberterrorists, the person with the most skills 
or resources is the one that seems to be “running the show.” A lot of times, that is 
the person that has the highest resources and connections. 
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We saw at the beginning of this study that a vast majority of nodes are connected 
to the network by way of just one link: fewer have two, even fewer have three, and so 
down the line (Barabasi, 2002). Unlike an exponential network, a cyberterrorist network 
has small but significant numbers of nodes that have many connections. Consequently, a 
cyberterrorist network exemplifies an uneven distribution of connectedness. Rather than 
having a random pattern of connections, some nodes act as very connected hubs, while 
many other nodes do not (Johnson, 2000; Keller, 2005). The role of hubs considerably 
influences how their network operates. The excerpt above portrays the hub as a human, 
more precisely as a person who is not a designated leader, but who has an effect on the 
other actors in the network through his or her highest skills, resources, and connections. 
The hub, in this context, is the one who seems to be “running the show.” From this, it 
follows that, while many cyberterrorists are simple nodes, that is, cyberterrorists who do 
things and who have all kinds of skills or expertise, other fewer cyberterrorists are hubs. 
These hubs act as directors, that is, people with the highest power and who appear to be 
charismatic, influential, and motivating. More importantly, they are the ones who have 
the most connections. Given this, they are hubs who have high degrees of centrality; they 
are givers/receivers and central locations for the other nodes. They impact the flow of 
information and activity (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). The next excerpt is similar to the 
previous one, but focuses more on the value of hubs through the transfer and exchange of 
knowledge: 
What we are trying to understand here is how cyberterrorists congregate and 
transfer knowledge. They live in small circle networks that overlap to a certain 
extent. These networks have, indeed, hubs, but the hubs, in my view, are central 
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individuals. They are not places necessarily. They are individuals that know more 
and are known by more people. They are essential for exchanging this knowledge; 
they are the people with the highest degree of centrality. And it goes very fast. 
Hubs, our participant says, “are not places necessarily.” From his statements, it 
follows that they are humans. These humans are important because they are “central 
individuals.” This degree of centrality points to the notion that their networks have a 
number of direct connections to a human who acts as a router node (Lott & Taylor, 
2005). Wigand (1997) argues that central individuals in a network enable quick 
communication with the nodes connected to them. From this vantage point, 
communication between simple nodes and hubs [central individuals] is mostly done 
through quick exchanges, meaning that relationships among the less important nodes in 
the network are not as fast. This is not a postmodern transformation because what makes 
communication among nodes vastly quicker in the network is the presence of a human 
hub. Our participant expresses it clearly: “And it goes very fast.” This paves the way for 
innovative interactions among individuals greedy for wreaking havoc against computers 
and systems. By the same token, this is an addition to the main premise of systems 
theory, that is, that a system is the sum of all its parts plus the effects of interconnection 
and interdependency among those parts (Lilienfeld, 1978; Weinberg, 1975). Put another 
way, while systems theory rests on the principle that interrelations among all the parts of 
a system are vital [which implies that the system is more than the mere sum of its parts], 
the theory does not take into account the role of the important parts – which would be the 
hubs in the network – as social network theory does. 
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In a similar vein, what this excerpt illustrates is not only the importance of 
centrality, but also the importance of knowledge transfer and exchange (“They are 
essential for exchanging this knowledge”). What can be inferred is that exchange among 
cyberterrorists must pass through a hub that is a central node. Hubs can afford to be the 
ones in charge of transferring knowledge in the network because, as our participant says, 
“they are individuals that know more and are known by more people.” This shows the 
importance of being a hub. This is crucial for cyberterrorists because a hub can provide 
the network the ability to communicate with other nodes one-to-many within seconds. 
And the Internet helps. What the Internet does is enable the development of 
communication patterns that did not exist before IT systems were implemented in social 
networks. The use of central individuals in conventional terrorist organizations was not as 
efficient as that of present-day cyberterrorist networks (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Since 
relationships through hubs are the shortest and the most efficient, social network theory 
assumes the existence of a network characterized by sporadic but extremely fast 
exchanges that require neither prolonged human contact nor a social contract in order to 
persist. 
So, this great timeliness of knowledge exchange through rapid communication 
between hubs and nodes enables cyberterrorist networks to be founded on 
unprecedentedly quick relationships with a wide range of actors. As it was recounted by 
some participants in previous sub-sections of this study, cyberterrorist networks span the 
globe. Their postmodern type of network is the opposite of dense networks. Dense 
networks lay emphasis on organizational cohesiveness with a central location to store 
information (Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005). The problem with centralization of information 
225
is that the exchange of knowledge is not as fast, efficient, and resourceful. Besides, it is 
not as readily transferable to other actors. Given this, centralization of information does 
not allow for quick decisions. For cyberterrorists, knowledge is not something that can be 
stored in a central container. They need hubs, what our participant calls “people with the 
highest degree of centrality” and “individuals that know more and are known by more 
people.” 
Hubs as Go-Betweens 
 So far, the types of hubs that have been described were the hubs as humans with 
high degrees of centrality. The type of hub analyzed in this sub-section is similar to the 
previous except that it focuses more on the role of brokering or, simply put, the “go-
between.” To corroborate the arguments about the importance for cyberterrorist networks 
to have go-betweens, three quotes were selected from the interviews and one quote was 
selected from the scholarly literature. The first quote was taken from an interview 
conducted with a professor at a Midwestern university: 
These networks are kind of small, but they have go-betweens, individuals that 
contact multiple groups. These are the people that are more respected, that have 
greater fame if you want, individuals that have been there for some time. They’re 
like a switch, like a switchboard if you want. And it’s all on the Internet. 
 A go-between is a mediator who acts as a link between multiple actors (Pearson & 
Hobbs, 2004). A hub has a similar meaning: it is a place of convergence that links 
multiple actors (Greenie, 2005). For this professor at a Midwestern university, a go-
between is someone who contacts multiple groups. They have the privilege to act as go-
betweens because they are “more respected,” they have “greater fame,” and they “have 
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been there for some time.” This view resembles the statements made by two previous 
participants, respectively, that the cyberterrorists with high degrees of centrality are the 
ones with the highest “skills, resources, and connections” and the ones who “know more 
and are known by more people.” A go-between, our participant adds, is like a 
switchboard. From this statement, we can deduce that, just as the switchboard is an 
interface that connects lines and trunks, the go-between is an interface that connects 
nodes. The following excerpt was selected from an account told by the chief information 
security officer at a Midwestern university and its regional campuses: 
The cyberterrorists’ market is like the mafia or the mob. They’re getting into 
middlemen or the brokers of information. They’re not only doing the hacking, 
they’re also doing the selling. They want to make sure they cannot be found. 
They’re not only doing the stealing of the data; they’re also brokering; they’re 
getting something off the top. 
 Based on this participant’s statements, the go-between is the middleperson or the 
broker. The term “brokerage” has been defined as the occupancy of a structural position 
that links unconnected actors (Fernandez & Gould, 1994). A broker is a middleperson, a 
mediator, a go-between, or, as Granovetter (1973) would call it, a “local bridge.” As a 
local bridge, he or she performs the role of a gatekeeper, whether it is between nodes that 
are already parts of a cyberterrorist network or nodes that are not yet part of the network, 
but that might be potential members. They might be very different in nature. In the 
excerpt above, the nodes that might get into contact with the cyberterrorist/broker can 
also be the ones that are being sold something. As the participant puts it, “the 
cyberterrorists’ market is like the mafia or the mob;” “they’re also doing the selling.” The 
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selling of what? Dunnigan (2003) contends that it is not unusual for cyberterrorists to sell 
malicious software programs to nodes that are not part of their network, such as 
suspicious organizations. The brokering role of the cyberterrorist also implies that he or 
she “screens” outside resources (i.e., “stealing of the data”) and communicates or 
exchanges them with other nodes. Fernandez and Gould (1994) maintain that brokerage 
involves the very notion that the broker finds himself or herself in a position where he or 
she is tied to nodes that are not necessarily interconnected. For Raider (1998), being a go-
between in a network is very advantageous because, 
this brokerage or gatekeeping location in the social structure is a position of 
competitive advantage because it offers the opportunity to access diverse 
information, to control the transfer of information between disconnected parties, 
and to identify and broker transactions between otherwise disconnected parties (p. 
5). 
So, to have go-betweens is very crucial to the interconnectedness of the 
cyberterrorist network. Although few in numbers, go-betweens are not random; rather, 
they are so powerful that they connect a great number of other nodes. For Simmel (1950), 
the go-between becomes “the third who benefits,” a.k.a. tertius gaudens, that is, the third 
who benefits from exchanging information with, say, two other nodes that do not 
necessarily know each other. Through the use of the Internet, information, secrets, ideas, 
knowledge, and even orders and assignments are transmitted by this hub, this central 
messenger, or this virtual master who maintains contact and communication. The last 
excerpt of this sub-section, selected from an interview conducted with the chair of a 
cyber forensics program in the department of computer and information technology at a 
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Midwestern university (where he is also an associate professor), also highlights the 
importance of having a go-between: 
In some of these social networks, some have a gatekeeper or a go-between, others 
don’t. Those social networks that have a very loose structure have a go-between 
because it makes things easier for them, I mean, for the social networks. It’s also 
much faster. 
This quote, again, illustrates that a cyberterrorist can take advantage of the 
Internet in order to use it for communicating knowledge effectively to any other 
cyberterrorist in the network. In doing so, the cyberterrorist/go-between occupies a 
pivotal position in the network. The main benefit is that “it makes things easier” for the 
social network of cyberterrorists. As the participant continues, “it’s also much faster.”  
Barabasi (2002) maintains that the use of a go-between implies that the nodes in the 
network are not necessarily connected to one another; they might not even know about 
the existence of one another. Any node, however, can be connected to the go-between. 
By adopting this method, each node can obtain superior information due to the go-
between’s privileged position through his or her high degree of centrality. Truly, the 
important gain to all this is that greater connectivity through the cyberterrorist/go-
between can tremendously improve and, ultimately, accelerate communication in the 
network. In turn, it will also enhance the performance of the cyberterrorist network 
overall (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). 
Hubs as Central Locations 
A third type of hub identified in the accounts told by the interviewees is the hub 
that acts as a central location. In this context, the hub acts as a place of convergence in 
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the network, that is, a central location where any cyberterrorist can meet. In fact, Zepp 
(1999) asserts that cyberterrorists need a “location” where they can meet, exchange ideas, 
trade insights, and share tools and software programs, all of which provide the means, 
knowledge, and incentives they need to wage cyber attacks. The first excerpt was 
selected from an interview with the same IT Analyst II mentioned previously:  
The university, for the most part, seems to be kind of a pass-through point to do 
other things. Universities are generally at the top of the list for cyberterrorists. 
Universities have a lot of IP addresses out there. So, they [cyberterrorists] start 
with the universities first because they are less secure. There are academic reasons 
for that. You know, a university has to be somewhat open. 
The university is the central location here because, as the IT Analyst II expresses 
it, it is a “pass-through point.” Cyberterrorists use universities for transit, for making a 
passage to other locations. As a result, universities are big hubs for cyberterrorists. What 
makes things easier for them is that, as the participant confers to us, “a university has to 
be somewhat open.” How is it open? Through its huge number of IP addresses 
(“Universities have a lot of IP addresses out there”). IP stands for “Internet protocol.” An 
IP address is a unique number that devices use to identify and communicate with one 
other through a network utilizing the Internet protocol standard (Kozeriok, 2005). Any 
participating network device – which includes, but is not limited to, routers, computers, 
Web servers, and internet fax machines – must have its own unique address (Matthews, 
2005). The problem is that universities are so open that it is easier for cyberterrorists to 
delve into these IP devices that enable them “to do other things” such as hacking into 
computer networks that are related to these university IP addresses. The next excerpt, 
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from the same participant, discusses another type of hub as central location: the Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC). As the participant expresses it, 
I would say that probably 90% of all the machines that I’ve looked at use IRC to 
communicate. It’s one of the first things we look at to see suspicious activities 
from a machine. We’ll go out and see if it’s doing IRC traffic because they will 
go back and use that communication path. It’s definitely where they meet. 
It would be wise to begin with a definition of Internet Relay Chat (IRC). IRC is a 
tool for instant communication over the Internet. In essence, it is designed for group 
(many-to-many) communication in channels or discussion forums; it also allows one-to-
one communication (Charalabidis, 1999). The Internet Relay Chat is a big hub for 
cyberterrorists because this central location is factually a worldwide network where 
everybody can join. As our participant remarks, “they will go back and use that 
communication path” and “it’s definitely where they meet.” From this, it follows that 
millions of Web users the world over can use that communication path to chat with 
friends, discuss any subject, and collaborate on projects (Mutton, 2004). Yet, it is also a 
forum where cyberterrorists can recruit new potential members, share malicious software 
programs, and, of course, create networks. With a simple, well defined protocol, the 
Internet Relay Chat has become one of the hottest central locations. It is more than just a 
basic chat system; it is also a network of intercommunicating servers, allowing thousands 
of Web users to get connected from anywhere in the world using the IRC protocol 
(Mutton, 2004). As our security analyst declares, perhaps 90% of all the computer 
machines he looks at “use IRC to communicate.” The last excerpt of this sub-section, 
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selected from the account told by the supervisor of a computer forensics unit in the 
Southwest, also focuses on chat rooms as central locations: 
Chat rooms are hubs for cyberterrorists. The Internet itself would be a huge hub, 
but if you think of individual nodes being one guy at this computer; the chat 
rooms and IRC are big areas where they meet. The reason is that it’s flexible. 
They can be very anonymous there. They don’t have to be discovered for who 
they are, for their true identities. So they can meet there and share information. 
The Internet is still kind of the Wild Wild West. Now, the new frontier is not 
policed per se. There are no cops walking on the Internet. So, it’s an easy place to 
share criminal types of information. 
His first sentence is clear: “Chat rooms are hubs for cyberterrorists.” From a 
social network theory perspective, the chat room is a hub, a central location with a vast 
number of highly connected nodes. In this excerpt, it is also plainly stated that “the chat 
rooms and IRC are big areas where they meet.” What this also means is that the larger the 
hub, the greater the number of links to it. And the higher the capacity of the hub, the 
faster its growth. There are countless chat rooms where cyberterrorists can communicate 
and network with one other. The reason they meet in these central locations, says our 
participant, lies in the fact that they are “flexible.” Cyberterrorists, he continues, “can be 
very anonymous there.” Zepp (1999) observes that in these chat rooms, cyberterrorists 
can ask others how to wage a cyber attack and get almost instant feedback. By the same 
token, this enables them not to waste time searching what they need on the World Wide 
Web or through newsgroups. For all these reasons, we can deduce that the “scale-free 
network” theory mentioned at the beginning of this long study can be applied here. As a 
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reminder, a scale-free network is recognized by its centrally located, highly connected 
hubs, which considerably influences the way the Internet operates (Dorogovtsev & 
Mendes, 2003).  
Of equal importance is the principle that cyberterrorists function in an “all-
channel” type of network, as it has been mentioned before (see Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 
1951). The “all-channel” network is a network where all dispersed nodes can be 
connected to each other for simultaneous dissemination of information and instant 
coordination (Barabasi, 2002). This is precisely how the chat room works: simultaneous 
dissemination of information and immediate coordination. The chat room is a very good 
example of an Internet hub because it has decentralized command and control; it also has 
extremely fast communication flow between numerous nodes in the network. The 
participant goes even further when he says that the Internet itself is a huge hub. After all, 
cyberterrorism would be meaningless without the Internet because the literature shows 
that cyber attacks are mostly waged through the Internet (see Dunnigan, 2002; Verton, 
2002a, 2003a). So, the Internet itself is a central location for those postmodern reapers of 
terror. Because this central location is so flexible, it turns out to be a form of “new 
frontier” or, as the participant puts it, “the Wild Wild West.” A major difference from 
actual physical space is that the Internet is not “policed per se.” As the participant 
continues, “there are no cops walking on the Internet.” This, again, is a manifestation of 
postmodernism. 
Networks of Cyberterrorists: Communities of Practice 
 This sub-section is an analysis of a set of data selected from the participants’ 
views on the culture and practices of cyberterrorists’ networks. As such, the question in 
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the interview protocol was the following: “Describe the culture or way of life of 
cyberterrorist networks.” Based on six excerpts, it was found that a cyberterrorist network 
constitutes a culture in itself because it has its own distinctive “community of practice” 
that enables cyberterrorists to create and maintain their network. It was also found that 
part of their communities of practice involves a way of life that uses “leet” speak, a 
jargonized lingo used by cyberterrorists in order to reinforce their culture and avoid 
detection by law enforcement. Finally, it was also assumed that cyberterrorists tend to be 
emotional communicators via online media (i.e., the Internet). 
The concept of community of practice is important in our effort to understand the 
complex relationships between cyberterrorists in cyberspace. Communities, unlike other 
types of structures, need to invite interaction to make them alive (Wenger, McDermott, & 
Snyder, 2002). Communities develop because of ongoing human interaction, regardless 
of time or place. The same happens on the Internet. Just as communities develop in cities 
and tropical forests, Web users can create cultures by exchanging ideas, collaborating on 
tasks, and developing relationships. Software programs and other sophisticated tools 
allow individuals to process and interpret information, construct meaning, and engage in 
social interaction with other individuals. The first excerpt, selected from an account told 
by a professor at a Midwestern university, discusses the role of knowledge in the 
cyberterrorists’ communities of practice: 
I think cyberterrorist networks are the best example that we have of communities 
of practice. Basically, their knowledge is practical knowledge, embedded 
knowledge, and this knowledge is transferred from one individual to another 
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within these communities. They are rarely written down and very rarely 
systematized. 
According to Wenger (1998), a community of practice refers to the process of 
social learning that occurs when individuals with a common interest in some areas 
collaborate over a certain period of time to share knowledge (i.e., ideas, solutions) and 
build innovations. Communities of practice have become associated with knowledge 
management as people increasingly see them as ways of developing social capital, 
feeding new knowledge, promoting innovation, and sharing existing information within a 
system (Saint-Onge & Wallace, 2003). Based on this participant’s comments, it follows 
that, because “their knowledge is practical knowledge, embedded knowledge,” 
cyberterrorist networks form “the best example that we have of communities of practice.” 
This statement is very consistent with observations made in the scholarly literature on the 
subject. For instance, Hildreth and Kimble (2004) state that communities of practice are 
knowledge networks.  
In the same train of thought, for the participant, embedded knowledge is 
knowledge that “is transferred from one individual to another within these communities.” 
Leonard and Sensiper (1998) corroborate this idea when they say that embedded 
knowledge is subjective, experiential, and developed in the “here and now.” As they 
continue, it is “semiconscious and unconscious knowledge held in peoples’ heads and 
bodies” (p. 113). For these reasons, embedded knowledge is not much quantifiable and 
cannot be simply captured, codified, and stored (Hildreth & Kimble, 2002). Winograd 
and Flores (1986) describe embedded knowledge as lost in the unfathomable depths of 
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personal experience. The same professor at a Midwestern university adds another 
interesting quote on the subject: 
 Cyberterrorist knowledge is tacit knowledge; it is embedded knowledge. It’s not 
explicit, it’s implicit. It’s built in what they do and what they try to achieve, which 
is subversion. What they do is engage in subversive activities. From this 
perspective, they are very uninterested in the theoretical aspect of what they do. 
They are more interested in the broader implications of the technologies they use 
and the broader issues to build and maintain these infrastructures. 
“Cyberterrorist knowledge,” he says, “is tacit knowledge; it is embedded 
knowledge. It’s not explicit, it’s implicit.” From this vantage point, communities of 
practice seem to offer a way to make tacit knowledge valuable, despite the fact that tacit 
knowledge cannot be easily captured, codified, and stored (Hildreth & Kimble, 2002). In 
the context of knowledge management (KM), Polanyi (1966, 1975) describes two types 
of knowledge: tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is embedded, 
unsystematic, personal, informal, and subjective knowledge, while explicit knowledge is 
codified, theoretical, communicated in the form of symbols, systematic, formal, and 
easier to exchange. Tacit knowledge is what the knower knows; it is gained through 
experience in a specific context (Flanagin, 2002) and it embodies beliefs and values 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Explicit knowledge is represented by some artifact (i.e., 
document or video) typically created with the goal of communicating with another 
person. 
 So, knowledge management (KM) is a strategy to capitalize on what a network 
knows (Knapp, 1998). The main goal is to acquire, coordinate, and communicate 
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knowledge of actors so that other actors can use it in order to be more efficient and 
productive in their endeavors (Alavi & Leidner, 1999). “Knowledge” here means both the 
experience and understanding of the network actors and the information available within 
the network (Marwick, 2001) and among the nodes that are interconnected. Sources of 
knowledge that come from outside a network are crucial to social learning in the network, 
the development of the network’s abilities, and the innovation process. For these reasons, 
cyberterrorists are mostly interested in what they gain and learn from their own 
experience (i.e., “It’s built in what they do and what they try to achieve”). They are not 
concerned with symbols and theories. Our participant expresses it clearly: “From this 
perspective, they are very uninterested in the theoretical aspect of what they do.”  
The next excerpt was selected from the captain of a Midwestern County Sheriff’s 
Department. This captain also oversees IT operations for that Sheriff’s Department, as 
well as the 911 systems of the county and its public safety network. This excerpt focuses 
a little bit more on cyberterrorists’ cultural practice and identity formation in their 
networks and communities of practice: 
They do have a culture, that’s why you have all these funky names that these 
cyberterrorists… these groups have online. The Internet is a great source of 
identity formation and education. Cyberterrorists do all these things because they 
can. They also like to send codes or leave like, you know, an impressionable 
signature about what their work is, whether it’d be a backward “7” or a different 
character that they type. It’s some sort of identifiable thing that says, “I’ve been 
here.” It’s like the Da Vinci code. 
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This excerpt has several implications. First, as the participant suggests, “they do 
have a culture;” “the Internet is a great source of identity formation and education;” and 
they have “these funky names.” These assumptions go along with the comments made by 
Poster (2001) that cyberterrorists’ communities of practice are manifested through the 
interplay of cultural identity, the interaction among each other, and a strong motivation to 
wreak havoc on computers and networks. Since interaction among cyberterrorists is done 
anonymously, it allows them to engage in what our participant calls “identity formation.” 
In other words, cyberspace allows them to create new identities; attributes of identity 
such as name, gender, class, race, physiognomy, and nationality are no longer at stake. 
The performance of identity, then, becomes less of a critical element of communicative 
practice in cyberspace (Wright, 2005). Cyberterrorists cannot locate and identify their 
identities through historically-established relation to physical phenomena like the body, 
land, physical environment, and social or political systems. Rather, cultural identities on 
the Internet are fluid and are a fleeting linkage to an ever-evolving and creative process 
of cultural construction (Frederick, 2005; Poster, 2001). Part of their identity is also to 
leave “an impressionable signature.” 
In addition, to create a community of practice is the ability to connect with people 
who have similar interests and may well be the key to cyberterrorists’ networks. In that 
respect, based on what the captain calls “education,” cyberterrorists appear to be 
interested in social learning (Bandura, 1977). Social learning is a process in which 
individuals are not only the active members in the community of practice, but also one 
through which they build their own identities vis-à-vis that community (Hildreth & 
Kimble, 2002). Members of communities of practice recognize that networking among 
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them is important for participation because actors in a network need to see themselves 
through each other and through communication (Wenger, 1998). Any community of 
practice like that of cyberterrorists will produce cultural practices such as tools, 
procedures, stories, and, of course, codes and languages (Hildreth & Kimble, 2002). 
Speaking of languages, the next two excerpts were selected from participants who 
claim that cyberterrorists have come up with a new type of lingo that is peculiar to them 
and that aims at excluding “outsiders.” This lingo or language code is called “leet speak” 
(Crystal, 2001). Leet speak is an online language code used in the Internet population, 
including cyberterrorists (Kee, 2005). More precisely, leet speak is a meta-textual system 
of symbols distinguished by complex layers of signification (Crystal, 2001). The quote 
below was told by an IT Security Analyst II in the Southwest: 
They [cyberterrorists] have this term called “leet speak,” in which they have their 
lingo. “Leet” comes from “elite.” You use character substitution. So, instead of 
using “elite,” they will change to “leet.” They’ll do character substitution and do 
“l33t.” It used to be a good way you communicated online to show how good 
your leet speak skills were. Now, cyberterrorists use it a lot, which makes it 
difficult for us, and law enforcement as well. 
From this excerpt, it follows that cyberterrorists have their own community’s 
lingo with specific categories and with changes in semantics, not only to hide meanings 
from the outsider world, but also to give it metaphorical beauty (i.e., “l33t” for “leet”). 
Phonetically, says our participant, the word “leet” comes from the word “elite.” For 
Verhoeven (2000), “leet” is a cipher, or cryptic form of spelling that replaces letters with 
numbers (i.e., “h4cker”), symbols, and other letters that sound or look alike. Leet speak 
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originates from incorrect spelling due to speed of typing; then, it is intentionally and 
repeatedly used as incorrect (Carooso, 2004). What can be also inferred in this excerpt is 
that “leet” helps reinforce cyberterrorists’ communities. It gives them a unique identity. 
Philipsen (1992) asserts that a community, in any society, can be established in a 
particular time and location, whether this time and location be recognized or not, which 
sets itself apart as a group of individuals with a common language [here, it is leet speak] 
as a method of communication and cultural bonding between its members.  
This excerpt also states that because cyberterrorists use leet speak a lot, the task 
becomes difficult for cyber forensics experts – what the participant refers to as “us” – and 
law enforcement. For Carooso (2004), the goal of using leet speak is to prevent law 
enforcement agents from deciphering specific meanings. Davis (1997) predicted the need 
for culturally diverse groups such as cyberterrorists to develop their own systems of 
communication in order to mislead law enforcement and “cope with the new diversity” 
(p. 267). This can imply that part of the effort of law enforcement agents to understand 
the nature of cyberterrorists’ communities (and the underlying reasons which may shed 
light as to why they engage in cyber attacks) is to concentrate not only on the technical 
skills of cyberterrorists (i.e., their abilities to develop malicious software programs), but 
also their codes and lingo.  
The next excerpt, from the same participant, points out the use of leet speak in 
cyberterrorist networks. Yet, it also assumes that, while the language used by 
cyberterrorists is oftentimes English, it can become a language barrier if cyberterrorists 
come from foreign countries. This view is also supported by Barber (1995). Below is the 
quote from the participant: 
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Of course, cyberterrorists sometimes face language barriers. You have 
Portuguese, French, German groups. But when they use leet speak, a jargonized 
lingo, they seem to understand one another better. What they’ll do is change 
characters of important words and turn them into numbers. For example, symbols 
like “1337” are common to all cyberterrorist groups. 
This excerpt corroborates the belief that leet speak has become a popular 
phenomenon among cyberterrorists. Leet speakers constitute a cultural group 
characterized by the secrecy and thrill of a specialized lingo (i.e., “What they’ll do is 
change characters of important words and turn them into numbers”) that excludes nodes 
that are not part of their networks (Crystal, 2001). Based on the first two sentences, it can 
be interpreted that those who want to engage in cyberterrorist activities had best read 
English if they want to reach maximized outcomes. However, “when they use leet 
speak,” says our participant, “they seem to understand one another better.” The last 
excerpt of this sub-section, selected from an account told by an assistant professor at a 
Midwestern university who is also involved in cyber forensics, rests on the main idea that 
in order to reinforce their messages, cyberterrorists have to find some common ground 
through emotions: 
I used to work with deaf students. Sign language is very limited; it’s a 
representative language based on emotions. When you say, “This is my friend,” 
you see the sign for “friend,” which is my two fingers crossed, almost like a 
handshake. But if I were to tell you, “This is my best friend,” you would see the 
emotions, not only through my finger gestures, but also my face. It’s an emotional 
language. I think the same can be said, to some degree, about the communication 
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styles in cyberterrorist networks. Whether it’s the use of directed language, 
specific language, diatribes of intent or mission, or why they’re doing this, or if 
it’s for short statements such as “Today’s the day,” the statements are usually very 
long diatribes about how Americans are the infidels. Yet, when the statements are 
related to a specific point that’s going to happen or issues that they are going to 
make, they are very much more specific. Email is nothing without the emotions. 
On the Internet, cyberterrorists have to be emotional communicators. 
The general description of this long quote is that email communication, just like 
sign language, is very limited because it is a representative language that needs the 
expression of emotions for the message to be produced and understood to its fullest 
extent. For deaf students to say, “This is my best friend,” they need to show the emotions, 
not only through their finger gestures, but also their face. Likewise, when cyberterrorists 
need to express statements related to specific events that will happen (or “issues that they 
are going to make”), they need to be much more specific. For this reason, email, an 
important means of communication for cyberterrorists (Dunnigan, 2003), is “nothing 
without the emotions.” “On the Internet,” our participant adds, “cyberterrorists have to be 
emotional communicators,” in the same way that deaf students have to be emotional 
conveyers of message if they want to let their feelings come across in the most effective 
way.  
So, in order to reinforce their messages, cyberterrorists have to find some 
common ties through emotions. Emotional communication is the ability to send 
emotional signals. This might be an additional reason that explains why cyberterrorist 
networks are communities of practice. Ekman (2003) argues that emotional 
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communicators allow people to communicate an expression. The purpose of emotional 
communication is to give one’s feelings stronger about particular goals or reinforce a 
bond. The signal transmitted by the sender is transformed into a stimulus to cause a 
change (Hunter-Carsch & Cooper, 2006). The outcomes derived from emotional 
communication are the main basis for the goals to be achieved. For emotional 
communication to be understood via email, the receiver must be highly knowledgeable 
with the culture of the cyberterrorist networks and all their practices. Although it is 
known that sending text messages can be enhanced with emotional content (Longueuil, 
2002), cyberterrorists must use a sort of universal language – leet speak is one – in order 
to be able to communicate their emotions in the most effective manner.  
Communication between cyberterrorists, after all, is communication between 
humans. Communication happens not only in the cold and distant method of digits, but 
also in the emotionally direct and powerful language of images and sounds (Salem, Anne 
Bogat, & Reid, 1997). With this ability emerges a new, previously undreamed of 
possibility of using the computer as a means for conveying emotional communication. As 
the participant confers to us, cyberterrorists can do it too. From all this, it is reasonable to 
say that cyberterrorist networks enable affectionate, emotional communication. Yet, as 
Kee (2005) contends, it primarily depends on the culture of their communities of practice 
or even on the social context (i.e., the expectations, norms, and values of the members of 
the cyberterrorist networks). 
Networks of Cyberterrorists: Networks of Trust 
The very nature of cyberspace is paradoxical, liberating, empowering, 
fragmenting, and very changeable (Jordan, 1999; Lévy, 2000; Poster, 2001). Cyberspace 
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is so flexible that it yields a sensation of informational risk that can only be conquered 
through trust development (Nissenbaum, 2001). Leat speak is accounted for the way in 
which cyberterrorists attempt to not only keep law enforcement out of their network 
premises, but also to build trust among each other. Trust is the belief that, within a 
community of shared behaviors, honesty and cooperative behavior are expected on the 
part of all the members of that community (Fukuyama, 1996). Bucher (2002) explores the 
phenomenon of “trust development” in cyberspace as a key characteristic of online 
communication in networks of Web users. The postmodern, disembodied nature of 
communication in cyberspace seems to call for innovative ways of building trust. Yet, 
based on the quotes selected from two participants, it appears that trust is based on 
chaining (that is, following connections from one friend to the next), a practice that has 
been used since the birth of civilization. The first quote comes from an interview 
conducted with a forensics examiner who also happens to be a graduate student at a 
Southwestern university:  
In a network of cyberterrorists, a friend of a friend introduces you. Again, it’s all a 
network of trust. Somebody has to introduce you first or you have to make a name 
for yourself in your own right so that you get someone’s attention, someone who 
can contact their friends to let you in. 
This quote illustrates that trust is important in networks of cyberterrorists. Misztal 
(1996) remarks that trust makes outcomes more predictable, creates a sense of 
community, and makes it easier for people to collaborate on tasks and projects. These 
assumptions seem to work perfectly for cyberterrorists: by working with other 
cyberterrorists that they trust, outcomes will likely be more predictable, their 
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communities will be reinforced, and they will be more able to work on tasks and projects. 
So, how is trust built then? Based on the participant’s statements, “somebody has to 
introduce you first.” This notion of trust resembles that of the community of practice 
described previously in that both involve relationships between inviduals. By introducing 
“a friend of a friend,” there is an implied belief by one person that another’s motivations 
towards them are well-intended and honest. This practice of using a friend to gain more 
people in the network is called chaining (Madorsky Elman & Kennedy-Moore, 2003). 
From a social network theory perspective, chaining implies following connections from 
one node to the next.  
It is important to note that this quote stresses that reputation alone can help a 
cyberterrorist gain trust from a cyberterrorist network. As the participant puts it, “you get 
someone’s attention, someone who can contact their friends to let you in.” Nevertheless, 
the process of “getting in” the network is still done through chaining (“someone who can 
contact their friends to let you in”). The second quote, told by a professor at a 
Midwestern university, compares cyberterrorist communities with conspiratorial 
communities of the past, which is his account for how trust is developed in their 
networks: 
Cyberterrorist communities are very much like your typical conspiratorial 
communities of war from the 19th century, like the Carbonari of Italy or the 
masons, where trust is important. They congregate enough people that they kind 
of know. Those people only get in if somebody kinda knows them, not that people 
know each other personally, but they know each other from online identities. 
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They are let in as more and more people are willing to vouch for their name and 
reputation. 
The first statement is worth to be analyzed: cyberterrorist communities are very 
much like the Carbonari in Italy and the (Free)masons. The Carbonari (which means 
“coalminers”) were a group of secret revolutionary societies created in Italy in the 19th 
century. They were very good at orchestrating revolutions not only in Italy, but also in 
countries like Spain (Frost, 2005). They were organized in the fashion of cyberterrorists, 
broken into small cells scattered across Italy. Freemasonry, still existing today, is a 
fraternal organization where members are united by shared ideals (Hodapp, 2005). While 
certain aspects of Freemasons’ networks and practices are not disclosed to the public, 
Freemasons have become notorious worldwide for their lodges (Mackey, 1996), that is, 
their locations for meetings and congregations. The Freemasons have been accused of 
creating conspiracies against certain governments (Davis & Preiss, 2006). Both the 
Carbonari’s and Freemasons’ organizational structure, as opposed to the design of 
cyberterrorist networks, is very hierarchical.  
What characterizes both societies is the value of trust (“where trust is important”). 
After all, what is conspiracy? It is a secret agreement between individuals to commit a 
malicious act. For conspiracy to succeed, trust is essential (Vankin & Walen, 2004). How 
is trust built? Based on the participant’s statements, it can be inferred that it comes from 
chaining (“They congregate enough people that they kind of know. Those people only get 
in if somebody kinda knows them, not that people know each other personally”). 
Chaining is a series of connections that start with a trustworthy node. This node will 
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contact another node to make nodes connect with another. The ultimate goal is to create a 
flexible, trustworthy network.  
Networks of Cyberterrorists: The Individualism-Collectivism Dimension  
The analysis of cyberterrorist networks can be articulated upon the individualism-
collectivism dimension as well. When designing the questionnaire, I did not anticipate to  
collect any data that would pertain to the individualism-collectivism dimension. Yet, two 
strong quotes, selected from the answers to the question that was analyzed earlier 
(“Describe the culture or way of life of cyberterrorist networks”), reveal that 
cyberterrorists tend to be individualistic, even if they are part of a cyberterrorist network 
and even if they come from collectivistic cultures. The analysis of the motivations of 
cyberterrorists to engage in attacks against computers and networks was done earlier. 
However, there was no mention of individualistic or collectivistic motivations behind the 
cyber attacks. So, it might prove interesting to do an analysis of the issue. Let us begin 
with a definition of collectivism and individualism. Collectivism is defined as a social 
pattern consisting of individuals who see themselves as part of one or more collectives. 
This worldview demonstrates measurement of dependency between one another 
(Hofstede, 1991). Individualism is a social pattern that consists of individuals who view 
themselves as independent of collectives (Triandis, 1995).  
 However, it is important to note that some scholars have called into question the 
value of the individualism-collectivism dimension. For instance, Voronov and Singer 
(2002) claim that a whole culture or civilization cannot be pigeonholed in a dichotomous 
category such as individualism-collectivism. For these two scholars, individualism and 
collectivism are descriptive labels that evoke “unduly fixed and caricature-like mental 
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impressions of cultures” (Voronov & Singer, 2002, p. 461). Likewise, for Sinha and 
Tripathi, 1994), this worldview is too “black or white.” For them, presenting cultures in 
those terms “not only clouds one’s understanding of them, but inevitably leads to good-
bad comparisons” (p. 123). Nevertheless, the dimension of individualism-collectivism is 
not always a “catchcall default explanation for cultural differences in human behavior” 
(Kagitcibasi, 1994, p. 55). The dimension still holds value in specific contexts. The first 
quote reinforces the arguments made by Triandis. The quote was taken from an interview 
conducted with a chief information security officer in the upper Midwest. He has a 
degree in law and said that he lived overseas for a certain period of time. In his excerpt, 
he says that, 
cyberterrorists come from all over the world. They come from the U.S., from 
China, from Korea, from all over. Regardless of where they come from, if they 
want to compromise your network, sometimes they’ll work together on that. You 
know, the culture of cyberterrorists tend to be similar in many places. You sit in 
front of the screen and you try to get software programs out to cripple networks. If 
an Asian cyberterrorist hacks into your computer, most of the time I don’t think 
he’ll do it for the benefit of the collective. He’s a cyberterrorist. He knows he’s 
taking risks.  
The last statement of this quote exemplifies elements of individualism: “He’s a 
cyberterrorist. He knows he’s taking risks.” One of the variables used to understand the 
differences between collectivism and individualism is the variable of risk. While 
collectivists tend to be risk-avoidant (Sinha, 1997), individualists support risk taking 
(Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). In a similar fashion, the statement, “I don’t 
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think he’ll [an Asian cyberterrorist] do it for the benefit of the collective,” also depicts 
major tenets of individualism. Kling and Carmel (1997) note that, in the context of 
cyberterrorism, malicious computer hackers tend to be individualistic. The individualistic 
cyberterrorist’s mindset and his or her risk-taking computer ethos, that is, being 
innovative in targeting computer systems or delving into networks where nobody has 
dared going before (Kling & Carmel, 1997), have led to the conclusion that individualists 
have the best flexibility and adaptability in dealing with the unexpected; they are also 
among the least likely to be overpowered by cyber attacks (MacNulty, 1999). The second 
quote was selected from an account told by a computer analyst in a Midwestern 
university: 
I don’t know that cyberterrorists are state-sponsored. It’s hard to tell. I’ve read 
before that Titan Rain was being backed up by the Chinese government, but that’s 
just speculation. Even if that’s true, I think that cyberterrorists are people that start 
as individualistic hackers in their teens. At the beginning, they do it to show off, 
and then they become nastier as they get better.  
 Again, the belief that cyberterrorists are individualists is evident (“I think that 
cyberterrorists are people that start as individualistic hackers”). Our participant also 
mentions Titan Rain, a group of Chinese cyberterrorists. He doubts that Titan Rain is 
supported by the Chinese government. No matter what the situation is, we can deduce, 
based on these two quotes, that, although the thinking pattern most prevalent in a 
dominant culture is typically the most highly valued in that culture, a risk-taking 
cyberterrorist tends to be individualistic, even if he or she is a Chinese cyberterrorist 
hired by the Chinese government to attack an American computer system. As a matter of 
249
fact, the literature says that it is the case of Titan Rain; they are stealing U.S. secrets 
(Thornburgh et al., 2005). Titan Rain is thought to be highly risk-taking and among the 
most pervasive threats that U.S. computer networks have ever faced. They engage in 
malicious hacking to such a large degree that they fall into the category of “extreme 
individualism” (Hay, 2000, p. 39). Drawing upon the individualism-collectivism 
dimension, this means that even in collectivistic cultures there are people who are 
idiocentric, that is, who believe, feel, and act like other individualists around the world 
(Triandis, 1995). 
Another important consideration is that individualistic cyberterrorists’ concept of 
themselves is contingent upon their ability to compare themselves with others (“they do it 
to show off”). To strengthen this statement, Kling and Carmel (1997) found that their 
self-esteem is contingent upon finding themselves to be “better off.” Display of their 
hacking talents, and particularly the display of potential successes (i.e., disrupting a large 
computer network like a university computer network, even for just fifteen minutes, is 
considered a major success by many hackers), is a necessary element in establishing their 
worth or “name” in the cyber world. What comes next is an account of cyberterrorism 
and intercultural differences on privacy. 
Cyberterrorism and Intercultural Differences on Privacy 
The question of privacy in cyberspace has already been studied by scholars such 
as Capurro (2005) and Nakada and Tamura (2005). Yet, no scholarly work has ever been 
published on the conception of privacy in the cyberterrorist’s culture. The data provided 
in this sub-section come from two excerpts selected from interviews conducted with the 
same upper Midwestern chief information security officer mentioned earlier and a law 
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enforcement agent in the Midwest. Privacy, defined as the condition of being concealed 
or hidden, can be achieved by “the management of interaction and information” (Laufer 
& Wolfe, 1977, p. 23). Privacy is a cultural universal, but the conceptions thereof vary 
from culture to culture (Altman, 1977). Concern over privacy has been associated with 
cultural values. Specifically, individuals in individualistic cultures as measured by 
Hofstede‘s (1991) individualism-collectivism index are more concerned about privacy 
than collectivists (Milberg, Smith, & Burke, 2000; Smith, 2001). 
One aspect of privacy that is specifically analyzed in this sub-section is private 
space on the Internet. Space is a major standard by which a culture designates who has 
privilege (Wood, 1994). With regard to the conception of privacy in the cyberterrorist’s 
culture, the degree of file penetration is culturally based (Debrix, 2001). The level of file 
protection is culturally based too; it depends on the concern for invasion of privacy. One 
way of grasping the importance attached to private space on the Internet is the extent to 
which disclosure of information is deliberately kept private. Tran (1996) argues that “in 
intercultural communication there is often an overlap, where what is personal for one 
culture is considered public in another, and vice versa. It is in this area of overlap where 
communication problems occur” (p. 214). To illustrate these postulations, let us analyze 
the first quote: 
We tend to see the development of software as being an intellectual property of 
values. In our country, we value individual creation and we’re trying to protect it, 
even on the Internet. Not everybody in the world sees it that way. Some network 
intruders see software and hardware as being opportunities for advancement. 
They don’t see something like software as something you can’t really touch. 
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The chief information security officer comes from the American upper Midwest. 
He is no Asian and was probably not raised in a strongly collectivistic family as many 
Asians are. As he made it obvious in his quote, “we value individual creation and we’re 
trying to protect it, even on the Internet.” Private space is a major standard by which our 
participant designates who has privilege. For our participant, because “the development 
of software” is “an intellectual property of values,” nobody else can invade his private 
property, even if it is on the Internet. For this reason, he will try to protect it. With respect 
to the individualism-collectivism dimension, Triandis (1995) asserts that individualists 
are mainly motivated by their own preferences, needs, and rights. Individualists are more 
aware of their rights to privacy (and to a greater extent). The debate is complicated by 
intercultural dimensions on privacy today; what is viewed as freedom in some cultures is 
perceived as taboo in other cultures. 
Nevertheless, our participant seems to be aware of intercultural differences when 
he says that “not everybody in the world sees it that way.” He contends that “some 
network intruders see software and hardware as being opportunities for advancement.” 
What it all boils down to saying is that, based on the individualism-collectivism 
worldview, mindsets and thinking patterns (i.e., reasoning) are valued differently from 
culture to culture (Johari, 2005) and this has an impact on the way cyberterrorist 
operations are conducted. From this vantage point, some cyberterrorists “don’t see 
something like software as something you can’t really touch.” The second quote, taken 
from an account told by a law enforcement agent in the Midwest, also attributes online 
invasions of privacy and cyber attacks to cyberterrorists with a different culture, 
particularly a collectivistic culture. As he explains it, 
252
if a cyberterrorist steals your data, they might not see it as stealing. Opposition of 
values causes a big problem. I tend to think that somebody coming around on my 
network without coming to the front door snooping is improper. But it might be 
normal for them to nose around somebody else’s property. So, some of it is 
cultural. If they come from a culture that values collective property, then it might 
be normal for them to delve into my network.  
While individualists hold that people should mind their own business and that 
private space should be respected (Triandis, 1995), collectivists believe that the space of 
the collective is also one’s space (as the participant remarks, “if they [cyberterrorists] 
come from a culture that values collective property, then it might be normal for them to 
delve into my network”). According to the collectivists, people should be concerned with 
each other’s personal matters (i.e., “it might be normal for them to nose around 
somebody else’s property”). “Putting one’s nose in another person’s business” is 
absolutely reasonable and expected. The collective is entitled to know, even regulate, 
what others do privately (Hofstede, 1991). As a result, cyberterrorists from collectivistic 
cultures see the Internet as a place where they can access any Web site they want, log into 
others’ accounts, and penetrate anybody’s private cyber “space.” Conversely, 
individualist Web users will try to protect their files by having two layers of password 
protection, by changing their password every month, and by installing firewalls and anti-
virus software. Their goal is to make sure that no other Web user invades or even knows 
“what is going on” in their private space. As the participant contends, invading one’s 
space is improper (i.e., “I tend to think that somebody coming around on my network 
without coming to the front door snooping is improper”). 
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However, as it was argued in the previous sub-section, the small fractions of 
highly skilled computer and Internet users worldwide may share the same levels of 
individualistic privacy preferences and concerns (Smith & Bond, 1993), regardless of the 
fact that they belong to individualistic or collectivistic cultures. For this reason, even in 
collectivistic cultures, there are idiocentric people; they believe, feel, and act like other 
individualists around the world (Triandis, 1995). Now that we have seen the participants’ 
[computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’] perspectives on what 
cyberterrorism is, what the motivations of cyberterrorists are, what the social networks of 
cyberterrorists are, what actions and practices are accomplished in these networks, the 
manners in which they create these networks, the roles of nodes and hubs [minor and 
important actors] in the networks, the degree of centrality in cyberterrorist networks, and 
the culture and way of life of these networks, let us move on to the analysis of RQ2, that 
is, the analysis of the accounts told by computer security experts and law enforcement 




Analysis of Research Question 2 
In order to answer RQ2 (What do computer security experts’ and law enforcement 
officials’ accounts reveal about their own networks?), the following questions were asked 
in each interview: (1) What types of networks do you use to combat cyberterrorism?; (2) 
What do you do in those networks?; (3) Is it necessary to create networks against 
networks? Explain; (4) Describe the downsides to networking with other agencies; (5) 
Are those networks formal or informal? Explain; (6) Describe the role of nodes and hubs 
[minor and important actors] in your networks; (7) Describe the degree of centrality in 
your networks. As it was for the analysis of RQ1, these questions were mostly driven by 
social network theory and do not include probing questions that were asked during each 
interview because, for each participant, the interviews progressed differently. Let us 
begin by analyzing the participants’ accounts of what networks of cyber forensics experts 
and law enforcement agents are.  
Networks of Cyber Forensics Experts and Law Enforcement Agents: What Are They? 
This sub-section is based on accounts solicited by two questions, “What types of 
networks do you use to combat cyberterrorism?” and “What do you do in those 
networks?” The participants’ accounts in this context are broad and touch a little bit on 
specific concepts of social network theory like structures, nodes, hubs, and degrees of 
centrality. These concepts will be subject to an in-depth analysis later. Nevertheless, the 
quotes selected here are consistent with the statements made by various scholars about 
networks between law enforcement agencies and cyber forensics laboratories. Not only 
do the accounts focus on what networking designs and strategies are used in order to stop, 
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or at least, understand social networks of terror, but they also explain how networks are 
created at all levels: local, federal, national, and international. Four excerpts were 
selected to illustrate all this. The first excerpt was taken from an account told by an IT 
Security Analyst in the Southwest and illustrates that networking against cyberterrorism 
is done at the global level: 
You’re talking about an international network. The FBI and different groups 
cooperate with other governments. You can go to the German equivalent of the 
FBI and say, “We’re looking at this case; we think there’s a cyberterrorist group 
here.” Here is the evidence; help us prosecute these people. 
In the same way that cyberterrorists collaborate worldwide thanks to the rapid 
evolution of global electronic networks and anonymity on the Internet, law enforcement 
agencies also join forces internationally (“You’re talking about an international 
network”). Our participant gives a few examples (i.e., “You can go to the German 
equivalent of the FBI and say, ‘We’re looking at this case; we think there’s a 
cyberterrorist group here’”). If the cyberterrorist is in Germany, American federal 
agencies will be more able to prosecute him or her if they already have connections with 
the proper authorities in Germany (“Here is the evidence; help us prosecute these 
people”). The next quote, from an assistant professor at a Midwestern university, 
reinforces the same belief that these networks are international: 
Computer forensics labs work together with local police departments. It depends 
on the crime, the level of the scene, or the escalation of the crime. Mostly, it is LE 
to LE [law enforcement]. It’s global. Sometimes, differences in U.S. laws and 
international laws create difficulties. So, we’ll need the UK, Germany, France, all 
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collaborating with the U.S. We would tell them, “Go to this computer, you’ll find 
this, this, and this on it.” 
From this excerpt, it follows that collaboration occurs on many levels: (1) 
computer forensics labs with local police departments; (2) LE to LE [law enforcement]; 
and (3) globally (“Sometimes, we’ll need the UK, Germany, France, all collaborating 
with the U.S.”). With respect to the third point, because cyberterrorism is a problem that 
is very international, the need of networks to counter this problem almost goes without 
saying. The statements made by this participant are in harmony with studies found in 
recent scholarly articles on the matter. For instance, as Hutton and Mydlarz (2003) 
contend, Diplomatic Security (DS) trains foreign law enforcement officers in the 
reduction of cyber threats and repercussions of cyberterrorism throughout the world. 
Most of these training sessions are in Europe. In a similar vein, the U.S. National White 
Collar Crime Center is teaming up with counter-cyberterrorism agencies in Russia and 
Eastern Europe to help prosecute online intruders (Kshetri, 2005). 
The necessity to create networks also stems from the fact that American cyber 
laws cannot be applied the same way everywhere. As Aeilts (2005) remarks, 
cyberterrorism incidents can cross regional, state, and even international jurisdictional 
boundaries, to the point where traditional jurisdictions and boundaries do not apply. For 
this reason, American federal agencies need to network with foreign agencies that would 
be willing to go after the identified cyberterrorists and prosecute them. As the participant 
tells us, directions on how to recognize a cyberthreat can be given from the U.S. itself 
(i.e., “We would tell them [foreign countries], “Go to this computer, you’ll find this, this, 
and this on it”). Besides, going back to the legal barriers, language problems, as Cutler 
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(1999) remarks, constitute many obstacles to U.S. investigations abroad. Pacts and 
treaties date from as far back as the 1800s and their requirements vary from country to 
country. Because of this, “courts face the complicated task of applying constitutional 
protections from the eighteenth century to today’s computerized world (Ziff, 2005, p. 
841). As the participant expresses it, “differences in U.S. laws and international laws 
create difficulties.” For this reason, U.S. federal agencies have started to create networks 
with countries like the UK, Germany, and France. Some countries allow U.S. officials to 
interrogate potential cyber attackers and obtain documents from cooperative individuals 
or organizations. Other countries do not, as they view it as a violation of their sovereignty 
(Cutler, 1999). 
As it has been mentioned several times, cyberspace’s very design dispenses with 
national borders. In fact, the postmodern nature of the Net is such that the Net really is a 
computer system on a global scale (Cangemi, 2004). However, still today, under the 
long-standing principles of international law, countries have jurisdiction only on the 
territory upon which they exercise their national sovereignty. Thus, a conflict exists 
between cyberterrorism, global in scale, and criminal activities confined to national 
borders (Cangemi, 2004). Considering these facts, it is no surprise that American federal 
agencies have started to create networks with foreign agencies that have specialties in 
computer forensics. Our participant expresses it clearly (“It’s global”). Any law 
enforcement approach has to face with the reality that virus authorship is a highly 
international phenomenon. Any action based on law enforcement or legislatively 
mandated authentication would likely raise some eye-brows in some countries or even 
leave the entire Internet vulnerable to virus attacks in other countries. For these reasons, 
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international collaboration has been intensified for the past couple of years (Barnes, 
2004).  
The following excerpt does not deal with international cooperation among federal 
agencies, but pertains to a model of social network design based on the description of 
how computer forensics experts collaborate with other agencies, some of which 
collaborate among themselves as well: 
I have two positions. My first position is within an IT group where I am the senior 
analyst engineer in forensics and I do forensics for that IT group. I also have a 
position as an assistant professor with the college of technology, where I teach 
computer forensics at the graduate and undergraduate level. I have a very strong 
relationship with local law enforcement. I work fairly regularly with the state 
police. I have a relationship with the Department of Justice as well. Then, there is 
the entire network of the Big 10 universities. We get together in person four times 
a year. We work in circles. Sometimes, our state police will collaborate with 
agencies from other Big 10 states and local enforcement will be contacted by the 
Department of Justice. Those agencies don’t always go through me. We try to 
share the cyberterrorists’ signatures that we found after they committed their 
attacks. We just ask one another, “Are you seeing this?” If they see the same 
signatures, I can tell them other things to look for. 
Figure 5 on the next page illustrates a social network design where interagency 
connections are done in an all-channel manner (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951). Any node 
in the network, mainly composed of law enforcement agencies, can connect with any 
other node. As opposed to the “star” or “wheel” network (Bavelas, 1950), there is no 
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central point that shows a hub to which all the nodes of the network are connected. 
Rather, this network does not have a node with a high degree of centrality. 
 
Senior analyst engineer in 
 forensics for an IT group 
 and assistant professor 
 
Local law        state 
 enforcement                     police 
 
Department                                        Big 10 
 of Justice                                      universities 
 
Figure 5     Example of five nodes composing an all-channel network. There is no 
 central node or high degree of centrality. 
 
Indeed, there is no prominent individual or group that stands at the center of the 
network and that has influence on its environment (i.e., in terms of decision-making, 
etc.). As the participant explains it, “we work in circles. Sometimes, our state police will 
collaborate with agencies from other Big 10 states and local enforcement will be 
contacted by the Department of Justice. Those agencies don’t always go through me.” 
This means that the all-channel network above is collaborative and multi-directional. 
There is no central commander. In other words, it is a full-matrix networks, where every 
cell is connected to one another and can communicate directly with every other cell 
(Evan, 1972). In the all-channel network, the measure of visibility is the number of links 
(Barabasi, 2003). The last excerpt of this sub-section, from a local officer in the 
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Southwest, is more an account of the fact that, in some cases, there is a jurisdictional 
hierarchy between law enforcement agencies: 
Homeland Security, in conjunction with various information-sharing analysis 
centers (ISACs), is finally starting to share information with all sorts of cyber 
forensics agencies, even the local ones, across state lines. They also try to get 
people within the states to understand that they need to share information with 
county governments. If a cyberterrorist case goes to federal agencies, they have 
jurisdictional power over us [the local police department]. 
 This excerpt points to the collaboration between the Department of Homeland 
Security and “all sorts of cyber forensics agencies, even the local ones, across state 
lines.” This act of working jointly goes even further as the participant says that “they 
[Homeland Security, in conjunction with various information-sharing analysis centers 
(ISACs)] also try to get people within the states to understand that they need to share 
information with county governments.” However, as opposed to the design of 
cyberterrorist networks, there is a clear hierarchical structure that a cyberterrorist case 
must go through. Based on the participant’s last statements in this quote, “if a 
cyberterrorist case goes to federal agencies, they have jurisdictional power over us [the 
local police department],” the Department of Homeland Security has supremacy over 
other agencies when a cyberterrorist case has to be investigated.  
From a social network perspective, while it is reported that cyberterrorists 
consider hierarchies as clumsy techniques to use in their networks (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 
2001), it appears from this excerpt that some law enforcement agencies follow a design 
where there is a jurisdictional hierarchy between them, especially when it comes to 
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investigating specific cases of cyberterrorism. This contrasts with the social network 
design portrayed in the previous excerpt, where connections among all agencies are made 
in an all-channel manner. No matter what, both cyberterrorists’ and law enforcement’s 
networks are similar overall, but they also have a few differences. The next excerpt, taken 
from an interview conducted with a lady who does strategic relations and 
communications between different agencies in the Midwest, deals with ethical issues 
based on the actions taken by law enforcement agents: 
I’m really glad you’re doing a study on that. Cyberterrorism needs to be explored, 
but I think it’s important to explore the role of law enforcement agents too. I 
mean, if they network among each other to monitor our private email, do their 
actions fall on the ethical side, even if their ultimate goal is to catch the bad guys? 
 It was explained in the literature review that the FBI has authorization from any 
Internet Service Provider to use Carnivore, a machine that observes and reads email, and 
that monitors other online communications (Mansfield, 2000). Yet, the participant 
expresses some concerns about the fact that the actions of the network of law 
enforcement agents are to monitor our private email. From this, it can be interpreted that 
we – that is, the average citizens – have a right to privacy. How can the line be drawn? 
For the participant, “even if their ultimate goal is to catch the bad guys,” does a law 
enforcement agency have the right to take those actions? In other words, what she is 
asking is the following: is computerized surveillance acceptable from an ethical 
standpoint, even if the objective is to protect society as a whole? Those issues are 
interesting because they pertain to many of us, computer users. The next sub-section 
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deals with the necessity for law enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts to create 
networks. 
Networks of Cyber Forensics Experts and Law Enforcement Agents: A Necessity 
Recall the six words used by Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2001) in the literature 
review: it takes networks to fight networks. Many participants reveal that it is necessary 
to join forces, through networking, in order to fight, let alone understand, cyberterrorist 
networks. As it turns out, it is also very advantageous for cyber forensics labs to do so. 
This sub-section is based on accounts mainly solicited by the following question, “Is it 
necessary to create networks against networks? Explain.” The participants’ accounts are 
consistent with reports made in the literature review and scholarly publications about the 
importance for cyber forensics experts and law enforcement officials to create networks. 
The first quote, selected from an interview conducted with a former FBI agent who 
worked as a computer forensics expert (now an assistant professor at a Southwestern 
university), emphasizes the need to network because of jurisdictional reasons: 
Now, certainly, in the area of cyberterrorism, it’s a necessity that you network 
with state, federal, and other state agencies within inter-states because most of 
these types of crimes cross jurisdictional boundaries. So, oftentimes you have to 
collaborate in order to solve these kinds of things.  
From this quote, it appears that networking is necessary “because most of these 
types of crimes [of cyberterrorism] cross jurisdictional boundaries.” This statement is 
consistent with the observation made by Sadler (2005) that, since 2001, local agencies 
such as small-town police departments do not have the same mandates for investigating 
computer crime cases as a federal agency such as the FBI would. In fact, Mansfield 
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(2000) comments that the FBI is allowed to investigate any Internet Service Provider in 
order to observe and read email, as well as monitor other online communications. As far 
as state agencies, they need a prosecutor’s certification, such as a mandate (Dekker, 
2002), in order to investigate any case of cyberterrorism (Berkman & Shumway, 2003). 
What it all boils down to saying is that, a local or state agency might not be able to 
perform a counter-cyberterrorism operation based on the fact that there are some 
jurisdictional barriers. Consequently, it takes networks to fight networks. As our 
participant says, “oftentimes you have to collaborate in order to solve these kinds of 
things.” The next quote was selected from an interview conducted with a police officer in 
the Southwest. 
It’s necessary to work with cyber forensics labs. What I’ve found is that the more 
people are involved, the better collaboration you have. It’s like teamwork. Instead 
of working home on an investigation, if I’ve got three or four people, it usually 
comes out better because they have different specialties and skills they can bring 
to the investigation. You’re gonna get a better work product if you have a team 
doing it. 
While the previous participant highlights the importance for networks between 
agencies at all levels to rely heavily on multi-jurisdictional collaboration, this participant, 
a local police officer, stresses the need to collaborate with experts in cyber forensics 
because “they have different specialties and skills they can bring to the investigation.” 
Cyber forensics experts are computer experts who have superior technical skills. For this 
reason, says our police officer, “it’s necessary to work with cyber forensics labs.” 
According to Thilmany (2004), cyber forensics labs improve investigation into an ever-
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growing era of crimes that uses computers, computer-aided terrorism, cyberterrorism, 
espionage, bank and business fraud, and identity theft. Teamwork makes dream work 
(i.e., “the more people are involved, the better collaboration you have” and “you’re gonna 
get a better work product if you have a team doing it”). The next excerpt, taken from an 
interview conducted with the commander of an investigation division in a Midwestern 
state (who also supervises computer crime experts), supports the statements made in the 
previous quote when he says that, 
it’s necessary to network because there are so many kinds of computer systems; 
you’ve got servers. You only have three people in our department and they will 
not have expertise in all domains of cyber forensics. You have to specialize in 
certain areas, to do things that other people don’t do. It’s nice to reach out to 
somebody else who doesn’t have the expertise in that field.  
“It’s necessary to network,” says our division commander, and “there are so many 
kinds of computer systems.” To illustrate that this statement is true, it is worth 
mentioning that cyber forensics is not a term that can be applied broadly because there 
are several types of computer forensics expertise. Generally, cyber forensics applies to 
the retrieving and analyzing of evidence from computer systems, including small bits of 
computer hardware and electronic data online (Delio, 2005; Holsapple, 2005; Roberts, 
2005; Smith, 2000). A parallel definition of cyber forensics is that it refers to the 
identification, examination, and rebuilding of evidence extracted from any element of 
computer systems, computer networks, computer media, and computer peripherals that 
enable forensics analysts to solve a computer-related crime (Hosmer et al., 2000). 
Although cyber forensics experts usually have solid knowledge in a wide range of 
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computer/networking hardware, software, and operating systems, there are other types of 
cyber forensics experts who only specialize in areas that others would have no knowledge 
about. For instance, there are only a handful of cyber forensics experts worldwide who 
specialize in analyzing attacks waged against computers via cell phones (McCullough, 
2004). Although this might be trivial or inconsequential, cell phones have the power to 
download malicious data as much as certain computers do. For this reason, the participant 
says that “it’s nice to reach out to somebody else who doesn’t have the expertise in that 
field.” 
Rist and Chee (2004) state that it is necessary for law enforcement, in their 
tracking down of cyberterrorists or recovery of seized and frozen data, to consult with 
cyber forensics labs in order to maximize the outcomes of their investigations. Part of this 
necessity to network lies in the fact that, as Bhaskar (2006) notes, knowledge of cyber 
forensics within the law enforcement community is still limited. For Hesalroad (2001), 
cyberterrorism investigation is a fairly new area in law enforcement. Our participant 
shares similar views (“You only have three people in our department and they will not 
have expertise in all domains of cyber forensics”). The network of computer security 
experts and other important agents is enabled by cyber forensics experts involved in team 
projects that start at the level of local police departments. These projects include 
immediate incident responses, and high-rate security analysis tools (Rist & Chee, 2004). 
Because cyber forensics experts have the required knowledge, skills, and expertise to 
resist cyber attacks, most cyberterrorist attempts have not been successful (Dunnigan, 
2003). The next excerpt was taken from an account told by an ex-CIA agent whose last 
position was head of an overseas operation. As he states,  
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there are some dangers to networking with other agencies because you’re 
exposing a system. So, isolationism is good in the sense that nobody knows what 
you’re doing. But, on the other hand, you don’t know what anyone else is doing. 
So, networking is a necessity. 
To begin with, the participant expresses concerns about networking with others 
(“There are some dangers to networking with other agencies because you’re exposing a 
system”). In fact, Goldsborough (2006) notes that, because of the advent of the Internet 
and networks, collaboration among agencies is not always safe as it exposes computers to 
various security threats. To corroborate his statement about the dangers to networking, 
the participant mentions isolationism (“isolationism is good in the sense that nobody 
knows what you’re doing”). Isolationism is a type of foreign policy based on the 
principle that political leaders should not entangle alliances with other nations. Thomas 
Paine is generally credited with instilling the idea of avoiding the creation of alliances 
(Liell, 2003). Isolationism also implies that legal barriers should be imposed to avoid 
trade and cultural exchange with people in other nations (Nordlinger, 1995). In the 
context of this study, what this could mean is that American federal agencies should not 
exchange their software programs with other agencies across the world or share their 
anti-cyberterrorist tactics with them.  
However, as our participant states, when agencies do not network with others, 
they do not know what anyone else is doing (“on the other hand, you don’t know what 
anyone else is doing”). From this perspective, isolationism can also be criticized for 
being an “ostrich policy,” where people hide from danger by burying their heads in the 
sand (Kandell, 1995). In other words, agencies cannot conduct an ostrich policy because 
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the endurance of networks and, above all, their increased intercollaboration are vital for 
their success against cyberterrorism. For this reason, as our participant expresses it, 
“networking is a necessity.” The next excerpt, from an assistant professor at a 
Midwestern university, includes several attention-grabbing statements that strengthen this 
study: 
I think that no man is an island. I’m nothing without the network. I can sit in front 
of my computer all day long. What would I gain? I can sit in front of the TV and 
learn, but my interaction would be limited to what I’m being fed through the 
Internet. If I have no feedback mechanism, communication is useless. 
Communication is based on feedback. I can sit and talk all day to the wall. For 
example, we’re building a database currently, which comprises of over 500 high-
tech agencies dealing with computers. Me, sitting in my office, analyzing over 
500 agencies? Impossible. I couldn’t do it. I don’t have enough money and I don’t 
have the time.  
 Let us start with the first statement: “I think that no man is an island.” These 
words come from a quote by English poet John Donne, who wrote that “no man is an 
island; every man is a piece of the continent” (cited in Nutt, 1999). The idea is that 
people cannot be isolated from one another, but should be interconnected. As the 
participant continues, “I’m nothing without the network.” For this reason, networking is 
important, otherwise, as the participant indicates, there is nothing to gain (“What would I 
gain?”). It is also impossible to solve all network-related problems by oneself (“Me, 
sitting in my office, analyzing over 500 agencies? Impossible. I couldn’t do it. I don’t 
have enough money and I don’t have the time”).  
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Another important concept in this excerpt is that of feedback mechanism (“If I 
have no feedback mechanism, communication is useless”). It is an accepted principle that 
one of the crucial elements needed for effective communication is feedback (Mory, 
2003). Feedback is the foundation of all communication (Franklin, Powell, & Emami-
Naeini, 2005). The participant’s assumptions are consistent with the fact that positive 
outcomes in the fight against cyberterrorists can only be achieved, not by working alone, 
but by being involved in a social network that relies on a feedback mechanism. As a 
result, developing a feedback mechanism is a crucial function of the communication 
process. According to Wiener (1961), feedback mechanism is circular mechanism. It is a 
mechanism that is organized by receptors that either initiate or inhibit a reaction. 
Feedback mechanisms are necessary to maintain stable conditions and achieve a dynamic 
equilibrium in a network (McFarland, 1971). When there is a continuous feedback 
mechanism, there is an ongoing flow of communication between humans, and as the 
network seeks to increase its performance, feedback helps the network make essential 
adjustments. 
As one can see, our participant encourages feedback mechanisms. Because “no 
man is an island,” it is worth collaborating with others. Can one person analyze five 
hundred companies by him- or herself? The participant says he could not (“Impossible. I 
couldn’t do it. I don’t have enough money and I don’t have the time”). As Mory (2003) 
notes, collective problem-solving is required to assess progress, correct errors, and 
improve performance. By the same token, adjustments can be made on a continuous basis 
when he or she makes mistakes. An honest feedback mechanism can accurately tell what 
the problem is. Intergroup network feedback can be given in the form of 
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recommendations or through a process whereby questions and needs can be heard, 
analyzed, and ultimately acted upon (Franklin, Powell, & Emami-Naeini, 2005). 
Therefore, a continuous communication loop between cyber forensics experts and/or law 
enforcement agents is necessary. Not only does it help reinforce the existence of a 
community of practice among them, but it also helps weigh up their direction and areas 
for improvement.  
Champagne (2002) remarks that networks can break down if they lack the 
feedback mechanisms that would allow them to control their growth and achieve a 
dynamic equilibrium with their environment. When the participant says, “I can sit in front 
of my computer all day long,” it implies that no feedback would be possible because 
there are no humans involved. When the cyber forensics expert, locked to him- or herself 
through the junctions of screen, mouse, and keyboard, interacts alone, that individual 
becomes his or her own sender and receiver, providing feedback to him- or herself in an 
ongoing internal process. What would the expert gain? Nothing. As the participant 
expresses it, “What would I gain? I can sit in front of the TV and learn, but my 
interaction would be limited to what I’m being fed through the Internet.” Some of the 
excerpts mentioned in the previous sub-section also highlight, indirectly, the importance 
of feedback mechanism. Collaborating with federal agencies from other countries form a 
basis for future collaboration by sharing information and providing a feedback 
mechanism for information shared. 
Cyber Forensics Experts and Law Enforcement Agents: Networks of Trust 
This sub-section drives on the analysis of some of the participants’ answers to the 
following question: “Are those networks formal or informal? Explain.” Trust is at the 
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core of relationships between humans. The boundaries of trust are often personal, and, 
thus, decentralization is the nature of trust because each individual will have a unique 
trusting relationship with another individual (Fukuyama, 1996). The sense of what it 
means to trust someone can also be applied in the realm of counter-cyberterrorism. As 
expressed in six different interview excerpts, trust depends on “who is proven in the 
field,” “whom we should have faith in,” and “who knows whom” in the network. 
Defeating cyberterrorism is a priority that drives not only military action to subdue 
individual terrorists and deter their state supporters, but also multilateral cooperation in 
law enforcement and intelligence sharing. The first quote comes from an interview 
conducted with a forensics examiner in the Southwest:  
That’s more of a matter of whom you know because the FBI, Secret Service, or 
the NSA won’t work with you if they don’t trust you. You have to be proven in 
the field, you have to know each other. It’s a network of trust. You’re not out to 
just network with any forensics program. There are some in the state that we 
specifically won’t work with because we don’t trust them. But, generally, 
agencies like the FBI and local departments will collaborate with each other 
without any reservations. 
Based on the first statement, in order to be part of the network of federal agencies, 
one should have earned their trust beforehand (“the FBI, Secret Service, or the NSA 
won’t work with you if they don’t trust you”). The result is that “it’s a network of trust. 
You’re not out to just network with any forensics program.” In fact, as the participant 
continues, “there are some [forensics programs] in the state that we specifically won’t 
work with because we don’t trust them.” Therefore, just as it is the case for cyberterrorist 
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networks, this practice of using someone whom we know to gain more people in the 
network is called chaining (Madorsky, Elman, & Kennedy-Moore, 2003). From a social 
network theory standpoint, chaining involves following connections from one node to the 
next. So, in this context too, chaining is used in order to recruit the “right” people in the 
network (as the participant says, “That’s more of a matter of whom you know”). By 
introducing someone “whom you know,” it is implied that the third person who is trusted 
will be honest and have good intentions.  
The last statement, “generally, agencies like the FBI and local departments will 
collaborate with each other without any reservations,” is interesting. “Without any 
reservations” implies that some agencies trust one another and do not have doubts that 
prevent them from accepting to work together without conducting some sort of 
background check. McNamara (2003) notes that the collaboration between computer 
crime units of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the NSA and other 
state and local agencies shows that law enforcement agencies trust one another and 
recognize the significance of networking with each other. As McNamara (2003) 
continues, with the rapid proliferation of cyber attacks, the FBI has created trust networks 
like the National Infrastructure Protection Center in order to provide safety measures to 
governments and industries.  
In a similar fashion, the FBI has created networks of trust such as Computer 
Crime Squads across the nation, and the National Infrastructure Protection Center in 
Washington. They also have Computer Analysis and Response Teams to do computer 
forensics investigations on magnetic media. Those networks of trust make certain that 
cyberterrorist cases are investigated by the proper parties (Prosise & Mandia, 2001). 
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Additionally, analysts like Diamond et al. (2003) say foreign governments have increased 
cooperation with U.S. law enforcement authorities primarily because they trust these 
authorities. This is exactly what the participant means when he says that “you have to be 
proven in the field” for people to trust you. They recognize that their people and 
infrastructures have become targets of cyberterrorists. All these examples show that some 
agencies “will collaborate with each other without any reservations.” Note, however, that 
one of the points made in the analysis of RQ4 is that the FBI and the CIA, though being 
two immense U.S. federal agencies, still oppose each other on different mission goals and 
tend not to trust one another (Riebling, 2002). The following excerpt, selected from an 
interview conducted with an IT Security Analyst in the Southwest, also emphasizes the 
importance of trust in networks between law enforcement agents:  
Most of it is a matter of whom you know because you can’t get in a lot of these 
places without already knowing somebody there. Security officers go to 
presentations on cyber security; they go to agencies and conferences and give 
presentations. After your presentations, people hear your ideas and your theories. 
They might agree or disagree, but you get the idea of whoever talked. That’s 
where a lot of the trust is built and that’s how networks form. 
This excerpt resembles the previous one for two main reasons. First, in order to 
get entrée to those networks, one must already have a foot in the door by knowing 
someone who can let that person in (“Most of it is a matter of whom you know”). As the 
participant continues, “you can’t get in a lot of these places without already knowing 
somebody there.” Consequently, it can be deduced that trust is built from chaining. 
Chaining refers to a chain of connections that start with a trustworthy node. This node, 
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then, contacts another node that will make nodes connect with each other. The ultimate 
goal is to create a network of trust. The principle is the same as that of cyberterrorist 
networks. Plus, this notion of trust resembles that of the community of practice because 
both concepts involve relationships between inviduals.  
Another similarity between this excerpt and the previous one lies in the idea that, 
in order to be seen as trustworthy, one has to be established in the domain. While the 
previous participant said, “You have to be proven in the field,” this participant argues that 
security officers will go to agencies and conferences to “hear your ideas and your 
theories.” So, one has to be seen and considered credible. In doing so, the participant 
continues, “you get the idea of whoever talked. That’s where a lot of the trust is built and 
that’s how networks form.” From a social network perspective, this tactic of creating 
networks of trust follows a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) model. The P2P model is a model where 
users can see where trustworthy information arrives from and which peers are at the 
source of this information (Oram, 2001). When the personal views (what the participant 
calls “ideas” and “theories”) are collected and evaluated, they can be used as guidelines 
for recommending the information to other sources, hence creating personalized webs of 
trust (Moore & Hebeler, 2001). The next excerpt, selected from an account told by the 
chair of a cyber forensics program in a department of computer and information 
technology of a Midwestern university, where he is also an associate professor, describes 
networks of trust through the transitive trust model: 
We rely on technology for the networking. I only know 50% of the people I 
network with face-to-face. Our community is still a virtual community. It’s a 
transitive trust model. I know Jim face-to-face and if Jim told me that this person 
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is OK, then my trust in this person is to the extent that I have a good relationship 
with Jim. So, the trust becomes a transitive trust model. 
As this chair of a cyber forensics program expresses it, because the cyber 
forensics community “is still a virtual community,” trust is done through “a transitive 
trust model.” The transitive trust model is a model whereby trust is transitive, that is, 
transmitted through another party. As shown in Figure 6, based on the main tenets of 
social network theory, node A validates and trusts node B; node B validates and trusts 
node C; node A trusts but does not need to validate node C. For example, node A trusts 
node C, but does not engage in checking anything related to node C. As a result, for A to 
trust C, A needs to trust B that he or she [B] has validated C by the same standards that A 
validates B (Hermann, Issarny, & Shiu, 2005). 
 
node A             node B                node C 
 
Figure 6     The transitive trust model is a model where node A validates and trusts node  
 B; node B validates and trusts node C. Yet, node A trusts but does not need to  
 validate node C. 
 
So, a transitive trust model portrays trust as being a two-relationship model 
between three nodes. Indeed, node B has two relationships; one with node A and one 
with node C. From this, it is implied that node A automatically trusts node C due to the 
extent that node A trusts node B. As the participant explains it, “I know Jim face-to-face 
and if Jim told me that this person is OK, then my trust in this person is to the extent that 
I have a good relationship with Jim.” This pattern resembles the chain network coined by 
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Bavelas (1950) and Leavitt (1951), where information moves in a sequential manner 
through a series of nodes. The use of trust in both the chain network and the transitive 
trust model requires the existence of a common purpose (Jøsang, Gray, & Kinateder, 
2003), which needs somehow to be derived from or given by a specific transitive chain. 
This has either to be modeled from relevant evidence or, one way or another, the trusting 
nodes must be enabled to derive it from past experiences. The advantage of the transitive 
trust model is that it enables the connection of different nodes while reducing the 
credential validation (i.e., background check) effort (Demaio, 2001). The following 
interview excerpt, from an assistant professor at a Midwestern university, adds interesting 
points about the importance of trust in networks: 
In my world (the world of cell phone forensics), the network is composed of a 
small group. Worldwide, it’s less than 50. For example, the Secret Service only 
has one. The FBI has a couple. In computer forensics, it’s the same; you know the 
names of those who are trusted. You earn that trust of the node through their 
experiences, their abilities. You learn by watching others’ actions; this is how the 
network forms. 
The excerpt does not discuss a chain network or the transitive trust model. The 
point that the participant is making is that the world of cell phone forensics, a branch of 
study that is part of cyber forensics overall, is so small that “you learn by watching 
others’ actions; this is how the network forms.” Trust, here, comes from the benefit of 
having increased frequency of communication and more intimate connections between 
cell phone forensics experts (i.e., “the network is composed of a small group;” 
“worldwide, it’s less than 50”). In fact, the network is so small that “the Secret Service 
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only has one. The FBI has a couple.” So, how can trust be created in these 
circumstances? According to the participant, “you earn that trust of the node through their 
experiences, their abilities.” In developing strong ties this way, as Larson (1992) puts it, 
nodes in the network learn about one another, become more dependent on each other, and 
develop relational trust (“you know the names of those who are trusted”). The next 
excerpt, selected from a former CIA agent, stresses the importance of having formal 
networks: 
I like formal networks better because you know whom you’re dealing with, 
somebody you trust. I’d rather deal with the German Minister of Defense than 
some shady German informant. I have a lot more faith in the official guys. 
They’re not going to try to screw you because they know you’re gonna come back 
and say, “What did you do that for?” Going through an informal network, say, 
working with a little hacker, can save you a problem, but give you a couple of 
more besides. 
 Based on this former CIA agent’s statements, in a formal social network, an actor 
will be less tempted to cheat another because “you know whom you’re dealing with.” In 
other words, in a formal network, nodes will know of one another’s actions. In fact, 
Thornburgh et al (2005) observe that one of the formal rules in social networks is that law 
enforcement agents are supposed to check another’s behavior. For this reason, the 
participant believes, “I’d rather deal with the German Minister of Defense than some 
shady German informant.” It would be very difficult to do a background check on a 
shady German informant. Mutual observable behavior between each actor in the network 
provides more security to the network itself (Roson, 2001). That monitored behavior in 
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question must be consistent with the exchanged information between those actors. Hence, 
the participant has “more faith in the official guys.” Because of such mutual monitoring 
of behavior, our participant continues, “they’re not going to try to screw you because they 
know you’re gonna come back and say, ‘What did you do that for?’”  
Such behavior control is exerted through repeated interaction, leading to dyadic 
expectations of reciprocity between each actor (both of whom are strongly connected). 
Rutten (2004) remarks that being part of a formal network is judicious because the actors 
can share information in a way that establishes conjoint trust regarding the protection of 
the actors themselves (i.e. through a secure link). Our participant opposes informal 
networks (“Going through an informal network, say, working with a little hacker, can 
save you a problem, but give you a couple of more besides”). From this viewpoint, a 
formal network provides more security [to the network] because dyadic reciprocity 
reinforces mutual expectations which, in turn, yield to trust. Trust and security are almost 
synonyms here. The last excerpt, selected from an FBI agent, contrasts with the previous 
one in that this excerpt underscores networks of trust that are informal: 
The network is fairly informal and it’s based on mutual trust. It’s not like 
somebody in the administration and the FBI says, “You will work with the 
University.” Over a period of time, law enforcement agents and experts in cyber 
forensics have had so much interaction that there has been a level of trust. We do 
not have informants; we depend only on assets that we can control. The danger is 
when you don’t know the other party well. That’s why mutual trust is very 
important. For this reason, you need to know the background and the level of 
integrity. 
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A network of counter-cyberterrorism officials, involving FBI agents and cyber 
forensics experts, “is fairly informal and it’s based on mutual trust.” The network is 
created through repeated interaction over a period of time (“law enforcement agents and 
experts in cyber forensics have had so much interaction that there has been a level of 
trust”). According to the participant, trust depends on nodes that can be monitored (“we 
do not have informants; we depend only on assets that we can control”). Because it is 
difficult to know who the node is, mutual trust is very necessary (“when you don’t know 
the other party well. That’s why mutual trust is very important.”). This is a throwback to 
Coleman (1988) when he contends that mutual trust through strong interconnections 
guides or controls actions in a network and fosters cooperative behavior. This type of 
trust model also leads to more commitment. Therefore, norms of cooperation are quickly 
established because network actors that have faith in the idea that strong ties lead to 
better collective monitoring and sanctioning create an effective incentive for mutual trust 
(Coleman, 1988). This, in turn, facilitates the spreading of norms across the network. 
Consequently, a higher number of actors established in highly interconnected, dense 
networks develop shared behavioral expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; 
Rowley, 1997). 
 The difference between this view and the transitive trust model lies in the fact that 
the latter does not involve verifying the background or level of integrity of a node. Put 
another way, node A does not engage in authentification and verification of node C 
because node A trusts node B. This is how the transitive trust model works. However, our 
participant here suggests that mutual trust be supported by knowing the background and 
level of integrity of anybody in the network. As he says, “you need to know the 
279
background and the level of integrity.” The subsequent part of this analysis describes the 
downsides to networking with others. 
Downsides to Networking 
This section is an analysis of the data based on the participants’ answers to the 
following question: “Describe the downsides to networking with other agencies.” 
Although federal agencies have developed networks among each other for the past couple 
of years, it appears that not all networks can be trustworthy or dependable for keeping 
information secret. Three interview excerpts were selected in this sub-section to 
demonstrate that there are downsides to networking. The first of these excerpts, from an 
interview conducted with a visiting faculty at a Midwestern university, who is also a 
computer crime specialist with the National White Collar Crime Center, stresses that 
there is leaking of important data to the press: 
People working in law enforcement want to put cyberterrorists in jail; people 
working in academia also want to put them in jail. That is one of the reasons why 
we create all these social networks against cyber attackers. Yet, you also have a 
certain level of distrust between some agencies and other agencies, based on past 
experience. If I share this information with agency X, Y, or Z, they leak it to the 
press while my investigation is going on. As soon as I leak it to another agency, I 
lose control of that information. I’ve done all this work for the past six months, 
and agency A, B, or C is going to take it away from me and get all the credit for 
it. 
The first few statements of this excerpt are worth mentioning because they 
explain why social networks are created against cyber attackers. The reason those social 
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networks exist lies in the fact that “people working in law enforcement want to put 
cyberterrorists in jail,” in the same way that “people working in academia also want to 
put them in jail.” Yet, the participant continues, “you also have a certain level of distrust 
between some agencies and other agencies.” The source of distrust can be blamed on one 
single node, which takes a connection path other than the one officially blessed by the 
network. One leak to the press and secret information is made public. As the participant 
describes it, “if I share this information with agency X, Y, or Z, they leak it to the press 
while my investigation is going on.” The result is a loss of information on the part of the 
National White Collar Crime Center (“As soon as I leak it to another agency, I lose 
control of that information”). The distrust with nodes in the network is even amplified as 
the node that gets all the credit for doing all the counter-cyberterrorist network is another 
agency (“I’ve done all this work for the past six months, and agency A, B, or C is going 
to take it away from me and get all the credit for it”). The next excerpt, selected from a 
participant who does strategic relations and communications with different cyber crime 
agencies in a Midwestern state, also emphasizes the downside to networking with other 
agencies: 
I trust the people that I know in the network but not their friends, because I don’t 
know how far that chain goes. I don’t know how many nodes belong to the 
network. I can go to a guy who is brilliant in the area of cyber forensics (and I 
trust him) and ask him, “What do you think of this?” But there are still some 
dangers of networking with others even with those whom we trust. There can 
always be a bad actor. That is human nature. Every time you network with others, 
you expose yourself to risks and to somebody else with power over you.  
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The first important point of this excerpt is that no one knows how many nodes 
belong to a network (“I don’t know how many nodes belong to the network”). As a result, 
our participant thinks one cannot know “how far that chain goes.” Thornburgh et al. 
(2005) argue that one of the formal rules in social networks is that law enforcement 
agents are supposed to do a background check on every node in the network. Yet, their 
social networks consist of nodes across the nation and across the globe. As a result, it is 
not always possible to know every node. Besides, agents sometimes network with 
informants who are not official members of networks of agents and cyber forensics 
experts. As the participant explains it, “I can go to a guy who is brilliant in the area of 
cyber forensics (and I trust him) and ask him, ‘What do you think of this?’” Because the 
FBI does not have enough top-notch computer experts to recruit for cyber forensics, they 
will tend to rely on freelance cyber experts (Thornburgh et al., 2005). The downside to 
this type of networking is that “there can always be a bad actor.” The participant goes 
further when she says that every time we network with others, we expose ourselves to 
risks and to others with power over us. The last excerpt of this sub-section, from an 
assistant professor at a Midwestern university, points to the problem of ethical hacking as 
part of the practice of social networks: 
One of the phenomena in our networks is that technical people have vigilantism; 
they really want to try to clean this up. In that fervor to do good, the temptation to 
do bad is huge. I think that ethical hacking is a huge challenge nowadays. Ethical 
hackers are hired to penetrate your sites, your network, your system to expose 
your vulnerabilities. They violate laws and try to cut corners in order to reach 
outcomes. It is never appropriate to break a law while investigating a problem. In 
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our state, we have computer-trespassing and computer-tampering laws, which we 
often quote to our technical communities. If you change without permission, 
that’s tampering. 
The participant condemns the practice of ethical hacking as it represents a 
challenge nowadays. Britt (2005) explains that ethical hacking is a type of authorized 
network intrusion where the intruder employs the same tools and techniques as a 
cyberterrorist would. Ethical hackers are paid to hack into your network in order to check 
if everything is alright. Yet, as opposed to cyberterrorists, ethical hackers would neither 
damage the target systems nor steal information (Fadia, 2005). As the participant 
expresses it, “they are hired to penetrate your sites, your network, your system to expose 
your vulnerabilities.” The problem, says the same participant, is that it is a law-breaking 
practice (“They violate laws and try to cut corners in order to reach outcomes. It is never 
appropriate to break a law while investigating a problem”). Referring to the comments 
made about the previous excerpt, we could interpret that an ethical hacker represents a 
potential node that cannot be trusted in the network. First and foremost, they are not 
completely trustworthy. The reason, says Palmer (2001), is that ethical hackers may 
discover information about an organization that should have been kept secret. In many 
cases, this information, if publicized, could enable real cyberterrorists to break into the 
systems, possibly leading to significant damage. 
Another problem related to ethical hacking is that, during a paid intrusion, the 
ethical hacker usually holds the keys to the organization, and therefore can hurt the 
system with just a few keystrokes (Palmer, 2001). It is very difficult to hold absolute trust 
in such a node in the network because they could exercise total control over any 
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information about a target. That control, of course, could easily be misused. Although 
there is a contract between the client and the ethical hacker (Simpson, 2005), it has been 
known that wicked humans violate pacts and treaties for their own benefits. In fact, 
Swartz (2003) notes that ethical hackers often sneak in through Internet access points. All 
in all, although this study reveals that there are many benefits to networking with other 
agencies or groups in their fight against cyberterrorism, there are also downsides to 
networking with particular nodes. The following sub-section focuses on informal 
networks, calling attention to the strength of weak ties.  
Informal Networks: The Strength of Weak Ties  
This sub-section derives from the data obtained from the participants who 
answered the following question: “Are those networks formal or informal? Explain.” It 
discusses Granovetter’s (1973) theory of the strength of weak ties in informal networks 
of law enforcement agencies. The basic tenet of Granovetter’s theory is that a weak tie 
represents a bridge (Granovetter, 1973) between nodes in a social network. Weak ties 
lead to more flexibility. Two excerpts were selected from the participants’ interviews to 
illustrate that having weak ties presents benefits. The main benefit is the extreme facility 
of information flow, that is, the ample diffusion of information among actors in the 
network. The first of these excerpts was taken from an account told by a professor of 
communication at a Midwestern university who has worked with the FBI: 
You like to ask about social networks a lot. You know, in my experience, many of 
the ties we have developed with computer crime analysts working for the FBI 
have become strong. And that’s when the network becomes formal because, over 
time, we end up having a set of definite rules and habits for conducting our 
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investigations. But we also have weak ties with other computer crime analysts 
too. That way, it’s more informal, you’re freer to exchange information, and 
things get more flexible, you can cut corners, you get more opportunities.  
 Based on these statements, it is obvious that formal networks with strong ties 
make collaboration between law enforcement officials possible (“many of the ties we 
have developed with computer crime analysts working for the FBI have become strong”). 
The advantage of a formal network is that rules and practices are fixed, settled, and clear-
cut (“that’s when the network becomes formal because, over time, we end up having a set 
of definite rules and habits for conducting our investigations”). Yet, many scholars argue 
that using networks with strong ties can trap the highly connected nodes into one 
particular area of knowledge and lock them out of external opportunities (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Young-Ybarra & 
Wiersema, 1999). Nodes connected through strong formal ties may be reluctant to 
pursuing better opportunities. 
 However, our participant explains that he and his team also use weak ties because, 
“that way, it’s more informal.” As he continues, “we also have weak ties with other 
computer crime analysts too.” Granovetter (1973) contends that informal networks 
contribute to greater mobility and autonomy. This is where the importance of his theory 
of the strength of weak ties comes into play. Having weak ties is advantageous. The main 
advantage is the flexibility of information flow between the nodes (“you’re freer to 
exchange information, and things get more flexible”). By having an informal network 
with weak ties, law enforcement agents do not become isolated from receiving new 
information from outside circles. Rather, they can act as bridges between different 
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agencies. They see themselves in situations where they receive information that they can 
share with any actor they want (Granovetter, 1982; Haythornthwaite, 2000). The second 
excerpt was taken from an interview conducted with a computer crime analyst working 
for a local police department: 
Not all our networks are formal. Sometimes, we work with informants. When we 
go for informants, at that point, they’re working with us and that’s how we get the 
bigger fish. Most of the time, if they’re working with us, they have hacked, they 
have a track record. So, we kind of direct them in a way that we need to go in the 
investigation. So, if they are willing to work with us, they can play the part. 
 The first six words are clear: “Not all our networks are formal.” “Sometimes,” the 
police officer continues, “we work with informants.” By definition, an informant is a 
person who supplies information to law enforcement agencies (Eichenwald, 2001). 
Having ties with informants can be beneficial for law enforcement agents in that they can 
flexibly communicate and cooperate with them, as they might possess specialized 
knowledge and capabilities. What it also comes down to saying is that informal networks 
are valuable when law enforcement agents use them as conduits to unfamiliar nodes that 
own novel and potentially unique information. As the participant says, “they’re working 
with us and that’s how we get the bigger fish.” What weak ties do is locate or embed 
nodes [informants] in distant regions of the social network. Likewise, weak ties can make 
law enforcement investigations improve as agents are freer to use informants the way 
they want. As the participant explains it, “we kind of direct them in a way that we need to 
go in the investigation.” 
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Adler and Kwon (2002), Greif (1997), and Uzzi (1996) argue that formal 
networks are not good for using informants. Plus, constant interaction with the same 
actors in the network limits the network’s exposure to new ideas and information. It also 
weakens the diversity of knowledge available in the social network, thus diminishing its 
value (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, 1991; Nakamura, Shaver, & Yeung, 
1996). The next sub-section also analyzes informal networks, but, this time, it stresses the 
importance of structural holes.  
Informal Networks: Structural Holes 
This sub-section builds directly on the previous section. In the previous section, 
Granovetter’s theory of the strength of weak ties highlighted weak ties through the 
description of their meaningful roles for the diffusion of information within social 
networks of law enforcement agents. As part of the analysis of RQ2, this sub-section 
shows that Granovetter’s theory also provides the groundwork from which important 
emerging perspectives on informal networks can be made. One of these perspectives is 
Burt’s (1992) structural holes theory. Burt’s ideas stem directly from Granovetter’s 
theory in that, for Burt, individuals with whom a person has weak ties are less likely to be 
connected to one another. In other words, the person is embedded in a structural hole. 
The first excerpt, selected from an account told by the chair of a cyber forensics program 
in a department of computer and information technology of a Midwestern university, 
where he is also an associate professor, mentions those structural holes: 
The majority of what gets done on a daily basis probably gets done on the 
informal level. At the formal level, you have a compressed time frame for law 
enforcement investigations. What ends up happening is that investigators will use 
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informal networks because they are faster and allows people to be in structural 
holes.  
 Note the criticism of formal networks again (“At the formal level, you have a 
compressed time frame for law enforcement investigations”). By having an informal 
network, by having a grasp on who knows whom and who knows what, law enforcement 
agents can easily manage their networks because it is assumed that they provide or feed 
relationships that they see fit. Indeed, for the participant, informal networks “are faster.” 
What ends up happening is that the investigators find themselves to be in “structural 
holes.” The participant does not explain it further. For Burt (1993), when actors in a 
network are kept discrete, a succession of holes in the network starts to develop, to such a 
point that an important actor can become the bridge between different actors. This is what 
is called “structural holes” (Burt, 1993). Burt (1992) argues that being embedded in a 
structural hole allows actors to be more efficient in obtaining information. This is where 
Burt meticulously revisits Granovetter’s ideas. For Burt, the benefits of the strength of 
weak ties are increased for a gatekeeper, or what Granovetter (1973) refers to as a “local 
bridge,” connected to different groups that have no other bridging connection.  
More importantly, the structural hole is a knot in the social network that gives 
access to missing knowledge. Therefore, an individual who is the only one linking a 
group to another is at a significant advantage. Not only does the individual gain from 
having access to a different set of information that is unavailable in a dense network of 
strong ties, but, also, he or she has the power to control what aspects of this information 
can be shared with the different groups to which they belong (Burt, 1992). This is very 
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important for communication among network actors because the less dense and formal 
the networks are, the more structural holes emerge and develop in those networks. 
By the same token, what those actors do is taking advantage of le vide (literally, 
emptiness; conceptually, structural holes) (Stewart, 1996), considered as necessary in 
network-based relationships. The second excerpt takes a different angle on the matter: 
With respect to Internet regulation, we have a private safety network, maintained 
by Verizon, and a public safety network, which is actually owned and maintained 
by us. The two never really directly mesh. They’re not directly interconnected. 
We use a key player, like a router, for the communication between the two. 
From this excerpt, the key player (“like a router”) finds him- or herself in a 
structural hole because the private safety network and the public safety network “never 
really directly mesh.” As a result, the key player is a link “for the communication 
between the two.” So, the key player is in a structural hole in the social network because 
it acts as a bridge between the “private safety network, maintained by Verizon, and a 
public safety network.” It empowers that network by enabling important actors to get 
indirectly interconnected. Here, the two networks are forms of sub-networks being part of 
a gigantic network for Internet regulation against cyber attacks. Managing the flow of 
information to a great extent is vital for communication between network actors because 
these actors need to acquire as much information as possible in order to maximize profits 
and benefits of all kinds. For this reason, by acting as a local bridge between these actors, 
the key player strengthens his or her abilities to gain and control information. The next 
sub-section describes the hubs in their networks. Analyzing their hubs is important 
because hubs are nodes in a social network that have many connections with other nodes. 
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Hubs in Their Networks 
This is the last sub-section in the analysis of RQ2. The data selected here are 
answers to the two following questions: “Describe the role of nodes and hubs [minor and 
important actors] in your networks” and “Describe the degree of centrality in your 
networks.” An analysis of the role of hubs in social networks of law enforcement 
agencies is provided, based on social network theory. Particularly examined are hubs as 
humans with high degrees of centrality. As a reminder, hubs are nodes in a social 
network that are so important that they connect a great number of other nodes. The 
outcome of this analysis is that any type of network is much stronger when its hubs are 
active. The first excerpt was selected from the captain of a Midwestern County Sheriff’s 
Department. This captain also oversees IT operations for that Sheriff’s Department, as 
well as the 911 systems of the county and its public safety network: 
We have key players at different agencies that we can call who can provide a 
certain level of assistance. They can remotely connect. So, we do share files; they 
can give us access; we can give them access, or we can each deny mutual access 
to each other. 
A vast majority of nodes are connected to a social network by way of just one 
link: fewer have two, even fewer have three, and so down the line (Barabasi, 2002). 
However, some nodes become hubs because they are very important through their higher 
visibility or the amount of help they can provide (Johnson, 2000; Keller, 2005). Here, in 
this excerpt, the hubs are key players. As the captain describes it, “we have key players at 
different agencies that we can call who can provide a certain level of assistance.” The 
role of hubs considerably influences how the network operates. The excerpt above 
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portrays the hub as a human, more precisely as a person who has an effect on the other 
actors in the network through his or her assistance and location (“They can remotely 
connect”). The next excerpt, from the same participant, highlights the role of specialists 
who are important actors in the network: 
There are various investigators with each agency who have a skills set that allows 
them to research cyber threats, whether they are terrorist-related or larceny-related 
or some sort of theft-related. Aside from that, there are specialists that I know are 
very good in cyber forensics technology, in terms of recovering data, and also 
investigating network issues. 
These hubs act as key actors, that is, people with the highest skills. As the captain 
explains it, “there are various investigators with each agency who have a skills set that 
allows them to research cyber threats.” As he continues, “there are specialists that I know 
are very good in cyber forensics technology, in terms of recovering data, and also 
investigating network issues.” By pointing to their being “very good in cyber forensics 
technology,” they must be special nodes in the network and, hence, hubs. Removing 
these hubs might pose a problem. This shows the importance of being a hub. This is 
crucial for law enforcement agents because hubs can provide the network the ability to 
understand and fight cyberterrorism in the most effective way. This does not mean that 
relationships through these particular hubs are the shortest and the most efficient, but this 
means that those hubs have the skills and knowledge necessary to counter cyber attacks. 
They can provide special assistance when it comes to “recovering data, and also 
investigating network issues.” The subsequent excerpt emphasizes the role of hubs as 
humans with high degrees of centrality in social networks: 
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I do strategic relations and communications. Basically, I am the interface between 
this agency and other folks across campus here in terms of putting together teams 
or proposals or to see how they can work together and do research with other 
colleges, break through still pipes. I am also the interface between state 
government and some federal agencies, as well as between local agencies and 
corporations. So, I am the front facing people. 
Based on the statements made in this excerpt, the participant seems to be a hub 
where she acts as “the interface” between different agencies. As she describes it, she is 
“the interface between state government and some federal agencies, as well as between 
local agencies and corporations.” And she does “strategic relations and communications.” 
In this case, she is a hub with a high degree of centrality. She has many connections with 
different actors in the network. Given this, she is the giver/receiver of information. She 
also impacts the flow of information and activity (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). This 
degree of centrality calls to mind that the network has a number of direct connections to a 
human who acts as a router node (Lott & Taylor, 2005). Wigand (1997) argues that 
central individuals in a network enable quick communication with the nodes connected to 
them. This is a beneficial method for improving the network because what makes 
communication among nodes easier in the network is the presence of a human hub. 
In line with these contentions, it can also be inferred that the participant acts as a 
go-between, that is, a mediator or a link between multiple actors (Pearson & Hobbs, 
2004). A hub has a similar meaning: it is a place of convergence that links multiple actors 
(Greenie, 2005). For this person who does strategic relations and communications, a go-
between is someone who is at the interface between multiple agencies. Barabasi (2002) 
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maintains that the use of a go-between implies that the nodes in the network are not 
necessarily connected to one another. As she expresses it, she breaks “through still 
pipes.” Any node, however, can be connected to the go-between. By adopting this 
method, each node can obtain superior information due to the go-between’s privileged 
position through his or her high degree of centrality. Let us have a look at the last 
excerpt, selected from an account told by a forensics examiner: 
We work with law enforcement directly. We have direct physical network contact 
with them; we work with the law enforcement on a personal level. In a lot of 
ways, it’s better when I work with actual investigators in the agency. Now, my 
directors, they work with chiefs of police at different states and different areas. 
Once they’ve got their relationships set up, and agree on whatever services, then 
they bring their investigators and I actually talk to the investigators. 
 What this excerpt is telling us is that, in order for the forensics examiner to work 
and talk with the investigators from the law enforcement agency, he has to obtain the 
agreement from his directors (“my directors”) that the investigators be allowed to work 
with him (once they “agree on whatever services”). This shows that collaboration 
between key actors in the network has to go through go-betweens, that is, the directors. 
The go-betweens are the directors because they are the middlepersons. A comparison can 
be made with the previous excerpt where the middleperson occupies a structural position 
where she is the interface between different agencies. Here, the middleperson [director] 
links unconnected actors (Fernandez & Gould, 1994). In this context, the director stands 
between the investigators and the forensics examiners. Again, Granovetter (1973) would 
call it a “local bridge.” As a local bridge, he or she performs the role of a gatekeeper, 
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whether it is between nodes that are already parts of a cyberterrorist network or nodes 
that are not yet part of the network, but that might be potential members. Fernandez and 
Gould (1994) maintain that brokerage involves the very notion that the broker finds 
himself or herself in a position where he or she is tied to nodes that are not necessarily 
connected in the network. 
Now that we have an in-depth understanding of what social networks of both 
cyberterrorists and cyber forensics experts (and law enforcement officials) are, let us 
move on to the next step of this study: the analysis of RQ3. This analysis looks at how 
networks function against and vis-à-vis other networks, that is, how the two sides conflict 
and interact with each other, based to a little extent on social network theory and to a 




Analysis of Research Question 3 
Except for the first two interview questions (that is, “What is cyberterrorism?” 
and “What are the motivations to engage in cyberterrorism?”), all the interview questions 
in RQ1 and RQ2 pertain to social network theory. The main goal was to understand how 
both cyberterrorists and cyber security experts (and law enforcement officials) create 
networks. The questions were both broad and technical (about nodes, hubs, degrees of 
centrality, etc.). The analysis of RQ3 is not an analysis of networks per se. Rather, this 
section looks at how networks of cyber security experts (and law enforcement officials) 
operate against and vis-à-vis networks of cyberterrorists, that is, how the two sides 
conflict and interact with each other, based slightly on social network theory and mostly 
on game theory. The reason game theory is very much emphasized in this section lies in 
the fact that game theory is well applied in direct interactional and conflicting situations 
that involve two players (Fent, Feichtinger, & Tragler, 2002), as it is the case in this 
study.  
In order to analyze RQ3 (How can the conflict and interaction between 
cyberterrorists and computer security experts [and law enforcement officials] be 
explained through the use of social network theory and game theory?), both theories are 
used. The arrangement of this interpretation is structured in three different parts. Each is 
independent from one another. The first part is exclusively a social network theory 
approach; the second part is exclusively a game theory approach; and the third part is an 
intersection of the two approaches. The following questions were asked in each 
interview: (1) Describe a direct interaction or conflict between cyberterrorist networks 
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and cyber forensics experts’ (and law enforcement agents’) networks?; (2) How can a 
network knock down another network? (3) What game or strategy do cyberterrorists use?; 
(4) What game or strategy do cyber security experts and law enforcement officials use?; 
(5) Could you give me an example of a collaborative game strategy between the two 
sides?; (6) Could you give me an example of a non-collaborative game strategy between 
the two sides?; and (7) Do cyberterrorists make the rules of the game or do they go 
along? These questions do not include probing questions that were asked during each 
interview because, for each participant, the interviews progressed differently. Let us 
begin by analyzing the participants’ perspectives, from a social network theory approach, 
of the conflict and interaction between cyberterrorists and computer security experts (and 
law enforcement officials).  
Part I: A Social Network Theory Approach 
 Although the heading of this sub-section is “Part I: A Social Network Theory 
Approach,” it does not analyze social networks per se. This was the purpose of the 
analysis of the two previous research questions (RQ1 and RQ2). Instead, this sub-section 
specifically analyzes the conflict and interaction between cyberterrorists and computer 
security experts (and law enforcement officials). The data were driven by the two 
following questions: “Describe a direct interaction or conflict between cyberterrorist 
networks and cyber forensics experts’ (and law enforcement agents’) networks?” and 
“How can a network knock down another network?” The data are very consistent with 
the scholarly literature on the matter. The first excerpt was selected from an interview 
conducted with a local police officer in the Midwest: 
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Sometimes our agents will go online and act as scouts. What they’ll do is interact 
with cyberterrorists for a while. They’re trying to get more information on them. 
They know they’re dealing with a whole network of those guys because they 
recognize them by their nicknames. But the agents don’t know for sure if the 
people behind those nicknames are the real cyberterrorists. They have to abide by 
the law. So, they won’t investigate their computers unless they have a warrant. 
And the cyberterrorists will do the same; they’ll interact with our agents to get 
more information on our network infrastructure, but that doesn’t mean they will 
cooperate with them. 
 From a social network theory viewpoint, this excerpt, in essence, describes the 
interaction of a network with another network. Overall, it appears that law enforcement 
agents do not always engage in battle with cyberterrorists. They will try to interact with 
them in order to obtain more information about their networks (and vice versa). For this 
reason, our participant says that the “agents will go online and act as scouts,” in the same 
way that cyberterrorists will interact with them (“they’ll interact with our agents”). 
Nevertheless, the last statement clearly distinguishes interaction from cooperation (“that 
doesn’t mean they will cooperate with them”). The word “interact” in this context can be 
interpreted as “interface” or “having some type of communication” online. As far as the 
nature of interaction, unfortunately, it is not made clear in this excerpt. Diani and 
McAdam (2003) argue that interface between networks can increase knowledge about 
each other’s network. Interface here does not mean collaboration in itself. Rather, the 
more interactive the network, the more open the network, and the more open the network, 
the more chances to obtain new information and ideas about the enemy than closed 
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networks that have no interaction whatsoever. In other words, nodes that only interact 
within their network already share the same knowledge; the network, in this case, is not 
bound to make progress (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). 
 For this reason, law enforcement agents interact with their enemies (and vice 
versa) in order to know them better. A whole theme entitled “Know Thy Enemy” is 
analyzed in the next chapter (the analysis of the themes for RQ4). However, the danger of 
interacting with the enemy is exposing one’s network to the enemy. In fact, Bannister 
(2005) notes that, because of the advent of the Internet, interaction with another network 
of actors can be risky because it exposes the nature of the network such as the size of the 
network, the frequency of online use of the different actors, the depth of communication 
between the actors in the network, their specific type of language (including the number 
of keystrokes per minute, the accent, and the spelling mistakes), and other various 
components. The next excerpt, from an account told by a law enforcement officer in the 
Southwest, focuses more on how networks of cyberterrorists clash with networks of law 
enforcement agents: 
Those networks [of cyberterrorists], they always go after our soft spots, you 
know, like a weak link in our chain. If that soft spot is inside a critical 
infrastructure like ours, the other networks and systems that are connected to it 
could be severely compromised. What’s gonna happen is a ripple effect. Law 
enforcement would have trouble taking actions, their communications systems 
would go down, basically we could be vulnerable. So, what do we do to prevent 
that? We try to dirupt their networks first. 
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Here, there is no interaction involved. Instead, it is conflict between two 
networks. Our participant makes it clear that the goal of each network is to disrupt the 
network: “Those networks [of cyberterrorists], they always go after our soft spots, you 
know, like a weak link in our chain” and “what do we do to prevent that? We try to dirupt 
their networks first.” The motivations seem to be different on each side. On the one hand, 
the cyberterrorists seem to be trying to cripple the networks of law enforcement for the 
sake of crippling them. On the other hand, law enforcement agents disrupt cyberterrorists 
networks in order to prevent them from waging cyber attacks. From this excerpt, it 
follows that the fight between the two opposing networks seems to be offensive on the 
cyberterrorist side and preemptive on the law enforcement side.  
What this excerpt is also telling us is that cyberterrorists are trying to find the 
hubs of their enemies’ networks (“If that soft spot is inside a critical infrastructure like 
ours, the other networks and systems that are connected to it could be severely 
compromised”). A critical infrastructure like “theirs” (what the participant refers to as 
“ours”) is certainly a hub because nodes are attached to it (“the other networks and 
systems that are connected to it”). The consequence, the participant continues, would be a 
“ripple effect.” Based on the main tenets of social network theory, a ripple effect is a 
gradually spreading effect of one node on the other nodes (Johnson & Levin, 2002). If 
that node is an important node, and if it gets damaged, the other nodes connected to it 
will be damaged as well. If it were to happen to a critical infrastructure such as a law 
enforcement agency, the results would be devastating. As our participant explains it, “law 
enforcement would have trouble taking actions, their communications systems would go 
down, basically we could be vulnerable.” A “ripple effect” is the same as a “cascading 
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failure,” a detailed analysis of which is given in the next chapter on the themes (RQ4). 
The theme under which “cascading failures” fall is called “Postmodern State of Chaos.” 
The next excerpt, from a chief information security officer at a Midwestern university, 
also emphasizes the networks that cyberterrorists are trying to target: 
If the cyberterrorists are trying to attack a community, and we have a documented 
case of it, or if they were trying to take down the city of Los Angeles, for 
instance, they probably are going to do it in little bits and pieces. They’re gonna 
be testing the police department’s network, they’re gonna test the state 
government’s network. 
 This excerpt illustrates networks against networks again. The network of 
cyberterrorists is attacking the law enforcement network “in little bits and pieces.” This 
time, it is not a large hub that is targeted at once, but smaller hubs after smaller hubs (“the 
police department’s network” and “the state government’s network”). They would follow 
this method, for instance, “if they were trying to take down the city of Los Angeles.” 
These views expressed by the chief information security officer are slightly different than 
other descriptions of what cyberterrorists are trying to achieve. Other participants said 
that it takes large hubs down to cripple a network. Faloutsos, Faloutsos, and Faloutsos 
(1999) and Matlis (2002) corroborate this too. Nevertheless, in the case presented by the 
participant above, the impact would still be devastating because a network like the police 
department’s network is a hub in itself, and people’s lives depend on it. Imagine the fear 
of having no police available. Now that we have seen examples of what a network of 
cyberterrorists could do to a network of law enforcement agents, let us analyze what the 
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latter could do to their opponents. The next excerpt was taken from an account told by a 
professor of social networks at a Midwestern university: 
You need to cripple the network of cyberterrorists before they attack. In order to 
disable their network, what you need to do is to disable its go-betweens, like in 
any other network, these cyberterrorists that mediate contact between a number of 
localized networks; they contact multiple groups because it makes things easier 
for the network.  
 Just as cyberterrorists try to target the hubs of their enemies’ networks, so do law 
enforcement agents; they attempt to cripple the big actors in cyberterrorists’ networks. 
Who are these big actors? They are the go-betweens (“to disable its go-betweens”). What 
do these go-betweens do? They “mediate contact between a number of localized 
networks; they contact multiple groups because it makes things easier for the network.” 
After all, as Pearson and Hobbs (2004) put it, a go-between is a mediator who acts as a 
link between multiple actors (“they contact multiple groups because it makes things 
easier for the network”). So, law enforcement would strike the node that links 
unconnected actors (Fernandez & Gould, 1994), that is, the middleperson or, as 
Granovetter (1973) would call it, a “local bridge.” As a reminder, a local bridge is a 
gatekeeper. Go-betweens, then, are very crucial to the interconnectedness of the 
cyberterrorist network. Getting rid of these go-betweens would be as destructive to their 
network as destroying the gas reserve of the German infantry in WWII. In line with these 
contentions, as the point was made in a previous excerpt, this participant stresses that the 
fight between the two opposing networks seems to be offensive on the cyberterrorist side 
and preemptive on the law enforcement side (“You need to cripple the network of 
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cyberterrorists before they attack”). The following excerpt, taken from an interview 
conducted with an IT Security Analyst II, underscores that the IRC server is a hub for 
cyberterrorists that law enforcement is trying to knock down: 
From a law enforcement perspective, you generally want to go for an IRC server. 
The first thing to do is to find out where that server is. You knock out the hubs. 
You have to knock out the heads off and hope that everything falls by the 
wayside. It’s time-consuming to go after the smaller ones. Go after the servers 
that are the commanding control channels. 
So, according to our participant, the hub that law enforcement agents try to target 
is a communication channel like an IRC server. He even gives us the steps to follow 
(“The first thing to do is to find out where that server is. You knock out the hubs”). If we 
“knock out the heads off,” he continues, everything will fall “by the wayside.” The 
reason to do this is that “it’s time-consuming to go after the smaller ones.” Here, the 
statements reinforce the idea that small nodes are only drops in the ocean. The “heads” in 
this excerpt are not go-betweens, but important channels like IRC servers. A 
cyberterrorist network is a typical example of a scale-free network; it will not be 
destroyed if the small nodes are removed and the large nodes are still there. A network 
like that can cope with about 80% of random node failures (Faloutsos, Faloutsos, & 
Faloutsos, 1999; Matlis, 2002). Only when the hubs are wiped out will the network stop 
working (Matlis, 2002). This is exactly what our participant says (“Go after the servers 
that are the commanding control channels”). The last excerpt, from another forensics 
examiner, follows a similar train of thought: 
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The chat room is another place to get cyberterrorist networks. Like any kind of 
undercover action or like a drug undercover investigation in order to infiltrate a 
ring, the same thing happens on the Internet because anybody can go into these 
chat rooms and IRC. You can basically be anybody you want. It’s a good place 
for law enforcement agents to gain intelligence and get information. 
 Like an IRC server, a chat room is considered a hub by law enforcement agents as 
they try to target it (“The chat room is another place to get cyberterrorist networks”). 
Now, “to get cyberterrorist networks” is a little vague, but the point here is that, whether 
or not the intent is to get rid of the chat room, it is obviously an important objective for 
law enforcement agents. Interaction between the networks of the two opposing sides is 
more subtle. Our participant suggests that agents “infiltrate a ring” by going “into these 
chat rooms and IRC.” The situation in this excerpt is about networks going after 
networks. The incentive is that “it’s a good place for law enforcement agents to gain 
intelligence and get information.” Of equal importance is that, in those virtual channels, 
“you can basically be anybody you want.” A similarity can be found with the first excerpt 
of this sub-section. The participant of that section said that law enforcement agents 
interact with their enemies (and vice versa) in order to know them better; our forensics 
examiner here also points to the agents’ opportunity for infiltration so that they can “gain 
intelligence and get information.” The procedure seems to be the same: to approach the 
enemy (and, by the same token, to know them), to get them, and to destabilize their 
network.  
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So far, the analysis of the interaction and conflict between cyberterrorists and law 
enforcement agents has been driven by social network theory. Now, let us analyze the 
same issue based on game theory. 
Part II: A Game Theory Approach 
 This section includes the highest number of excerpts in this study. The goal is to 
illustrate the importance of game theory in the understanding of the complexity of the 
interaction and conflict between cyberterrorists and cyber forensics experts (and law 
enforcement officials). The data analyzed in this section are driven by the participants’ 
answers to the following interview questions: “What game or strategy do cyberterrorists 
use?” “What game or strategy do cyber security experts and law enforcement officials 
use?” “Could you give me an example of a collaborative game strategy between the two 
sides?” “Could you give me an example of a non-collaborative game strategy between 
the two sides?” and “Do cyberterrorists make the rules of the game or do they go along?” 
The data are very consistent with the basic tenets of game theory. 
Before getting into the analysis proper, let us reexamine in one paragraph what 
game theory is. Game theory studies the relationships between individuals, using models 
with clear statements of consequences (i.e., payoffs) that depend on the actions taken by 
those individuals (Aumann & Hart, 1992; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Game theory also studies how those very individuals behave when 
they are placed in situations that require them to interact with each other. This theory is 
about power and control. It deals with two-person decision-making situations (with 
opposing or joined interests). One important tenet of game theory is that each person 
“must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best 
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for himself or herself” (Jehle & Reny, 2001, p. 267). As such, each person is a player in 
the game, as well as a decision maker, choosing how he or she acts. Because each player 
wants the best possible consequence or outcome to his or her preference, every decision 
made by each player will have an impact – whether positive or negative – on the outcome 
of the game. Put another way, each outcome is the result of particular moves made by the 
players at a given point in the game (Rapoport, 1974). The outcome can be a Nash 
equilibrium, a zero-sum game, a positive-sum game, or a negative-sum game (see 
literature review). The players have also the choice to engage in collaborative games or 
non-collaborative games.  
The essential characteristic of game theory is the notion that players are rational 
and intelligent in strategic reasoning. Consequently, they look for the maximization of the 
difference between their own costs and benefits when considering an action they want to 
take. The first excerpt, taken from an interview conducted with a visiting faculty at a 
Midwestern university, who is also a computer crime specialist with the National White 
Collar Crime Center, illustrates those aspects of rationality and intelligence in strategic 
reasoning: 
Cyberterrorists’ victory is based on law enforcement’s defeat. I’ll give you an 
example. Some of the really smart cyberterrorists have figured out that law 
enforcement agents use special software tools to examine hard drives and pull 
evidence off. They know what these products are and they try to find ways to 
disrupt these products. For example, if law enforcement agents run into a 
compressed file, very often they want to open up that file to see what was in it. 
While some hackers insert pornographic files in these compressed files, other 
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clever cyberterrorists can set the compressed file as a logic bomb. What happens 
is that when the law enforcement software decompresses it, that file crashes the 
officer’s computer. They have to start all over. Sometimes, they may not even 
realize what’s causing that crash, except that when they open the compressed file, 
it goes to a certain process where to crashes their computer again. 
The very first statement, “Cyberterrorists’ victory is based on law enforcement’s 
defeat,” is a very good example of a zero-sum game (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944). It was described in the literature review that a zero-sum game is a game where, no 
matter what the outcome of the game is, the victory of one player is exactly balanced by 
the defeat of the other player. In other words, each of the payoffs must be the negative of 
the other (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). “Zero-sum” occurs when a player adds up his or 
her total gains and subtracts the total losses of the other; they will sum to zero. So, in this 
conflict between cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents, the cyberterrorist will win 
only at the expenses of the law enforcement agent, but the benefits and losses to both 
players amount to the same value. For this reason, it is a zero-sum game.  
As far as the strategies, game theory postulates that strategies are available to each 
player. On the one hand, a strategy used by law enforcement, based on the excerpt above, 
is to create special software tools “to examine hard drives and pull evidence off.” On the 
other hand, a strategy used by cyberterrorists is “to find ways to disrupt these products.” 
So, this is the first step of a chess game going on here. The next action of the 
cyberterrorists is to insert a logic bomb in a compressed file that they think law 
enforcement will open up. The action of the law enforcement agent, according to our 
participant, is to open up that file. In this situation, the payoff of the cyberterrorists is to 
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see the agent’s computer crashed (“when the law enforcement software decompresses it, 
that file crashes the officer’s computer”). Payoffs are the “gains” that each player 
receives as a consequence of each possible outcome. The payoffs of the cyberterrorists 
are balanced by a loss of their opponents. Game theory also postulates that every possible 
strategy pursued by each player leads to a defined end-state. As we have seen, the end-
state, or outcome, here, is a zero-sum game. The next excerpt, selected from an account 
told by an ex-CIA agent, explains how law enforcement agents, this time, win against 
cyberterrorists: 
If the target is a law enforcement agent that is a real computer user storing 
everything he or she has, as some people do, the reward for the cyberterrorist 
could be very high because the agent’s life is on their machine. It could be the 
equivalent of taking their entire filing cabinet and carrying it off. At least, 
potentially, the rewards of a computer attack could be very high. That’s both the 
good news and the bad news because if you download a lot of gigabytes and data, 
you have to go through it, which means that the task for the cyberterrorist can be 
very difficult. And if it’s tons of garbage and pictures of the agent’s family, and 
all these kinds of things, you may find it’s very hard to process it. There are some 
risks of downloading data, especially if the files have viruses on them. The agent 
might do that on purpose. That’s what can happen to the cyberterrorist if they 
don’t know what they’re after. In that case, they’d lose. 
Here, we have an excerpt explaining two opposing situations. On the one hand, 
the cyberterrorist’s victory would be diametrically opposed to the law enforcement 
agent’s loss. If the cyberterrorist steals what the agent has on his or her computer (which 
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can be his or her entire life, that is, “the equivalent of taking their entire filing cabinet and 
carrying it off”), the cyberterrorist would win and the agent would lose something vital 
(“the rewards of a computer attack could be very high”). The outcome, again, would be a 
zero-sum game because the victory of the cyberterrorist is exactly balanced by the defeat 
of the agent.  
However, the opposite can also happen (“That’s both the good news and the bad 
news”), that is, there could be a situation where, this time, it is the cyberterrorist who 
loses against the law enforcement agent. First, as the participant explains it, “if you 
download a lot of gigabytes and data, you have to go through it, which means that the 
task for the cyberterrorist can be very difficult.” We saw earlier that every decision made 
by each player has an impact on the outcome of the game. Yet, if the decision taken by 
the cyberterrorist hurts him- or herself, the opponent already has an advantage in the 
game. As the participant continues, “there are some risks of downloading data, especially 
if the files have viruses on them. The agent might do that on purpose.” The basic 
assumption here is that the law enforcement agent follows specific objectives and takes 
into account both the skills and expectations of the other player (the cyberterrorist). This 
is what the participant means when he says that “the agent might do that on purpose.” If 
the cyberterrorist does not know that what he or she is downloading is actually a set of 
files that are intentionally stuffed with viruses, they would lose the game (“if they don’t 
know what they’re after. In that case, they’d lose”). The end-result, or outcome, would be 
a zero-sum game in this situation because, in this battle between the cyberterrorist and the 
law enforcement agent, the latter would win at the expenses of the former.  
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What these two examples demonstrate is that the dangerous game played by 
cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents is a strategies-versus-counterstrategies game, 
like a chess game, where the players who prevail are those who possess the structural 
advantage. One might think that to disrupt is structurally less difficult than to protect, but 
as the second scenario tells us, the agent can create a situation where the cyberterrorist’s 
defeat equals that of a scorpion killing itself with its sting. In other words, the 
cyberterrorist uses his or her usual tactics (stealing and downloading files) that eventually 
hurt him or her (those files were intentionally replete with viruses). The next excerpt, 
taken from an interview conducted with the computer crime specialist with the National 
White Collar Crime Center mentioned earlier, does not exemplify a zero-sum game, but a 
Nash equilibrium: 
In some situations, all of those guys [cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents] 
use their own strategies and don’t change them. One such example occurs in the 
Internet chat room. The law enforcement agent pretends to be a safe Web user or 
a certain target-type victim online. A good portion of the cyberterrorists is wise to 
that. They do things like asking the same questions three times over a four-hour 
period to see if they get the same answer. If they get the same answer every time 
within a four-hour period, that’s a cue to them that there are talking to a real 
person. However, if they ask the same question to a fake user and if they get 
different answers, which happens sometimes because two hours later the person 
does not remember that that question was asked and they don’t remember what 
that answer was, the cyberterrorists will be probing for undercover law 
enforcement that way. Of course, law enforcement agents are wise to people 
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doing that. So, they keep a log of questions that have been asked and answers that 
have been given. In fact, they anticipate the common questions and they will 
actually write down a list of important elements, such as “these are my 
preferences, these are the groups I like, these are the groups I don’t like,” and so 
forth. 
This situation suggests a Nash equilibrium as the outcome of the interaction 
between cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents in the chat room for several reasons. 
First, one of the tenets of the Nash equilibrium is that each player takes his or her 
opponent’s current strategies as given (Nash, 1950). As such, a player has nothing to gain 
by changing only his or her own strategy. If a player has selected a tactic and if he or she 
cannot benefit by changing that tactic, while the other player keeps his or hers unchanged 
as well, then the current set of tactics and the payoffs that result from the outcome of the 
game constitute a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). The participant clearly 
expresses these assumptions in the first statements he uses: “In some situations, all of 
those guys [cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents] use their own strategies and 
don’t change them.” To be more precise, the participant gives us a clear example. Many 
cyberterrorists know that “the law enforcement agent pretends to be a safe Web user or a 
certain target-type victim online.” Because of this, the tactic that cyberterrorists usually 
use is “asking the same questions three times over a four-hour period to see if they get the 
same answer” from the Web user. However, if they get different answers from the same 
Web user, “the cyberterrorists will be probing for undercover law enforcement that way.” 
So, there is no reason for cyberterrorists to change their strategies. 
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What gives the Nash equilibrium all its legitimacy in this excerpt is that law 
enforcement agents use counter-strategies (“they keep a log of questions that have been 
asked and answers that have been given” ) and use the same strategies over and over 
again. As the participant argues, “they anticipate the common questions.” For this reason, 
“they will actually write down a list of important elements, such as ‘these are my 
preferences, these are the groups I like, these are the groups I don’t like,’ and so forth.” In 
the Nash equilibrium, both players perform their dominant strategies. None of the two 
players changes his or her strategy when they are offered the chance to do so at the end of 
the game. So, each player takes the actions of his or her opponent as given (Mehlmann, 
2000). The end-result, or the outcome, is an equilibrium of strategies between the two 
players. In other words, it is a Nash equilibrium. Both cyberterrorists and law 
enforcement agents can maximize their outcomes that way. There is no reason to change 
their strategies in that type of situation. The next excerpt, taken from an interview 
conducted with a senior analyst engineer in forensics who has an IT group and who 
supports the police of a Midwestern university, does not exemplify any type of outcome 
but focuses on the postmodern aspect of game theory in cyberspace: 
Our friends at Iowa State had a break-in last week. Here’s the quote from the 
chief information security officer from Iowa State: “Analysis of both computers 
indicated the intruders were not looking for personal data, but for space to 
distribute pirated movies.” Well, that’s what they believe. The problem here is if I 
were an intruder looking for personal data, I would masquerade as someone 
distributing pirated movies. The people at Iowa State are missing the point. These 
cyberterrorists know that they might accidentally be found out. When they’re 
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found out, they want to have a cover story. So, load up your kit, put some fake 
movies in it. When cyber forensics experts do their analysis, they’ll hit the pirated 
movies. It’s incredibly naïve on the part of the players. And you’re talking about a 
chief information security officer. 
As it was mentioned earlier, game theory studies how players behave when they 
are placed in situations that require them to interact with one another. Game theory, as it 
appears, is about power and control. A cyber forensics expert who notices something 
unusual in the network will suspect that an attack has occurred and that action must be 
taken on that very moment. This implies that the players are in the same context: one 
player wants to attack a computer system, while the other wants to protect it. The context 
involves short-term strategies on the part of both players. However, in the excerpt above, 
the participant makes the point that the cyber forensics experts at Iowa State got deceived 
by cyberterrorists who masqueraded themselves as intruders “distributing pirated 
movies.” Because of the postmodern nature of the Internet, and because of the absence of 
spatiality, the Web user can make any moves that would not be possible in actual 
physical space. When interacting with anything in cyberspace, cyberterrorists find 
themselves in situations that are aperspectival (Gebser, 1985). If “they want to have a 
cover story,” they can do it however they want.  
That is the postmodern aspect of game theory in cyberspace. As opposed to 
conventional war techniques, game theory in cyberspace allows for the use of grand 
strategies aiming at fast and easy deception of the respective opponent. The Internet 
allows players to change their moves more quickly and more frequently than in actual 
physical space (Carmel & Frequently, 1996). For this reason, our participant says “the 
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people at Iowa State are missing the point.” It would not be fair to say that the outcome is 
a zero-sum game where the cyberterrorists’ victory is contingent upon the law 
enforcement’s defeat, because deception is not the same as defeat. The case here is a 
situation where the “good” side is being misled by the “bad” side. From what it appears, 
there is no damage or financial loss involved. Yet, there is a big deal of deception. 
Deception is part of game theory. Our participant extends this view in the excerpt below: 
The other aspect is that we don’t understand our enemy. They can pretend to be 
just distributing pirated movies. They [the people at Iowa State] will believe that 
and they will stop their investigation. I got a gamble going on over here and I’m 
keeping you busy, while I’m really taking your data in the back while you’re not 
looking. It’s like a chess game. It’s exactly game theory and they’re good at it. 
They’re the bad ones; they don’t have to be fair. That’s not part of the deal. 
One of the goals of the players in game theory is to make sure that one player 
does not understand the other. The problem, our participant argues, seems to be on the 
cyber forensics/law enforcement side (“we don’t understand our enemy”). What he 
means is that the cyber forensics/law enforcement side at Iowa State will stop at a certain 
end-state in the game, that is, when they see pirated movies downloaded on their files and 
when they stop the investigation at that point (“They [the people at Iowa State] will 
believe that and they will stop their investigation”). Yet, the participant says that they do 
not seem to understand that cyberterrorists are playing a chess game (“It’s like a chess 
game”). Moreover, the participant continues, “it’s exactly game theory and they’re good 
at it.” Again, this is a situation where the cyberterrorists know their true strength, but the 
targeted sources cannot estimate the true cyberterrorist actions behind the intrusion 
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attempts. The next excerpt, from our same participant, corroborates the assumptions 
made so far: 
Cyberterrorists are culturally very savvy. They know what the current script 
kiddies are doing. Sometimes, the talented guys, while bashing the script kiddies, 
use them as their cover, because if law enforcement agents look at a script kiddie, 
then they instantly assume that it’s some copycat, but the agents don’t realize that 
the true danger has been masked by this copycat. So, cyberterrorists are clever. 
 The problem here is the same. Law enforcement agents will stop investigating 
when they come across what they think is a script kiddie. “Script kiddie” is a pejorative 
term for inexperienced hackers who use programs developed by others, without knowing 
what these programs are or how they work (Tanaka, 2001). The intent is to compromise 
computer accounts and files (Verton, 2001a). Our cyberterrorists seem to play a cunning 
game (“while bashing the script kiddies, [they] use them as their cover”) where they 
capitalize on their enemies’ ignorance (“if law enforcement agents look at a script kiddie, 
then they instantly assume that it’s some copycat”). According to Rapoport (1974), an 
expert on game theory, the player seeks to follow the best strategy that will help him or 
her accomplish the most beneficial goal in every situation. The strategy here is deception 
of law enforcement and, based on our participant’s comments, it seems to work. For this 
reason, our participant says that “cyberterrorists are clever.”  
The following five excerpts depict the conflict between cyberterrorists and law 
enforcement agents (and cyber forensics experts) as an evolutionary game. The first of 
those excerpts was taken from an interview conducted with an IT Security Analyst II in 
the Southwest: 
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Technologies are only a means to an end. It has never changed throughout the 
course of human history and there has always been some type of conflict. 
Cyberterrorists find new ways in order to exploit someone’s vulnerabilities. 
Technology only makes that attack vector easier. When we find a new way to 
protect something, they [cyberterrorists] always find a new way to exploit it. 
There are always continuous patches and changes in technology. We are 
developing technology so quickly that security is sometimes not built into it. So, 
there are always going to be holes that people can take advantage of. I see that 
being a continuous struggle. It’s going to get worse before it gets better.  
To begin with, the third sentence of this excerpt is interesting. Based on the 
participant’s statement that “cyberterrorists find new ways in order to exploit someone’s 
vulnerabilities,” the goal of the cyberterrorists is to create tactics and weapons that 
continually change in an effort to defeat their opponents’ networks and systems. Besides, 
“when we find a new way to protect something, they [cyberterrorists] always find a new 
way to exploit it.” From this vantage point, it does not seem that, in this dangerous game, 
any of the players loses. On the part of the cyberterrorists, there is no re-machining. If the 
cyberterrorists lose today, they will not disappear. Rather, they will learn what did not 
work and use it against their enemies tomorrow. The reason is that “there are always 
continuous patches and changes in technology.” On the part of the cyber forensics experts 
and law enforcement agents, they will choose the option for the highest expected payoff 
by having the latest technological measures to protect their networks. Yet, in turn, 
cyberterrorists also select the option for the highest expected payoff for their digital 
attacks; as such, they manage to find out the probability of their opponents’ failure on 
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their computer networks. It is an evolutionary game because it is based on situations 
where the players know their own strengths, but they can only estimate their opponents’ 
power (as well as their resources and capabilities) based on the level of their moves (that 
is, their actions, tactics, and attacks or defensive measures). For this reason, our 
participant sees it as a “continuous struggle.” 
Based on the excerpt above, if cyber security is a game then cyberterrorists are the 
ones who make the rules. Indeed, protective measures like anti-virus software programs 
and firewalls are measures taken by cyber forensics experts and law enforcement as a 
reaction to cyberterrorists attacks. When the latter ones launch a new computer virus, the 
target side has to adapt to it. When the cyberterrorists manage to find a hole in the new 
adapted technology that has just been used against the virus, the target side has to adapt 
again. This evolutionary game seems to be a ping-pong match where the target has to 
play by the cyberterrorists’ rules. Moreover, their very rules may change during the 
game, based on new cyber weapons, new tactics, new tools, all of which can be acquired 
a few mouse clicks away. Any cyber forensics or law enforcement agent who is unable to 
handle that is at a critical disadvantage. The last statement of this excerpt, “it’s going to 
get worse before it gets better,” can be opened to a solid interpretation. The 
cyberterrorists may be able to design programs that will get a computer network in 
trouble. Yet, the target can learn from his or her defeats and mistakes. The idea of losing 
the game against the cyberterrorists is not always a bad idea; computer security agents 
can learn from mistakes. This is where game theory perfectly fits (Littman, 1994). Yet, 
this game never ends; rather, it is continuously evolving. The next excerpt is from the 
same participant: 
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The Internet allows the possibility for no ending in this conflict. Because of this, 
there is increased motivation to do anything to exploit it. Cyberterrorists will 
always find a way. Essentially, they are finding new methods every day. It’s a 
moving target because the cyberterrorists’ methods are always gonna be 
changing. They’re gonna become more sophisticated. 
Just as it is the case in the previous excerpt, the conflict between cyberterrorists 
and their opponents is an evolutionary game because new methods are constantly 
invented (i.e., “Cyberterrorists will always find a way. Essentially, they are finding new 
methods every day”). Also interesting are the first few statements (“The Internet allows 
the possibility for no ending in this conflict. Because of this, there is increased motivation 
to do anything to exploit it”). The postmodern nature of the Internet is such that the 
players in cyberspace are under no space or time control constraints (Carmel & 
Markovtich, 1996). Therefore, there is the possibility for no end of anything, not even the 
end of cyberwar (“no ending in this conflict”). Because timing for move and state updates 
is not fixed in cyberspace, it is no surprise that “the cyberterrorists’ methods are always 
gonna be changing.” For example, as we have seen in the literature review, not only can a 
player make multiple moves at the same time, but, also, both players can make multiple 
simultaneous moves as well. While in most conventional games players alternate moves, 
in cyberspace this is not true anymore. An opponent can launch multiple simultaneous 
attacks easily and quickly (Littman, 1994). For this reason, the participant argues that 
cyberterrorists will become “more sophisticated.” The next excerpt was taken from an 
interview conducted with a chief information security officer at a Midwestern university: 
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With cyberterrorists, you always have to think ahead. I’m trying to work within a 
construct of a game or a set of rules. Remember 9/11; we were not thinking about 
planes crashing into buildings. We were thinking of car bombs, an Oklahoma City 
bombing kind of thing. So, now, instead of looking at the hundred-year flood, 
consider it. It’s not absurd now. The rules of the game keep changing. 
Because “the rules of the game keep changing,” it seems that anything is possible. 
As the participant explains it, nobody had really thought about planes crashing into 
buildings. On September 11, 2001, the rules of terrorism had changed. Would 
cyberterrorists be capable to flood an entire city by opening up a dam through its 
computer system? Well, the participant would say, “consider it. It’s not absurd now.” In 
most games, the rules are known by all players beforehand. These rules govern each 
player’s behavior and, assumedly, each player has full knowledge of the rules. In the 
situation of cyberterrorism, however, “the rules of the game keep changing.” Anything 
evolves. As a result, changing the rules leads to an outcome that would have been 
different had one or all players followed them. They are inventing new rules as they play 
the game. Or it might even be the case that the rules have changed by themselves, to the 
point of leading Web users with the sense that there are actually no rules. The rule of the 
game is that the game has no rules. After all, as Lyotard (1984) puts it, postmodernism 
means working without rules. So, in the postmodern multidimensional cyberspace, 
anything goes with anything, like a game with no rules. The next excerpt was taken from 
an interview conducted with a visiting faculty at a Midwestern university, where he is 
also a computer crime specialist with the National White Collar Crime Center: 
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Anything that you can do to try to identify the cyberterrorist can be done by them 
to identify you. Most of them know not to use a law enforcement information 
system because it will bite back at them. There is some escalation in that 
cyberterrorists get wise to law enforcement measures and, in turn, law 
enforcement agents get wise that cyberterrorists are getting wise to this angle, so 
they find counter-measures. There is somewhat of an escalation taking place. 
The word “escalation” is used twice here and feeds the thought that the game 
between the two opponents is an evolutionary game. Escalation is a phenomenon 
whereby a situation evolves step by step (Shukla-Mehta & Albin, 2003). The players do 
learn from each other as they are fighting on a daily basis. How do they learn from each 
other? Our participant explains that, while “cyberterrorists get wise to law enforcement 
measures,” “law enforcement agents get wise that cyberterrorists are getting wise to this 
angle.” From this, it follows that one never knows when the game is over. There is no 
outcome. This is essentially a postmodern fight. The next excerpt comes from the chief 
information security officer mentioned previously: 
They have to play a chess game in order to accomplish what they want to 
accomplish. I don’t think one knows for sure what the other’s gonna do. 
Professional cyberterrorists will try to stay abreast of defense mechanisms so they 
can always develop a means of exploiting known vulnerabilities or getting around 
the defense that’s there.  
The concept of “chess game” is mentioned here. The game of chess is a reflection 
of the ongoing events in the battle that takes place between cyberterrorists and law 
enforcement agents. Just like in a chess game, the computer security agent does not know 
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the next move of the cyberterrorist, and vice versa (“I don’t think one knows for sure 
what the other’s gonna do”). It is fair to assume that both players know what each other is 
capable of doing. Yet, they do not know what each other’s next move will be. For this 
reason, cyberterrorists try to have the upper-hand against their enemies (“Professional 
cyberterrorists will try to stay abreast of defense mechanisms so they can always develop 
a means of exploiting known vulnerabilities”). To complete this short excerpt, law 
enforcement agents respond when an attack on the computer network is suspected or has 
actually happened. So, this battle is a chess game, where each player does not know what 
moves the opponent will take. Therefore, each of the players will find a strategy to 
examine the possible actions of each other in the situation. The ultimate goal is to 
determine the best course of action for him- or herself (Jehle & Reny, 2001). No matter 
what, the game is evolutionary. The next excerpt was selected from an interview 
conducted with a forensics examiner in the Southwest: 
A lot of it is intelligence. We watch what’s going on in the rest of the world. We 
run what we call “honey pots” and we sniff traffic, trying to see things developing 
in advance, we try to head it off. We set up firewalls. A lot of it is preemptive, just 
to try to know what cyberterrorists do on the outside, to keep up with 
vulnerabilities as we see their new techniques coming out on the honey wall side 
and from all the security companies. We start patching against it internally so that 
cyberterrorists cannot use that vulnerability against us. That’s the main goal, to 
stay one step ahead of them.  
The phrases “to head it off,” “preemptive,” and “to stay one step ahead of them” 
are basic tenets of game theory. Just like a chess game, the cyber conflict is not a game of 
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chance. It is based exclusively on tactics and strategies. The outcome of the game is not 
influenced by some randomizing device. For this reason, forensics examiners have to 
“head it off,” “just to try to know what cyberterrorists do on the outside.” They go to 
access control lists to determine what does and does not belong to the network. Forensics 
examiners also use honey pots (“We run what we call ‘honey pots’ and we sniff traffic”). 
A honeypot is a good example of game theory in the world of computers. In essence, it is 
like a mousetrap that is used to detect or counteract attempts of cyber attacks or 
intrusions into information systems. Once the intruder or cyberterrorist enters a honeypot, 
his or her actions are monitored, enabling the forensics examiner to sniff what kind of 
danger is coming (Hall, 2004). Overall, the honeypot consists of a computer or an entire 
network site that seems to be part of a network but which is in fact isolated from 
everything else. It also seems to contain information or resources that look valuable to 
cyber attackers. So, a honeypot masquerades as something innocuous. Yet, it is not. The 
result is that the enemies of computer security experts can fall prey to honeypots.  
The next few excerpts concentrate on the different collaborative games that law 
enforcement agents are able to play with their opponents. Game theory helps demonstrate 
the potential for collaborative behavior among distrustful players in the game. The first of 
these excerpts comes from an interview conducted with a computer analyst in a local 
police department: 
We [computer analysts in local police departments] don’t engage in collaborative 
games with cyberterrorists. On a local level, at the grassroots level, we don’t do 
that. At the federal level, the FBI does that. They collaborate with cyberterrorists 
in order to get what they want. It’s important; you got to communicate with them. 
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And, you know, if the cyberterrorists know that the FBI has enough resources to 
force them to surrender eventually, then the most beneficial strategy for the 
cyberterrorists is to collaborate.  
Here, this excerpt mentions two types of game: the non-collaborative game and 
the collaborative game. According to our participant, computer analysts in local police 
departments do not play collaborative games with cyberterrorists. As he expresses it, “on 
a local level, at the grassroots level, we don’t do that.” Simply defined, a non-
collaborative game is a game where each player pursues his or her own interest 
independently. The players do not have end goals that are compatible. Yet, it might also 
be the case here that local police officers are not allowed to do that. The participant was 
not clear on that issue. However, the participant says that “at the federal level, the FBI 
does that.” They do collaborate with cyberterrorists “in order to get what they want.” In a 
collaborative game, players agree to interact without threats and combine their efforts to 
reach outcomes (Basar & Olsder, 1999). The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a 
history of collaborating with cyberterrorists. According to Verton (2001), investigators 
from the FBI develop close relationships with cyberterrorists through the use of Internet 
chat rooms. Under such conditions, cyberterrorists ask the investigators to participate in 
coordinated cyber attacks and, eventually, they offer, in exchange for their participation, 
to share information that was stolen from other computer networks (Verton, 2001). The 
result is that the players join forces and do fairly well (“If you participate in our cyber 
attacks, we will give you what you need”). This collaboration between cyberterrorists and 
FBI agents is to be viewed as a postmodern two-player game. The excerpt above, 
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however, does not explain what strategies are used by the players and how FBI agents 
can use the outcomes of the game to improve the security of their network. 
Another important consideration in the excerpt is that the participant emphasizes 
the importance of communication with the opponents (“It’s important; you got to 
communicate with them”). Communication plays a central role in game theory (Buttyán, 
Hubaux, & Capkun, 2004). The theory involves the analysis of conflict, cooperation, and 
the degree of communication necessary to arrive at a desired outcome by each player. 
Game theory also deals with strategic interaction. A strategic interaction requires that the 
players make decisions; the outcome of the game depends on the choices made by the 
players. A strategic interaction intrinsically involves human communication. For 
instance, the cyberterrorist would need to find a way through communication and trust in 
order to reach a collaborative outcome with the FBI agent. In fact, in a collaborative 
game, the ability with which each player communicates, the intensity of communication, 
and even the organization with which these players communicate will have a great impact 
on the outcome of the game (Osborne, 2003). If there is no communication between the 
players, then no collaboration is possible. However, if they can communicate and engage 
in collaborative behavior, the outcome would be quite different. Consequently, repeated 
interaction might lead to different outcomes.  
A final note regarding this excerpt is that it might be the case that cyberterrorists 
collaborate with law enforcement agents such as the FBI because they have to. As the 
participant expresses it, “if the cyberterrorists know that the FBI has enough resources to 
force them to surrender eventually, then the most beneficial strategy for the 
cyberterrorists is to collaborate.” In fact, Mitnick and Simon (2005) note that former 
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intruders sometimes cooperate with federal agencies because they have no choice. If they 
do not cooperate, they go to jail. The collaborative game, in this case, is not altruistic; it 
is not a function of empathy, but an awareness that one is in need. The next excerpt, 
selected from an interview conducted with a professor of social networks at a Midwestern 
university, takes a different angle on the collaborative game between those opponents: 
Law enforcement agents play collaborative games with cyberterrorists, but this is 
a very important ethical issue. I suppose they have some sort of regulations or 
rules of the game. They play a game, but where do they stop? They pass 
themselves as somebody like them [cyberterrorists]. The strategies that they use 
are meant to reach a specific outcome, to hurt you, to deny some things, to take 
away some things from you. You don’t only want the best solution, but you also 
want to get the darn enemy. Sometimes, you choose an outcome that is not only 
unethical, but also the only choice that brings you close to what you want to do. 
 Based on the participant’s comments, it appears that the collaborative game that 
law enforcement agents play with cyberterrorists is a necessary evil. The means do not 
matter, only the end. As the participant describes it, “you don’t only want the best 
solution, but you also want to get the darn enemy.” This is why the participant thinks that 
engaging in a collaborative game with the enemy is an ethical issue (“you choose an 
outcome that is not only unethical, but also the only choice that brings you close to what 
you want to do”). Let us make an analogy with Hitler’s Battle of the Bulge, which took 
place in the Belgian Ardennes (1944-1945) (Parker, 2004). For Hitler, the Battle of the 
Bulge was the only solution left for the German military because, eventually, it lost a 
good number of infantry divisions that could have been moved to the East front. 
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However, Hitler’s idea was that he was operating on the premise that he would push the 
Allies back into the sea (Dupuy, Bongard, & Anderson, 1994). His goal was related to 
some type of calculations. He needed to win the war, no matter what. The bottom line is 
that sometimes we engage in actions that do not take the costs and benefits into account 
any more. As long as we have the slightest chance, we are engaged and we do it. In the 
context of cyberterrorism, it seems that law enforcement agents would take the slightest 
chance to collaborate with the enemy in order to reach their outcomes. The next excerpt 
was taken from an interview conducted with a visiting faculty at a Midwestern university, 
where he is also a computer crime specialist with the National White Collar Crime 
Center: 
First of all, try to avoid making this a “black or white” or “either/or” thing. What 
we have is a whole bunch of human beings that fall in somewhere along the shade 
of gray, sometimes people change and go to a different shade of gray, maybe a 
lighter shade of gray. Some cyberterrorists rationalize what they’re doing. You 
have people who defect to the other side to collaborate with them and you have 
people who pretend to defect. It’s very difficult to categorize people as 
cyberterrorists or the “good guys.” You don’t always know who’s who. 
 This excerpt is interesting because, as opposed to all the other excerpts in this 
section, it highlights the possibility of all the players in the game – that is, both 
cyberterrorists and their opponents – to fall in the same category. As the participant 
explains it, it is “a whole bunch of human beings that fall in somewhere along the shade 
of gray, sometimes people change and go to a different shade of gray, maybe a lighter 
shade of gray.” From this vantage point, it appears that there are no clear opponents or 
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enemies (there is no “‘black or white’ or ‘either/or’ thing”). Unlike battles in actual 
physical space, the warriors in cyberspace are difficult to identify. This is 
postmodernism, of which one of the main tenets is a shift away from spatialization as we 
know it in real life. For this reason, the participant says that “it’s very difficult to 
categorize people as cyberterrorists or the ‘good guys.’” As he continues, we cannot 
always “know who’s who.” 
A good analogy of all this can be made with the fuzzy distinction between “white 
hats” and “black hats.” Just as there is no clear line between opponents in cyberspace, 
there is no clear difference between “white hats” and “black hats” in the computer 
security realm. A “white hat” is an intruder who is ethically opposed to compromising 
computer systems and networks for malicious purposes (Thaddeus, 2000). His or her 
ultimate goal is to improve computer security by “checking” a computer system. A 
“black hat” is a generic term for a real hacker, a cyber criminal, and a cyberterrorist 
(Bischoff, 2001). The term “white hat” comes from American western movies where the 
hero always wears the white cowboy hat, whereas the villain always wears a black hat. 
As opposed to clear opponents in western movies, there is no clear line between those 
who improve security (the white hats) and those who destroy it (the black hats). Indeed, 
the fact that a white hat generally focuses on securing computer systems and networks 
while a black hat aims at destroying them is a simplification. For instance, the black hat 
might wish to secure his or her own computer and the white hat might feel the need to 
intrude the black hat’s computer during an investigation. So, although white hats tend to 
emphasize that they have altruistic motivations, the difference between white hats and 
black hats is open to interpretation (Beaver & McClure, 2004). Consequently, the 
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participant’s statement that it is “a whole bunch of human beings that fall in somewhere 
along the shade of gray” is very consistent with what is found in the scholarly literature 
on the issue. In fact, the literature talks about “gray hats” (Harris et al., 2004). 
What adds to the complication is that the collaborative game between 
cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents seems blurry as well. As the participant 
confers to us, “you have people who defect to the other side to collaborate with them and 
you have people who pretend to defect.” In game theory, to defect means to select an 
action which increases one’s own payoffs by switching to the other side (Batson & 
Ahmad, 2001). The problem is that there are players who pretend to defect, which means 
that they leave and come back. Adopting this tactic can be as confusing as changing one’s 
goals completely. In fact, Carmel and Markovitch (1996a) remark that a single opponent 
may decide to change objectives. The last excerpt of this section, selected from an 
interview conducted with the chair of a cyber forensics program in a department of 
computer and information technology at a Midwestern university, discusses the 
differences between the end-game of hackers and that of cyberterrorists: 
Hackers and cyberterrorists have a different end-game. The end-game of 
cyberterrorists will tend to be a massive disruption of technologies. They want to 
take down entire computer systems and let everybody know about it. The hackers 
that hack into traffic control systems will hit that point where they go, “Ooh, I 
have broken into that system; now let’s go back.” The cyberterrorist will say, 
“Waw, now let’s get down some planes.” There’s a whole different mindset. 
There is a fine line here. Most hackers and cyber criminals will stop at a certain 
point, while cyberterrorists will take steps beyond. I don’t think they’ll ever stop. 
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This excerpt clearly makes the point that hackers are less malicious than 
cyberterrorists. This is illustrated through their end-games. The end-game of hackers is 
not constantly evolving; rather, they will stop at a certain point. As the participant 
explains it, “The hackers that hack into traffic control systems will hit that point where 
they go, ‘Ooh, I have broken into that system; now let’s go back.’” On the other hand, 
cyberterrorists will take steps beyond, to such a point that the participant thinks they will 
never stop (“I don’t think they’ll ever stop”). Evidently, the postmodern evolutionary 
game that law enforcement agents (as well cyber forensics experts) are involved in is 
with cyberterrorists, not innocuous hackers (in which case the game would not be 
evolutionary; it would stop at a certain point). The sixteen excerpts in this section have 
showed us important aspects of this postmodern battle; it is evolutionary, there are chess 
games going on, even collaborative games when needed, and the difference between the 
good and the bad is sometimes blurry. No matter what, our last participant says that the 
outcome of cyberterrorists is different from that of hackers. Now, let us move on to the 
third part of this analysis of RQ3: the intersection of social network theory and game 
theory. 
Part III: Intersection of Social Network Theory and Game Theory 
Game theory provides a good basis to analyze social networks. In this section, 
four excerpts serve to illustrate how the cooperation of one node in the network – that is, 
any Web user; whether the Web user is a cyberterrorist or a law enforcement agent, 
whether the cooperation is conscious or unconscious, and whether being part of the game 
is intentional or not – can contribute to the success or failure of social network 
operations. Hence, social network theory and game theory can be intersected. The first 
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excerpt was selected from an interview conducted with a forensics examiner in the 
Southwest: 
 What cyberterrorists also do is what we call here “ARP poisoning.” Basically, it’s 
when they make it look like you’re the router, you’re like the link between two 
law enforcement agents. The goal is to deceive them. There’s plenty of 
commercial applications and free applications out there to do it. And all the traffic 
is re-routed through you or any private-home PC user, which first of all slows 
down the traffic and, second of all, you control every piece of traffic that goes 
down through the network. 
The participant mentions ARP poisoning as a way to take advantage of a node 
[“you or any private-home PC user”] in the network by re-routing information through 
that node. By definition, ARP poisoning is a technique used against a network whereby a 
cyberterrorist confuses network devices by sending messages via another computer 
(Semmelroth, 2006). This excerpt shows that ARP poisoning can be employed in a man-
in-the-middle attack (Trabelsi, 2005). A man-in-the-middle attack is an attack where the 
cyberterrorist can control or change traffic between two law enforcement agents without 
either of them knowing that the link between them has been compromised (Chirillo, 
2002). The link between them, that is, the “man-in-the-middle,” can be any private home 
PC user. The cyberterrorist makes sure that all traffic is forwarded through that private 
home PC user. “The goal,” says the participant, “is to deceive them [law enforcement 
agents].” Game theory here is plugged into the framework of social network theory in 
that the operation of the network is based on the unconscious cooperation of the private 
home PC user who is used as a link (man-in-the-middle) between two law enforcement 
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agents (who are the enemies of the cyberterrorist). Each node [law enforcement agent] 
forwards traffic to the other through that man-in-the-middle. Yet, the nodes do not know 
that they are being deceived by the cyberterrorist. There is a complex game going on 
here. The following excerpt, taken from an interview conducted with an assistant 
professor at a Midwestern university, depicts a collaborative strategic game: 
When law enforcement collaborates with cyberterrorists, it’s often like this: “If 
you help us, we’re gonna help you too, because we know that you do a part in the 
game, or you are the game and you can bring in the other cockroaches, before 
they can crawl away.” So, on a personal level, law enforcement agents will use 
methods to make a cyberterrorist more likely to cooperate with their network. 
Game theory can be interpreted here as the aim of persuasion, not just to force 
cyberterrorists to complete the tasks of law enforcement, but also to take advantage of 
their knowledge in order to increase the success of the networks consisting of law 
enforcement agents. For this reason, “law enforcement agents will use methods to make a 
cyberterrorist more likely to cooperate with their network.” In this context, the 
participation of the user [here, the cyberterrorist who gets caught] can have far-reaching 
consequences because the operation of the network relies on the collaboration of one 
node [that cyberterrorist in question] complied to turn in other nodes (as the participant 
puts it, “you can bring in the other cockroaches, before they can crawl away”). So, game 
theory provides a good theoretical framework to analyze this issue (Orda, Rom, & 
Shimkin, 1993). The word “complied” was just used here. Compliance of the user is seen 
in the following statement: “If you help us, we’re gonna help you too.” Compliance is 
more probable if the cyberterrorist believes that, by complying, he or she is ingratiating 
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him- or herself with individuals who may give the cyberterrorist future benefits. Here, it 
is, in essence, getting in with the enemy. The following excerpt, taken from an account 
told by a professor and associate department head in a department of computer and 
information technology at a Midwestern university, also portrays a collaborative strategic 
game: 
The fact that law enforcement agents collaborate with cyberterrorists in order to 
catch other cyberterrorists is a standard law enforcement technique. They want the 
first person they arrest not to prosecute. They want that person just to get at the 
people behind this. They’re really after the big fish. They’ll do a plea bargain with 
the little fish so that they catch the big fish, the entire network. So, they’ll let that 
first person go. 
Here, the tactic of the player is to let one node go away in order to catch the 
whole network of nodes. In the participant’s words, law enforcement agents will “do a 
plea bargain with the little fish so that they catch the big fish, the entire network.” A plea 
bargain is an agreement between a prosecutor [here, law enforcement] and a defendant 
[here, the cyberterrorist] in exchange for some agreement from the prosecutor (Rosett, 
1976). Given this, the cyberterrorist becomes part of the network of law enforcement 
agents. Plus, the burden of responsibility is not entirely on the cyberterrorist. This is 
where the cyberterrorist believes that he or she is not solely responsible for the moves 
against his or her comrades. In social networks, the selfishness of the users has deeper 
consequences than in traditional networks because the operation of the network can be 
based on the cooperation of the nodes against other nodes. So, again, game theory offers 
a solid theoretical framework to analyze this issue (Orda, Rom, & Shimkin, 1993). The 
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last excerpt of this analysis of RQ3 was selected from an interview conducted with the 
head of a cyber forensics program at a Midwestern university: 
When cyberterrorists get caught by the FBI, sometimes the FBI asks them for 
supporting their network. That’s where they might come back to bite the FBI. If 
cyberterrorists cooperate, it’s not altruistic. They cooperate otherwise they’re 
going to jail. They’re compelled to do so. There is no intrinsic motivation for 
them to cooperate. The cyberterrorists’ thought process of what we relate to as 
unethical or ethical is not necessarily what you and I would consider to be. They 
have ulterior motives because they have an easy time rationalizing and justifying 
what they do. 
 This last excerpt points to the danger of networking with one’s enemy. Although 
law enforcement agents see some benefits to “recruiting” cyberterrorists for supporting 
their network, they run the risk of being betrayed – what the participant refers to as 
“bitten back.” In other words, even if law enforcement creates a credible situation that 
makes the cyberterrorist feel that he or she is immersed in the network of the “good” side, 
their cooperation is “not altruistic.” Klarreich (2004) notes that game theory rests on the 
premise that the players, however cooperative they become, can never be altruistic 
towards each other because they have ulterior motives. In this excerpt, the participant 
describes this phenomenon by saying that, in the minds of cyberterrorists, “there is no 
intrinsic motivation for them to cooperate.” Our participant justifies the cyberterrorists’ 
actions by saying that “the cyberterrorists’ thought process of what we relate to as 
unethical or ethical is not necessarily what you and I would consider to be. They have 
ulterior motives because they have an easy time rationalizing and justifying what they 
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do.” From this vantage point, the way game theory is intersected with social network 
theory is constructed within a framework of networking with the opposite players (i.e., 
enemies) without having any intent to establish trust with those players. The last portion 
of this analysis is the analysis of RQ4, which reveals four significant themes that emerged 




Analysis of Research Question 4 
 RQ4 (What are the themes that emerged across the participants’ accounts?) 
reveals four significant themes that emerged across a vast number of accounts told by the 
participants. The first of theme, the postmodern state of chaos, revolves around the idea 
that cyberterrorism has the power to create a state of immense confusion and disorder far 
different from what our sensory realism, as we know it in actual physical space, has ever 
experienced. The postmodern state of chaos also implies “cascading failures,” that is, 
ripple effects across a vast network casused by the failure of one important node. The 
second theme, social engineering, is described as the manipulation by the cyberterrorists 
of individuals (i.e., Web users) in order to obtain information from them or gain access to 
a particular location. The main goal of the social engineer is to have control over a 
network or system. The third theme, called “know thy enemy,” is an account of the 
tactics used by both cyberterrorists and law enforcement to understand the enemy and, by 
the same token, improve their fight against them. “Know thy enemy” implies the idea of 
putting oneself in their shoes. The fourth theme, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, is 
based on the notion that the establishment of a common cause among cyberterrorists is 
possible through the identification of a common enemy or group of enemies. The same 
applies to law enforcement; history has recorded that some federal agencies do not get 
along. However, when they realize they have common enemies, they will fight them 
together. The data from which these four themes emerged come from many interviews 
conducted with the participants. No particular question was favored or asked in order to 
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solicit these themes. All in all, it is the product of all the questions and answers to these 
questions. 
Postmodern State of Chaos 
This theme revolves around the idea that cyberterrorism has the potential to 
generate a postmodern state of chaos. Chaos is a state of extreme confusion and disorder 
(Gleick, 1987). Although conventional terrorist acts – as the ones usually shown in the 
media – that are perpetrated against common targets such as mass transit vehicles (i.e., 
metros, buses, and trains), airplanes, office buildings, and crowded restaurants, create a 
state of chaos, those conventional terrorist acts have not created a postmodern state of 
chaos, that is, a state of chaos that humans are not able to predict or to which they are not 
able to respond as they would in actual physical space. Indeed, with respect to 
conventional terrorist attacks, many emergency reponse initiatives and terrorism 
preparedness programs have been implemented, particularly after 9/11. What this means 
is that counter-terrorism agents have strong capabilities to prevent mass-scale terrorist 
incidents or, at least, fight them, let alone understand them. For instance, they install 
surveillance cameras (i.e., like those millions of cameras in London), they place scanners 
at airports, they learn from terrorist tactics, and they send operatives around the world to 
capture terrorist leaders. These reponses and measures against terrorism are very 
modernist; they are analog, organized, and disambiguous. They are based on a cause-and-
effect sequence. Time and space matter in the modernist perspective. A second reason 
why conventional terrorist acts have not engendered a postmodern state of chaos lies in 
the fact that one conventional terrorist act alone cannot jeopardize our critical 
infrastructure. Although the tragic 9/11 incident caused fear and dismay across the nation, 
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airports and other major infrastructures were not targeted. As a result, the chaos caused 
by the nineteen hijackers was very modernist. The weapons that they used (aircrafts) 
were modernist as well.  
However, the thirteen excerpts selected for this theme, all of which come from 
interviews conducted with seven or eight participants, reveal that cyberterrorist acts have 
the potential to create a postmodern state of chaos. Although massive cyberterrorist acts 
have not happened yet, they have the potential to create massive disorder to which we 
would not be able to respond and of which the effects would be digital, ambiguous, 
confusing, and non-sequential. These are traits of postmodernism. There is no cause-and-
effect sequence as in modernism. Furthermore, cyber attacks are far less predictable, even 
less understandable or sensical. Nothing happens in a context of spatialization. 
Postmodernism, just like cyberterrorism, is a shift away from spatialization. Time and 
space do not matter. In fact, postmodernism challenges both space and the past, the 
present, and the future. There is no spatial or temporal order possible; everything is 
discontinous and fragmented. Yet, the effects, as the participants conferred to me during 
the interviews, could be devastating, far more than what physical attacks could do. The 
effects of cyberterrorism are such that the state of chaos that humans would endure would 
be far greater than what they have suffered from modernist terrorist attacks. This is 
another reason why the state of chaos coming from a massive cyber attack would be 
postmodern. 
The problem is that “when the Internet was designed,” said a cyber forensics 
expert at a Midwestern university, “it was designed to be highly reliable, not highly 
secure.” As it turned out, the Internet designers considered the importance of how to keep 
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data traffic flowing on the Internet, but not the dangers of failures of routing computers 
and the disruption of communication links that make up the network. The designers 
assumed that all computers connected to the Internet belonged to a responsible 
governmental or commercial enterprise and would never belong to malicious individuals 
(Dunnigan, 2003). For this theme, the thirteen accounts describe the mechanics of 
cyberterrorism and its effects in detail. The main focus of their description of what 
cyberterrorists are capable of doing is on the fact that a cyber attack has the potential to 
cripple our critical infrastructures, as they rely heavily on computers. Besides, a cyber 
attack can generate a cascading failure, that is, a cascade caused by the removal of a 
single node. 
The postmodern state of chaos can be explained through chaos theory. One of the 
main proponents of chaos theory is Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist and mathematician 
(Gleick, 1987; Stewart, 1989). The main premise of his theory is that it is a theory of 
nonlinearity. Based on a mathematical approach to nonlinear modeling, chaos is 
disorderly orderliness (Remer, 2005). It results in sudden and dramatic change at the 
same time. More importantly, chaos theory deals with plans B to Z, describing unstable 
states where even small changes can cascade into gigantic long-term effects (Yorke, 
2005). This refers directly to what was just mentioned in the last sentence of the previous 
paragraph; the postmodern state of chaos implies a cascading failure, where the failure of 
one important node can have a long-term negative impact – like a ripple effect – on the 
rest of the network. Chaos theory is based on the premise that individuals cannot control 
their situation. Rather, their situation can change anytime, from moment to moment 
(Mounier et al., 2005). As such, chaos lacks periodic repetition (Sataloff, 2004). For this 
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reason, the concept of chaos is postmodern and fits well here. As will also be explained in 
the second theme (“social engineering”), chaos theory resembles game theory, 
particularly with respect to having a definite set of rules. Indeed, chaos, in spite of initial 
perceptions that is it purely random, has actually an inherently ordered and deterministic 
set of rules (Chamberlain, 1998; Freeman, 1991), just like a chess game. In one of the 
descriptions of “social engineering,” the intersection of game theory and chaos theory is 
explained in one pararaph. 
Although the participants themselves do not use the word “postmodern,” from my 
interpretation of their accounts, the use and consequences of cyberterrorism are very 
postmodern. The first excerpt, from an interview conducted with an IT Security Analyst 
II (or assistant IT Security Analyst), working at a Midwestern university, reveals the 
extreme and deadly damage that cyberterrorism could possibly do to our society: 
If half of a university loses its power, the consequences would be chaotic. All of 
the things that we rely on, technology-wise, are huge. It regulates the temperature 
in this room, it regulates lighting, um, communications. Basically, you can’t do 
any type of business any more. We cannot communicate with a person in the next 
building if we were used to communicating through email or something else. 
Online courses… It could be harmful. Look at the computers that regulate air 
traffic control. All computerized; hospitals too. A big thing in the medical field is 
that a doctor gets called at 2 o’clock in the morning. He doesn’t run in anymore to 
check on a patient. He logs on to his computer; he can even see the patient, 
interact with them. If that computer system goes down, the life support of that 
patient could be in jeopardy. Anything that is considered “critical infrastructure” 
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with the U.S. probably has some type of technology component to it. If 
technology and computer networks are attacked, if critical infrastructures are 
attacked, it would have a devastating impact on us. 
Based on the words “harmful” in the middle of this excerpt and “devastating” in 
the last sentence, it is obvious from the participant’s account that “if half of a university 
loses its power,” if a cyber attack targets “computers that regulate air traffic control,” and 
if “anything that is considered ‘critical infrastructure’ with the U.S. probably has some 
type of technology component to it,” the consequences could be, as the participant tells us 
in the first sentence, “chaotic.” What this means is that the impact of a major 
cyberterrorist incident would not only be chaotic for society; it would also generate a 
postmodern state of chaos. This resembles the state of disorder that was expected to be 
set in motion by the predicted Y2K computer crisis, causing widespread social confusion. 
As all thirteen excerpts will tell us, the potential for cyberterrorism to create mass chaos 
and insecurity in a society is there. 
What this description also indicates is that the postmodern chaos of the electronic 
world is such that our reliance on critical infrastructures vastly exceeds our ability to 
protect them. As the participant reveals, hospitals are computerized; if a computer system 
in a hospital goes down, the life support of a patient could be in jeopardy. We do have 
reliable technology, but it is not sufficiently secure. For this reason, a postmodern state of 
chaos implies that, since our infrastructures rely so much on technology, crippling these 
technologies would cripple an entire nation. Plus, we would not know how to respond. 
We might not even understand the causes. Computers control things: from hospitals to 
power plants, from universities to telephones, from critical infrastructures to a million 
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other crucial elements of life. Disruptions in any one of these can easily cause loss of life 
or widespread chaos.  
In effect, the cyberterrorist will make certain that the population of a nation will 
not be able to eat, to drink, to move, or to live. Conventional terrorists cannot do that 
because their weapons of warfare are modernist. Could they cripple the United States by 
flying two airplanes into buildings? No. Could they harm even a state by blowing up five 
police departments? No. Even if history records that our emergency responses are slow to 
massive conventional terrorist attacks, they still operate in a modernist perspective, where 
there is a time sequence, a cause-and-effect order, and where humans can move and 
respond in actual physical space. Responders can see what happened and better predict 
what could happen in the future. However, the possibilities in cyberspace and 
cyberterrorism are quasi unlimited. As a former FBI agent discussed in an interview, 
“tactics and weapons in cyberspace are invented, literally, every day.” The game between 
cyberterrorists and their opponents is evolutionary; it’s almost surreal. Cyber forensics 
experts have to learn from cyberterrorists and go from there. The next excerpt, taken from 
an account told by a cyber forensics expert in the Southwestern part of the United States, 
corroborates this previous short statement on the capabilities of cyberterrorists:  
Cyberterrorists are amazingly talented people and you’ll get to the end of the 
analysis sometimes when you finally figure out what the premise of some of their 
routine is or some of their tools. You just sit down and you say, “Oh, my god. 
This is good.” Sometimes, you don’t even know what a computer virus has done. 
You only see the immediate effects on the system, but it can come back next year 
and wreak havoc. Cyberterrorists do things that are unimaginable, and that 
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happens on a daily basis. We can’t predict the kind of chaos they can do; it’s not 
like conventional warfare. 
The problem, the participant says, is that even cyber forensics experts sometimes 
do not know what a computer virus has done. The postmodern state of chaos could be a 
step-by-step process where the chaos stops after a few steps (i.e., a situation where a 
computer virus was launched and we only see “the immediate effects on the system”) and 
then reemerges to propagate terror even more and to shutdown a considerable fraction of 
a whole infrastructure network (“it can come back next year and wreak havoc”). This, 
again, is very postmodern. The chaos that results could be gigantic. The cyberterrorist can 
plant a virus that wreaks havoc for one week, then that stops, and then that manifests 
itself one year later to wreak havoc on computers again. In essence, a computer virus can 
be programmed to function at a certain time or only if a certain condition is met. No 
physical time bomb could do that; once it explodes, it explodes. It will not reemerge 
some time later. While conventional weapons are analog – that is, used in a linear 
sequential order – postmodern cyber weapons are digital – that is, they are not based on a 
continuous analog order. Besides, what is also problematic is that law enforcement agents 
and those in charge with the protection of a nation do not have warnings as they do with 
respect to physical terrorist attacks. They will unlikely be able to stop the cyber attacker 
since he or she is most likely on the other side of the world. 
The postmodern aspect of cyberterrorism is also demonstrated in the fact that 
cyber attackers can win without ever firing a shot. As for the impact of cyberterrorism, 
Garrison (2003) mentions weapons of mass disruption as means to cause damage to the 
infrastructure of a society. Cyberterrorism is successful at making the attack as short as 
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possible, but the impact as long-lasting as possible. Disruption is a vital element of the 
postmodern state of chaos associated with cyberterrorism. This is well exemplified in the 
excerpt below, selected from the same participant (the previous cyber forensics expert in 
the Southwestern part of the United States): 
If you take out the traffic management system in San Antonio, many things would 
happen: cameras go down, the police have trouble responding, lights go down, 
accidents, freeway management goes down. It could easily cause mass chaos on 
the traffic system. There are so many ways imaginable. Those cyberterrorists 
could theoretically do it. Water control, they can easily open up dam point gates, 
flood a city and blow it down. Those cyberterrorists out there try to create a new 
world order and wreak havoc to such a degree that our nation’s infrastructure will 
get dreadfully damaged. 
Postmodern terror implies that cyber attacks make chaos more chaotic. Via a 
computer, “those cyberterrorists could theoretically do it. Water control, they can easily 
open up dam point gates, flood a city and blow it down.” This statement may not be as 
dramatic as collapsing tall buildings or massive deadly syndromes, but the destructive 
potential of cyberterrorism is no less catastrophic (“It could easily cause mass chaos on 
the traffic system”). All in all, it has the capability to lead to unprecedented chaos and 
destruction with a few clever strokes of a computer keyboard. While modern terrorist 
attacks are certainly devastating, imagine the panic and overreaction that might ensue if 
one day our country underwent mass power outages, failures of street lights, and chaos in 
other crucial facilities. Any service run by an automated computer system is at risk: 
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systems that control airline traffic, transportation systems, water and oil pipelines, and 
similar infrastructures. 
Another relevant concept in this excerpt is “new world order” (“Those 
cyberterrorists out there try to create a new world order”). “New world order” became a 
catchphrase in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union broke up, the Berlin Wall was 
demolished, the two parts of Germany were reunified, and a variety of other events 
occurred. “New world order” was widely accepted by the global media as evidence that 
the world was seeing a new horizon and was made into a new, international order 
different from and better than the previous one. Yet, “new world order” is also a term that 
refers to the joining of forces by powerful and secretive individuals or groups to overturn 
the existing “order,” that is, the system of law or government in place. As it was 
described in the accounts selected in the analysis of RQ1, networks of cyberterrorists are 
both powerful and secretive. Based on diverse cyberterrorists’ motives, their networks 
might be based on a secret agenda to eventually control the world of computers and cause 
chaos. A “new world order” in this context would happen through postmodern attacks 
and tactics that would catch everybody off-guard, something that our world has never 
seen before. This would imply a dramatic overturn in society, like a full-scale apocalypse. 
The next excerpt was taken from an account told by computer crime analyst in a police 
department: 
 Cyberterrorism is all messed up. It’s not like the war on drugs, where we launch a 
raid on people after we find out where they are. It’s always the same. We’ve been 
doing it for years. But, I mean, hackers and cyberterrorists, we don’t know where 
to find them. Our fight against them is not consistent. It’s fought in the dark. The 
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methods they use are new and they’re always changing, and because of that, if 
they hit us with big-time viruses, there would be massive disorder, something 
we’ve never seen before. 
Here, significant concepts are being used to illustrate the postmodern state of 
cyberterrorism. Because their “fight against them is not consistent,” as opposed to the 
war on drugs that is “always the same,” it implies that there is a lack of continuity or 
coherent sequence. By the same token, the “methods they use are new and they’re always 
changing.” As such, the postmodern theatre of war may be fundamentally changed by the 
Information Age revolution, at both the strategic and tactical levels (Peters, 2004). 
Postmodernism implies a reality that is shifting (“always changing”) and evolving. The 
war on cyberterrorism is evolutionary because cyberspace allows this. Cyberspace 
implies that cyberterrorism is “fought in the dark.” What this also means is that modern 
terrorism is dealt with in a modern way; it is not based on de-structured and de-centered 
tactics. However, with postmodernism, the idea of disorder and fragmentation is viewed 
as an acceptable representation of reality. More importantly, according to the participant, 
“if they hit us with big-time viruses, there would be massive disorder, something we’ve 
never seen before.” The postmodern state of chaos could be triggered by computer 
viruses which, on the market, could be launched for free. No single war fought in the 
modern perspective has ever been fought for free. The next excerpt corroborates some of 
the statements made earlier with respect to mass chaos: 
Space and time don’t matter. The Internet is all over the world. If anything is 
connected to the Internet, it’s vulnerable at some point. Everything is at stake, 
your water supply, your electricity, your basic necessities of life. If we didn’t have 
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electricity, it would be mass chaos. Look at your critical infrastructure. 
Vulnerable? Yes, I think everything is vulnerable. 
This excerpt has several implications. First, cyberspace is a manifestation of the 
postmodern condition (Gur-Ze’ev, 2000) because postmodernism rejects all boundaries 
(“The Internet is all over the world”). Cyberterrorism is global and exceptionally fast and 
mobile. In highlighting the danger of cyberterrorism, Pillar (2001) points out the ease of 
movements across international boundaries and the growing potential for cyberterrorists 
to manoeuvre despite long distances. The space-time compression established by a 
postmodern communications environment (Lister et al., 2003) enables cyber attacks 
against the Internet and other computer networks to be carried out far away, making 
physical barriers irrelevant (“Space and time don’t matter”). Cyberspace is the new 
public sphere because it is all over the world, at any particular time or place (Zarefsky, 
1994). Consequently, the postmodern map of cyberspace becomes the totality itself, 
superseding the world. Cyberterrorism is also a postmodern strategy for spreading terror 
because it seemingly has no limits; no inside or outside.  
Second, without a doubt, cyber attacks can be waged via the Internet, which 
makes cyber targets extremely vulnerable (“If anything is connected to the Internet, it’s 
vulnerable at some point”). Anything that is connected to the Internet is so vulnerable 
that “everything is at stake, your water supply, your electricity, your basic necessities of 
life.” As a result, “if we didn’t have electricity, it would be mass chaos.” It’s a unique 
techno-challenge. Imagine the following: without networks controlled by computers, 
there would be no water coming out of our taps, there would be no electricity lighting our 
rooms, there would be no food being carried to our grocery stores, there would be no 
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monetary funds coming out of our banks, and there would be no emergency systems 
responding to emergencies. All this would be a postmodern state of chaos. As some 
participants recounted in previous sections, cyberterrorists’ motivations are more than 
feelings of “what can I do to try to invade someone’s space.” From the participants’ 
accounts, cyberterrorists motivations are really to cause havoc and chaos. 
The following statement is short; it was made by the associate head of an 
information technology center in the Midwestern part of the United States. For him, 
“cyberterrorism is real. The real difficult question is how to quantify it.” In other words, 
we can have a rough estimate of Al Qaeda members or even the victims of their terrorist 
acts. However, because of the anonymous and ubiquitous nature of cyberterrorism, we 
cannot have a similar type of assessment. If truth be told, it really is impossible to 
quantify cyberterrorism. As of January 2006, more than one billion people are using the 
Internet (Internet World Stats, 2006), which means that over one billion humans could 
launch a computer virus from anywhere and at any time. Are cyber enemies or 
cyberterrorists countable? No, or, at the very least, “hardly” countable. Even more, 
although chaos is quantifiable in the modernist realm (i.e., we could count the number of 
9/11 victims and the amount of damage inflicted on 9/11), chaos cannot be quantified in 
the postmodern state of things. If “everything is at stake,” is it measurable? No, such 
chaos could not be measured. Our dams, our electricity, our water supply, our essential 
infrastructures, basically, our life could be compromised by cyber attacks. Is it 
quantifiable? No, but it is still very real. For this reason, the state of chaos that could be 
inflicted by cyberterrorism is very postmodern. The following excerpt comes from an 
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interview conducted with the chief information security officer at a Midwestern 
university and its regional campuses: 
Protecting the country against cyberterrorism is the same as protecting the country 
against terrorism or illegal intruders, with physical borders. The problem is that 
it’s hard for us to tell good zeros from bad zeros. Just because something is good 
yesterday does not mean it’s gonna be good tomorrow. With every new piece of 
technology comes a new way to try to exploit it. Even if we wanted to take the 
philosophy of trying to stop all the bad zeros at the “border,” it’s a never-ending 
process. We pride of ourselves of creating wonderful technology, but sometimes 
we feel that we’re shooting ourselves at the foot and that we suffer from it. 
Numerous implications can be inferred from this excerpt. First, the participant 
informs us that the “problem is that it’s hard for us to tell good zeros from bad zeros.” 
Game theory would apply well in this context. Let us take the example of the fight 
between the Red Brigades, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization active in Italy in the 
1970s (Ignazi, 2003; Lloyd, 2002), and their opponents, counter-terrorism agents. The 
Red Brigaders and their opponents were clear opponents. It was rarely difficult for any 
player of the game to tell who was who. The rules of the game were easier than those in 
cyberspace; the Red Brigaders and the counter-terrorism agents were taking actions 
against each other in a linear dialectical process. This was a battle fought in a modernist 
realm. Based on game theory, they were learning from each other’s strategies as they 
were taking actions and moving to the right locations. Because they fought in actual 
space, they were operating within physical borders. As such, it was difficult for any of 
those players to infiltrate their enemy’s “team.” However, on the Internet, there is so 
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much anonymity that it is hard to differentiate good zeros from bad zeros. It is not only 
difficult to tell what game the cyber attacker is playing; it is also difficult to determine 
who the other player is or what his or her ulterior goal is. Is the other player a good zero 
or a bad zero? Is the other player a real danger or is it actually one of our agents acting as 
a cyber spy? Because of the postmodern nature of the Internet, because of the absence of 
spatiality, because of the negation of geometry, and because of the shift away from 
spatialization, the players in this postmodern fight between cyberterrorists and their 
opponents can move effortlessly across the spatial divide.  
Second, as the participant shared with me, “with every new piece of technology 
comes a new way to try to exploit it.” For every wall, there is a ladder. We are vulnerable 
to the technologies upon which we rely. There are always soft spots. No matter how high 
we build a wall, it can be reached by helicopter. Postmodernism implies this never-
ending process; it is ceaseless, uninterrupted in time, ad infinitum, long continuing. 
Defensive measures in the modernist world, on the other hand, have clear boundaries. Let 
us take the example of Homeland Security. Its governmental actions made to prevent, 
detect, and respond to acts of terrorism can, one day, reach a certain scope, to such a 
point that no terrorist attack will be successful at all. In fact, today it is already much 
more difficult for terrorists to commit horrendous acts in certain parts of the United 
States. In addition to the emergency response initiatives put into place, we also have 
those domestic intelligence activities (largely today within the FBI), protections of 
critical infrastructures, border security and transportation security measures, biodefense 
programs, and detection mechanisms for nuclear and radiological materials (Kamien, 
2005). The list can go further and further.  
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Third, related to the same statement, “with every new piece of technology comes 
a new way to try to exploit it,” for every technology, there is a hole and “even if we 
wanted to take the philosophy of trying to stop all the bad zeros at the ‘border,’ it’s a 
never-ending process.” We can stop the bad zeros today, but new technologies will have 
new soft spots and new bad zeros will emerge. Likewise, cyberterrorists will try to find 
these new soft spots. The fight will always be evolving, but it will never end. Both sides 
will become better at it, but the courses of action against each other will never end. All 
this can lead to a postmodern state of chaos. Based on game theory, it is really an 
evolutionary battle that never finds an outcome or end-result. And unconcluded wars or 
wars without ending are very chaotic. Even if one player thinks they have found an 
outcome, the outcome might be different tomorrow. To support this last statement, it is 
worth looking into what the participant said in the indented excerpt selected above: “Just 
because something is good yesterday does not mean it’s gonna be good tomorrow.” Law 
enforcement agents think they got the bad zeros out, but it might be the case that they got 
the wrong “bad zeros” or that the battle is simply not over.  
Fourth, the methods of counter-terrorism that domestic and international agents 
have perfected over the decades are ineffectual against cyberterrorists. Let us look at it 
this way: cyberterrorists do not attack us with truckloads of explosives, briefcases of 
Sarin gas (Sharp, 2006), or dynamite sticks strapped to the bodies of fanatics. 
Cyberterrorists attack with algorithms (i.e., ones and zeros) at locations where we are 
most vulnerable and where our lives depend on. And it is so convenient, cheap, and 
innovative. The multidimensional and slippery facets of postmodernism constitute this 
innovation; anything goes with anything, like a game without ending. That is very 
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chaotic. Cyberterrorism constitutes a powerful lens through which to view the emergence 
of postmodern conflict in cyberspace fought within the context of “intellectual 
technology” (Bell, 1973). Simply put, intellectual technology means that bad zeros 
[algorithms (problem-solving rules)] are substituted for intuitive tactics (Bell, 1973). 
Making a comparison between postmodern cyberterrorism and modern warfare, it is the 
same as saying that mips – that is, millions of computer instructions per second (Gruman, 
2005) – are substituted for muscular might. 
Lastly, the postmodern state of chaos is representative of our being the slaves of 
the technologies that we have created. As the participant tells us at the end of the 
indented excerpt in question, “we pride of ourselves of creating wonderful technology, 
but sometimes we feel that we’re shooting ourselves at the foot and that we suffer from 
it.” This is a throwback to the argument made by Donald Norman (1993) that society has 
fallen into a machine-centered orientation to life, one that overemphasizes the needs of 
technology. Our technology is wonderful when it fulfills our needs. As Norman (1993) 
contends, we create technologies and build machines. What we build makes us smart, 
even smarter. When designed well, technologies help us do important accomplishments 
and provide us with affordances for desired behaviors and outcomes. Yet, as the 
participant recounts, “we feel that we’re shooting ourselves at the foot.” We devote a lot 
of time and effort into building machines that can hurt us, to such a point that today we 
serve our technologies (Norman, 1993). As the participant says, now we “suffer from it.” 
For Heidegger (1977), we have reached the edge of the “supreme danger,” that is, of 
succumbing to the limited vision of technology. Cyberterrorism perfectly exemplifies all 
this; the notion that our technologies can hurt us when they are targeted. We are proud of 
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technology, we rely on the Internet and computer systems, but the vision we have of 
technology can be limited as our blind reliance on technology can be turned against us, to 
the degree of creating an unprecedented mass chaos. Cyberterrorists know this.  
 The next excerpt is an addition to the previous one, also dealing with the “never-
ending” facet of cyberterrorism and computer technologies. It was taken from an 
interview conducted with a computer crime analyst in a cyber forensics lab at a 
Midwestern university: 
Every time we create a new technology, something vulnerable occurs. There are 
new holes to patch. The Internet reduces naiveté; it reduces a lot of the ethical 
boundaries. Cyberterrorism is there; we’ll always have it. Every time something 
new is created, we’re gonna have another hole. 
The statements made by this participant reinforce the statements made by the 
previous participant. “Every time we create a new technology,” the participant says, 
“something vulnerable occurs.” From this vantage point, the possibilities for 
cyberterrorists to create chaos are tantamount to the vulnerabilities provided by 
technology. In other words, the probabilities of cyber attacks increase as the 
vulnerabilities of our technologies increase. With new technologies, “there are new holes 
to patch.” Based on game theory, this evolutionary process is produced by an ongoing 
conflict of chaos, which will never be totally resolved or put to an end. For this reason, it 
is never-ending (“Cyberterrorism is there; we’ll always have it. Every time something 
new is created, we’re gonna have another hole”). Another problem, our participant 
continues, is that cyberterrorists have the upper hand because they have no ethical 
standards (i.e., the Internet is a good means for them because it “reduces a lot of the 
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ethical boundaries”), which seems that the game law enforcement agents and cyber 
forensics experts are involved in has to be played by the standards determined by the 
cyberterrorists. Cyberterrorists, then, are the ones making the rules.  
The next excerpt emphasizes the ambiguous and confusing aspects of the Internet. 
Because of so much anonymity and openness in cyberspace, cyberterrorists turn the 
Internet to their advantage, as this associate professor and chair of a cyber forensics 
program in a department of computer and information technology at a Midwestern 
university conferred to me: 
I believe cyberterrorism is dangerous. The fact is that much of our infrastructure 
now, the things that we need the most, electricity, water, are run, powered, and 
managed by computers. Anybody that can attack or take those systems down is a 
serious threat. And it just takes a few keystrokes. Much of our business, our 
financial situation, our commerce, is all done on the Internet. Financially, it can 
be a big problem if those networks were taken down. Not only wouldn’t we be 
able to respond to information warfare attacks but, also, in most cases we 
wouldn’t know where those attacks come from, and we wouldn’t know whom to 
retaliate against. All that stuff is ambiguous and confusing. 
The advantages of a cyber attack over a physical attack are evident. A cyber 
attack can be executed from a remote site and a few keystrokes (i.e., anybody can attack 
“and it just takes a few keystrokes”); the chance of detection is much smaller than a 
terrorist setting a time bomb in a shopping mall or in a public bus. Would a cyberterrorist 
have a crack at gaining entry to the Federal Reserve building or another of those bonanza 
buildings? It is very unlikely since failure is almost guaranteed. Likewise, a large truck 
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pulling alongside a building like these is very noticeable. Nevertheless, in the case of a 
cyberterrorist, the attacker is sitting in his or her room, probably in a remote location, 
attempting to make a nation’s economic system grind to a halt. The chances for such 
destabilization are more achievable. The cyber attack can be more flexible than a brute 
force physical attack (again “it just takes a few keystrokes”). The leverage can be much 
greater than for a physical attack (“Much of our business, our financial situation, our 
commerce, is all done on the Internet. Financially, it can be a big problem if those 
networks were taken down”). Such chaos is very postmodern. 
What this all means is that the modern, physical world is matter and energy –
warm and cold, time and space, all physical matter; bombs and airplanes, all physical 
matter as well. It is that world in which humans are raised, live, and function. The virtual 
world is not made of matter and energy; it is postmodern; it is that world in which 
computer programs function and data move. From a logical standpoint, placing bombs at 
different locations and at the same time requires at least one operative per location. On 
the other hand, planting a devastating virus into thousands of connected computers at 
dispersed sites may take a few keystrokes and only one operative on another continent. 
This form of terror is very postmodern. So is the chaos thereof. Cyberterrorism, our 
participant discloses, threatens the global economy (i.e., “Financially, it can be a big 
problem if those networks were taken down”). This is a throwback to the potential Y2K 
catastrophe mentioned earlier. A cyberterrorist will disrupt “much of our business, our 
financial situation, our commerce,” all of which is “done on the Internet.” The chaos 
would also be a situation where the citizens of a country lose their confidence in the 
nation’s economic system.  
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In line with these contentions, the postmodern chaos is demonstrated in the fact 
that, should a major cyber attack emerge, “not only wouldn’t we be able to respond to 
information warfare attacks but, also, in most cases we wouldn’t know where those 
attacks come from, and we wouldn’t know whom to retaliate against.” From this, it 
follows that, since law enforcement and cyber forensics experts might not be able to 
respond to a major cyber attack, there would be no means of signaling an alert of that 
cyber attack to the rest of a nation. This is a postmodern challenge that humans have to 
face. As it turns out, the literature shows that, as a matter of fact, there is a shortage of 
qualified and trained personnel to detect and respond directly to cyberterrorist attacks 
(Mecham, 2002). More precisely, even though our country has cyber forensics experts 
and computer crime analysts working for law enforcement agencies like the FBI or the 
CIA, there are an insufficient number of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel able to 
protect the nation against cyberterrorist attacks. Given these facts, let us picture ourselves 
in a situation where systems go down simultaneously; electricity shuts down, phone lines 
fail, 911 emergency services are grinded to a halt, and other incidents.  
Such is the chaos that we can all encounter in a postmodern state of affairs, giving 
us more deconstructions than constructions, more of a fragmented landscape than one of 
wholeness, and more questions than answers. For this reason, “all that stuff is ambiguous 
and confusing,” says our participant. By “ambiguous” and “confusing,” postmodernism is 
held to the very notion that it has a de-structured, de-centered reality that is also 
fragmented. So, postmodernism accepts the possibility of ambiguity. Ambiguity implies 
that reality (i.e., things and events) can have two different meanings simultaneously. A 
modernist and linear approach is set to avoid or reduce ambiguity as much as possible. 
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Postmodernism, in contrast, embraces simultaneous views not as conflicting but as being 
part of the complex patterning of reality (Derrida, 1967). Accordingly, cyberterrorism is 
to be understood form the standpoint that, for the past several years, part of the paradigm 
of modernist conflict has shifted to that of postmodern chaos, that is, a state of ambiguity, 
complexity, de-structuration, deconstruction, discontinuity, and the negation of other 
modernist aspects of the real. 
Of equal relevance is the fact that the postmodern nature of the Internet is such 
that, according to our participant, “we wouldn’t know whom to retaliate against.” In fact, 
postmodernism can dilute the very notion of friend and enemy because, as another 
participant communicated to me, “on the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Hence, 
this opposite extreme facilitates the replacement of modern order by postmodern chaos. 
In cyberspace, whom are we dealing with, after all? Who is who? As a computer crime 
specialist with the National White Collar Crime Center said, “it’s very difficult to 
categorize people as cyberterrorists or the ‘good guys.’ You don’t always know who’s 
who.” In today’s postmodern terrorism, the human dimension is taken away from the 
enemy. The postmodern enemy can appear in many guises. Cyberterrorists are held up as 
the invisible, irrational enemies capable of incalculable damage. They are more 
mysterious than enemies we have seen before. Postmodern cyberterrorism entails fighting 
with the mysterious and in mysterious ways. Also mysterious, and certainly problematic 
is that, as a participant from the South asserted, “the Internet has no center.” This means 
that, because the Internet negates geometry (Mitchell, 1995), cyber attacks come from no 
center. The postmodern state of chaos represents that very state of de-spatialization and 
de-structuration mentioned earlier. The next excerpt, selected from the interview with the 
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same computer crime specialist with the National White Collar Crime Center, is partly a 
follow-up argument that nobody knows who is who on the Internet: 
Anybody can use a computer to commit a crime. They can do it everywhere 
throughout the world. A cyberterrorist can create a two-hour outage during which 
emergency services are impaired or ambulances are not getting a heart-attack 
victim to a vital destination on time. Every time you interrupt the communication 
flow, that’s a problem because there is a certain amount of communication that 
takes place on an infrastructure that people’s lives depend on. Another thing is 
what appears as innocuous on the surface and not as something malicious. 
From this excerpt, it follows that we do not have to examine the international 
scene in order to identify potential sources of cyber attacks. The sources are from 
everywhere (“They can do it everywhere throughout the world”) and from every web 
user (“Anybody can use a computer to commit a crime”). A single individual, working in 
a private home and taking advantage of commercially available hardware and software, is 
capable of committing acts that can yield to the economic and social chaos described so 
far. Besides, if cyberterrorists can launch attacks from anywhere, they can potentially 
frame other people for their evildoing. Truly, information technology makes time and 
distance senseless and leads to the disconcerting condition of “everywhere throughout the 
world.” Now, the modernist symbiosis set by time and space is being disassembled. The 
results are both profound and far-reaching. They lead to vulnerability and volatility.  
The participant’s other statements not only pertain to the danger of cyber attacks 
(i.e., “a two-hour outage”), but also to the seemingly harmless aspect of what can be done 
in cyberspace (“Another thing is what appears as innocuous on the surface and not as 
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something malicious”). Kevin Mitnick’s (2002) book, The Art of Deception, is an account 
of how tactics that look innocuous can actually be very malicious. This book is 
essentially about earning someone’s trust by deceiving them and then abusing that trust 
for malevolent purposes. The postmodern state of chaos can be amplified by what will be 
explained later – in the second theme – as “social engineering.” The next excerpt, taken 
from a cyber forensics expert in the Southwestern part of the United States, emphasizes 
the dangers for computers of having all threads and infrastructures to be connected to the 
Internet: 
The targets can become primary, secondary or tertiary victims. Targets are going 
to be the critical infrastructures, which is going to be your telecommunications, 
your hydroelectric, your oil, your gas, your hospital, your air traffic control, your 
transportation. All these have connections on the Internet, whether these 
infrastructures are the primary infrastructures or not. They all have threads, they 
all have connections. 
Without a doubt, the full potential of cyberterrorism is a possibility that should 
concern us. The participant tells us that “the targets can become primary, secondary or 
tertiary victims.” What is of equal concern is that our interconnectivity (“threads”) is 
what makes us vulnerable (i.e., all these infrastructures “have connections on the Internet, 
whether these infrastructures are the primary infrastructures or not”). Now we know it: 
those with a high degree of computer knowledge can use those connections and threads 
against us. As a result, the threats to critical infrastructures go beyond those of physical 
attacks. For the past couple of years, each of the infrastructure sectors has gradually more 
relied on the Internet, information systems, and computer networks for their operations. 
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The interconnected nature of our infrastructure sectors drastically amplifies the impacts 
of service disruptions. Major troubles or disorders that start at the local level or in one 
sector are more likely than ever before to cascade at the regional or national levels. As a 
result, they would severely impact multiple sectors of the economy.  
For this reason, the following accounts pertain to the “cascading failures” caused 
by the destruction of one node (that is, the knocking down of one actor in the network; be 
it a critical infrastructure or an important hub in the system) that has been attacked by a 
cyberterrorist. Such cascading failures, or “ripple effects,” or even, simply, “cascades,” 
could contribute tremendously to the postmodern state of chaos associated with 
cyberterrorism. The first of these accounts, coming from an IT Security Analyst II (or 
assistant IT Security Analyst), reveals the dangers of computer viruses and the cascading 
failures that result from those viruses: 
You’re familiar with Code Red that came out in 2001? Basically, it was a virus 
attack against computers running Microsoft’s IIS web server, you know, a whole 
bunch of workstations connected to the Internet. What you had was a cascading 
failure to a certain degree. Some of the adjacent and connected systems became 
failures too. I don’t think the cyberterrorists brought down what they really 
wanted. Eventually we recovered from the attack, but it could have been 
disastrous for the Internet.  
What this excerpt is revealing is that the probability of cyberterrorism bringing 
down the Internet is real and that the technical achievability has been already 
demonstrated to us, at least partially (“What you had was a cascading failure to a certain 
degree”). Our participant recounts that what provoked this partial cascade failure was a 
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virus named Code Red. The literature says that Code Red was a computer virus launched 
in the summer 2001 that caused an estimated $2.4 billion in damage (Acohido, 2002). 
The effects of Code Red would have been even more damaging, leading to a postmodern 
state of chaos (“it could have been disastrous for the Internet”). The word “disastrous” is 
in the same ballpark as the work “chaotic” stated in previous excerpts. Here, the virus 
could have been dreadful, affecting the entire Internet and, in the same process, every 
vulnerable machine connected to the Internet. Berghel (2001) contends that the Code Red 
virus infected more than 250,000 systems. The virus crawled over the Internet, mixed up 
important vulnerable systems, and infected other programs connected to those systems. 
The result was a cascading failure.  
From a social network theory perspective, this Code Red incident demonstrates 
that if one large node (hub) is brought down, other large nodes (hubs) in the network can 
suffer as well. A cascading failure is a failure in a system of interconnected nodes, where 
the service provided is contingent upon the operation of a preceding node, and the failure 
of a preceding node can trigger the failure of successive nodes (Newth & Ash, 2004). An 
example of cascading failure happened on August 10, 1996 in a western United States 
power grid. As it turned out, everybody was affected by it (Barabasi, 2002). More 
precisely, in the summer of 1996 in Oregon, a mixture of hot weather and unusually high 
demand of electricity made power lines sag into trees, causing a cascade failure of power 
stations and distribution substations. It also affected infrastructures and power supplies in 
the neighboring states. Barabasi (2002) calls this destructive step-by-step process a flow 
of internal failures. If the major part of a network is destroyed, it can induce a cascading 
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failure in the form of internal chaos in a network. For instance, in a power transmission 
grid, each node (power station) deals with a load of power. The removal of nodes, either  
by random breakdown or intentional attacks, alters the balance of flows and provokes a 
global redistribution of loads all over the network. In turn, this can trigger a flow of 
internal failures. 
For a cascading failure to be successful, the attack that leads to it must be well 
thought out (Berghel, 2001). The Code Red virus attack exploited a large node, that is, a 
specific software weakness in one of the tons of servers and workstations connected to 
the Internet. That weakness was exploited to create the 2001 cascading failure; the Code 
Red virus provoked a self-replicating failure that induced additional failures (Metz, 
2004). In other words, based on the tenets of social network theory, a single point of node 
failure on a fully loaded network can result in a sudden spike across all nodes of the 
network. Recall that the attacked node has to be as large as a hub in order to have 
consequences on the others [i.e., sending a destructive virus against a hub (Barabasi & 
Albert, 1999)], because small node failures like random node failures are merely drops in 
the ocean. The network connectivity of the Internet – and hence its functionability – is 
such that the Internet is robust against random failure of nodes (Albert, Jeong, & 
Barabasi, 2000) and to some extent is even robust against intentional attacks. However, 
the Internet, where the load represents the amount of information a node (router) is 
requested to transmit per unit of time (and overloads correspond to congestion), can 
collapse, to a certain degree, caused by congestion. Such incidents have been reported 
since the very inception of the Internet (Barabasi, 2002). Part of the reason is that, as 
Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000) have contended, there is a very small average distance 
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between nodes on the Internet, as well as a highly organized distribution of links per 
node. Rarely will the average distance be affected by the removal of a random number of 
nodes. Nevertheless, it will increase significantly if the removed nodes are among the 
most connected ones (Watts 1999a, 1999b). 
Fortunately, so far, cascading failures have been limited to only ten thousands of 
sites (i.e., 250,000 from the Code Red virus). The problem is that, based on what the 
participant reveals in the excerpt selected previously, the effects of the cyberterrorist 
actions could be far more disastrous for the Internet. When the cyberterrorists approach 
the study of Internet weaknesses in a planned and concerted manner, and if their attacks 
become fully successful, they could create a postmodern state of chaos, like a cyber 9/11. 
In fact, another participant (a senior analyst engineer in computer forensics) expressed his 
concern about the possibility of a postmodern state of chaos when he said that “one day, 
we might have our cyber 9/11.” The “cyber 9/11” statement termed by this participant 
perfectly exemplifies chaos. This adds to other excerpts, selected at the beginning of this 
theme, that have described the dangers of cyberterrorist attacks against the Internet, 
power plants, electrical power grids, and other critical infrastructures, all of which can 
have a deep impact on our lives as they depend on those infrastructures. Here, the main 
argument is that something needs to be done or the consequences will be a “cyber 9/11” 
or, as the theme indicates, a postmodern state of chaos. The following excerpt reveals the 
type of devastation that can be created if there were a successful attack against a few hubs 
in a scale-free network. This excerpt was selected from an account told by an associate 
professor specializing in social network theory at a Midwestern university: 
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The Internet is a network that’s scale-free. If you were to create a map of the 
Internet, you would come to the conclusion that the Internet is just a large bunch 
of hubs, you know, like routers and that all that kind of stuff. The Internet is very 
susceptible to cyber attacks on those hubs, the kind of thing cyberterrorists like to 
do. It’s also heterogeneous, you damage a few of those hubs and the rest falls too. 
We saw earlier that the Internet is a scale-free network because it can support 
most random node failures (Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003). In other words, the Internet 
is not a random network where a small number of random failures can create its collapse. 
Rather, it is a scale-free network that tolerates random failures up to 80% of its nodes 
before it gets destroyed. Yet, because the “Internet is just a large bunch of hubs,” as the 
participant tells us, it follows that the “Internet is very susceptible to cyber attacks on 
those hubs, the kind of thing cyberterrorists like to do.” The participant’s account is 
consistent with the scientific proof that scale-free networks are tremendously vulnerable 
to cyber attacks on their hubs. Indeed, attacks that eliminate even a small amount of 
important nodes (hubs) in a scale-free network like the Internet can break it apart (Keller, 
2005). For this reason, simultaneity of a cyber attack on selected hubs could be extremely 
chaotic. This is the postmodern nature of cyberwar.  
Another important concept stated in this excerpt is the word “heterogeneous.” 
Cascading failures only occur in heterogeneous networks (“It’s also heterogeneous, you 
damage a few of those hubs and the rest falls too”), not in homogeneous networks. The 
basis for this is the non-homogeneity of the nodes in the network; failures are much more 
likely to occur on nodes that are quite small (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). Thus, 
from a social network perspective, cascading failures only occur in heterogeneous 
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networks, that is, networks where few nodes have the capacity for high-loads (or, simply 
put, hubs) and where the rest of the nodes only have the capacity for low-loads (that is, 
small nodes). Another reason the Internet is a heterogeneous network lies in the fact that 
heterogeneous networks connect computers and other machines with different operating 
systems and protocols. For instance, LANs (local area networks) that connect Microsoft 
Windows and Linux-based PCs with Apple Macintosh computers are heterogeneous 
(Zivkovic et al., 2005). Hence, a homogeneous network does not suffer cascading failures 
because all its nodes handle an equal load. Unfortunately, most infrastructure networks 
nowadays – since they rely on information technologies and the Internet – are 
heterogeneous by design, which makes them very vulnerable or, as the participant 
informs us, “susceptible” (“The Internet is very susceptible to cyber attacks”). 
“Susceptible” is the right word here because vulnerability is the susceptibility of a 
network to fail under a cyber attack. The following excerpt was taken from an interview 
conducted with the chair of an information technology center at a Midwestern university: 
Cyberterrorism is there. Even the U.S. does not know how to deal with it right 
now. I see cyberterrorism to be a force multiplier. The first attacks that we will 
see will be the ones that will be devastating; attacks on critical cyber 
infrastructures in addition to attacks against traditional physical infrastructures. 
You blow a dam and you deregulate utilities industries (i.e., gas, water, 
electricity), you blow a plane and then you target the air traffic control and the 
other control systems so that you can’t even get the emergency responders. You 
basically increase the force of that attack by magnitudes. It’s like a cascading 
failure. 
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From this vantage point, the postmodern state of chaos could be a rapid process 
(“you blow a plane and then you target the air traffic control and the other control 
systems so that you can’t even get the emergency responders”). The cascading failure 
here is not caused by one hub affecting other hubs, as it was described in the previous 
accounts. Rather, in this excerpt, it is seen as a “force multiplier” (“You basically 
increase the force of that attack by magnitudes”). A force multiplier is a term used in the 
military that refers to a factor that dramatically amplifies – and hence multiplies – the 
combat effectiveness of a military force (Burkard, 1994). In this context, cyberterrorists 
can create a force multiplier by using both cyber attacks and conventional attacks 
(“attacks on critical cyber infrastructures in addition to attacks against traditional physical 
infrastructures”). A cascading failure will be the result from all the damage caused by the 
combination of the attacks.  
Truly, networks are a vital part of modern society (Strogatz, 2003). The 
breakdown of one hub can unbalance the flow of the network and, by the same token, 
cause load redistribution to other hubs or the nodes connected to the hub that was initially 
damaged (Motter & Lai, 2002). Social network theory treats network ties and nodes as 
having a random probability of failure. To be more precise, their failure [vulnerability] is 
the susceptibility to disruptions that can cause reductions in network service or the ability 
to use a particular network link (Berdica, 2000). In fact, in any network, the hubs are so 
crucial that when they are destroyed, the network breaks into pieces. More importantly, 
this dependence and contingence on hubs is a weakness for the Internet and other 
information networks because an attack against the hubs can be very harmful. 
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Sadly, these examples do not belong to the realm of science fiction. On the 
contrary, they are real and can be executed today. As the international community 
continues to rely increasingly on information technologies, it will become ever more 
possible for cyberterrorists to cause chaos, on and via the Internet, on a level previously 
adapted for weapons of mass destruction in actual physical space. The ubiquity of access 
to harmful cyber weapons and methods brings to mind that a number of cyberterrorists 
are able to launch the specter of an unanticipated and unprecedented massive-scale attack 
on critical infrastructures, one that may cripple vital targets like electrical power plants, 
gas and oil, banking and financial supplies, water supplies, and emergency services. 
Likewise, imagine the chaos that could result from a cyberterrorist launching malicious 
programs on military, transportation, and telecommunication networks. Information is 
disseminated broadly and rapidly (“And it just takes a few keystrokes”). One single-
handed cyberterrorist attack could cause the whole infrastructure of a country to crumble. 
Not only are the information technology means required for mass destruction so different 
from the WMDs (that we know in the physical world) that they are hardly computable or 
assessable, but, also, the possibilities of such deadly cyber weapons are very real. 
Because the modern world is so interconnected, a cyber attack at one point of the 
technological infrastructure can generate a disastrous cascading effect. For this reason, 
the main focus of the last part of this analysis was on cascading failures, that is, cascades 
caused by the removal of a single hub. The possibility of such chaos is well established. 
Cascading effects of destruction, even momentarily, of critical infrastructure systems 
such as power, communication, or emergency care, single-handedly or in conjunction 
with other attacks, have very much been the concern of governments and law 
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enforcement agencies. Their goal is to understand and protect our safety in the collective. 
The postmodern state of chaos could reach a high degree. What makes the possibility of 
technologies to be turned into weapons of mass disruption and confusion is that (1) 
cyberterrorist attacks can originate from anywhere, (2) there is a lack of qualified and 
trained personnel, even in law enforcement agencies, to respond, let alone identify, these 
attacks, and (3) there are no solid or dependable means to signal a cyber alert to the rest 
of the country. It is a postmodern challenge that humans have to face. Think of the chaos 
that could result from a cyber attack coordinated with a conventional strike, such as the 
bombing of an extremely densed area combined with the compromising of emergency 
systems (like those that tamper with hospitals and first-responders services for wounded 
civilians). That is our postmodern fear. It looks like humans have to live with the Y2K 
panic for the rest of their lives. In a sense, we all do. 
Social Engineering 
This theme is different from the previous theme of “postmodern state of chaos,” 
but it is equally relevant. We have seen that cyberterrorists attempt to find weak spots or 
exploit holes in computer systems in order to cause mass chaos. Cascading failures are a 
good example. Yet, cyberterrorists also use another tactic: social engineering. The theme 
of “social engineering” emerged in many of the accounts revealed by the participants. 
Social engineering is as old as humankind. It is defined as the manipulation, by an 
outsider, of an individual in order to obtain information from that individual or gain 
access to a particular location (Kopf, 1998). The main goal of the social engineer is to 
have control over a network or system. 
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The concept of social engineering was already discussed in the literature over 
sixty years ago. Karl Popper (1945), for instance, argues vehemently against social 
engineering, which he equates as manipulation and population control, as exemplified in 
the social engineering values of Nazism and Communism. For Popper, Nazism bases its 
social engineering values of control and manipulation on a national level, whereas 
Communism on an international level. For these reasons, Popper promotes a 
fundamentally different type of social engineering: “piecemeal social engineering.” This 
essential value of Popper is not to manipulate society, but to advocate changes in an open 
society and on an individual level (Popper, 1945). Popper is altruistic and wants to 
improve society. As he explains it, “Whatever his ends, he [man] tries to achieve them by 
small adjustments and re-adjustments which can be continually improved upon” (Popper, 
1961, p. 66). 
However, cyberterrorists, as opposed to Popper, are not altruistic and society-
oriented. On the contrary, they are selfish, terror-oriented, and manipulative (Matusitz & 
O’Hair, in press). Social engineering is one of their tactics to reach their ends. In order to 
be successful, the social engineer will target the weakest link in a network – the human 
being. As such, the social engineer will exploit human weaknesses such as ignorance, 
naiveté, and the natural propensity to be liked, helpful, and, above all, gullible and 
trustworthy (Erlanger, 2004). For the purpose of this analysis, we will limit ourselves to 
social engineering as described in the context of information technology and the Internet. 
Based on the accounts from various participants, the outsiders doing social engineering 
are cyberterrorists and other malicious hackers who use unimaginable tricks on a 
computer or web user in order to obtain the information they need. Their ultimate goal is 
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to control a computer or network in order to wreak havoc. One participant, an IT security 
analyst, expresses his view on social engineering: 
Social engineering is a huge aspect; it can apply to both computers and non-
computers. It’s basically humanized cyberterrorism. You convince somebody else 
to give you their password and you’ve got one piece of the puzzle by being 
logged into their network. This is what social engineering is. You learn who the 
player is so that you can actually break into the system more easily in order to 
control it and eventually destroy it. 
This participant clearly reveals that social engineering is an evil practice 
(“humanized cyberterrorism”) of obtaining vital information through the manipulation of 
Web users. Here, the cyberterrorist tricks people into revealing confidential information 
(“their password”) or getting them to take actions against typical policies (not to let any 
outsider into their network). Social engineering is the art of persuasion (“you convince 
somebody else to give you their password”). It is the art of getting humans to comply 
with one’s wishes (“you’ve got one piece of the puzzle”). As we will see in this section, 
by using a variety of manipulative techniques that abuse a human being’s natural 
propensity to trust and provide assistance to others, cyberterrorists can learn user names, 
passwords, ID information, names of key personnel, and other types of data that allow 
them to penetrate networks and control them – even those secured with highly advanced 
technology (Erlanger, 2004). Besides, the methods of social engineering use very low 
cost and low technology means to surmount obstacles posed by information security 
measures.  
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Regardless of the method used, the main objective is to convince the person 
disclosing the information that the social engineer is in fact a person that they can trust 
with that sensitive information. Because social engineering involves strategies of 
persuasion, tactics of manipulation, and different moves to capitalize on the victim’s 
ignorance and willingness to blindly trust strangers, social engineering is, in essence, a 
game. The description below, recounted from a participant who is an expert in cyber 
forensics, makes it very obvious: 
Social engineering is a game. Social engineering is when an attacker will use tools 
in addition to, uh, the traditional network to coordinate or launch an attack. They 
will lure the secretary, to get her provide secret information just as a password or 
ID. Social engineering is a convenience mechanism. The attacker will take a 
really good guess at what moves the secretary will make. Kevin Mitnick’s book, 
The Art of Deception, has a lot of examples like that. 
From this excerpt, it appears that “social engineering is a game.” Most of the 
work of social engineering is in the rules and preparation, rather than the attempt itself. 
Social engineering is a skill, and like any skill, the more one practices the game, the 
better one becomes. Practice makes perfect. Game theory can be briefly discussed here. 
Just like a chess game, social engineering is not a game of chance. It is based entirely on 
tactics and strategies. Game theory and chaos theory can be intersected here, particularly 
with respect to having specific rules. Indeed, chaos, in the face of initial perceptions that 
is it entirely random, has actually an inherently ordered and deterministic set of rules 
(Chamberlain, 1998; Freeman, 1991), just like a chess game. The success of the game is 
not influenced by some randomizing device; it is based on tactics, strategies, and, above 
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all, rules and preparation. In chaos theory, the future is prepared not by conceptualizing 
some place or time out on the horizon. Rather, the future is based on an individual’s next 
thoughts, words, or actions. It is not solely based on chance (Bright & Pryor, 2005). 
Likewise, social engineering is the appropriate method whenever the success of an 
individual depends on another individual. So, in this respect, game theory is an essential 
component of chaos theory. 
As we have just seen, the success of the game is not influenced by some 
randomizing device. Kevin Mitnick knew this. Kevin Mitnick is a former social engineer 
who, after being caught, served five years in prison (Shimomura & Markoff, 1996). He 
was convicted of Internet fraud and of breaking into the computer systems of Fujitsu, 
Motorola, Nokia, and Sun Microsystems (Littman, 1997). When he was released from jail 
in 2000, he wrote a seminal book on social engineering called The Art of Deception, with 
his friend William Simon (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Another reason social engineering is 
an important theme lies in the fact that social engineering is all about communication. It 
is the process of using social interactive skills to obtain critical information from a 
victim. The last four words of the next excerpt, from a cyber forensics expert in the 
Midwest, clearly demonstrate that social interactions are necessary for social engineering 
to be successful: 
They also utilize the social engineering skills. They could get in just enough to get 
the systems administrators information and then you start doing social 
engineering, contact them and say, “Hey, this is so and so…” “I’m working on 
your system; I need your password… so…” It seems to me they get a little piece 
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of the pie and they build on the blocks, those little pieces that they obtain, and one 
way to do that is social engineering. Social interaction is important. 
Indeed, “social interaction is important.” Social interaction is the set of behaviors 
and beliefs between individuals dependent upon the behavior and beliefs of one other and 
of other individuals. It is a dynamic, evolving sequence of social actions between people 
who alter their actions and reactions vis-à-vis their interactions with others (Mead, 1934).  
When humans interact in an environment, they do not do it in a vacuum. There are 
conventions and rules that constrain their social behavior. The same applies to 
cyberspace. Internet rules and conventions are intended to anticipate certain types of 
behavior among Web users. For this reason, dictionaries on Internet etiquette 
(“Netiquette”) abound in libraries and bookshops. Cyberterrorists know this. Since 
communication on the Internet is anonymous, this will be an advantage to them.  
Besides, social interactions in cyberspace – as in any other natural environment – 
are always evolving. This evolution can be lengthy. The main objective of the social 
engineer is to convince the victim that he or she is an individual that they can trust with 
vital information that the victim will give them. In order to do so, social engineers will 
seduce their target through a succession of pleasant exchanges, sometimes over an 
extended period of time (as the participant demonstrates it in this last excerpt, “they 
[cyberterrorists] get a little piece of the pie and they build on the blocks”). The easiest 
way for social engineers to earn trust is to be patient, get that “little piece of the pie,” and 
not ask suspicious questions. Social engineers who request sensitive information too 
quickly will be less successful than those who do not ask such suspicious questions. 
Hence, social engineers initiate a series of chats to obtain chunks of information at a time. 
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They will normally start by asking simple questions that look insignificant to the 
attacked. Such social interactions not only build trust between the victim and the cyber 
attacker; they also maintain the appearance of comfortable relationships. It can start with 
a simple conversation, for instance in a chat room. The chat room is used by 
cyberterrorists as a hub, a sort of central location in the network (Scott, 2004) where they 
can develop social interactions with victims-to-be. Essentially, cyberterrorists make 
cyberspace more user-friendly and receptive to their needs.  
The next excerpt makes obvious that the simplest and most popular means of 
social engineering is still human based. It can involve intense interpersonal 
communication and deception, using tactics such as pretense, impersonation, or 
masquerade. As the participant – the same cyber forensics expert from the Midwest 
mentioned earlier – recounts, 
cyberterrorists engage in social engineering more than we think we know because 
they are so good at it. They show up at Joe’s company and pretend to be network 
administrators or “repairmen.” How do you know if someone is a legitimate 
person or not? For years, we have trained customer service people to be nice, to 
be helpful. It’s perfect for a cyberterrorist. 
Using the tools of the trade such as asserting authority (i.e., pretending to be 
“network administrators”), they appear as legitimate individuals. As Vijayan (2005) 
continues the argument, social engineers will sometimes study the structure of a target 
organization so that they can be able to drop names of important employees in an attempt 
to gain credibility. Ultimately, it is no surprise that social engineers appear as legitimate 
persons. What the participant – cyber forensics expert – also reaches out to us is that 
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social engineering applies to the act of face-to-face manipulation in order to gain physical 
access to computer systems (i.e., “They show up at Joe’s company…”). Even face-to-face 
communication between individuals can be exploited; all it takes is to be a good liar 
(Denning, 2000). For the purpose of this analysis, a social engineer is, in essence, a liar, a 
con artist, a deceiver, and a manipulator. The following excerpt highlights the weakest 
link in a social network: the human. This short section was lifted from the transcription of 
an interview conducted with the associate head of a technology lab at a Midwestern 
university. As the participant recounts,  
because we have passwords, anti-virus programs, and the like, the weakest link 
may be the operator, the one you give a box of chocolates to. Social engineering 
means getting around the system through bribery or seduction, the art of being a 
con man.  
Social engineering is a practice that can be used to exploit what has long been 
considered the weakest link in the security chain of an organization – the human factor. 
From that participant’s account, the weakest link is the human (here, “the operator”). 
Because of this, social engineering is one of the cyberterrorist’s cleverest manipulations 
of the human tendency to be gullible or reliable. When the cyberterrorist develops trust 
with a user or befriends them, he or she is going to find it easier to talk them into what 
they want (Rohan & Donaldson, 2002). The literature even reports that, in some cases, 
cyberterrorists build trust with naïve users for weeks or even months (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). So, the first objective is to establish trust. How can it be done? As this participant 
puts it, one gives “a box of chocolates” to the operator. The skilled social engineer is a 
wolf in sheep’s clothing. As an evil manipulator, he or she acquires information very 
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slowly, doing small favors, and then, in turn, asks the victim for small favors (“through 
bribery or seduction”) or obtains information by means of outwardly innocent 
conversations.  
Kevin Mitnick explains it well. In the corporate world, employers are unlikely to 
assess a request thoroughly, so they take a mental shortcut (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). The 
reasoning follows that if a person calls an employee who is willing to help them solve a 
problem, that employee is on that person’s side and means no harm to them. By this 
method, cyberterrorists take advantage of the natural tendency of a human to trust their 
words or deeds (i.e., a box of chocolates), rather than solely exploiting computer security 
holes. Oddly enough, network administrators such as the operator mentioned in this last 
excerpt do not need to know the password of users. If they are ever asked for their 
password, it is always a social engineering attack. Yet, from the participants’ accounts, 
even operators fall into a trap. There is a well-recognized rule in social interactions that if 
someone gives someone else something or promises them something, that “someone 
else” should return the favor. This tends to be true even if the original gift was not 
requested or even if what is requested in return is far more valuable than what was 
originally given. This truth is known as “reciprocation” (Sagarin et al., 2002). 
What social engineering reveals is not just blind trust in strangers, but also human 
ignorance. From the accounts that are being told, social engineering relies on human 
incapacity to keep up with a culture that relies greatly on information technology. Social 
engineers rely on the fact that people are not aware of the value of the information they 
possess and are careless about protecting it. Lack of security awareness and lack of 
knowledge of information technology on the part of computer users make any computer 
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user the weakest link in the security chain, threatening the whole network. In other 
words, based on social network theory, when one node (i.e., secretary) in the network 
gives valuable information to a cyberterrorist, that node has become a hub because that 
node has become important to the cyberterrorist. Indeed, that node gave the cyber 
attacker vital information that they needed: password, ID, security information, and the 
like. As a result, the node-turned-into-hub can cause the network to be very vulnerable, 
leading to its destruction.  
Figure 7 (on the next page) shows a graph that represents an all-channel network 
(Leavitt, 1951) where, at the beginning, there are no hubs; there are just nodes. In this 
typical all-channel network, every actor can be connected to every other actor in the 
network; there is no central point that is at the hub or core of different connections, 
otherwise this type of network would be called the “star” or “wheel” network (Bavelas, 
1950). Up to the point where the social engineer attacks one of the nodes by manipulating 
them or convincing them to take certain actions that they would normally not do, there is 
no “most prominent” individual (i.e., actor, node) standing at the center of the network or 
having influence on their environment (i.e., in terms of decision-making, etc.). In other 
words, according to social network theory, no node represents a point that is said to be 
locally central because it has no larger “number of connections in its immediate 
environment” (Scott, 2004, p. 82). However, when the cyberterrorist/social engineer 
exploits one node, that is, when the attacker has him or her give them vital information 
such as password, ID, or security data, the node (Node 4 in the graph) turns into a hub 
and, hence, becomes a vital actor whose blind and ignorant actions can jeopardize the 
entire network. The other three nodes are meaningless to the cyberterrorist/social 
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engineer. They are merely drops in the ocean. The hub, however, is a big ocean in itself. 




Node 2                              Node 3 
 
Node 4 ---) becomes HUB 
because it gave vital information 
to the cyberterrorist and, hence, 
turns into vital actor in the network 
 
Figure 7      Example of four nodes composing an all-channel network. One node can turn into a  
 hub (e.g., Node 4) if the information they give is vital to the cyberterrorist.  
 
Yes, now we have it: the exploitation of a single node by turning it into a hub. 
Now, the social engineer can take control of a network and, ultimately, wreak havoc. The 
main conclusion is that social engineering attacks against single nodes are personal. 
Cyberterrorists are aware that humans are regularly the weakest links in a security 
system. They are susceptible to fraud and deceit; their reactions can give intruders many 
opportunities for success. Besides, social engineering can be a great danger because the 
attacks do not have to be directed against everyone; a single node can provide enough 
information to the enemy so that it can affect the entire network. It only takes one gullible 
user to make a social engineering attack successful. As a result, it is legitimate to say that 
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users are the weakest links in a chain of security. The last excerpt, from a former FBI 
agent who became a professor, is a specific example of social engineering via email: 
I’ll give you an example of social engineering. Sometimes, you get an email that 
is kind of a pleasant surprise: “Look at the file I sent you, it’s really cool.” It’s an 
executable file that you put on your computer and you find out that it’s a virus. 
That’s social engineering. 
In this example, cyberterrorists use social engineering strategies to manipulate 
any Web user who has an email address. The social engineer will load enthralling e-mails 
(i.e., “Look at the file I sent you, it’s really cool”) with viruses. In a similar fashion, 
Mitnick and Simon (2005) report that social engineers send emails with subject lines like 
“I Love You,” which end up in hundreds of thousands of email boxes, destroying email 
servers and, in some cases, wreaking havoc on information services. Another present-day 
example of a social engineering attack that uses innocent-looking email attachments as 
“cyber” weapons is the attack that uses email attachments filled with malicious payloads 
(i.e., massive quantities of spam). Many users, unfortunately, tend to blindly click on 
such attachments, thus allowing the attack to work. This really demonstrates to us that 
social engineering is a combination of gullibility and curiosity. Numerous people tend to 
want to see what they should not want to see. 
Let us focus on a previous example. A few participants mentioned that 
cyberterrorists use social engineering skills, sometimes for long periods of time, in order 
to obtain the passwords of their victims. The colossal danger is not only that Web users 
give their passwords to cyberterrorists, but also the fact that many Web users often repeat 
the use of one simple password on every account: hotmail.com, yahoo.com, and so on. 
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As a result, once the cyberterrorist has one password, he or she can probably have access 
to multiple accounts. In line with these contentions, one way in which social engineers 
have been known to get hold of passwords is through online forms for web users to fill in. 
More precisely, social engineers send out some type of sweepstakes information and 
request the user to write their name, including email address; that way, they might even 
give their company account password in the process (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
In another instance, a pop-up window tells the web user that their network 
connection has been lost and that they need to re-enter their user name and password to 
reconnect. In doing so, the information is sent to a remote site by a program that the 
social engineer has installed. Similarly, a cyberterrorist writes a program that asks for 
usernames and passwords in exchange for a “grand prize” (Flynn, 2003). This is a 
throwback to the previous comment made by the associate head of a technology lab at a 
Midwestern university that the weakest link in the computer network system is “the one 
you give a box of chocolates to.” The box of chocolates here is the “grand prize.” Those 
usernames and passwords can be sent to the target by email and be programmed to be 
sent back to a location to which the cyberterrorist has access. What these three last 
paragraphs have discussed is a form of nefarious activity using social engineering 
techniques called “phishing” (Borja, 2006; Sparks, 2005), as commented by the 
participant in the following excerpt: 
People fall prey to phishing scams all the time, even those who hold a Ph.D. and 
other brilliant folks. I ask them, “If someone came to your door in person and told 
you that story, would you believe them?” They would say no. “Then, why did you 
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believe them when they came to your computer door?” “Well, it was over the 
Internet and they looked believable.” 
The term “phishing” stems from the use of increasingly sophisticated 
manipulations to “fish” for victims’ information and passwords (James, 2005). Phishing 
is characterized by what has been explained so far: efforts to maliciously acquire 
sensitive information such as passwords, masquerading as a trustworthy person or 
network administrator, and even building up trust, via chat rooms and the like, in an 
apparently innocent means of electronic communication (Lininger & Vines, 2005). 
Phishing is a social engineering technique that is so successful that “even those who hold 
a Ph.D. and other brillian folks” fall prey to it. The reason is that, on the Internet, it looks 
more “believable.” What this means is that Web users from all layers of society, from the 
low, uneducated to the high, very educated ones, can be victims of cyberterrorism and 
social engineering. Phishing also implies a technique known as “reverse social 
engineering,” as commented by an IT analyst in the Southwest:  
Sometimes, you have the problem of reverse social engineering. So, you have a 
situation where a cyberterrorist is helping you fix a computer security problem 
that he has himself sabotaged. Basically, he will attack a Web site in some way 
and then list himself as a person of authority, you know, like an administrator. 
Then, he’ll tell you to contact him to fix your security problem. So, you’re gonna 
do that, you’ll give him information he needs, and he’s gonna give you far more 
problems. 
From what has been said here, the cyberterrorist sabotages a network, causing a 
problem arise, then advertises that he or she is the appropriate contact (i.e., “a person of 
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authority, you know, like an administrator”) to fix the problem. When the cyberterrorist 
proceeds to fix the network problem, he or she asks for additional vital information from 
the victim and gets what was intended initially. What is really frightening is that the 
victim never knows the “problem-solver” is a cyberterrorist because, from the outward 
appearance, the network problem goes away and “everyone is happy.” Imagine what 
happens next, the cyberterrorist is perceived as a hero and has even gained the confidence 
and trust of the target. Truly, reverse social engineering is even a sneakier method of 
social engineering because not only does the cyberterrorist get their victims to ask them 
questions instead of questioning them, but, also, the target feels indebted to the 
cyberterrorist even before the cyberterrorist resolves the security problem.  
To sum it all up, let us compare the main differences between social engineering 
and reverse social engineering. While in social engineering, the user has to provide 
information to the cyberterrorists so that he or she can have control over the security 
network, reverse social engineering implies that the cyberterrorist already has some 
control over the network, but will obtain even more information from the user by 
pretending he or she is a person of authority (i.e., network administrator). The ultimate 
goal is to have even more, if not total, control of the security network. By the same token, 
while social engineering requires little or “some” preparation for the strategy to be 
successful, reverse social engineering necessitates significant planning and previous 
access to a security network. In fact, as Mitnick and Simon (2002) put it, reverse social 
engineers have to do a lot of planning to make their cyberterrorist acts successful. They 
must already have some control over the network. Finally, the last difference is that, with 
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reverse social engineering, victims ask the cyberterrorist questions, rather than vice-
versa. In both cases, however, online interaction is needed. 
To conclude this section describing the theme of social engineering that emerged 
in many of the accounts, it appears that all security networks and other information 
systems across the globe rely on humans who have the vulnerable characteristic of being 
the weakest link in the chain of security. Social engineering is an ideal situation for the 
cyberterrorist because humans are generally trusting. Indeed, there is a natural 
willingness for humans to accept anybody, even an outsider, at their word, possibly 
leaving many humans vulnerable to harmful attacks. No matter how secure the equipment 
is from e-invasion, the information extracted from a legitimate user may make a 
computer network inoperable if used in a “deadly” manner. Let us not forget that social 
engineers use social skills and human interaction. They instigate a series of conversations 
to obtain bits of information at a time. They start by asking basic questions that look 
innocuous to the attacked. This type of communication not only builds trust between the 
target and the cyber attacker; it also preserves the appearance of a comfortable 
relationship. It can start with a simple chat, for instance in a chat room. 
As we can see, social engineering is a malicious combination of tactics and 
psychological hoaxes used by cyberterrorists on Web users in order to access computer 
systems or networks. In addition to the methods discussed so far, usually termed 
“phishing,” cyberterrorists use another method called “reverse social engineering,” where 
they try to learn how to manipulate legitimate users into asking valuable network 
information so that those users become totally dependent on the social engineer, and not 
vice versa. The reverse social engineer can even gain further access to the security 
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network, hence having total control of the network. The consequences could be 
devastating: for the network involved, for other networks that depend on that network, 
even for an entire city or county. Accounts could be lost, sensitive information could be 
compromised, and even reputation could take a toll.  
Beyond doubt, social engineering can be a very effective and dangerous method 
for cyberterrorists to hurt both information and infrastructure. Social engineering is 
unlike any other threat to the security of a network. It can circumvent the computer 
technologies put into place to protect and spot malicious acts or attempts. It is a threat 
that is as old as civilization, that still exists, and that will always exist, because, as we 
now know it, the weakest link in a network is not the anti-virus software, the thorough 
patching, the firewall, or the intrusion detection system; the weakest link is the human, 
the user. It only takes one unaware employee to make a social engineering attack 
successful, and as a result makes employees the weakest link to a security policy. With 
the proper training, and policies in place, the risk of social engineering can be effectively 
mitigated. It only takes one gullible user – yes, one single node in the network – to make 
a social engineering attack successful. Consequently, it makes users the weakest links in 
a chain of security. 
Know Thy Enemy 
The third theme of this analysis is “know thy enemy.” Four interview excerpts 
were selected to illustrate that “know thy enemy” is a saying that might sound a little 
obsolete, but, according to the participants, it is a good approach for both cyberterrorists 
and law enforcement to understand one another and, ultimately, improve their fight 
against each other. “Know thy enemy” implies “think like the enemy.” This rule follows 
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naturally from the complex nature of computer security. The first excerpt, selected from 
an account told by a computer forensics examiner and assistant professor at a Midwestern 
university, shows that information gathering is still widely practiced as a method to know 
the opponent: 
Networking against others all comes down to intelligence gathering. We know 
they [cyberterrorists] are trying to gather intelligence on us and they know we are 
trying to gather intelligence on them. It’s just a game back and forth, just like 
street informants and cops. 
From this excerpt, it follows that the theme of “know thy enemy” applies to both 
law enforcement and cyberterrorist activities (“We know they [cyberterrorists] are trying 
to gather intelligence on us and they know we are trying to gather intelligence on them”). 
So, both sides engage in intelligence gathering in order to better understand their 
opponent and, ultimately, defeat them. Fixmer (2000) notes that law enforcement agents 
use all kinds of intelligence-gathering tactics used to monitor everything a cyberterrorist 
suspect types on their computer. Likewise, cyberterrorists from any country and culture 
know a lot about law enforcement activities, even in cyberspace, which might give them 
a leg up on how to defeat or fool law enforcement. Part of the reason is that law 
enforcement officials – voluntarily or involuntarily – share information with 
cyberterrorists. Cyberterrorists see the new software programs and read professional 
journals on new technology releases (Neighly, 2000). Some enroll in American 
universities; this gives them a great idea of what cyber forensics experts do, what 
decisions will be taken in the future, and even the reasons for making these decisions. All 
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this boils down to saying that cyberterrorists can base their actions on what they have 
learned from their enemies. 
The next excerpt was selected from an interview conducted with a cyber forensics 
expert who has spent the last fifteen years tracking cyberterrorists. Holding a doctorate in 
computer forensics, the participant lives by the idea that in order to understand one’s 
enemy, one has to know them: 
Know thy enemy. It’s a simple military strategy. It’s the number one condition in 
the U.S. military handbook. Sun Tzu said the same thing. When you go to war, 
know whom you are dealing with. In a cyberterrorist situation, how do you know 
your enemy? You have to know their network, find their weak spots. Pretend 
you’re the tech guy. 
As pointed out in this excerpt, Sun Tzu (2003) already said that one cannot defeat 
one’s enemy if one does not know how the enemy operates and why the enemy does so. 
What this means is that both cyber forensics experts and law enforcement officials have 
to outwit their enemies and stand in their shoes because ignorance is no bliss when it 
comes to fighting cyberterrorists. Besides, they must understand more about 
cyberterrorists’ networks to be able to identify their weaknesses. How can it be done? 
According to the participant, one has to “to know their network, find their weak spots” 
and to pretend that one is a “tech guy.” The following excerpt was selected from the chair 
of a cyber forensics program, who is also an associate professor in computer and 
information technology. This participant makes comments on how to know the enemy 
better: 
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Know your enemy: go after the cyberterrorist group, infiltrate the group, pretend 
that you are a hacker, and that you have all these skills and you go in and join 
their group. There are those people who are undercover, those agents that do go 
out and try to penetrate the group, figure out their command and control structure, 
and try to knock them out that way. Find out where they are. The difficulty is that, 
because of the Internet, cyberterrorists come from everywhere. They also have 
different cultures and motives. 
 A relevant word that emerges in those two excerpts is the word “pretend.” To 
know one’s enemy is to “pretend” that one is “one of them.” As the participant suggests, 
one has to go “after the cyberterrorist group,” to “infiltrate” it, and pretend that one has 
those “skills” to “join their group.” This understanding of one’s enemy was part of the 
analysis of the accounts based on game theory (see previous chapter). The problem, says 
the participant, is that it is difficult for law enforcement to “find out where they are” 
because “cyberterrorists come from everywhere” and “they also have different cultures 
and motives.” An important analogy can be made here. When George Patton fought 
against Germany, he could make the claim that he knew much about his enemy because 
the main European enemy in WWII was a Western Nation, being geographically located 
in Western Europe, sharing a similar cultural heritage, and adopting similar strategies in 
warfare. However, cyberterrorists come from everywhere; China, Singapore, Brazil, and 
so on. They can wage attacks, with a simple mouse click, from a laptop computer in the 
middle of Siberia. Because they come from everywhere, cyberterrorists might come from 
different cultures and have unknown motives (Jordan, 1999). Behind their cyber attacks 
lie cultural backgrounds and underlying motives that even George Patton – if he were 
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alive today – could not decipher. For this reason, law enforcement agents have to find 
new ways to know their enemies. The next excerpt, taken from an interview with a 
security analyst in a Midwestern university, is a suggestion on how to better understand 
the enemy: 
In order to understand and fend against cyberterrorists, our technology has to be at 
the same level as the technology of the people who are doing it. This goes without 
saying, but it has been very difficult for law enforcement. It has to become much 
of an arms’ race. They have to keep up with technology every day. 
This excerpt focuses more on technology itself rather than tactics and techniques 
to penetrate cyberterrorist networks. As revealed in the accounts described in previous 
sections, what law enforcement officials have attempted to do is maintain a team of 
highly trained specialists who can analyze the history, motives, and actions of every 
potential cyberterrorist network. Yet, as pointed out in this last excerpt, it is “very 
difficult” for law enforcement officials “to keep up with technology” on a daily basis and, 
ultimately, to keep up with their enemies. Only when law enforcement agents have the 
technology that meets the cyberterrorists’ level will those agents better know them. Only 
then will the fight against malicious hackers be useful. The literature shows that 
cyberspace is a winner-take-it-all system (Dunnigan, 2003). With knowledge superiority 
and the latest computer technologies, law enforcement agents expect to shape cyberspace 
to their advantage – in fact, they want cyberspace to give them that asymmetric edge – 
but cyberspace levels the playing field rather than tilting it in their favor (MacNulty, 
1999).  
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The concept of cyberspace, with its high-tech battlefield, is truly a conflict 
between adversaries who are very well matched in terms of computer technology 
(MacNulty, 1999). Indeed, both opponents always keep their software programs up-to-
date. The concept of playing field mentioned previously is postmodern because it may be 
fundamentally altered by information technologies, both from strategic and tactical 
standpoints. The increasing breadth and depth of cyberspace has created a playing field to 
the point at which dominance [in cyber conflict] alone may now generate consistent war-
winning advantages to able practitioners. Therefore, collecting information on the enemy 
(and making sure that they do not collect information about law enforcement) is crucial. 
Law enforcement must be able to understand how software programs can be used to 
better understand cyberterrorists’ intentions. 
The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend 
 Human history abounds with unexpected alliances of previous enemies joining 
forces to defeat a common enemy, whether they call it imperialists or religious infidels. 
In Antiquity, for instance, Constantine sought total political unification of the Roman 
Empire. In order to achieve his goal, he proceeded to unify the various religious, ethnic, 
and linguistic groups that lived under Roman rule, but that had long been fighting with 
each other. Constantine accomplished his objective by inculcating in Roman citizens a 
common sense of brotherhood, namely by identifying common enemies of the Roman 
state (Leadbetter, 2002). Likewise, in 19th-century America, many Indian tribes that had 
long been waging war with each other joined forces in order to stop the slaughter of the 
“invaders” and regain the land all over the Plains. Those tribes came together to fight a 
common enemy. The Kiowa, Comanche, Arapaho, and Cheyenne were among the tribes 
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that participated in combined raids in an attempt to put an end to the invasion to the land 
(Malinowski, 1998). These two historical cases exemplify that “the enemy of my enemy 
is my friend.”  
Even in cyberspace “the enemy of my enemy” can be “my friend.” The formation 
of a common cause among cyberterrorists is sometimes strengthened by the identification 
of a common enemy or group of enemies. Among these enemies are anything and anyone 
perceived as prohibiting access (including secret source codes) as well as mechanisms 
that promote dependence. Major corporations and federal agencies are identified as 
common enemies (Lehmann, 2004). Likewise, there is increasing evidence that 
individual Islamic cyberterrorist groups that have been traditionally fighting are now 
banding together and becoming interlinked through a shared pro-Islamic agenda 
(Hosenball, 2002). Each networked group wages cyber attacks under a common banner, 
that is, to fight against Israel and the United States. In another example, for the past few 
years, the Zapatistas have had an interconnected network of Web sites where groups have 
been progressively learning to network as they have realized they have common enemies 
(Elison, 2000; Martinez-Torres, 2001). 
These facts illustrate that, even with regard to the Internet and cyberterrorism, the 
phenomenon of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” is very real. This theme is 
analyzed and interpreted based on selected excerpts from interviews conducted with 
experts in cyber forensics. The first excerpt of this theme was selected from an interview 
conducted with a supervisor in a computer forensics unit who used to work for a state 
branch of the FBI as a cyber investigator. For the past four or five years, he has been 
involved in computer crime and computer forensics. His account is enlightening: 
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Maybe cyberterrorists groups aren’t all tight-knit groups or like each other, but 
there sometimes is this alliance that has the same cause to deface others’ web sites 
or even to cause more havoc. And there are cyberterrorists on the Web with 
specific mission statements. It may be that they don’t even know each other and 
they don’t even know their real name, but they’ve met on the Internet. They both 
have a common enemy, so to speak. 
This excerpt is analyzed thoroughly. The first important element of this excerpt is 
that, according to our participant, cyberterrorist groups that are not “tight-knit” can still 
form an “alliance that has the same cause.” The phenomenon of “the enemy of my enemy 
is my friend” is applied here in the context of common-goal networks. Unlike a network 
of trust that is based on blood, kinship ties, or bonding, a common-goal network is 
composed of groups that do not necessarily have the same structure, culture, philosophy, 
or core purpose, but that form as communities of practice because of a common goal, 
usually based on a same enemy or target (Brown & Duguid, 2000). Drawing from 
elements of social network theory, the nodes in the network are not tight-knit. Instead, 
these nodes are loosely affiliated actors who display emergent properties as they join 
forces, execute a task, and then disband. This notion of loose affiliated groups is not to be 
taken for granted. Some major acts of cyberterrorism are perpetrated by those common-
goal groups that network for a certain period of time before departing from one another. 
In this context, they collaborate because, as the participant says, they “have a common 
enemy, so to speak.” They have nothing in common, apart from their common enemy. In 
the information age, this has become part of what Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996; 2001) call 
“netwar design.” Network design is a pattern of communication and synchronization 
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among totally distinct organizations that join forces on behalf of their common goal 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996; 2001). This pattern fits within the standard model of social 
network theory; nodes converge gradually into a “relationship” circle, then disband, but 
survive on their own by self-organizing in their respective environment. 
Second, this type of synergistic cyberterrorism based on a common enemy is 
developed by not only independent or ad-hoc groups, but also by networks of ill-defined 
and constantly shifting groups (Fulghum, 2005). They come together to plan and carry 
out a single mission before completely disbanding. Not only do these groups not 
necessarily fight for the same cause, but, also, they might be unbeknownst to each other 
(as the participant says, “it may be that they don’t even know each other”). The literature 
reveals that the Internet can be used in such a way that the structure of cyberterrorist 
networks allows some groups to communicate with each other while they do not even 
know one another (McClure & Scambray, 1999). They just join forces when they find it 
necessary or when they have a common enemy. They act like sleeper cells that are 
located in various locations, maybe Colorado or the Philippines, and that communicate 
“in the dark” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). They operate in a harmonized fashion without 
their members meeting face to face (Kerbs, 2001). However, some of these groups are 
enemies towards each other. They have been for years (Verton, 2002a). They sometimes 
come to realize, though, that they have a common enemy. For this reason, through the 
Internet, these groups will act conjointly across great distances. 
Third, our participant says that not all cyberterrorist groups “like each other,” but 
they can also have a common enemy. So, they will create an alliance “to deface others’ 
web sites or even to cause more havoc.” When enemies have a common enemy, it is 
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enough to sustain an alliance. Two concise real-life examples illustrate this phenomenon. 
At the end of the 1980s, a cyberterrorist named Lex Luthor, his online name, founded 
Legion of Doom, a cyberterrorist group. Two members of this group got into a feud. 
Phiber Optik, one of these two members, left and created a rival cyberterrorist group 
named Masters of Deception (Verton, 2002a). Later, it was found that the two 
cyberterrorist groups reconciled after they discovered that they had a common enemy: 
U.S. agencies of various kinds (Verton, 2002a). In a similar fashion, a couple of years 
ago, a cyber war broke out between web users responsible for launching different 
computer worms. The creators of these malicious programs started to send each other 
viruses. As it turned out, the fight between the different virus writing groups escalated 
(www.news.bbc.co.uk). Cyber forensics experts said that the groups behind the viruses 
appeared to have had different motives. In all cases, the intent was on enrolling infected 
computers into a network of remotely controllable PCs so that they could be used to 
forward viruses or act as a launch pad for other viruses. More importantly, it has been 
found that, recently, those former enemies joined forces against anti-virus companies in 
order to cripple them; they had resolved their long-time conflict by targeting a common 
enemy (www.news.bbc.co.uk).  
So, as we can see, it is sometimes the case that cyberterrorists resolve their 
quarrels by creating a team that fights against a common enemy. Cyberterrorism truly 
makes strange bedfellows, that is, individuals who find themselves together against a 
common enemy, but who would not normally work together or even communicate with 
each other (Levy, 2001). The following excerpt, from the same participant, emphasizes 
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the easiness of joining forces against enemies thanks to the anonymity allowed by the 
Internet: 
It’s this cooperative play, this chess, this partnering, this “enemy of my enemy is 
my friend.” On the Internet, thanks to anonymity, there are more opportunities for 
interactions and development of cyber programs against common enemies. 
Anonymity also allows you to reduce the threat of your mission to be 
compromised. 
The Internet, our participant says, facilitates “this cooperative play, this chess, this 
partnering.” In other words, it is a forum for binding people together in allegiance against 
a common enemy (“interactions and development of cyber programs against common 
enemies”) and who may never meet each other (what our participant calls “anonymity”). 
As mentioned earlier, cyberterrorism has a distinctive structure that enables networks of 
independent individuals to operate in complete anonymity. Anonymity, as it turns out, 
“also allows you to reduce the threat of your mission to be compromised.” By the same 
token, this method of action means that it is very difficult for law enforcement agents or 
cyber forensics experts to penetrate these networks as they are anonymous (Donath, 
1999). So, because of all those “opportunities for interactions and development of cyber 
programs against common enemies,” common enemies, then, make for common friends. 
The next excerpt, selected by an IT Analyst II (or assistant analyst in computer forensics), 
highlights other concepts that, in the social sciences, would be referred to as legitimation, 
“alliance vs. amity,” and “in-group vs. out-group.”  
Sometimes cyberterrorists see that they’re really rather alike, compared to other 
folks that are not into the hacking thing. Some of them don’t respect each other, 
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usually because of jealously and distrust. But what they will agree on is to agree 
on a common enemy that they can blame for all kinds of stuff. They will 
legitimate their cyber attacks based on that. 
This is an interesting excerpt in the sense that it is obvious that one must not 
confuse amity with alliance. Based on the statement, “Some of them don’t respect each 
other, usually because of jealously and distrust,” it can be inferred that there is certainly 
not always amity among cyberterrorists. Instead, if they “agree on a common enemy,” it 
is more of an alliance. While they may gain some satisfaction for being alike 
(“cyberterrorists see that they’re really rather alike”), while others are different 
(“compared to other folks that are not into the hacking thing”), nothing makes their 
communal heart stronger than being united against a common enemy and blame them 
“for all kinds of stuff.” What the concept of blame also means here is that when they have 
no enemies, they can create them. Indeed, their alliance involves the creation of easy 
targets because “they can blame” them “for all kinds of stuff.” 
In philosophy and international law, common enemies are sometimes referred as 
hostes humani generis, or enemies of humankind (Alfert, Jr., 1992). If a network of 
cyberterrorists feels burdened with hostes humani generis (that is, the “rest of the world,” 
cyber forensics experts, their opponents, and all the ones to be blamed “for all kinds of 
stuff”), they will legitimize their cyber attacks. In other words, they will feel they have an 
obligation to use all reasonable resources to target their enemies (Bialke, 2004). This 
legitimation is explained in terms of the cyber weapons that they use, the rules of their 
game, their vision of the common good, and, above all, the formation of a common 
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enemy (Eisenstadt, 1996). For this reason, says the participant, “they will legitimate their 
cyber attacks.” 
Lehmann (2004) claims that, in the early days of computing, such collective 
identity was already underpinned by shared practices. Our participant expresses the same 
view when he says that “cyberterrorists see that they’re really rather alike.” This might 
account for how they form socially in certain circumstances, one of which is the 
recognition of a common enemy (more precisely, “a common enemy that they can blame 
for all kinds of stuff”). The term “social formation” here refers to the types of social 
connections between Web users (Wellman, 2005) and exists only when people are united 
by a common cause (Strauss, 1978). This alliance makes obvious that cyberterrorists 
sometimes like to have a collective self-image, based on that common enemy. That self-
image, in turn, forms the boundary line, separating “us” from “them.” This boundary is 
sustained by a set of practices, that is, what the in-group members [cyberterrorists] do and 
what the outsiders do not do (i.e., the “other folks that are not into the hacking thing”) 
(Lehmann, 2004). 
In line with these contentions, in order for cyberterrorists to feel themselves to be 
members of a group, there must be nonmembers who, in the eyes of cyberterrorists, 
represent the dark side (i.e., those who can be blamed “for all kinds of stuff”). In this 
sense, cyberterrorists’ self-representation exemplifies some of the tenets of social identity 
theory (SIT). SIT is based on the comparisons that people make between in-groups 
(groups to which a person feels he or she belongs) and out-groups (groups to which a 
person feels he or she does not belong) (West & Turner, 2000). Tajfel (1978) created SIT 
to emphasize that individuals express a desire to compare themselves with others, find a 
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new meaning about their own identities, and, to some extent, think highly of themselves. 
It is sometimes the case that one plays up the qualities of his or her own group and 
denigrates the attributes of others to make the common enemy look darker and the 
common goal more definite (Monteith & Winters, 2002). From this vantage point, the 
perception of cyberterrorists that they belong to a particular world (i.e., that of 
cyberspace, systems invasion, network destruction, etc.) and that others belong to other 
groups (i.e., the “rest of the world,” cyber forensics experts, their opponents, and so on) is 
sufficient to create common enemies. This bias is based on their [cyberterrorists’] need 
for collective definition, mission statement, and fundamental purposes. It is their human 
recognition of a common plight, as described in Marxist theory (Edwords, 2005). All in 
all, as social identity theory shows that people will legitimate or rationalize their 
collective effort for the “common good” (Strauss, 1982), cyberterrorists get tied together 
by a common enemy, be it a hundred thousand computers on the West Coast or 
Microsoft. 
 The next two excerpts fall very much under this theme, but, this time, it is the role 
of law enforcement in their social formation of friends and enemies that is analyzed. The 
excerpt below was taken from an interview conducted with a former FBI agent and 
specialist in computer forensics: 
Between law enforcement agencies, historically, there has been jealousy and 
fighting. So collaboration has not always been good. But when it comes to 
fighting a common enemy, those agencies collaborate. With the case of hacking 
and cyberterrorism, collaboration has even been done at the international level. 
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From this excerpt, two important inferences can be drawn here. First, historically, 
between law enforcement agencies there have been feuds (“jealousy and fighting”). 
Second, “when it comes to fighting a common enemy, those agencies collaborate.” And it 
is applicable to the case of fighting against hackers and cyberterrorists. The literature 
shows that there have been many feuds among agencies. At the local level, Smith (1997) 
remarks that there are feuds between police departments and district attorneys’ offices in 
several states. Likewise, law enforcement officials in New York City claim there was a 
public fight between the NYPD and Port Authority Police Department over policies 
regarding major airports (Rashbaum, 2001). At the national level, two of the most 
important federal agencies, the CIA and the FBI, of which some of the members 
participated in this study, have been fist-fighting for more than six decades, to the point 
of stealing one another’s missions or revealing cover-ups (Riebling, 2002). The FBI has 
been accused of exploiting the political weakness of the CIA. This feud goes back to 
1947, when President Hoover opposed the creation of the CIA. In the 1940s, when the 
CIA was created to organize the U.S. response to the new threat of global communism, it 
was excluded from operating inside the United States. Instead, it received exclusive 
responsibility for intelligence and counter-intelligence overseas. This meant that the FBI 
had to withdraw many of their agents from posts abroad, which infuriated President 
Hoover. While the CIA was mostly a cosmopolitan and intellectual elite, the FBI 
considered itself as equally elite but was composed of commoner personnel (Posner, 
2003).  
Today, even without those obvious differences, the FBI and the CIA still oppose 
each other on different mission goals. The CIA is committed to espionage – as well as 
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cyber espionage – working overseas and outside the limits of U.S. law. Its goal is to 
collect information and weaken the enemy by any means. The FBI needs the CIA, and 
vice versa, when it comes to accomplishing certain tasks (Riebling, 2002). This has great 
implications on this study because not only does the literature tell us that an agency like 
the FBI needs serious monitoring with regard to computer capabilities (Posner, 2003), 
but, also, several participants revealed that the FBI is insufficiently trained to understand 
and, consequently, fight cyberterrorism. For instance, the head of a computer and 
information technology department at a Midwestern university claims that “the FBI 
doesn’t have the manpower to do computer forensics or computer crime investigation.” 
What this all means is that the FBI needs to collaborate with other agencies in this fight 
against cyberterrorists. As the previous excerpt tells us, “when it comes to fighting a 
common enemy, those agencies collaborate. With the case of hacking and cyberterrorism, 
collaboration has even been done at the international level.”  
 The last excerpt in the analysis of this theme was selected from an enforcer of the 
law working for a federal agency in the Midwestern part of the United States: 
By collaborative security, I mean all those agencies joining forces to defeat a 
common stealthy enemy. I mean, agencies privately or publicly work together 
with each respective security system, so that they can share information about a 
new cyber attack that is experienced precisely at the moment of attack. The goal 
is to protect the citizens we serve from the dangers of cyberterrorism. 
Based on these statements, when there are common enemies, it is best to fight 
them together. The emphasis here is not on how agencies, historically, have been fighting 
with each other, but on how they join forces in order “to defeat a common stealthy 
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enemy.” This excerpt explains how networking defines itself as much as what it opposes 
(i.e., a “common stealthy enemy” and “cyber attacks”) as what it defends (“the citizens 
we serve from the dangers of cyberterrorism”). It is mobilized as much through 
opposition to common enemies as by common solidarities and interests (“collaborative 
security”). Hence, when there is a new cyber attack, all other parties are informed right 
away so that corrective actions and defensive positions can be taken properly. The state 
of cyber security is too unsafe to avoid opportunities to build coalitions. For this reason, 
“agencies privately or publicly work together with each respective security system.” That 
head of an information technology center said in one of the interviews that his “cyber 
forensics experts are involved in various national and international societies that are 
looking at various aspects of cyber crime.” And they “get calls for help from all over the 
world.” This very much acknowledges the importance of various countries to work 
together against a common enemy: cyberterrorists. 
So, to conclude these last thoughts, it appears, from selected interviews, that, 
despite some disagreement between key government agencies about how operations 
should be conducted (Perlmutter, 2000), both the FBI and CIA (as well as other agencies) 
should keep in mind that they have a common ultimate goal; not only is the goal to defeat 
the common enemy (as discussed in great lengths), but, also, it is to secure Web users and 
citizens from the dangers of cyberterrorism. Close coordination among law enforcement 
agencies can minimize hurdles concerning the handling of cyberterrorism. They share the 
same enemy; they share the same purpose; and they share the same goal: to protect the 




Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
 The first ten pages or so of this chapter are devoted to the conclusion of this 
study, that is, the analysis of the four research questions. The following pages deal with 
the implications of this study. The last few pages discuss the limitations of this study. 
Conclusions of the Study 
The qualitative data produced from the interviews have laid the groundwork for 
the premises put forth in this study. With respect to the analysis of RQ1 (What do 
computer security experts’ and law enforcement officials’ accounts reveal about networks 
of cyberterrorists?), the participants’ accounts reveal the dangers of cyberterrorism and 
the similarities and differences it has with other types of intrusion, particularly hacking. 
While both hacking and cyberterrorism are forms of intrusion, cyberterrorism has the 
distinguishing characteristic of being deliberate in wreaking havoc or causing harm. A 
few examples were given to demonstrate the potential threat of cyberterrorism; it could 
flood a town, harm a power plant, cripple an entire infrastructure, or compromise 
computer systems. Although hacking could be a good means for threatening computers or 
make them more vulnerable, attacks through the Internet or against networks or systems 
need to have a terrorist component in order to be labeled “cyberterrorism.” For this 
reason, the motives of cyberterrorists are the same as those of conventional terrorists. 
Whereas cyberterrorist motives tend to be political, social, ethnic, religious, or 
ideological, financial motives for cyberterrorists do not seem to be as prominent as the 
other motives. More importantly, just like terrorism is primarily a process of 
communication between terrorists and target audiences (Tuman, 2003), an important goal 
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of cyberterrorists is to send a powerful signal, whose meaning is intended to frighten and 
coerce. Cyberterrorism is a semiotic act; it is a message, a symbol, and a new media 
image. Our society is wrapped up with images, signs, and symbols. Given this, there is a 
powerful semiotic dimension to cyberterrorism. Without a doubt, it can involve sending 
images of fear. 
The analysis of RQ1 also consists of analyzing their social networks. Overall, it 
was found that cyberterrorists tend not to work alone. Rather, they team up with others. 
Cyberterrorists are nodes in a network of rapidly expanding networks; they can be male 
or female with an average age of twenty-eight years old. Cyberterrorist networks are so 
flexible, nimble, and rapid that they can have sub-networks or hybrids. They are also 
characterized by a decentralized structure that is composed of cells. Given this, 
cyberterrorists do not communicate or collaborate among each other in traditional 
hierarchies (as opposed to armies and traditional terrorist organizations). Because of the 
absence of leadership and the postmodern nature of the Internet, collaboration and 
communication tend to be horizontal, in an all-channel manner, and anonymous. Part of 
the analysis of their network is the role of their hubs. Hubs are important nodes in the 
network of cyberterrorists that have so much potential that they can connect a great 
number of other nodes [cyberterrorists]. The end-result of the analysis is that any type of 
network is much stronger when its hubs are active. Three types of hubs are identified in 
this study: (1) hubs as humans with high degrees of centrality, (2) hubs as go-betweens, 
and (3) hubs as central locations (the central location being the Internet chat room or 
IRC). 
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Of equal relevance in the participants’ accounts is that networks of cyberterrorists 
were found to be communities of practice. As such, a cyberterrorist network constitutes a 
culture in itself because it has its own distinctive “community of practice” that enables 
cyberterrorists to create and maintain their networks. It was also found that part of their 
communities of practice involves a way of life that uses “leet” speak, a jargonized lingo 
used by cyberterrorists in order to reinforce their culture and avoid detection by law 
enforcement. Likewise, it was assumed that cyberterrorists tend to be emotional 
communicators via online media (i.e., the Internet). One participant mentioned the 
importance of cyberterrorists’ knowledge. For him, their knowledge is tacit and 
embedded knowledge; it is not explicit, but implicit. Along the same lines, cyberterrorists 
build networks of trust through a method called chaining. From a social network theory 
perspective, chaining implies following connections from one node to the next (i.e., 
introducing a friend of a friend). For this reason, it was found that cyberterrorist 
communities resemble the conspiratorial communities like the Carbonari in Italy and the 
Freemasons in that they are broken into small cells, which would be nodes in the 
cyberterrorist world. Finally, the analysis of cyberterrorist networks can be articulated 
upon the individualism-collectivism dimension as well. Two strong quotes reveal that 
cyberterrorists tend to be individualistic, even if they are part of a cyberterrorist network 
and even if they come from collectivistic cultures. Cyberterrorists are also individualistic 
because they try to protect their private space (for them, privacy is important). 
In regard to the analysis of RQ2 (What do computer security experts’ and law 
enforcement officials’ accounts reveal about their own networks?), the participants’ 
accounts begin by demonstrating that it takes networks to fight networks. As such, it was 
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found that it is necessary to combine efforts, through networking, in order to fight, let 
alone understand, cyberterrorist networks. In the same way that cyberterrorists 
collaborate worldwide thanks to the rapid evolution of global electronic networks and 
anonymity on the Internet, law enforcement agencies also collaborate at the global level. 
Because cyberterrorism incidents can go past regional, state, and even international 
jurisdictional boundaries, to the point where traditional jurisdictions and boundaries are 
no longer valid, American federal agencies feel the need to network with foreign agencies 
that would be willing to track the identified cyberterrorists and prosecute them. Overall, 
cyberterrorists’ and the law enforcement’s networks are largely similar, but they also 
have a few differences. For instance, while some law enforcement agencies model a 
social network design where interagency connections are done in an all-channel manner 
(just like cyberterrorist networks), other law enforcement agencies model a design where 
there is a jurisdictional hierarchy between them. 
In line with these contentions, it was also found, based on the participants’ 
accounts, that it is necessary for law enforcement, in their fight against cyberterrorists, to 
consult with cyber forensics labs in order to maximize the outcomes of their 
investigations. Cyber forensics specialists have outstanding computer expertise and 
superior technical skills. Cyber forensics labs improve investigation into an ever-growing 
era of crimes that uses computers, computer-aided terrorism, cyberterrorism, and 
espionage. One of the participants found that “no man is an island,” meaning that people 
cannot be isolated from one another, but they should be interconnected. As such, positive 
outcomes in the fight against cyberterrorists can only be achieved not by working alone, 
but by being involved in a social network that relies on a feedback mechanism. Feedback 
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mechanisms are necessary to maintain stable conditions and achieve a dynamic 
equilibrium in a network. When there is a continuous feedback mechanism, there is an 
ongoing flow of communication between humans. As the network seeks to increase its 
performance, feedback helps the network make essential adjustments. 
This analysis of RQ2 also reveals that participants stress the importance of 
networks of trust among law enforcement agents. In order to be part of their network, one 
should have earned their trust beforehand. Just as it is the case for cyberterrorist 
networks, this practice of using someone whom we know to gain more people in the 
network is called chaining. In addition, because the cyber forensics community “is still a 
virtual community,” trust is done through “a transitive trust model.” The transitive trust 
model portrays trust as being a two-relationship model between three nodes. So, trust is 
transitive, that is, transmitted through another party. Based on the main tenets of social 
network theory, node A validates and trusts node B; node B validates and trusts node C; 
node A trusts but does not need to validate node C. However, some of the participants’ 
accounts also reveal that there are downsides to networking with others. Although federal 
agencies have developed networks among each other for the past couple of years, it 
appears that not all networks can be trustworthy or dependable for keeping information 
secret. Plus, it is not always possible to know every node. The level of trust decreases 
under those circumstances. Every time humans network with others, they expose 
themselves to risks and to others with power over them. 
This analysis of RQ2 also discusses the theory of the strength of weak ties in 
informal networks of law enforcement agencies. The main benefit is the extreme facility 
of information flow, that is, the ample diffusion of information among actors in the 
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network. By having an informal network, by having a grasp on who knows whom and 
who knows what, law enforcement agents can easily manage their networks because it is 
assumed that they provide or feed relationships that they see fit. Formal networks are not 
good for using informants. However, having ties with informants in informal networks 
can be beneficial for law enforcement agents in that they can flexibly communicate and 
cooperate with them, as they might possess specialized knowledge and capabilities. Of 
equal importance is the role of structural holes in those informal networks. For Burt 
(1992), individuals with whom a person has weak ties are less likely to be connected to 
one another. In other words, the person is embedded in a structural hole. The structural 
hole is a knot in the social network that gives access to missing knowledge. Therefore, an 
individual who is the only one linking a group to another is at a significant advantage. As 
such, the individual can gain from having access to a different set of information 
unavailable elsewhere. The participants’ accounts also point to the importance of key 
players in networks of law enforcement agents. From a social network standpoint, hubs 
are humans with high degrees of centrality in their networks. Just as it is for a 
cyberterrorist network, any type of network between law enforcement agencies is much 
stronger when its hubs are active. Therefore, the role of hubs considerably influences 
how the network operates. 
With respect to the analysis of RQ3 (How can the conflict and interaction between 
cyberterrorists and computer security experts [and law enforcement officials] be 
explained through the use of social network theory and game theory?), the participants’ 
accounts reveal that law enforcement agents do not always engage in battle with 
cyberterrorists. They sometimes try to interact with them in order to obtain more 
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information about their networks (and vice versa). The more interactive the network, the 
more open the network, and the more open the network, the more chances to obtain new 
information and ideas about the enemy than closed networks that have no interaction 
whatsoever. However, it was also found that the danger of interacting with the enemy is 
exposing one’s network to the enemy. For this reason, law enforcement agents and 
cyberterrorists do fight with each other as well. Just as cyberterrorists try to target the 
hubs of their enemies’ networks, so do law enforcement agents; they attempt to cripple 
the big actors in cyberterrorists’ networks. Who are these big actors? They are the go-
betweens. A chat room is considered a hub by law enforcement agents as they try to 
target it. The procedure seems to be the same: to approach the enemy (and, by the same 
token, to know them), to get them, and to destabilize their network. 
The second part of the analysis of RQ3 illustrates the importance of game theory 
in the understanding of the complexity of the interaction and conflict between 
cyberterrorists and cyber forensics experts (and law enforcement officials). One excerpt 
portrays a very good example of a zero-sum game (“Cyberterrorists’ victory is based on 
law enforcement’s defeat”). A zero-sum game is a game where, no matter what the 
outcome of the game is, the victory of one player is exactly balanced by the defeat of the 
other player. In this conflict between cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents, the 
cyberterrorist will win only at the expenses of the law enforcement agent, but the benefits 
and losses to both players amount to the same value. For this reason, it is a zero-sum 
game. No matter what, the battle is a chess game, where each player does not know what 
moves the opponent will take. Therefore, each of the players finds a strategy to examine 
the possible actions of each other in the situation. The ultimate goal is to determine the 
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best course of action for him- or herself. This chess game played by cyberterrorists and 
law enforcement agents is a strategies-versus-counterstrategies game where the players 
who prevail are those who possess the structural advantage. One might think that to 
disrupt is structurally less difficult than to protect, but an agent can create a situation 
where the cyberterrorist’s defeat equals that of a scorpion killing itself with its sting. 
Another example of the conflict between law enforcement agents and 
cyberterrorists depicts a Nash equilibrium. One of the tenets of the Nash equilibrium is 
that each player takes his or her opponent’s current strategies as given. As such, a player 
has nothing to gain by changing only his or her own strategy. If a player has selected a 
tactic and if he or she cannot benefit by changing that tactic, while the other player keeps 
his or hers unchanged as well, then the current set of tactics and the payoffs that result 
from the outcome of the game constitute a Nash equilibrium. What gives the Nash 
equilibrium all its legitimacy is that law enforcement agents use counter-strategies and 
use the same strategies over and over again. The end-result, or the outcome, is an 
equilibrium of strategies between the two players. In other words, it is a Nash 
equilibrium. Both cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents can maximize their 
outcomes that way. There is no reason to change their strategies in that type of situation. 
In line with these arguments, it was also found that the conflict between 
cyberterrorists and their opponents is an evolutionary game because new methods are 
constantly invented. The goal of the cyberterrorists is to create tactics and weapons that 
continually change in an effort to defeat their opponents’ networks and systems. If the 
cyberterrorists lose today, they will not disappear. Rather, they will learn what did not 
work and use it against their enemies tomorrow. The reason is that there are always 
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continuous patches and changes in technology. On the part of the cyber forensics experts 
and law enforcement agents, they will choose the option for the highest expected payoff 
by having the latest technological measures to protect their networks. It is an evolutionary 
game because it is based on situations where the players know their own strengths, but 
they can only estimate their opponents’ power (as well as their resources and capabilities) 
based on the level of their moves (that is, their actions, tactics, and attacks or defensive 
measures). For this reason, participants see it as a “continuous struggle.” If cyber security 
is a game, then cyberterrorists are the ones who make the rules. Indeed, the game law 
enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts are involved in has to be played by the 
standards determined by the cyberterrorists. Cyberterrorists, then, are the ones making the 
rules. Protective measures like anti-virus software programs and firewalls are measures 
taken by cyber forensics experts and law enforcement as a reaction to cyberterrorist 
attacks. When the latter ones launch a new computer virus, the target side has to adapt to 
it. When the cyberterrorists manage to find a hole in the new adapted technology that has 
just been used against the virus, the target side has to adapt again. This evolutionary 
game seems to be an endless match where the target has to play by the cyberterrorists’ 
rules. Moreover, their very rules may change during the game, based on new cyber 
weapons, new tactics, new tools, all of which can be acquired a few mouse clicks away. 
The third part of this analysis of RQ3 is the intersection of social network theory 
and game theory. Overall, game theory helps demonstrate the potential for collaborative 
behavior among distrustful players in the game. It was found that law enforcement agents 
have a history of collaborating with cyberterrorists, but the collaborative game that those 
agents play with cyberterrorists is a necessary evil. The collaborative game, in this case, 
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is not altruistic. It is not a function of empathy, but an awareness that one is in need. In 
the context of cyberterrorism, it seems that law enforcement agents would take the 
slightest chance to collaborate with the enemy in order to reach their outcomes. One of 
the tactics used by law enforcement is to let one node go away in order to catch the whole 
network of nodes. For instance, law enforcement agents will do a plea bargain with the 
little fish [a cyberterrorist who got caught] so that they catch the big fish [the entire 
network]. Given this, the cyberterrorist becomes part of the network of law enforcement 
agents. Plus, the burden of responsibility is not entirely on the cyberterrorist. This is 
where the cyberterrorist believes that he or she is not solely responsible for the moves 
against his or her comrades. In social networks, the selfishness of the users has deeper 
consequences than in traditional networks because the operation of the network can be 
based on the cooperation of the nodes against other nodes. Game theory rests on the 
premise that the players, however cooperative they become, can never be altruistic 
towards each other because they have ulterior motives. So, there is no intrinsic 
motivation for them to cooperate. From this vantage point, the way game theory is 
intersected with social network theory is constructed within a framework of networking 
with the opposite players (i.e., enemies) without having any intent to establish trust with 
those players. 
Finally, with respect to the analysis of RQ4 (What are the themes that emerged 
across the participants’ accounts?), four themes were found across the participants’ 
accounts. The “postmodern state of chaos” was the first of these themes. It was about the 
idea that cyberterrorism has the potential to create a state of immense confusion and 
disorder far different from what our sensory realism, as we know it in actual physical 
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space, has ever experienced. “Social engineering” was the second theme. A social 
engineer is a manipulator of naïve individuals (i.e., Web users). The goal is to gain 
information from them or gain access to a particular location. The ultimate motive of the 
social engineer is to have control over a network or system. “Know thy enemy” was the 
third theme. This theme gives an account of the tactics used by both cyberterrorists and 
law enforcement to understand the enemy and, by the same token, improve their fight 
against them. “Know thy enemy” implies the idea of putting oneself in the shoes of one’s 
opponents. The fourth theme, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” rests on the 
principle that the establishment of a common cause among cyberterrorists is likely if they 
identify a common enemy or group of enemies. The same applies to law enforcement; 
history has shows that some federal agencies do not get along. Yet, when they become 
conscious that they have common enemies, they will join forces and fight them.   
Implications of the Study 
The implications of this study are considerable. A first implication is that, now, 
readers have a better understanding of the meaning and impact of cyberterrorism. Based 
on the analysis of all the four research questions and the findings in this study, we can 
conclude that cyberterrorists challenge principles and laws that are at the heart of 
American concepts of liberty, private space, personal rights, and possession. The face of 
terrorism is evolving. While the motives remain the same, we are increasingly 
confronting new and unknown weapons. The intelligence systems, counter-attacks, and 
security procedures that were once created to protect individuals, systems, and countries, 
are powerless against this postmodern, devastating weapon. Cyberterrorism is 
postmodern terrorism because it is disorderly. Cyberterrorists use grand strategies 
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envisaging disorganization of the respective enemy. Against opponents who fight in a 
postmodern fashion, conventional strategies lead nowhere. The motives for 
cyberterrorists are that our lives depend immensely on technology. The danger of 
cyberterrorism is that it has been inadequately considered by many people and leads 
insufficiently to our shared anxieties.  
A second implication of this study is that it is the first to explore – thoroughly, 
rigorously, and methodologically – the fight between cyberterrorists and law enforcement 
agents (and cyber forensics experts). One of the supreme goals is to provide a new 
approach as what law enforcement agents can do to counter cyberterrorism. The fight 
between cyberterrorists and their enemies seems to be offensive on the cyberterrorist side 
and preemptive on the law enforcement side. Yet, what will give law enforcement the 
asymmetric advantage? One answer to such question, for instance, is the “know thy 
enemy” concept, that is, knowledge superiority. Based on this study, we can say that Sun 
Tzu was right. Part of what knowledge superiority encompasses is not only being 
acculturated in the cyberterrorists’ world, but also being “bilingual” in their “language.” 
We saw earlier that cyberterrorists’ lingo is leet speak. As such, it is not only important to 
examine and understand their language and dialects (as well as their mode of 
communication); it is also essential for cyber forensics experts and law enforcement 
officials to interpret messages such as, “The big event is coming soon” or “The blade will 
hit again.” Recall that cyberterrorists are emotional communicators. So, it is important to 
be in their shoes.  
No matter what, this study has revealed that all the measures taken by various 
local, federal, and even international agencies indicate an unprecedented commitment 
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from the anti-cyberterrorism community to galvanize a united front against postmodern 
reapers of terror. The fight against cyberterrorism is well underway. Participants have 
emphasized the importance for various agencies to cooperate and share intelligence in 
ways they have never had before. As such, social networks are necessary. If agencies do 
not create these networks, who knows what can happen tomorrow if a massive-scale 
cyberterrorist attack goes through? If social networks of law enforcement agents and 
cyber forensics experts fail to protect their citizens where the virtual and physical realms 
converge, then all that will ensue is terror – like one participant expressed it, terror “in 
ones and zeros.” Therefore, the main implication of this dissertation is that this study 
concerns everybody who lives in a country where infrastructures and networks rely 
heavily on computers and the Internet. Many quotes from the participants have revealed 
that the full-blown power of cyberterrorism – whose goal is to wreak greatest havoc 
around the world – is a possibility that should concern us. We are interconnected. This 
means that we are vulnerable. Malicious hackers can use it against us. In this respect, the 
future of terror may come from anybody and from any part of the world. 
A third important implication is theoretical and broadens the horizons of research 
prospects for social network theorists. This study has shown that social network theory 
can overcome the limitation of both individual-based and structural-based theories. 
Indeed, social network theory appreciates the interconnections that influence an 
individual’s actions because this individual is part of a social network, whether it is a 
social network of cyberterrorists or law enforcement agents. Decisions made in a social 
network do not take place in a vacuum, even in cyberspace. Rather, decisions are made 
within a context (Musalia, 2005). Thus, as Lin (2001) would argue, the resources 
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embedded in social networks, especially through the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 
1973), orchestrate both the flow of information and influence on the actors who are 
linked to those networks. This study has also demonstrated that the social networks of 
both cyberterrorists and law enforcement agents are very similar; for instance, hubs are as 
crucial to the interconnectedness of cyberterrorist networks as they are for networks of 
law enforcement agents (and cyber forensics experts). Yet, their networks also differ on 
several aspects. For example, some networks of law enforcement agents have some type 
of hierarchical structure, especially when it comes to making decisions related to a 
particular case of cyberterrorism. No matter what, it would not be surprising if the 
Internet, a communication medium with so much power to unite people worldwide, 
regressed to its origins in the Cold War and became an international battlefield.  
A fourth implication is also theoretical and concerns game theorists. This study 
has brought to light that, despite the fact that law enforcement agents have come to 
realize that they must possess and ultimately master sophisticated computer technology in 
order to understand cyberterrorist networks, they should not believe that their fight 
against cyberterrorists will be fought on their terms. Rather, as participants have 
described it, the game of cyberterrorism is not fought by the law enforcement agents’ 
rules; the game is evolving and law enforcement agents have to learn from their enemies’ 
weapons and strategies. Law enforcement agents must learn new rules as they fight their 
opponents; they must create new technologies to protect our systems; and they must learn 
how to play with new, postmodern players. These findings are very consistent with the 
contention made by MacNulty (1999) that law enforcement agents must not assume that 
they automatically understand their enemy’s logic or motivations. For this reason, game 
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theory was applied to this study on cyberterrorism. In part, it emphasized the role of 
postmodern actors and their evolutionary strategies. As a qualitative tool for the 
researcher, the strength of game theory is the methodology it offers for structuring and 
analyzing issues related to strategic moves in cyberspace. This game-theoric approach 
will, hopefully, enable scholars to further explore these phenomena in a rigorous and 
consistent manner. 
A fifth implication of this study is that it is the first to intersect social network 
theory and game theory. Game theory can overlap with social network theory because the 
Internet is a wide-scale network that cannot be managed by one central hub, but by 
various nodes or hubs that interact with each other and that use all kinds of strategies. 
Some of these nodes or hubs are cyberterrorists themselves and they are also part of the 
game. So, game theory provides a sound basis for analyzing social networks. As we have 
seen, the cooperation of one node in the network can contribute to the success or failure 
of the operations of that social network. Hence, social network theory and game theory 
can be intersected. For instance, the operation of a social network can be based on the 
unconscious cooperation of a private home PC user who is used as a link (man-in-the-
middle) between two law enforcement agents. The culprit behind all this is, of course, 
another node: the cyberterrorist. Law enforcement agents are not aware of the fact that 
they are being tricked by the cyberterrorist. All this boils down to saying that there is a 
complex game going on in the network. Likewise, game theory can be intersected with 
social network theory when there is a situation where opponents collaborate without 
having any intent to establish trust with those players. There is a game that is being 
played here. 
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Limitations of the Study 
My work represents an original foray into the world of cyberterrorist networks 
and the networks of their opponents, a largely uncharted field. Given the exploratory 
nature of this extensive study, there are some limitations that should be discussed. The 
first limitation is that the researcher has never been like any of the participants in this 
study. In other words, the researcher has never been a cyber forensics expert or a law 
enforcement agent. Had the researcher had experience in a network of law enforcement 
officials and cyber forensics experts, the conclusions of the study might have been 
different. By the same token, the accounts told about networks of cyberterrorists are told 
from a law enforcement and cyber forensics perspective, not a cyberterrorist point of 
view. Had the participants been cyberterrorists themselves, the results of this study might 
have been different as well.  
A second limitation pertains to the method used in this study: face-to-face 
interviewing. The twenty-seven interviews might not have extracted typical accounts of 
what cyberterrorism is and how to fight it. Mishler (1995) observes that “the teller of the 
tale is also engaged in a retelling. The version we hear or read is shaped both by the 
context of its telling and the history of earlier retellings” (p. 118). In other words, it is 
possible that participants alter their accounts for unknown reasons. There is also the risk 
of distorted interpretations being made by the researcher. Of equal relevance is that the 
number of participants (n=27) is, at this point in the research, insufficient to fully 
examine the nature of this study.  
A third limitation pertains to the transitive trust model mentioned in the analysis 
of research question two (RQ2). As such, in cyberspace, the transitive trust model can be 
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dangerous. Risks including conspiracy and wrong recommendations can be serious 
threats for those involved in the social network. The notion of “A trusts B; B trusts C; 
therefore, A can trust that C will be a reliable member of the social network” is too 
simplistic for network in cyberspace. These connectivity relationships are oftentimes not 
transitive in real-life situations. In real life, it is regularly the case that “A trusts B; B 
trusts C; yet, it does not imply that A trusts C.” One of the real problems with the 





 This is the last chapter of this dissertation. Future directions are important because 
they can give scholars valuable suggestions based on the conclusions of this study. This 
chapter is divided into four subsections. It gives future directions from (1) an 
organizational communication perspective, (2) an intercultural communication 
perspective, (3) an international communication perspective, and (4) a law enforcement 
perspective. 
An Organizational Communication Perspective 
This study has thoroughly described what social networks of cyberterrorists are 
and how their opponents create social networks themselves in order to fight those 
networks. It might be interesting for organizational communication scholars to further 
explore the structures of social networks that can present more than one design. As such, 
since the postmodern nature of cyberspace is so ambiguous, could a network be a line (or 
chain) network and an all-channel network at the same time? It would also prove useful 
to further examine to what degree a network can blend a multitude of webs of 
relationships. In order to cope with cyberterrorism from a social network perspective, 
scholars must first learn what kinds of networks cyberterrorists are involved in and draw 
upon the best methods for analysis. Besides, how deep are the communication patterns 
among cyberterrorists in their networks? The same issue could be analyzed in networks 
of law enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts. Given this, a new comparative 
study between the two opposing networks is worthwhile. Cyberterrorists know they had 
better conceal their interrelationships, let alone their presence of their networks 
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(Dunnigan, 2003). Therefore, it might be helpful for organizational communication 
scholars to investigate whether or not cyberterrorists create social networks in order to 
create diversions or to hide their real intentions. The literature says that it takes a while 
for law enforcement agents to dismantle, let alone to identify a network in an efficient 
way (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Do cyberterrorists intentionally send confusing or 
deceptive information through their networks in order to strike targets on their own?  
More importantly, technology is only one way law enforcement can look at 
cyberterrorism in order to cripple cyberterrorist networks. There are multiple factors to 
take into consideration, like the “social policy” of the network and other soft dynamics. 
As such, an area of future research is to investigate the ways in which cyberterrorists 
handle and control their social networks as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the 
communication paradigms that are possible when they use the Internet. In a similar 
fashion, the significance of social network theory is partially contingent upon the precise 
connection between nodes in a social network. Therefore, it might be useful for 
organizational communication scholars to investigate how small changes in those 
connections may produce large changes in the properties of social networks of 
cyberterrorists. It is clear, however, that, unless the researcher infiltrates their networks, 
becomes a member of their communities, and “thinks” like them, any study of 
cyberterrorist networks will miss some data about how many nodes there are in those 
networks, how deep the communication patterns are, and so on. In other words, had the 
participants been cyberterrorists themselves, the results of this study might have been 
different. 
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For this reason, it might prove useful if future researchers take an emic approach 
whereby the information that the researchers gather is a direct account of cyberterrorism 
by cyberterrorists themselves, that is, a description of their behavior and actions in terms 
that are meaningful to them. In this case, the researchers would not be the outsiders, but 
the insiders. Hence, the analysis of the data would reflect the viewpoint of the native 
informants. At the same time, it would also be very innovative and ground-breaking. 
An Intercultural Communication Perspective 
A second area for future research is in intercultural communication. 
Understanding the culture of cyberterrorist networks should be at the forefront of 
counter-cyberterrorism concerns, whether law enforcement agencies and cyber forensics 
experts are dealing with small networks or massive-scale networks. The cyberterrorists’ 
culture may consider disruptions of computer networks and denial-of-service attacks as 
acceptable actions, but the targeted victims usually look at these matters differently. So 
do law enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts (MacNulty, 1999). The 
disagreement on what is acceptable on the Internet and what is not can result in long-
lasting intercultural miscommunication. Therefore, further research on improving 
intercultural communication in that respect should be conducted. We know that, offline, 
efforts at intercultural dialogue are increasing worldwide (Conhaim, 2005). Yet, does 
intercultural dialogue ever exist in the fight between cyberterrorists and their opponents 
online? If so, how does it occur? These are vital questions that can only be answered 
through profound digging into the realm of cyber warfare. If we do not understand the 
culture of cyberterrorists, then our ability to gather information quickly as well as our 
ability to make decisions and carry them out much faster than cyberterrorists becomes 
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even more critical. For these reasons, it is important that we get inside the cyberterrorists’ 
decision loop. 
In line with these contentions, is it easier to share an enemy than a friend? In 
cyberspace, does the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” phenomenon hold water because 
it is easier to share an enemy than a friend? The answers to these questions would help us 
understand the nature of the cyberterrorists’ culture and the possible motives that may 
cause them to launch their attacks. This implies that linguistic and interactive skills 
become as important as technical skills. It is also essential to understand how law 
enforcement agents may deal with them appropriately as both potential allies and 
enemies. They should know the “Other” and what they value. Cyberterrorist values, like 
any other value, are largely shaped by cultural norms (Johari, 2005). Ideologies do not 
die easily. If all computers in a foreign country are taken down, it will not erase the 
ideology. Cyberterrorists will find a different way of communicating their acts of terror. 
Therefore, it would be useful to look at the fundamental root causes that lead 
cyberterrorists to engage in malicious activities against our information systems and 
networks. By the same token, law enforcement should strive to understand more about 
their own culture so that they can recognize their own strengths and weaknesses as well. 
Likewise, it might prove interesting to further explore how culture affects the way 
cyberterrorists use the computer and the interfaces they might choose. For some Web 
users, the Internet is another facet of new media that highlights their inability to “speak” 
at all. As such, it would be important to know whether or not cyberterrorists commit 
cyber attacks because of their inabilities to “speak.” It is evident that cyberterrorists 
understand technology; their culture leads them to look for different applications and 
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utilizations of what is available in cyberspace (Slay et al., 2003). Therefore, more insight 
may be gained by finding out if collectivistic cyberterrorists use different cyber weapons 
than individualistic cyberterrorists do. And is there a difference between the way 
collectivistic cyberterrorists encounter – or conflict with – law enforcement agents and 
the way individualistic cyberterrorists do? 
Of equal importance is to study cultural customs such as taboos within the 
cyberterrorist’s culture, and how they might affect their culture’s decision-making or 
interacting processes. Murdock (1965) already studied taboos from an anthropological 
perspective, but no research has ever been conducted on cyberterrorists’ taboos, or even 
their sacred values. What are the implications of these taboos or values for scholars 
interested in intercultural communication? In what ways can intercultural communication 
theory help us understand these taboos or values? How is the conventional study of 
intercultural communication, bound as it is to the face-to-face or interpersonal context, 
relevant to the new issues arising with cyberterrorism? 
It is also necessary to understand new cultural constructions in the emerging 
communicative spaces established by cyberterrorists. Intercultural communication in 
cyberspace is affected by cultures that members of cyberterrorist networks bring to each 
exchange (Kluver, 2004). Scholars should examine the developing processes and tools 
that cyberterrorists bring into play and exploit to negotiate or embody group identity and 
collective construction of meaning in their virtual chat rooms. Regarding the issue of 
online privacy, as the Internet and computer technologies open doors for an increasing 
number of cyberterrorists, one fundamental area of future research is to determine 
whether or not maintaining the advantages of free communication on the Internet should 
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be appropriate. The debate is complicated by the intercultural dimensions of 
communication today; what is regarded as freedom in some cultures is perceived as sinful 
or profligate in other cultures (Triandis, 1995). If the law enforcement’s goal is to chase 
cyberterrorists, should it be to the detriment of online freedom? Our big intercultural 
challenge, and inherently the global challenge, is to determine how free we want 
ourselves to be.  
Similarly, our vulnerabilities need to be identified, whether they are cultural, 
psychological, or social, and work to minimize them. The Internet is certainly bringing a 
major part of life to a few mouse clicks away, but to what extent do all those whom it 
brings together really understand one another? What if opponents do not understand one 
another? Do law enforcement agents understand the culture of whom they are dealing 
with? Do cyberterrorists really belong to another culture or do they share the same culture 
as their opponents? Truly, research on intercultural communication in these areas is no 
longer an option, but a necessity. Intercultural communication as an approach for 
understanding cyberterrorism must be part of a coherent scholarly effort. We must not 
assume that we automatically know our enemy’s logic or motivation. 
Finally, cyberterrorism exemplifies the notion that, at the cultural level, the 
Information Age has made – in part – a negative impact on worldwide culture. For 
example, American movies such as Firewall (starring Harrison Ford), that glorify 
cyberterrorism, are distributed in other parts of the world and do not necessarily convey a 
positive image of the United States (Matusitz, 2005b). As the old saying goes, “your 
cultural image is your country’s image.” Hence, an important task of our representatives 
– whether they are tourists or diplomats – is to appease the rising bitterness from allies 
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and others based on the cyberterrorist culture exported by the United States to their nation 
states. Changes need to be brought in that respect. For instance, more movies and 
cartoons should be released that stress the counter-cyberterrorism culture more and give 
accounts for how the fight against the dark side of the Information Age can be won 
(Matusitz, 2005b). This cultural package could be used by intercultural communication 
scholars as a stepping stone to create conceptual models that rationalize how the future of 
the digital age may turn out to be positive if the war on cyberterrorism is fought the 
proper way. 
An International Communication Perspective 
Since this study deals with conflict in cyberspace and the Information Age, it has 
multiple effects on international communication as well. Therefore, providing directions 
for future research seems more than appropriate in this context. Let us start by defining 
what international communication is. International communication is the study of global 
information, its development, and its pervasion in the political and international realms 
(Thussu, 2001). Through international communication, nations like the United States are 
better positioned than other countries to interact with other cultures through sophisticated 
and less sophisticated means. The less sophisticated means are common means such as 
talk. The sophisticated means are means such as communication technologies. Yet, 
because the Information Age has revolutionized how the United States communicates 
with other countries and because this colossal openness of interchange is available to 
everyone, cyberterrorists – as this study has revealed – have taken the chance of finding 
soft spots in those communication technologies and launch various cyber attacks. This is 
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bad news not only for the United States but also for the international arena (Matusitz, 
2005b).  
One of the top issues in international communication is the vulnerability to these 
new global security threats (Thussu, 2001). Our enemies are not only nation states, but 
also increasingly powerful and determined non-state actors who rely on information 
technologies and other technological innovations to strike their targets. A postmodern 
type of terrorist has emerged: the cyberterrorist. The globalization of information through 
computers and networks is partially directing the world into the dark side of the 
Information Age (Matusitz, 2005b). Not only are our enemies increasingly non-state 
actors, but they are also cyberterrorists who try to cripple entire infrastructures a few 
mouse clicks away. This is a chief international issue because cyberterrorism exemplifies 
our vulnerability to new security threats. Therefore, the changing nature of global 
relations and how we improve them are basic factors defining international 
communication (Harvey & Griffith, 1999). Now the question remains as to how 
international communication scholars can better explain the phenomenon of 
cyberterrorism. What future research can be done for improving international 
communication in that respect? 
It is a maxim that international communication always improves through an 
understanding of how national interests can be developed in the best way possible 
(Bloom, 1993). Some questions that scholars might explore are the following: “How can 
nations determine how serious the threat of cyberterrorism is to global communication?” 
“Can global communication affect national interests because of cyberterrorism?” “Are 
there any communication means to fight cyberterrorism, or does the fight against cyber 
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warriors have to be fought mainly through firewalls (and the like) or collaboration with 
cyberterrorists who got caught?” “Will a global communication network, comprising of 
not only law enforcement agents and cyber forensics experts, but also diplomats and 
officials, help reduce cyberterrorist threats?” “And can we improve the understanding of 
cyberterrorism through international education?” To be able to answer these questions, 
which are just a sample of all the questions that are necessary to ask in order to improve 
the situation, it will take years of research for international communication scholars. 
Therefore, it is important to look at those issues now.  
In line with these contentions, given the powerful trends of the globalization of 
information and based on the main tenets of international relations and American foreign 
policy, it might prove interesting to further investigate how international policy-making is 
increasingly involved in global policy processes (Matusitz, 2005b). As such, it would be 
useful to answer the following questions: “In this fight against cyberterrorism, what are 
the outcomes for international policy-making processes?” and “As the awareness of 
cyberterrorism is different in some countries than in others, how can advanced countries 
like the United States persuade foreign audiences that cyberterrorism is a matter of a high 
international priority?” 
A Law Enforcement Perspective 
A final area of research is that of law enforcement. As such, scholars of relevant 
disciplines should explore how law enforcement agents can implement security and 
cyberterrorism prevention measures that are concomitant with technology and computer-
based development. Law enforcement agents might have progressively learned to better 
counter cyber attacks with new technologies, but the ability of the local law enforcement 
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community to fight cyberterrorism would be much improved if they could figure out how 
to communicate and exchange information in a seamless fashion. As such, it is the 
responsibility of scholars to develop theoretical models that rationalize, or at least 
facilitate, this communication and exchange of data in the law enforcement community. 
Besides, it might prove useful if scholars could offer a conceptual knowledge framework 
of the systems and structures that enable cyberterrorists to commit their crimes in the 
digital age. After all, did cyberterrorism emerge simultaneously with computer 
technology or not? 
Another suggestion for future research is to examine how the United States and 
other countries that use computer technologies a great deal can develop treaties that 
impose the same, unique Internet regulations on their citizens. This would make the task 
of counter-cyberterrorism agents much easier. Constraining Web users to subscribe to a 
state-run Internet service provider would remove objectionable web sites (Denning, 
2001). The major benefit of having strict Internet rules is that it would facilitate the 
identification of where digital attacks originate. By the same token, because existing laws 
on Internet regulations are unique in each country, it would be important to investigate 
how legal liability and jurisdiction become serious issues for the judicial and legal 
systems. The major task of law enforcement agencies is to solve issues of jurisdiction that 
are ambiguous and those matters of concern that fall across multinational borders. 
Truly, no matter what area of research scholars investigate in order to understand 
the complex phenomenon of cyberterrorism, there needs to be “continued progress 
towards a just and humane world order” (Swazo, 2004, p. 15). The time to act is now. 
Hopefully, the lengthy review of the literature, the analysis of the accounts told by the 
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participants, the conclusions of this study, its implications, and its suggestions for future 
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